nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing/gossip_validation.nim

# beacon_chain
# Copyright (c) 2019-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
#   * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
#   * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.

{.push raises: [].}

import
  # Status
  chronicles, chronos, metrics,
  results,
  # Internals
  ../spec/[
    beaconstate, state_transition_block, forks, helpers, network, signatures],
  ../consensus_object_pools/[
    attestation_pool, blockchain_dag, blob_quarantine, block_quarantine,
    spec_cache, light_client_pool, sync_committee_msg_pool,
    validator_change_pool],
  ".."/[beacon_clock],
  ./batch_validation

from libp2p/protocols/pubsub/errors import ValidationResult

export results, ValidationResult

logScope:
  topics = "gossip_checks"

declareCounter beacon_attestations_dropped_queue_full,
  "Number of attestations dropped because queue is full"

declareCounter beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full,
  "Number of aggregates dropped because queue is full"

declareCounter beacon_sync_messages_dropped_queue_full,
  "Number of sync committee messages dropped because queue is full"

declareCounter beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full,
  "Number of sync committee contributions dropped because queue is full"

# This result is a little messy in that it returns Result.ok for
# ValidationResult.Accept and an err for the others - this helps transport
# an error message to callers but could arguably be done in an cleaner way.
type
  ValidationError* = (ValidationResult, cstring)

template errIgnore*(msg: cstring): untyped =
  err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring msg))
template errReject*(msg: cstring): untyped =
  err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring msg))

# Internal checks
# ----------------------------------------------------------------

func check_attestation_block(
    pool: AttestationPool, attestationSlot: Slot, blck: BlockRef):
    Result[void, ValidationError] =
  # The voted-for block must be a descendant of the finalized block, thus it
  # must at least  as new than the finalized checkpoint - in theory it could be
  # equal, but then we're voting for an already-finalized block which is pretty
  # useless - other blocks that are not rooted in the finalized chain will be
  # pruned by the chain dag, and thus we can no longer get a BlockRef for them
  if not (blck.slot > pool.dag.finalizedHead.slot):
    return errIgnore("Voting for already-finalized block")

  # The attestation shouldn't be voting for a block that didn't exist at the
  # time - not in spec, but hard to reason about
  if not (attestationSlot >= blck.slot):
    return errIgnore("Voting for block that didn't exist at the time")

  # We'll also cap it at 4 epochs which is somewhat arbitrary, but puts an
  # upper bound on the processing done to validate the attestation
  # TODO revisit with less arbitrary approach
  if not ((attestationSlot - blck.slot) <= uint64(4 * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH)):
    return errIgnore("Voting for very old block")

  ok()

func check_propagation_slot_range(
    consensusFork: ConsensusFork, msgSlot: Slot, wallTime: BeaconTime):
    Result[Slot, ValidationError] =
  let futureSlot = (wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()

  if not futureSlot.afterGenesis or msgSlot > futureSlot.slot:
    return errIgnore("Attestation slot in the future")

  let pastSlot = (wallTime - MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()

  if not pastSlot.afterGenesis:
    return ok(msgSlot)

  if consensusFork < ConsensusFork.Deneb:
    # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#configuration
    # The spec value of ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE is 32, but it can
    # retransmit attestations on the cusp of being out of spec, and which by
    # the time they reach their destination might be out of spec.
    const TIME_IN_FLIGHT_BUFFER = 4
    static: doAssert ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE > TIME_IN_FLIGHT_BUFFER
    if msgSlot + (ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE - TIME_IN_FLIGHT_BUFFER) <
        pastSlot.slot:
      return errIgnore("Attestation slot in the past")
  else:
    # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
    # "[IGNORE] the epoch of attestation.data.slot is either the current or
    # previous epoch (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e.
    # compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot) in
    # (get_previous_epoch(state), get_current_epoch(state))"
    #
    # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
    # "[IGNORE] the epoch of aggregate.data.slot is either the current or
    # previous epoch (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e.
    # compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot) in
    # (get_previous_epoch(state), get_current_epoch(state))"
    if msgSlot.epoch < pastSlot.slot.epoch.get_previous_epoch:
      return errIgnore("Attestation slot in the past")

  ok(msgSlot)

func check_slot_exact(msgSlot: Slot, wallTime: BeaconTime):
    Result[Slot, ValidationError] =
  let futureSlot = (wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()

  if not futureSlot.afterGenesis or msgSlot > futureSlot.slot:
    return errIgnore("Sync committee slot in the future")

  let pastSlot = (wallTime - MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()

  if pastSlot.afterGenesis and msgSlot < pastSlot.slot:
    return errIgnore("Sync committee slot in the past")

  ok(msgSlot)

func check_beacon_and_target_block(
    pool: var AttestationPool, data: AttestationData):
    Result[BlockSlot, ValidationError] =
  # The block being voted for (data.beacon_block_root) passes validation - by
  # extension, the target block must at that point also pass validation.
  # The target block is returned.
  # We rely on the chain DAG to have been validated, so check for the existence
  # of the block in the pool.
  let blck = pool.dag.getBlockRef(data.beacon_block_root).valueOr:
    pool.quarantine[].addMissing(data.beacon_block_root)
    return errIgnore("Attestation block unknown")

  # Not in spec - check that rewinding to the state is sane
  ? check_attestation_block(pool, data.slot, blck)

  # [REJECT] The attestation's target block is an ancestor of the block named
  # in the LMD vote -- i.e.
  # get_checkpoint_block(store, attestation.data.beacon_block_root,
  # attestation.data.target.epoch) == attestation.data.target.root
  # the sanity of target.epoch has been checked by check_attestation_slot_target
  let target = blck.atCheckpoint(data.target).valueOr:
    return errReject("Attestation target is not ancestor of LMD vote block")

  ok(target)

func check_aggregation_count(
    attestation: Attestation, singular: bool): Result[void, ValidationError] =
  let ones = attestation.aggregation_bits.countOnes()
  if singular and ones != 1:
    return errReject("Attestation must have a single attestation bit set")
  elif not singular and ones < 1:
    return errReject("Attestation must have at least one attestation bit set")

  ok()

func check_attestation_subnet(
    shufflingRef: ShufflingRef, slot: Slot, committee_index: CommitteeIndex,
    subnet_id: SubnetId): Result[void, ValidationError] =
  let
    expectedSubnet = compute_subnet_for_attestation(
      get_committee_count_per_slot(shufflingRef), slot, committee_index)

  if expectedSubnet != subnet_id:
    return errReject("Attestation not on the correct subnet")

  ok()

func check_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(
    blob_sidecar: deneb.BlobSidecar): Result[void, ValidationError] =
  let res = blob_sidecar.verify_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof()
  if res.isErr:
    return errReject(res.error)

  ok()

# Gossip Validation
# ----------------------------------------------------------------

# Generally, the following rules apply for gossip validation:
#
# [REJECT]
# This doesn't depend on the wall clock or the exact state of the DAG; it's
# an internal consistency/correctness check only, and effectively never has
# false positives. These don't, for example, arise from timeouts.
#
# [IGNORE]
# This may be intermittent, depend on timing or the current state of the DAG.

template checkedReject(
    msg: cstring, strictVerification: bool): untyped =
  if strictVerification:
    raiseAssert $msg
  errReject(msg)

template checkedReject(
    error: ValidationError, strictVerification: bool): untyped =
  doAssert error[0] == ValidationResult.Reject
  if strictVerification:
    raiseAssert $error[1]
  err(error)

template checkedResult*(
    error: ValidationError, strictVerification: bool): untyped =
  if error[0] == ValidationResult.Reject and strictVerification:
    raiseAssert $error[1]
  err(error)

# ChainDAGRef
template checkedReject(
    dag: ChainDAGRef, msg: cstring): untyped =
  checkedReject(msg, strictVerification in dag.updateFlags)

template checkedReject(
    dag: ChainDAGRef, error: ValidationError): untyped =
  checkedReject(error, strictVerification in dag.updateFlags)

template checkedResult(
    dag: ChainDAGRef, error: ValidationError): untyped =
  checkedResult(error, strictVerification in dag.updateFlags)

# AttestationPool
template checkedReject(
    pool: ref AttestationPool, msg: cstring): untyped =
  pool[].dag.checkedReject(msg)

template checkedReject(
    pool: ref AttestationPool, error: ValidationError): untyped =
  pool[].dag.checkedReject(error)

template checkedResult(
    pool: ref AttestationPool, error: ValidationError): untyped =
  pool[].dag.checkedResult(error)

# ValidatorChangePool
template checkedReject(
    pool: ValidatorChangePool, msg: cstring): untyped =
  pool.dag.checkedReject(msg)

template checkedReject(
    pool: ValidatorChangePool, error: ValidationError): untyped =
  pool.dag.checkedReject(error)

template checkedResult(
    pool: ValidatorChangePool, error: ValidationError): untyped =
  pool.dag.checkedResult(error)

template validateBeaconBlockBellatrix(
    signed_beacon_block: phase0.SignedBeaconBlock | altair.SignedBeaconBlock,
    parent: BlockRef): untyped =
  discard

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/bellatrix/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
template validateBeaconBlockBellatrix(
    signed_beacon_block:
      bellatrix.SignedBeaconBlock |
      capella.SignedBeaconBlock |
      deneb.SignedBeaconBlock |
      electra.SignedBeaconBlock,
    parent: BlockRef): untyped =
  # If the execution is enabled for the block -- i.e.
  # is_execution_enabled(state, block.body) then validate the following:
  #
  # `is_execution_enabled(state, block.body)` is
  # `is_merge_transition_block(state, block.body) or is_merge_transition_complete(state)` is
  # `(not is_merge_transition_complete(state) and block.body.execution_payload != ExecutionPayload()) or is_merge_transition_complete(state)` is
  # `is_merge_transition_complete(state) or block.body.execution_payload != ExecutionPayload()` is
  # `is_merge_transition_complete(state) or is_execution_block(block)`
  #
  # `is_merge_transition_complete(state)` tests for
  # `state.latest_execution_payload_header != ExecutionPayloadHeader()`, while
  # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/bellatrix/beacon-chain.md#block-processing
  # shows that `state.latest_execution_payload_header` being default or not is
  # exactly equivalent to whether that block's execution payload is default or
  # not, so test cached block information rather than reconstructing a state.
  let isExecutionEnabled =
    if signed_beacon_block.message.is_execution_block:
      true
    else:
      # If we don't know whether the parent block had execution enabled,
      # assume it didn't. This way, we don't reject here if the timestamp
      # is invalid, and let state transition check the timestamp.
      # This is an edge case, and may be hit in a pathological scenario with
      # checkpoint sync, because the checkpoint block may be unavailable
      # and it could already be the parent of the new block before backfill.
      not dag.loadExecutionBlockHash(parent).get(ZERO_HASH).isZero
  if isExecutionEnabled:
    # [REJECT] The block's execution payload timestamp is correct with respect
    # to the slot -- i.e. execution_payload.timestamp ==
    # compute_timestamp_at_slot(state, block.slot).
    let timestampAtSlot =
      withState(dag.headState):
        compute_timestamp_at_slot(
          forkyState.data, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)
    if not (signed_beacon_block.message.body.execution_payload.timestamp ==
        timestampAtSlot):
      quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
      return dag.checkedReject(
        "BeaconBlock: mismatched execution payload timestamp")

  # The condition:
  # [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes all
  # validation (excluding execution node verification of the
  # `block.body.execution_payload`).
  # cannot occur here, because Nimbus's optimistic sync waits for either
  # `ACCEPTED` or `SYNCING` from the EL to get this far.

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.4/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#blob_sidecar_subnet_id
proc validateBlobSidecar*(
    dag: ChainDAGRef, quarantine: ref Quarantine,
    blobQuarantine: ref BlobQuarantine, blob_sidecar: BlobSidecar,
    wallTime: BeaconTime, subnet_id: BlobId): Result[void, ValidationError] =
  # Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
  # perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
  # an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
  # different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.
  template block_header: untyped = blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.message

  # [REJECT] The sidecar's index is consistent with `MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK`
  # -- i.e. `blob_sidecar.index < MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK`
  if not (blob_sidecar.index < MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK):
    return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: index inconsistent")

  # [REJECT] The sidecar is for the correct subnet -- i.e.
  # `compute_subnet_for_blob_sidecar(blob_sidecar.index) == subnet_id`.
  if not (compute_subnet_for_blob_sidecar(blob_sidecar.index) == subnet_id):
    return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: subnet incorrect")

  # [IGNORE] The sidecar is not from a future slot (with a
  # `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY` allowance) -- i.e. validate that
  # `block_header.slot <= current_slot` (a client MAY queue future sidecars
  # for processing at the appropriate slot).
  if not (block_header.slot <=
      (wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).slotOrZero):
    return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: slot too high")

  # [IGNORE] The sidecar is from a slot greater than the latest
  # finalized slot -- i.e. validate that `block_header.slot >
  # compute_start_slot_at_epoch(state.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)`
  if not (block_header.slot > dag.finalizedHead.slot):
    return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: slot already finalized")

  # [IGNORE] The sidecar is the first sidecar for the tuple
  # (block_header.slot, block_header.proposer_index, blob_sidecar.index)
  # with valid header signature, sidecar inclusion proof, and kzg proof.
  let block_root = hash_tree_root(block_header)
  if dag.getBlockRef(block_root).isSome():
    return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: already have block")
  if blobQuarantine[].hasBlob(
      block_header.slot, block_header.proposer_index, blob_sidecar.index):
    return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: already have valid blob from same proposer")

  # [REJECT] The sidecar's inclusion proof is valid as verified by
  # `verify_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(blob_sidecar)`.
  block:
    let v = check_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(blob_sidecar)
    if v.isErr:
      return dag.checkedReject(v.error)

  # [IGNORE] The sidecar's block's parent (defined by
  # `block_header.parent_root`) has been seen (via both gossip and
  # non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue sidecars for processing
  # once the parent block is retrieved).
  #
  # [REJECT] The sidecar's block's parent (defined by
  # `block_header.parent_root`) passes validation.
  let parent = dag.getBlockRef(block_header.parent_root).valueOr:
    if block_header.parent_root in quarantine[].unviable:
      quarantine[].addUnviable(block_root)
      return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: parent not validated")
    else:
      quarantine[].addMissing(block_header.parent_root)
      return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: parent not found")

  # [REJECT] The sidecar is from a higher slot than the sidecar's
  # block's parent (defined by `block_header.parent_root`).
  if not (block_header.slot > parent.bid.slot):
    return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: slot lower than parents'")

  # [REJECT] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the sidecar's
  # block -- i.e. `get_checkpoint_block(store, block_header.parent_root,
  # store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root`.
  let
    finalized_checkpoint = getStateField(dag.headState, finalized_checkpoint)
    ancestor = get_ancestor(parent, finalized_checkpoint.epoch.start_slot)

  if ancestor.isNil:
    # This shouldn't happen: we should always be able to trace the parent back
    # to the finalized checkpoint (else it wouldn't be in the DAG)
    return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: Can't find ancestor")

  if not (
      finalized_checkpoint.root == ancestor.root or
      finalized_checkpoint.root.isZero):
    quarantine[].addUnviable(block_root)
    return dag.checkedReject(
      "BlobSidecar: Finalized checkpoint not an ancestor")

  # [REJECT] The sidecar is proposed by the expected `proposer_index`
  # for the block's slot in the context of the current shuffling
  # (defined by `block_header.parent_root`/`block_header.slot`).
  # If the proposer_index cannot immediately be verified against the expected
  # shuffling, the sidecar MAY be queued for later processing while proposers
  # for the block's branch are calculated -- in such a case do not
  # REJECT, instead IGNORE this message.
  let proposer = getProposer(dag, parent, block_header.slot).valueOr:
    warn "cannot compute proposer for blob"
    return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: Cannot compute proposer") # internal issue

  if uint64(proposer) != block_header.proposer_index:
    return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: Unexpected proposer")

  # [REJECT] The proposer signature of `blob_sidecar.signed_block_header`,
  # is valid with respect to the `block_header.proposer_index` pubkey.
  if not verify_block_signature(
      dag.forkAtEpoch(block_header.slot.epoch),
      getStateField(dag.headState, genesis_validators_root),
      block_header.slot,
      block_root,
      dag.validatorKey(proposer).get(),
      blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.signature):
    return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: Invalid proposer signature")

  # [REJECT] The sidecar's blob is valid as verified by `verify_blob_kzg_proof(
  # blob_sidecar.blob, blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment, blob_sidecar.kzg_proof)`.
  block:
    let ok = verifyProof(
        blob_sidecar.blob,
        blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment,
        blob_sidecar.kzg_proof).valueOr:
      return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: blob verify failed")
    if not ok:
      return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: blob invalid")

  # Send notification about new blob sidecar via callback
  if not(isNil(blobQuarantine.onBlobSidecarCallback)):
    blobQuarantine.onBlobSidecarCallback(blob_sidecar)

  ok()

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/bellatrix/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
proc validateBeaconBlock*(
    dag: ChainDAGRef, quarantine: ref Quarantine,
    signed_beacon_block: ForkySignedBeaconBlock,
    wallTime: BeaconTime, flags: UpdateFlags): Result[void, ValidationError] =
  # In general, checks are ordered from cheap to expensive. Especially, crypto
  # verification could be quite a bit more expensive than the rest. This is an
  # externally easy-to-invoke function by tossing network packets at the node.

  # [IGNORE] The block is not from a future slot (with a
  # MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. validate that
  # signed_beacon_block.message.slot <= current_slot (a client MAY queue future
  # blocks for processing at the appropriate slot).
  if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot <=
      (wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).slotOrZero):
    return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: slot too high")

  # [IGNORE] The block is from a slot greater than the latest finalized slot --
  # i.e. validate that signed_beacon_block.message.slot >
  # compute_start_slot_at_epoch(state.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)
  if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot > dag.finalizedHead.slot):
    return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: slot already finalized")

  # [IGNORE] The block is the first block with valid signature received for the
  # proposer for the slot, signed_beacon_block.message.slot.
  #
  # While this condition is similar to the proposer slashing condition at
  # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/validator.md#proposer-slashing
  # it's not identical, and this check does not address slashing:
  #
  # (1) The beacon blocks must be conflicting, i.e. different, for the same
  #     slot and proposer. This check also catches identical blocks.
  #
  # (2) By this point in the function, it's not been checked whether they're
  #     signed yet. As in general, expensive checks should be deferred, this
  #     would add complexity not directly relevant this function.
  #
  # (3) As evidenced by point (1), the similarity in the validation condition
  #     and slashing condition, while not coincidental, aren't similar enough
  #     to combine, as one or the other might drift.
  #
  # (4) Furthermore, this function, as much as possible, simply returns a yes
  #     or no answer, without modifying other state for p2p network interface
  #     validation. Complicating this interface, for the sake of sharing only
  #     couple lines of code, wouldn't be worthwhile.
  #
  # TODO might check unresolved/orphaned blocks too, and this might not see all
  # blocks at a given slot (though, in theory, those get checked elsewhere), or
  # adding metrics that count how often these conditions occur.
  if dag.containsForkBlock(signed_beacon_block.root):
    # The gossip algorithm itself already does one round of hashing to find
    # already-seen data, but it is fairly aggressive about forgetting about
    # what it has seen already
    # "[IGNORE] The block is the first block ..."
    return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: already seen")

  let
    slotBlock = getBlockIdAtSlot(dag, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)

  if slotBlock.isSome() and slotBlock.get().isProposed() and
      slotBlock.get().bid.slot == signed_beacon_block.message.slot:
    let curBlock = dag.getForkedBlock(slotBlock.get().bid)
    if curBlock.isOk():
      let data = curBlock.get()
      if getForkedBlockField(data, proposer_index) ==
            signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index and
          data.signature.toRaw() != signed_beacon_block.signature.toRaw():
        return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: already proposed in the same slot")

  # [IGNORE] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root) has been seen
  # (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue blocks for
  # processing once the parent block is retrieved).
  #
  # [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root)
  # passes validation.
  let parent = dag.getBlockRef(signed_beacon_block.message.parent_root).valueOr:
    if signed_beacon_block.message.parent_root in quarantine[].unviable:
      quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)

      # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/bellatrix/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
      # `is_execution_enabled(state, block.body)` check, but unlike in
      # validateBeaconBlockBellatrix() don't have parent BlockRef.
      if signed_beacon_block.message.is_execution_block:
        # Blocks with execution enabled will be permitted to propagate
        # regardless of the validity of the execution payload. This prevents
        # network segregation between optimistic and non-optimistic nodes.
        #
        # If execution_payload verification of block's parent by an execution
        # node is not complete:
        #
        # - [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes
        #   all validation (excluding execution node verification of the
        #   `block.body.execution_payload`).
        #
        # otherwise:
        #
        # - [IGNORE] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes
        #   all validation (including execution node verification of the
        #   `block.body.execution_payload`).

        # Implementation restrictions:
        #
        # - We don't know if the parent state had execution enabled.
        #   If it had, and the block doesn't have it enabled anymore,
        #   we end up in the pre-Merge path below (`else`) and REJECT.
        #   Such a block is clearly invalid, though, without asking the EL.
        #
        # - We know that the parent was marked unviable, but don't know
        #   whether it was marked unviable due to consensus (REJECT) or
        #   execution (IGNORE) verification failure. We err on the IGNORE side.
        return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: ignored, parent from unviable fork")
      else:
        # [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes
        # validation.
        return dag.checkedReject(
          "BeaconBlock: rejected, parent from unviable fork")

    # When the parent is missing, we can't validate the block - we'll queue it
    # in the quarantine for later processing
    if (let r = quarantine[].addOrphan(
        dag.finalizedHead.slot,
        ForkedSignedBeaconBlock.init(signed_beacon_block)); r.isErr):
      debug "validateBeaconBlock: could not add orphan",
       blockRoot = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.root),
       blck = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.message),
       err = r.error()
    else:
      debug "Block quarantined",
        blockRoot = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.root),
        blck = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.message),
        signature = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.signature)
    return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: parent not found")

  # Continues block parent validity checking in optimistic case, where it does
  # appear as a `BlockRef` (and not handled above) but isn't usable for gossip
  # validation.
  validateBeaconBlockBellatrix(signed_beacon_block, parent)

  # [REJECT] The block is from a higher slot than its parent.
  if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot > parent.bid.slot):
    return dag.checkedReject(
      "BeaconBlock: block not from higher slot than its parent")

  # [REJECT] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of block -- i.e.
  # get_ancestor(store, block.parent_root,
  # compute_start_slot_at_epoch(store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)) ==
  # store.finalized_checkpoint.root
  let
    finalized_checkpoint = getStateField(dag.headState, finalized_checkpoint)
    ancestor = get_ancestor(parent, finalized_checkpoint.epoch.start_slot)

  if ancestor.isNil:
    # This shouldn't happen: we should always be able to trace the parent back
    # to the finalized checkpoint (else it wouldn't be in the DAG)
    return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: Can't find ancestor")

  if not (
      finalized_checkpoint.root == ancestor.root or
      finalized_checkpoint.root.isZero):
    quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
    return dag.checkedReject(
      "BeaconBlock: Finalized checkpoint not an ancestor")

  # [REJECT] The block is proposed by the expected proposer_index for the
  # block's slot in the context of the current shuffling (defined by
  # parent_root/slot). If the proposer_index cannot immediately be verified
  # against the expected shuffling, the block MAY be queued for later
  # processing while proposers for the block's branch are calculated -- in such
  # a case do not REJECT, instead IGNORE this message.
  let
    proposer = getProposer(
        dag, parent, signed_beacon_block.message.slot).valueOr:
      warn "cannot compute proposer for block"
      return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: Cannot compute proposer") # internal issue

  if uint64(proposer) != signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index:
    quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
    return dag.checkedReject("BeaconBlock: Unexpected proposer")

  # [REJECT] The proposer signature, signed_beacon_block.signature, is valid
  # with respect to the proposer_index pubkey.
  if not verify_block_signature(
      dag.forkAtEpoch(signed_beacon_block.message.slot.epoch),
      getStateField(dag.headState, genesis_validators_root),
      signed_beacon_block.message.slot,
      signed_beacon_block.root,
      dag.validatorKey(proposer).get(),
      signed_beacon_block.signature):
    quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
    return dag.checkedReject("BeaconBlock: Invalid proposer signature")

  ok()

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
proc validateAttestation*(
    pool: ref AttestationPool,
    batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
    attestation: Attestation,
    wallTime: BeaconTime,
    subnet_id: SubnetId, checkSignature: bool):
    Future[Result[
      tuple[attesting_index: ValidatorIndex, sig: CookedSig],
      ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
  # Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
  # perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
  # an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
  # different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.

  # [REJECT] The attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
  # attestation.data.target.epoch ==
  # compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot)
  let slot = block:
    let v = check_attestation_slot_target(attestation.data)
    if v.isErr():
      return pool.checkedReject(v.error())
    v.get()

  # attestation.data.slot is within the last ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE
  # slots (within a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e.
  # attestation.data.slot + ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot
  # >= attestation.data.slot (a client MAY queue future attestations for
  # processing at the appropriate slot).
  #
  # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
  # modifies this for Deneb and newer forks.
  block:
    let v = check_propagation_slot_range(
      pool.dag.cfg.consensusForkAtEpoch(wallTime.slotOrZero.epoch), slot,
      wallTime)
    if v.isErr():  # [IGNORE]
      return err(v.error())

  # The attestation is unaggregated -- that is, it has exactly one
  # participating validator (len([bit for bit in attestation.aggregation_bits
  # if bit == 0b1]) == 1).
  block:
    let v = check_aggregation_count(attestation, singular = true)
    if v.isErr():  # [REJECT]
      return pool.checkedReject(v.error)

  # The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root) has been seen
  # (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue attestations
  # for processing once block is retrieved).
  # [REJECT] The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root)
  # passes validation.
  # [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
  let target = block:
    let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], attestation.data)
    if v.isErr():  # [IGNORE/REJECT]
      return pool.checkedResult(v.error)
    v.get()

  # The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
  # unviable blocks from the chain dag:
  #
  # [IGNORE] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the block
  # defined by attestation.data.beacon_block_root -- i.e.
  # get_checkpoint_block(store, attestation.data.beacon_block_root,
  # store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root
  let
    shufflingRef =
      pool.dag.getShufflingRef(target.blck, target.slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
        # Target is verified - shouldn't happen
        warn "No shuffling for attestation - report bug",
          attestation = shortLog(attestation), target = shortLog(target)
        return errIgnore("Attestation: no shuffling")

  # [REJECT] The committee index is within the expected range -- i.e.
  # data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(state, data.target.epoch).
  let committee_index = block:
    let idx = shufflingRef.get_committee_index(attestation.data.index)
    if idx.isErr():
      return pool.checkedReject(
        "Attestation: committee index not within expected range")
    idx.get()

  # [REJECT] The attestation is for the correct subnet -- i.e.
  # compute_subnet_for_attestation(committees_per_slot,
  # attestation.data.slot, attestation.data.index) == subnet_id, where
  # committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(state,
  # attestation.data.target.epoch), which may be pre-computed along with the
  # committee information for the signature check.
  block:
    let v = check_attestation_subnet(
      shufflingRef, attestation.data.slot, committee_index, subnet_id)
    if v.isErr():  # [REJECT]
      return pool.checkedReject(v.error)

  # [REJECT] The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size -- i.e.
  # len(attestation.aggregation_bits) == len(get_beacon_committee(state,
  # data.slot, data.index)).
  #
  # This uses the same epochRef as data.target.epoch, because the attestation's
  # epoch matches its target and attestation.data.target.root is an ancestor of
  # attestation.data.beacon_block_root.
  if not attestation.aggregation_bits.compatible_with_shuffling(
      shufflingRef, slot, committee_index):
    return pool.checkedReject(
      "Attestation: number of aggregation bits and committee size mismatch")

  let
    fork = pool.dag.forkAtEpoch(attestation.data.slot.epoch)
    attesting_index = get_attesting_indices_one(
      shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, attestation.aggregation_bits)

  # The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size, which ensures
  # this condition holds.
  doAssert attesting_index.isSome(),
    "We've checked bits length and one count already"
  let validator_index = attesting_index.get()

  # There has been no other valid attestation seen on an attestation subnet
  # that has an identical `attestation.data.target.epoch` and participating
  # validator index.
  # Slightly modified to allow only newer attestations than were previously
  # seen (no point in propagating older votes)
  if (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 > validator_index.uint64) and
      pool.nextAttestationEpoch[validator_index].subnet >
        attestation.data.target.epoch:
    return errIgnore("Attestation: Validator has already voted in epoch")

  let pubkey = pool.dag.validatorKey(validator_index).valueOr:
    # can't happen, in theory, because we checked the aggregator index above
    return errIgnore("Attestation: cannot find validator pubkey")

  # [REJECT] The signature of `attestation` is valid.

  # In the spec, is_valid_indexed_attestation is used to verify the signature -
  # here, we do a batch verification instead
  let sig =
    if checkSignature:
      # Attestation signatures are batch-verified
      let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
                             .scheduleAttestationCheck(
                              fork, attestation.data, pubkey,
                              attestation.signature)
      if deferredCrypto.isErr():
        return pool.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)

      let (cryptoFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()
      # Await the crypto check
      let x = (await cryptoFut)
      case x
      of BatchResult.Invalid:
        return pool.checkedReject("Attestation: invalid signature")
      of BatchResult.Timeout:
        beacon_attestations_dropped_queue_full.inc()
        return errIgnore("Attestation: timeout checking signature")
      of BatchResult.Valid:
        sig # keep going only in this case
    else:
      attestation.signature.load().valueOr:
        return pool.checkedReject("Attestation: unable to load signature")

  # Only valid attestations go in the list, which keeps validator_index
  # in range
  if not (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 > validator_index.uint64):
    pool.nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(validator_index.int + 1)
  pool.nextAttestationEpoch[validator_index].subnet =
    attestation.data.target.epoch + 1

  return ok((validator_index, sig))

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
proc validateAggregate*(
    pool: ref AttestationPool,
    batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
    signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof,
    wallTime: BeaconTime,
    checkSignature = true, checkCover = true):
    Future[Result[
      tuple[attestingIndices: seq[ValidatorIndex], sig: CookedSig],
      ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
  # Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
  # perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
  # an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
  # different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.

  template aggregate_and_proof: untyped = signedAggregateAndProof.message
  template aggregate: untyped = aggregate_and_proof.aggregate

  # [REJECT] The aggregate attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
  # `aggregate.data.target.epoch == compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot)`
  let slot = block:
    let v = check_attestation_slot_target(aggregate.data)
    if v.isErr():
      return pool.checkedReject(v.error)
    v.get()

  # [IGNORE] aggregate.data.slot is within the last
  # ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE slots (with a
  # MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. aggregate.data.slot +
  # ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot >= aggregate.data.slot
  #
  # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
  # modifies this for Deneb and newer forks.
  block:
    let v = check_propagation_slot_range(
      pool.dag.cfg.consensusForkAtEpoch(wallTime.slotOrZero.epoch), slot,
      wallTime)
    if v.isErr():  # [IGNORE]
      return err(v.error())

  # [IGNORE] The aggregate is the first valid aggregate received for the
  # aggregator with index aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index for the epoch
  # aggregate.data.target.epoch.
  # Slightly modified to allow only newer attestations than were previously
  # seen (no point in propagating older votes)
  if (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 >
        aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index) and
      pool.nextAttestationEpoch[
          aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index].aggregate >
        aggregate.data.target.epoch:
    return errIgnore("Aggregate: validator has already aggregated in epoch")

  # [REJECT] The attestation has participants -- that is,
  # len(get_attesting_indices(state, aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits)) >= 1.
  #
  # get_attesting_indices() is:
  # committee = get_beacon_committee(state, data.slot, data.index)
  # return set(index for i, index in enumerate(committee) if bits[i])
  #
  # the attestation doesn't have participants is iff either:
  # (1) the aggregation bits are all 0; or
  # (2) the non-zero aggregation bits don't overlap with extant committee
  #     members, i.e. they counts don't match.
  # But (2) would reflect an invalid aggregation in other ways, so reject it
  # either way.
  block:
    let v = check_aggregation_count(aggregate, singular = false)
    if v.isErr():  # [REJECT]
      return pool.checkedReject(v.error)

  # [REJECT] The block being voted for (aggregate.data.beacon_block_root)
  # passes validation.
  # [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
  let target = block:
    let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], aggregate.data)
    if v.isErr():  # [IGNORE/REJECT]
      return pool.checkedResult(v.error)
    v.get()

  let
    shufflingRef =
      pool.dag.getShufflingRef(target.blck, target.slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
        # Target is verified - shouldn't happen
        warn "No shuffling for attestation - report bug",
          aggregate = shortLog(aggregate), target = shortLog(target)
        return errIgnore("Aggregate: no shuffling")

  # [REJECT] The committee index is within the expected range -- i.e.
  # data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(state, data.target.epoch).
  let committee_index = block:
    let idx = shufflingRef.get_committee_index(aggregate.data.index)
    if idx.isErr():
      return pool.checkedReject(
        "Attestation: committee index not within expected range")
    idx.get()
  if not aggregate.aggregation_bits.compatible_with_shuffling(
      shufflingRef, slot, committee_index):
    return pool.checkedReject(
      "Aggregate: number of aggregation bits and committee size mismatch")

  if checkCover and
      pool[].covers(aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits):
    # [IGNORE] A valid aggregate attestation defined by
    # `hash_tree_root(aggregate.data)` whose `aggregation_bits` is a non-strict
    # superset has _not_ already been seen.
    # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/2847
    return errIgnore("Aggregate: already covered")

  # [REJECT] aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof selects the validator as an
  # aggregator for the slot -- i.e. is_aggregator(state, aggregate.data.slot,
  # aggregate.data.index, aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof) returns True.
  if not is_aggregator(
      shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof):
    return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: incorrect aggregator")

  # [REJECT] The aggregator's validator index is within the committee -- i.e.
  # aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index in get_beacon_committee(state,
  # aggregate.data.slot, aggregate.data.index).

  let aggregator_index =
    ValidatorIndex.init(aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index).valueOr:
      return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid aggregator index")

  if aggregator_index notin
      get_beacon_committee(shufflingRef, slot, committee_index):
    return pool.checkedReject(
      "Aggregate: aggregator's validator index not in committee")

  # 1. [REJECT] The aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof is a valid signature
  #    of the aggregate.data.slot by the validator with index
  #    aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.
  #    get_slot_signature(state, aggregate.data.slot, privkey)
  # 2. [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
  #    signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
  # 3. [REJECT] The signature of aggregate is valid.

  let
    fork = pool.dag.forkAtEpoch(aggregate.data.slot.epoch)
    attesting_indices = get_attesting_indices(
      shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, aggregate.aggregation_bits)

  let
    sig = if checkSignature:
      let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
                    .scheduleAggregateChecks(
                      fork, signedAggregateAndProof, pool.dag,
                      attesting_indices
                    )
      if deferredCrypto.isErr():
        return pool.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)

      let
        (aggregatorFut, slotFut, aggregateFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()

      block:
        # [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
        # signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
        let x = await aggregatorFut
        case x
        of BatchResult.Invalid:
          return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid aggregator signature")
        of BatchResult.Timeout:
          beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full.inc()
          return errIgnore("Aggregate: timeout checking aggregator signature")
        of BatchResult.Valid:
          discard

      block:
        # [REJECT] aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof
        let x = await slotFut
        case x
        of BatchResult.Invalid:
          return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid slot signature")
        of BatchResult.Timeout:
          beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full.inc()
          return errIgnore("Aggregate: timeout checking slot signature")
        of BatchResult.Valid:
          discard

      block:
        # [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
        # signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
        let x = await aggregateFut
        case x
        of BatchResult.Invalid:
          return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid aggregate signature")
        of BatchResult.Timeout:
          beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full.inc()
          return errIgnore("Aggregate: timeout checking aggregate signature")
        of BatchResult.Valid:
          discard
      sig
    else:
      aggregate.signature.load().valueOr:
        return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: unable to load signature")

  # The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
  # unviable blocks from the chain dag:
  #
  # [IGNORE] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the block
  # defined by aggregate.data.beacon_block_root -- i.e.
  # get_checkpoint_block(store, aggregate.data.beacon_block_root,
  # finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root

  # Only valid aggregates go in the list
  if pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 <= aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index:
    pool.nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(
      aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.int + 1)
  pool.nextAttestationEpoch[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index].aggregate =
    aggregate.data.target.epoch + 1

  return ok((attesting_indices, sig))

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/capella/p2p-interface.md#bls_to_execution_change
proc validateBlsToExecutionChange*(
    pool: ValidatorChangePool, batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
    signed_address_change: SignedBLSToExecutionChange,
    wallEpoch: Epoch): Future[Result[void, ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
  # [IGNORE] `current_epoch >= CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH`, where `current_epoch` is
  # defined by the current wall-clock time.
  if not (wallEpoch >= pool.dag.cfg.CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH):
    return errIgnore(
      "SignedBLSToExecutionChange: not accepting gossip until Capella")

  # [IGNORE] The `signed_bls_to_execution_change` is the first valid signed bls
  # to execution change received for the validator with index
  # `signed_bls_to_execution_change.message.validator_index`.
  if pool.isSeen(signed_address_change):
    return errIgnore(
      "SignedBLSToExecutionChange: not first valid change for validator index")

  # [REJECT] All of the conditions within `process_bls_to_execution_change`
  # pass validation.
  withState(pool.dag.headState):
    when consensusFork < ConsensusFork.Capella:
      return errIgnore(
        "SignedBLSToExecutionChange: can't validate against pre-Capella state")
    else:
      let res = check_bls_to_execution_change(
        pool.dag.cfg.genesisFork, forkyState.data, signed_address_change,
        {skipBlsValidation})
      if res.isErr:
        return pool.checkedReject(res.error)

      # BLS to execution change signatures are batch-verified
      let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto.scheduleBlsToExecutionChangeCheck(
        pool.dag.cfg.genesisFork, signed_address_change)
      if deferredCrypto.isErr():
        return pool.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)

      let (cryptoFut, _) = deferredCrypto.get()
      case await cryptoFut
      of BatchResult.Invalid:
        return pool.checkedReject(
          "SignedBLSToExecutionChange: invalid signature")
      of BatchResult.Timeout:
        return errIgnore(
          "SignedBLSToExecutionChange: timeout checking signature")
      of BatchResult.Valid:
        discard  # keep going only in this case

  # Send notification about new BLS to execution change via callback
  if not(isNil(pool.onBLSToExecutionChangeReceived)):
    pool.onBLSToExecutionChangeReceived(signed_address_change)

  return ok()

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing
proc validateAttesterSlashing*(
    pool: ValidatorChangePool, attester_slashing: AttesterSlashing):
    Result[void, ValidationError] =
  # [IGNORE] At least one index in the intersection of the attesting indices of
  # each attestation has not yet been seen in any prior attester_slashing (i.e.
  # attester_slashed_indices = set(attestation_1.attesting_indices).intersection(attestation_2.attesting_indices),
  # verify if any(attester_slashed_indices.difference(prior_seen_attester_slashed_indices))).
  if pool.isSeen(attester_slashing):
    return errIgnore(
      "AttesterSlashing: attester-slashed index already attester-slashed")

  # [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_attester_slashing pass
  # validation.
  let attester_slashing_validity =
    check_attester_slashing(pool.dag.headState, attester_slashing, {})
  if attester_slashing_validity.isErr:
    return pool.checkedReject(attester_slashing_validity.error)

  # Send notification about new attester slashing via callback
  if not(isNil(pool.onAttesterSlashingReceived)):
    pool.onAttesterSlashingReceived(attester_slashing)

  ok()

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.4/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
proc validateProposerSlashing*(
    pool: ValidatorChangePool, proposer_slashing: ProposerSlashing):
    Result[void, ValidationError] =
  # Not from spec; the rest of NBC wouldn't have correctly processed it either.
  if proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index > int.high.uint64:
    return errIgnore("ProposerSlashing: proposer-slashed index too high")

  # [IGNORE] The proposer slashing is the first valid proposer slashing
  # received for the proposer with index
  # proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index.
  if pool.isSeen(proposer_slashing):
    return errIgnore(
      "ProposerSlashing: proposer-slashed index already proposer-slashed")

  # [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_proposer_slashing
  # pass validation.
  let proposer_slashing_validity =
    check_proposer_slashing(pool.dag.headState, proposer_slashing, {})
  if proposer_slashing_validity.isErr:
    return pool.checkedReject(proposer_slashing_validity.error)

  # Send notification about new proposer slashing via callback
  if not(isNil(pool.onProposerSlashingReceived)):
    pool.onProposerSlashingReceived(proposer_slashing)

  ok()

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
proc validateVoluntaryExit*(
    pool: ValidatorChangePool, signed_voluntary_exit: SignedVoluntaryExit):
    Result[void, ValidationError] =
  # [IGNORE] The voluntary exit is the first valid voluntary exit received for
  # the validator with index signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.
  if signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index >=
      getStateField(pool.dag.headState, validators).lenu64:
    return errIgnore("VoluntaryExit: validator index too high")

  # Given that getStateField(pool.dag.headState, validators) is a seq,
  # signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.int is already valid, but
  # check explicitly if one changes that data structure.
  if pool.isSeen(signed_voluntary_exit):
    return errIgnore(
      "VoluntaryExit: validator index already voluntarily exited")

  # [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_voluntary_exit pass
  # validation.
  let voluntary_exit_validity =
    check_voluntary_exit(
      pool.dag.cfg, pool.dag.headState, signed_voluntary_exit, {})
  if voluntary_exit_validity.isErr:
    return pool.checkedReject(voluntary_exit_validity.error)

  # Send notification about new voluntary exit via callback
  if not(isNil(pool.onVoluntaryExitReceived)):
    pool.onVoluntaryExitReceived(signed_voluntary_exit)

  ok()

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/altair/p2p-interface.md#sync_committee_subnet_id
proc validateSyncCommitteeMessage*(
    dag: ChainDAGRef,
    quarantine: ref Quarantine,
    batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
    syncCommitteeMsgPool: ref SyncCommitteeMsgPool,
    msg: SyncCommitteeMessage,
    subcommitteeIdx: SyncSubcommitteeIndex,
    wallTime: BeaconTime,
    checkSignature: bool):
    Future[Result[
      (BlockId, CookedSig, seq[uint64]), ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
  block:
    # [IGNORE] The message's slot is for the current slot (with a
    # `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY` allowance), i.e.
    # `sync_committee_message.slot == current_slot`.
    let v = check_slot_exact(msg.slot, wallTime)
    if v.isErr():
      return err(v.error())

  # [REJECT] The subnet_id is valid for the given validator
  # i.e. subnet_id in compute_subnets_for_sync_committee(state, sync_committee_message.validator_index).
  # Note this validation implies the validator is part of the broader
  # current sync committee along with the correct subcommittee.
  # This check also ensures that the validator index is in range
  let positionsInSubcommittee = dag.getSubcommitteePositions(
    msg.slot + 1, subcommitteeIdx, msg.validator_index)

  if positionsInSubcommittee.len == 0:
    return dag.checkedReject(
      "SyncCommitteeMessage: originator not part of sync committee")

  # [IGNORE] The block being signed (`sync_committee_message.beacon_block_root`)
  # has been seen (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue
  # sync committee messages for processing once block is received)
  # [REJECT] The block being signed (`sync_committee_message.beacon_block_root`)
  # passes validation.
  let
    blockRoot = msg.beacon_block_root
    blck = dag.getBlockRef(blockRoot).valueOr:
      if blockRoot in quarantine[].unviable:
        return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: target invalid")
      quarantine[].addMissing(blockRoot)
      return errIgnore("SyncCommitteeMessage: target not found")

  block:
    # [IGNORE] There has been no other valid sync committee message for the
    # declared `slot` for the validator referenced by
    # `sync_committee_message.validator_index`
    #
    # Note this validation is per topic so that for a given slot, multiple
    # messages could be forwarded with the same validator_index as long as
    # the subnet_ids are distinct.
    if syncCommitteeMsgPool[].isSeen(msg, subcommitteeIdx, dag.head.bid):
      return errIgnore("SyncCommitteeMessage: duplicate message")

  # [REJECT] The signature is valid for the message beacon_block_root for the
  # validator referenced by validator_index.
  let
    senderPubKey = dag.validatorKey(msg.validator_index).valueOr:
      return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: invalid validator index")

  let sig =
    if checkSignature:
      # Attestation signatures are batch-verified
      let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
                            .scheduleSyncCommitteeMessageCheck(
                              dag.forkAtEpoch(msg.slot.epoch),
                              msg.slot, msg.beacon_block_root,
                              senderPubKey, msg.signature)
      if deferredCrypto.isErr():
        return dag.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)

      # Await the crypto check
      let
        (cryptoFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()

      let x = (await cryptoFut)
      case x
      of BatchResult.Invalid:
        return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: invalid signature")
      of BatchResult.Timeout:
        beacon_sync_messages_dropped_queue_full.inc()
        return errIgnore("SyncCommitteeMessage: timeout checking signature")
      of BatchResult.Valid:
        sig # keep going only in this case
    else:
      msg.signature.load().valueOr:
        return dag.checkedReject(
          "SyncCommitteeMessage: unable to load signature")

  return ok((blck.bid, sig, positionsInSubcommittee))

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/altair/p2p-interface.md#sync_committee_contribution_and_proof
proc validateContribution*(
    dag: ChainDAGRef,
    quarantine: ref Quarantine,
    batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
    syncCommitteeMsgPool: ref SyncCommitteeMsgPool,
    msg: SignedContributionAndProof,
    wallTime: BeaconTime,
    checkSignature: bool
): Future[Result[
    (BlockId, CookedSig, seq[ValidatorIndex]), ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
  block:
    # [IGNORE] The contribution's slot is for the current slot
    # (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance)
    # i.e. contribution.slot == current_slot.
    let v = check_slot_exact(msg.message.contribution.slot, wallTime)
    if v.isErr():  # [IGNORE]
      return err(v.error())

  # [REJECT] The subcommittee index is in the allowed range
  # i.e. contribution.subcommittee_index < SYNC_COMMITTEE_SUBNET_COUNT.
  let subcommitteeIdx = SyncSubcommitteeIndex.init(
      msg.message.contribution.subcommittee_index).valueOr:
    return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: subcommittee index too high")

  # [REJECT] The contribution has participants
  # that is, any(contribution.aggregation_bits).
  if msg.message.contribution.aggregation_bits.isZeros:
    return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: aggregation bits empty")

  # [REJECT] contribution_and_proof.selection_proof selects the validator
  # as an aggregator for the slot
  # i.e. is_sync_committee_aggregator(contribution_and_proof.selection_proof)
  # returns True.
  if not is_sync_committee_aggregator(msg.message.selection_proof):
    return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: invalid selection_proof")

  # [IGNORE] The sync committee contribution is the first valid
  # contribution received for the aggregator with index
  # contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index for the slot contribution.slot
  # and subcommittee index contribution.subcommittee_index
  # (this requires maintaining a cache of size SYNC_COMMITTEE_SIZE for this
  #  topic that can be flushed after each slot).
  if syncCommitteeMsgPool[].isSeen(msg.message):
    return errIgnore("Contribution: validator has already aggregated in slot")

  # [REJECT] The aggregator's validator index is in the declared subcommittee
  # of the current sync committee.
  # i.e. state.validators[contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index].pubkey in
  #      get_sync_subcommittee_pubkeys(state, contribution.subcommittee_index).
  let
    aggregator_index =
      ValidatorIndex.init(msg.message.aggregator_index).valueOr:
        return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: invalid aggregator index")
    # TODO we take a copy of the participants to avoid the data going stale
    #      between validation and use - nonetheless, a design that avoids it and
    #      stays safe would be nice
    participants = dag.syncCommitteeParticipants(
      msg.message.contribution.slot + 1, subcommitteeIdx)
  if aggregator_index notin participants:
    return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: aggregator not in subcommittee")

  # [IGNORE] The block being signed
  # (`contribution_and_proof.contribution.beacon_block_root`) has been seen
  # (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue sync committee
  # contributions for processing once block is received)
  # [REJECT] The block being signed
  # (`contribution_and_proof.contribution.beacon_block_root`) passes validation.
  let
    blockRoot = msg.message.contribution.beacon_block_root
    blck = dag.getBlockRef(blockRoot).valueOr:
      if blockRoot in quarantine[].unviable:
        return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: target invalid")
      quarantine[].addMissing(blockRoot)
      return errIgnore("Contribution: target not found")

  # [IGNORE] A valid sync committee contribution with equal `slot`,
  # `beacon_block_root` and `subcommittee_index` whose `aggregation_bits`
  # is non-strict superset has _not_ already been seen.
  if syncCommitteeMsgPool[].covers(msg.message.contribution, blck.bid):
    return errIgnore("Contribution: already covered")

  let sig = if checkSignature:
    let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto.scheduleContributionChecks(
      dag.forkAtEpoch(msg.message.contribution.slot.epoch),
      msg, subcommitteeIdx, dag)
    if deferredCrypto.isErr():
      return dag.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)

    let
      (aggregatorFut, proofFut, contributionFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()

    block:
      # [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
      # `signed_contribution_and_proof.signature`, is valid.
      let x = await aggregatorFut
      case x
      of BatchResult.Invalid:
        return dag.checkedReject(
          "Contribution: invalid aggregator signature")
      of BatchResult.Timeout:
        beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full.inc()
        return errIgnore(
          "Contribution: timeout checking aggregator signature")
      of BatchResult.Valid:
        discard

    block:
      # [REJECT] The `contribution_and_proof.selection_proof`
      # is a valid signature of the `SyncAggregatorSelectionData`
      # derived from the `contribution` by the validator with index
      # `contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index`.
      let x = await proofFut
      case x
      of BatchResult.Invalid:
        return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: invalid proof")
      of BatchResult.Timeout:
        beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full.inc()
        return errIgnore("Contribution: timeout checking proof")
      of BatchResult.Valid:
        discard

    block:
      # [REJECT] The aggregate signature is valid for the message
      # `beacon_block_root` and aggregate pubkey derived from the
      # participation info in `aggregation_bits` for the subcommittee
      # specified by the `contribution.subcommittee_index`.
      let x = await contributionFut
      case x
      of BatchResult.Invalid:
        return dag.checkedReject(
          "Contribution: invalid contribution signature")
      of BatchResult.Timeout:
        beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full.inc()
        return errIgnore(
          "Contribution: timeout checking contribution signature")
      of BatchResult.Valid:
        discard
    sig
  else:
    msg.message.contribution.signature.load().valueOr:
      return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: unable to load signature")

  return ok((blck.bid, sig, participants))

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/altair/light-client/p2p-interface.md#light_client_finality_update
proc validateLightClientFinalityUpdate*(
    pool: var LightClientPool, dag: ChainDAGRef,
    finality_update: ForkedLightClientFinalityUpdate,
    wallTime: BeaconTime): Result[void, ValidationError] =
  # [IGNORE] The `finalized_header.beacon.slot` is greater than that of all
  # previously forwarded `finality_update`s, or it matches the highest
  # previously forwarded slot and also has a `sync_aggregate` indicating
  # supermajority (> 2/3) sync committee participation while the previously
  # forwarded `finality_update` for that slot did not indicate supermajority
  let finalized_slot = withForkyFinalityUpdate(finality_update):
    when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
      forkyFinalityUpdate.finalized_header.beacon.slot
    else:
      GENESIS_SLOT
  if finalized_slot < pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot:
    return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: slot already forwarded")
  let has_supermajority = withForkyFinalityUpdate(finality_update):
    when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
      forkyFinalityUpdate.sync_aggregate.hasSupermajoritySyncParticipation
    else:
      false
  if finalized_slot == pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot:
    if pool.latestForwardedFinalityHasSupermajority:
      return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: already have supermajority")
    if not has_supermajority:
      return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: no new supermajority")

  let
    signature_slot = withForkyFinalityUpdate(finality_update):
      when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
        forkyFinalityUpdate.signature_slot
      else:
        GENESIS_SLOT
    currentTime = wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY
    forwardTime = signature_slot.light_client_finality_update_time
  if currentTime < forwardTime:
    # [IGNORE] The `finality_update` is received after the block at
    # `signature_slot` was given enough time to propagate through the network.
    return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: received too early")

  if not finality_update.matches(dag.lcDataStore.cache.latest):
    # [IGNORE] The received `finality_update` matches the locally computed one
    # exactly.
    return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: not matching local")

  pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot = finalized_slot
  pool.latestForwardedFinalityHasSupermajority = has_supermajority
  ok()

# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/altair/light-client/p2p-interface.md#light_client_optimistic_update
proc validateLightClientOptimisticUpdate*(
    pool: var LightClientPool, dag: ChainDAGRef,
    optimistic_update: ForkedLightClientOptimisticUpdate,
    wallTime: BeaconTime): Result[void, ValidationError] =
  let attested_slot = withForkyOptimisticUpdate(optimistic_update):
    when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
      forkyOptimisticUpdate.attested_header.beacon.slot
    else:
      GENESIS_SLOT
  if attested_slot <= pool.latestForwardedOptimisticSlot:
    # [IGNORE] The `attested_header.beacon.slot` is greater than that of all
    # previously forwarded `optimistic_update`s
    return errIgnore("LightClientOptimisticUpdate: slot already forwarded")

  let
    signature_slot = withForkyOptimisticUpdate(optimistic_update):
      when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
        forkyOptimisticUpdate.signature_slot
      else:
        GENESIS_SLOT
    currentTime = wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY
    forwardTime = signature_slot.light_client_optimistic_update_time
  if currentTime < forwardTime:
    # [IGNORE] The `optimistic_update` is received after the block at
    # `signature_slot` was given enough time to propagate through the network.
    return errIgnore("LightClientOptimisticUpdate: received too early")

  if not optimistic_update.matches(dag.lcDataStore.cache.latest):
    # [IGNORE] The received `optimistic_update` matches the locally computed one
    # exactly.
    return errIgnore("LightClientOptimisticUpdate: not matching local")

  pool.latestForwardedOptimisticSlot = attested_slot
  ok()