Batch attestations (#2439)
* batch attestations * Fixes (but now need to investigate the chronos 0 .. 4095 crash similar to https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/issues/1518 * Try to remove the processing loop to no avail :/ * batch aggregates * use resultsBuffer size for triggering deadline schedule * pass attestation pool tests * Introduce async gossip validators. May fix the 4096 bug (reentrancy issue?) (similar to sync unknown blocks #1518) * Put logging at debug level, add speed info * remove unnecessary batch info when it is known to be one * downgrade some logs to trace level * better comments [skip ci] * Address most review comments * only use ref for async proc * fix exceptions in eth2_network * update async exceptions in gossip_validation * eth2_network 2nd pass * change to sleepAsync * Update beacon_chain/gossip_processing/batch_validation.nim Co-authored-by: Jacek Sieka <jacek@status.im> Co-authored-by: Jacek Sieka <jacek@status.im>
This commit is contained in:
parent
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# beacon_chain
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# Copyright (c) 2019-2021 Status Research & Development GmbH
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# Licensed and distributed under either of
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# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
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# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
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# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
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import
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# Status
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chronicles, chronos,
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stew/results,
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eth/keys,
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# Internals
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../spec/[
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datatypes, crypto, digest, helpers, signatures_batch],
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../consensus_object_pools/[
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blockchain_dag, block_quarantine,
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attestation_pool, exit_pool,
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block_pools_types, spec_cache
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],
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".."/[beacon_node_types, ssz, beacon_clock]
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export BrHmacDrbgContext
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logScope:
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topics = "gossip_checks"
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# Batched gossip validation
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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type
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BatchCrypto* = object
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# The buffers are bounded by BatchedCryptoSize (16) which was chosen:
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# - based on "nimble bench" in nim-blscurve
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# so that low power devices like Raspberry Pi 4 can process
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# that many batched verifications within 20ms
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# - based on the accumulation rate of attestations and aggregates
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# in large instances which were 12000 per slot (12s)
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# hence 1 per ms (but the pattern is bursty around the 4s mark)
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pendingBuffer: seq[SignatureSet]
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resultsBuffer: seq[Future[Result[void, cstring]]]
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sigVerifCache: BatchedBLSVerifierCache ##\
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## A cache for batch BLS signature verification contexts
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rng: ref BrHmacDrbgContext ##\
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## A reference to the Nimbus application-wide RNG
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const
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# We cap waiting for an idle slot in case there's a lot of network traffic
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# taking up all CPU - we don't want to _completely_ stop processing blocks
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# in this case (attestations will get dropped) - doing so also allows us
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# to benefit from more batching / larger network reads when under load.
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BatchAttAccumTime = 10.milliseconds
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# Threshold for immediate trigger of batch verification.
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# A balance between throughput and worst case latency.
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# At least 6 so that the constant factors
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# (RNG for blinding and Final Exponentiation)
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# are amortized,
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# but not too big as we need to redo checks one-by-one if one failed.
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BatchedCryptoSize = 16
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proc new*(T: type BatchCrypto, rng: ref BrHmacDrbgContext): ref BatchCrypto =
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(ref BatchCrypto)(rng: rng)
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func clear(batchCrypto: var BatchCrypto) =
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## Empty the crypto-pending attestations & aggregate queues
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batchCrypto.pendingBuffer.setLen(0)
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batchCrypto.resultsBuffer.setLen(0)
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proc done(batchCrypto: var BatchCrypto, idx: int) =
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## Send signal to [Attestation/Aggregate]Validator
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## that the attestation was crypto-verified (and so gossip validated)
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## with success
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batchCrypto.resultsBuffer[idx].complete(Result[void, cstring].ok())
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proc fail(batchCrypto: var BatchCrypto, idx: int, error: cstring) =
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## Send signal to [Attestation/Aggregate]Validator
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## that the attestation was NOT crypto-verified (and so NOT gossip validated)
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batchCrypto.resultsBuffer[idx].complete(Result[void, cstring].err(error))
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proc complete(batchCrypto: var BatchCrypto, idx: int, res: Result[void, cstring]) =
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## Send signal to [Attestation/Aggregate]Validator
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batchCrypto.resultsBuffer[idx].complete(res)
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proc processBufferedCrypto(self: var BatchCrypto) =
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## Drain all attestations waiting for crypto verifications
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doAssert self.pendingBuffer.len ==
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self.resultsBuffer.len
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if self.pendingBuffer.len == 0:
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return
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trace "batch crypto - starting",
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batchSize = self.pendingBuffer.len
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let startTime = Moment.now()
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var secureRandomBytes: array[32, byte]
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self.rng[].brHmacDrbgGenerate(secureRandomBytes)
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# TODO: For now only enable serial batch verification
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let ok = batchVerifySerial(
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self.sigVerifCache,
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self.pendingBuffer,
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secureRandomBytes)
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let stopTime = Moment.now()
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debug "batch crypto - finished",
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batchSize = self.pendingBuffer.len,
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cryptoVerified = ok,
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dur = stopTime - startTime
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if ok:
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for i in 0 ..< self.resultsBuffer.len:
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self.done(i)
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else:
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debug "batch crypto - failure, falling back",
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batchSize = self.pendingBuffer.len
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for i in 0 ..< self.pendingBuffer.len:
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let ok = blsVerify self.pendingBuffer[i]
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if ok:
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self.done(i)
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else:
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self.fail(i, "batch crypto verification: invalid signature")
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self.clear()
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proc deferCryptoProcessing(self: ref BatchCrypto, idleTimeout: Duration) {.async.} =
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## Process pending crypto check:
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## - if time threshold is reached
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## - or if networking is idle
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# TODO: how to cancel the scheduled `deferCryptoProcessing(BatchAttAccumTime)` ?
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# when the buffer size threshold is reached?
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# In practice this only happens when we receive a burst of attestations/aggregates.
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# Though it's possible to reach the threshold 9ms in,
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# and have only 1ms left for further accumulation.
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await sleepAsync(idleTimeout)
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self[].processBufferedCrypto()
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proc schedule(batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto, fut: Future[Result[void, cstring]], checkThreshold = true) =
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## Schedule a cryptocheck for processing
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##
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## The buffer is processed:
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## - when 16 or more attestations/aggregates are buffered (BatchedCryptoSize)
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## - when there are no network events (idleAsync)
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## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
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# Note: use the resultsBuffer size to detect the first item
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# as pendingBuffer is appended to 3 by 3 in case of aggregates
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batchCrypto.resultsBuffer.add fut
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if batchCrypto.resultsBuffer.len == 1:
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# First attestation to be scheduled in the batch
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# wait for an idle time or up to 10ms before processing
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trace "batch crypto - scheduling next",
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deadline = BatchAttAccumTime
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asyncSpawn batchCrypto.deferCryptoProcessing(BatchAttAccumTime)
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elif checkThreshold and
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batchCrypto.resultsBuffer.len >= BatchedCryptoSize:
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# Reached the max buffer size, process immediately
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# TODO: how to cancel the scheduled `deferCryptoProcessing(BatchAttAccumTime)` ?
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batchCrypto[].processBufferedCrypto()
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proc scheduleAttestationCheck*(
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batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
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fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
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epochRef: EpochRef,
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attestation: Attestation
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): Option[Future[Result[void, cstring]]] =
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## Schedule crypto verification of an attestation
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##
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## The buffer is processed:
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## - when 16 or more attestations/aggregates are buffered (BatchedCryptoSize)
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## - when there are no network events (idleAsync)
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## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
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##
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## This returns None if crypto sanity checks failed
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## and a future with the deferred attestation check otherwise.
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doAssert batchCrypto.pendingBuffer.len < BatchedCryptoSize
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let sanity = batchCrypto
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.pendingBuffer
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.addAttestation(
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fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef,
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attestation
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)
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if not sanity:
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return none(Future[Result[void, cstring]])
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let fut = newFuture[Result[void, cstring]](
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"batch_validation.scheduleAttestationCheck"
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)
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batchCrypto.schedule(fut)
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return some(fut)
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proc scheduleAggregateChecks*(
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batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
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fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
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epochRef: EpochRef,
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signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof
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): Option[tuple[slotCheck, aggregatorCheck, aggregateCheck: Future[Result[void, cstring]]]] =
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## Schedule crypto verification of an aggregate
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##
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## This involves 3 checks:
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## - verify_slot_signature
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## - verify_aggregate_and_proof_signature
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## - is_valid_indexed_attestation
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##
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## The buffer is processed:
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## - when 16 or more attestations/aggregates are buffered (BatchedCryptoSize)
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## - when there are no network events (idleAsync)
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## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
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##
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## This returns None if crypto sanity checks failed
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## and 2 futures with the deferred aggregate checks otherwise.
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doAssert batchCrypto.pendingBuffer.len < BatchedCryptoSize
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template aggregate_and_proof: untyped = signedAggregateAndProof.message
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template aggregate: untyped = aggregate_and_proof.aggregate
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type R = tuple[slotCheck, aggregatorCheck, aggregateCheck: Future[Result[void, cstring]]]
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# Enqueue in the buffer
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# ------------------------------------------------------
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let aggregator = epochRef.validator_keys[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index]
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block:
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let sanity = batchCrypto
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.pendingBuffer
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.addSlotSignature(
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fork, genesis_validators_root,
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aggregate.data.slot,
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aggregator,
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aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof
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)
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if not sanity:
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return none(R)
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block:
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let sanity = batchCrypto
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.pendingBuffer
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.addAggregateAndProofSignature(
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fork, genesis_validators_root,
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aggregate_and_proof,
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aggregator,
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signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature
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)
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if not sanity:
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return none(R)
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block:
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let sanity = batchCrypto
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.pendingBuffer
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.addAttestation(
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fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef,
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aggregate
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)
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if not sanity:
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return none(R)
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let futSlot = newFuture[Result[void, cstring]](
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"batch_validation.scheduleAggregateChecks.slotCheck"
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)
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let futAggregator = newFuture[Result[void, cstring]](
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"batch_validation.scheduleAggregateChecks.aggregatorCheck"
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)
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let futAggregate = newFuture[Result[void, cstring]](
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"batch_validation.scheduleAggregateChecks.aggregateCheck"
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)
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batchCrypto.schedule(futSlot, checkThreshold = false)
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batchCrypto.schedule(futAggregator, checkThreshold = false)
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batchCrypto.schedule(futAggregate)
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return some((futSlot, futAggregator, futAggregate))
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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import
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../spec/[crypto, datatypes, digest],
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../consensus_object_pools/[block_clearance, blockchain_dag, exit_pool, attestation_pool],
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./gossip_validation, ./gossip_to_consensus,
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./batch_validation,
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../validators/validator_pool,
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../beacon_node_types,
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../beacon_clock, ../conf, ../ssz/sszdump
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@ -70,6 +71,10 @@ type
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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exitPool: ref ExitPool
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# Almost validated, pending cryptographic signature check
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto
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# Missing information
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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quarantine*: QuarantineRef
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@ -85,6 +90,7 @@ proc new*(T: type Eth2Processor,
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exitPool: ref ExitPool,
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validatorPool: ref ValidatorPool,
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quarantine: QuarantineRef,
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rng: ref BrHmacDrbgContext,
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getWallTime: GetWallTimeFn): ref Eth2Processor =
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(ref Eth2Processor)(
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config: config,
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@ -94,7 +100,8 @@ proc new*(T: type Eth2Processor,
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attestationPool: attestationPool,
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exitPool: exitPool,
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validatorPool: validatorPool,
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quarantine: quarantine
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quarantine: quarantine,
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batchCrypto: BatchCrypto.new(rng = rng)
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)
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# Gossip Management
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@ -179,11 +186,13 @@ proc checkForPotentialDoppelganger(
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warn "We believe you are currently running another instance of the same validator. We've disconnected you from the network as this presents a significant slashing risk. Possible next steps are (a) making sure you've disconnected your validator from your old machine before restarting the client; and (b) running the client again with the gossip-slashing-protection option disabled, only if you are absolutely sure this is the only instance of your validator running, and reporting the issue at https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/issues."
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quit QuitFailure
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{.pop.} # async can raise anything
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proc attestationValidator*(
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self: var Eth2Processor,
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self: ref Eth2Processor,
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attestation: Attestation,
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committeeIndex: uint64,
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checksExpensive: bool = true): ValidationResult =
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checksExpensive: bool = true): Future[ValidationResult] {.async.} =
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logScope:
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attestation = shortLog(attestation)
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committeeIndex
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@ -201,7 +210,10 @@ proc attestationValidator*(
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# Potential under/overflows are fine; would just create odd metrics and logs
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let delay = wallTime - attestation.data.slot.toBeaconTime
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debug "Attestation received", delay
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let v = self.attestationPool[].validateAttestation(
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# Now proceed to validation
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let v = await self.attestationPool.validateAttestation(
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self.batchCrypto,
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attestation, wallTime, committeeIndex, checksExpensive)
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if v.isErr():
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debug "Dropping attestation", err = v.error()
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@ -210,16 +222,16 @@ proc attestationValidator*(
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beacon_attestations_received.inc()
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beacon_attestation_delay.observe(delay.toFloatSeconds())
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self.checkForPotentialDoppelganger(attestation.data, v.value, wallSlot)
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self[].checkForPotentialDoppelganger(attestation.data, v.value, wallSlot)
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trace "Attestation validated"
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self.verifQueues[].addAttestation(attestation, v.get())
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ValidationResult.Accept
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return ValidationResult.Accept
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proc aggregateValidator*(
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self: var Eth2Processor,
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signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof): ValidationResult =
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self: ref Eth2Processor,
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signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof): Future[ValidationResult] {.async.} =
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logScope:
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aggregate = shortLog(signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregate)
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signature = shortLog(signedAggregateAndProof.signature)
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|
@ -239,7 +251,8 @@ proc aggregateValidator*(
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wallTime - signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregate.data.slot.toBeaconTime
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debug "Aggregate received", delay
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let v = self.attestationPool[].validateAggregate(
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let v = await self.attestationPool.validateAggregate(
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self.batchCrypto,
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signedAggregateAndProof, wallTime)
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if v.isErr:
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debug "Dropping aggregate",
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|
@ -252,7 +265,7 @@ proc aggregateValidator*(
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beacon_aggregates_received.inc()
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beacon_aggregate_delay.observe(delay.toFloatSeconds())
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self.checkForPotentialDoppelganger(
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self[].checkForPotentialDoppelganger(
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signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregate.data, v.value, wallSlot)
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trace "Aggregate validated",
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@ -262,7 +275,9 @@ proc aggregateValidator*(
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self.verifQueues[].addAggregate(signedAggregateAndProof, v.get())
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ValidationResult.Accept
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return ValidationResult.Accept
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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proc attesterSlashingValidator*(
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self: var Eth2Processor, attesterSlashing: AttesterSlashing):
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|
|
|
@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
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# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
|
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# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
|
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|
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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import
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std/math,
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stew/results,
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|
@ -37,7 +35,7 @@ type
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v: Attestation
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attesting_indices: seq[ValidatorIndex]
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AggregateEntry* = AttestationEntry
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AggregateEntry = AttestationEntry
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VerifQueueManager* = object
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## This manages the queues of blocks and attestations.
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|
@ -70,6 +68,9 @@ type
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# Producers
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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blocksQueue*: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] # Exported for "test_sync_manager"
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# TODO:
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# is there a point to separate
|
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# attestations & aggregates here?
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attestationsQueue: AsyncQueue[AttestationEntry]
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aggregatesQueue: AsyncQueue[AggregateEntry]
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|
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|
@ -78,6 +79,8 @@ type
|
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consensusManager: ref ConsensusManager
|
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## Blockchain DAG, AttestationPool and Quarantine
|
||||
|
||||
{.push raises: [Defect].}
|
||||
|
||||
# Initialization
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
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|
@ -331,6 +334,10 @@ proc runQueueProcessingLoop*(self: ref VerifQueueManager) {.async.} =
|
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aggregateFut = self[].aggregatesQueue.popFirst()
|
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attestationFut = self[].attestationsQueue.popFirst()
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO:
|
||||
# revisit `idleTimeout`
|
||||
# and especially `attestationBatch` in light of batch validation
|
||||
# in particular we might want `attestationBatch` to drain both attestation & aggregates
|
||||
while true:
|
||||
# Cooperative concurrency: one idle calculation step per loop - because
|
||||
# we run both networking and CPU-heavy things like block processing
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -8,9 +8,12 @@
|
|||
{.push raises: [Defect].}
|
||||
|
||||
import
|
||||
# Standard library
|
||||
std/[sequtils, intsets, deques],
|
||||
chronicles,
|
||||
# Status
|
||||
chronicles, chronos,
|
||||
stew/results,
|
||||
# Internals
|
||||
../spec/[
|
||||
beaconstate, state_transition_block,
|
||||
datatypes, crypto, digest, helpers, network, signatures],
|
||||
|
@ -20,11 +23,15 @@ import
|
|||
],
|
||||
".."/[beacon_node_types, ssz, beacon_clock],
|
||||
../validators/attestation_aggregation,
|
||||
../extras
|
||||
../extras,
|
||||
./batch_validation
|
||||
|
||||
logScope:
|
||||
topics = "gossip_checks"
|
||||
|
||||
# Internal checks
|
||||
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
func check_attestation_block(
|
||||
pool: AttestationPool, attestationSlot: Slot, blck: BlockRef):
|
||||
Result[void, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
|
||||
|
@ -148,12 +155,18 @@ func check_attestation_subnet(
|
|||
|
||||
ok()
|
||||
|
||||
# Gossip Validation
|
||||
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
{.pop.} # async can raises anything
|
||||
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
|
||||
proc validateAttestation*(
|
||||
pool: var AttestationPool,
|
||||
attestation: Attestation, wallTime: BeaconTime,
|
||||
pool: ref AttestationPool,
|
||||
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
|
||||
attestation: Attestation,
|
||||
wallTime: BeaconTime,
|
||||
topicCommitteeIndex: uint64, checksExpensive: bool):
|
||||
Result[seq[ValidatorIndex], (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
|
||||
Future[Result[seq[ValidatorIndex], (ValidationResult, cstring)]] {.async.} =
|
||||
# Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
|
||||
# perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
|
||||
# an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
|
||||
|
@ -172,12 +185,18 @@ proc validateAttestation*(
|
|||
# attestation.data.slot + ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot
|
||||
# >= attestation.data.slot (a client MAY queue future attestations for
|
||||
# processing at the appropriate slot).
|
||||
? check_propagation_slot_range(attestation.data, wallTime) # [IGNORE]
|
||||
block:
|
||||
let v = check_propagation_slot_range(attestation.data, wallTime) # [IGNORE]
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err(v.error)
|
||||
|
||||
# The attestation is unaggregated -- that is, it has exactly one
|
||||
# participating validator (len([bit for bit in attestation.aggregation_bits
|
||||
# if bit == 0b1]) == 1).
|
||||
? check_aggregation_count(attestation, singular = true) # [REJECT]
|
||||
block:
|
||||
let v = check_aggregation_count(attestation, singular = true) # [REJECT]
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err(v.error)
|
||||
|
||||
# The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root) has been seen
|
||||
# (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue attestations for
|
||||
|
@ -185,7 +204,11 @@ proc validateAttestation*(
|
|||
# The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root) passes
|
||||
# validation.
|
||||
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
|
||||
let target = ? check_beacon_and_target_block(pool, attestation.data) # [IGNORE/REJECT]
|
||||
let target = block:
|
||||
let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], attestation.data) # [IGNORE/REJECT]
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err(v.error)
|
||||
v.get()
|
||||
|
||||
# The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
|
||||
# unviable blocks from the chain dag:
|
||||
|
@ -210,7 +233,10 @@ proc validateAttestation*(
|
|||
# committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(state,
|
||||
# attestation.data.target.epoch), which may be pre-computed along with the
|
||||
# committee information for the signature check.
|
||||
? check_attestation_subnet(epochRef, attestation, topicCommitteeIndex)
|
||||
block:
|
||||
let v = check_attestation_subnet(epochRef, attestation, topicCommitteeIndex) # [REJECT]
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err(v.error)
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size -- i.e.
|
||||
# len(attestation.aggregation_bits) == len(get_beacon_committee(state,
|
||||
|
@ -252,12 +278,29 @@ proc validateAttestation*(
|
|||
|
||||
# The signature of attestation is valid.
|
||||
block:
|
||||
# First pass - without cryptography
|
||||
let v = is_valid_indexed_attestation(
|
||||
fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef, attesting_indices,
|
||||
attestation, {})
|
||||
attestation,
|
||||
{skipBLSValidation})
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, v.error))
|
||||
|
||||
# Buffer crypto checks
|
||||
let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
|
||||
.scheduleAttestationCheck(
|
||||
fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef,
|
||||
attestation
|
||||
)
|
||||
if deferredCrypto.isNone():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject,
|
||||
cstring("validateAttestation: crypto sanity checks failure")))
|
||||
|
||||
# Await the crypto check
|
||||
let cryptoChecked = await deferredCrypto.get()
|
||||
if cryptoChecked.isErr():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cryptoChecked.error))
|
||||
|
||||
# Only valid attestations go in the list, which keeps validator_index
|
||||
# in range
|
||||
if not (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 > validator_index.uint64):
|
||||
|
@ -265,13 +308,15 @@ proc validateAttestation*(
|
|||
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[validator_index].subnet =
|
||||
attestation.data.target.epoch + 1
|
||||
|
||||
ok(attesting_indices)
|
||||
return ok(attesting_indices)
|
||||
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
|
||||
proc validateAggregate*(
|
||||
pool: var AttestationPool,
|
||||
signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof, wallTime: BeaconTime):
|
||||
Result[seq[ValidatorIndex], (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
|
||||
pool: ref AttestationPool,
|
||||
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
|
||||
signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof,
|
||||
wallTime: BeaconTime):
|
||||
Future[Result[seq[ValidatorIndex], (ValidationResult, cstring)]] {.async.} =
|
||||
# Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
|
||||
# perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
|
||||
# an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
|
||||
|
@ -291,7 +336,10 @@ proc validateAggregate*(
|
|||
# ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE slots (with a
|
||||
# MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. aggregate.data.slot +
|
||||
# ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot >= aggregate.data.slot
|
||||
? check_propagation_slot_range(aggregate.data, wallTime) # [IGNORE]
|
||||
block:
|
||||
let v = check_propagation_slot_range(aggregate.data, wallTime) # [IGNORE]
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err(v.error)
|
||||
|
||||
# [IGNORE] The valid aggregate attestation defined by
|
||||
# hash_tree_root(aggregate) has not already been seen (via aggregate gossip,
|
||||
|
@ -327,12 +375,19 @@ proc validateAggregate*(
|
|||
# members, i.e. they counts don't match.
|
||||
# But (2) would reflect an invalid aggregation in other ways, so reject it
|
||||
# either way.
|
||||
? check_aggregation_count(aggregate, singular = false)
|
||||
block:
|
||||
let v = check_aggregation_count(aggregate, singular = false) # [REJECT]
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err(v.error)
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] The block being voted for (aggregate.data.beacon_block_root)
|
||||
# passes validation.
|
||||
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
|
||||
let target = ? check_beacon_and_target_block(pool, aggregate.data)
|
||||
let target = block:
|
||||
let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], aggregate.data) # [IGNORE/REJECT]
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err(v.error)
|
||||
v.get()
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof selects the validator as an
|
||||
# aggregator for the slot -- i.e. is_aggregator(state, aggregate.data.slot,
|
||||
|
@ -354,42 +409,47 @@ proc validateAggregate*(
|
|||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
|
||||
"Aggregator's validator index not in committee")))
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] The aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof is a valid signature of the
|
||||
# aggregate.data.slot by the validator with index
|
||||
# aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.
|
||||
# get_slot_signature(state, aggregate.data.slot, privkey)
|
||||
if aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index >= epochRef.validator_keys.lenu64:
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring("Invalid aggregator_index")))
|
||||
|
||||
let
|
||||
fork = pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.fork
|
||||
genesis_validators_root =
|
||||
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.genesis_validators_root
|
||||
if not verify_slot_signature(
|
||||
fork, genesis_validators_root, aggregate.data.slot,
|
||||
epochRef.validator_keys[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index],
|
||||
aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof):
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
|
||||
"Selection_proof signature verification failed")))
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] The aggregator signature, signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
|
||||
if not verify_aggregate_and_proof_signature(
|
||||
fork, genesis_validators_root, aggregate_and_proof,
|
||||
epochRef.validator_keys[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index],
|
||||
signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature):
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
|
||||
"signed_aggregate_and_proof signature verification failed")))
|
||||
|
||||
let attesting_indices = get_attesting_indices(
|
||||
epochRef, aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits)
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] The signature of aggregate is valid.
|
||||
block:
|
||||
let v = is_valid_indexed_attestation(
|
||||
fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef, attesting_indices,
|
||||
aggregate, {})
|
||||
if v.isErr():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, v.error))
|
||||
# 1. [REJECT] The aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof is a valid signature of the
|
||||
# aggregate.data.slot by the validator with index
|
||||
# aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.
|
||||
# get_slot_signature(state, aggregate.data.slot, privkey)
|
||||
# 2. [REJECT] The aggregator signature, signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
|
||||
# 3. [REJECT] The signature of aggregate is valid.
|
||||
if aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index >= epochRef.validator_keys.lenu64:
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring("Invalid aggregator_index")))
|
||||
|
||||
let
|
||||
fork = pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.fork
|
||||
genesis_validators_root =
|
||||
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.genesis_validators_root
|
||||
|
||||
let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
|
||||
.scheduleAggregateChecks(
|
||||
fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef,
|
||||
signed_aggregate_and_proof
|
||||
)
|
||||
if deferredCrypto.isNone():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject,
|
||||
cstring("validateAttestation: crypto sanity checks failure")))
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof
|
||||
let slotChecked = await deferredCrypto.get().slotCheck
|
||||
if slotChecked.isErr():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
|
||||
"Selection_proof signature verification failed")))
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] The aggregator signature, signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
|
||||
let aggregatorChecked = await deferredCrypto.get().aggregatorCheck
|
||||
if aggregatorChecked.isErr():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
|
||||
"signed_aggregate_and_proof aggregator signature verification failed")))
|
||||
|
||||
# [REJECT] The aggregator signature, signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
|
||||
let aggregateChecked = await deferredCrypto.get().aggregateCheck
|
||||
if aggregateChecked.isErr():
|
||||
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
|
||||
"signed_aggregate_and_proof aggregate attester signatures verification failed")))
|
||||
|
||||
# The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
|
||||
# unviable blocks from the chain dag:
|
||||
|
@ -407,7 +467,12 @@ proc validateAggregate*(
|
|||
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index].aggregate =
|
||||
aggregate.data.target.epoch + 1
|
||||
|
||||
ok(attesting_indices)
|
||||
let attesting_indices = get_attesting_indices(
|
||||
epochRef, aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits)
|
||||
|
||||
return ok(attesting_indices)
|
||||
|
||||
{.push raises: [Defect].}
|
||||
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
|
||||
proc isValidBeaconBlock*(
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1704,6 +1704,40 @@ proc addValidator*[MsgType](node: Eth2Node,
|
|||
node.pubsub.addValidator(topic & "_snappy", execValidator)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: raiseAssert exc.msg # TODO fix libp2p
|
||||
|
||||
proc addAsyncValidator*[MsgType](node: Eth2Node,
|
||||
topic: string,
|
||||
msgValidator: proc(msg: MsgType):
|
||||
Future[ValidationResult] {.gcsafe, raises: [Defect].} ) =
|
||||
|
||||
proc execValidator(
|
||||
topic: string, message: GossipMsg): Future[ValidationResult] {.raises: [Defect].} =
|
||||
|
||||
inc nbc_gossip_messages_received
|
||||
trace "Validating incoming gossip message",
|
||||
len = message.data.len, topic
|
||||
|
||||
let decompressed = snappy.decode(message.data, GOSSIP_MAX_SIZE)
|
||||
|
||||
if decompressed.len == 0:
|
||||
debug "Empty gossip data after decompression",
|
||||
topic, len = message.data.len
|
||||
result.complete(ValidationResult.Ignore)
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
let decoded = try:
|
||||
SSZ.decode(decompressed, MsgType)
|
||||
except:
|
||||
error "SSZ decoding failure",
|
||||
topic, len = message.data.len
|
||||
result.complete(ValidationResult.Ignore)
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
return msgValidator(decoded)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
node.pubsub.addValidator(topic & "_snappy", execValidator)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: raiseAssert exc.msg # TODO fix libp2p
|
||||
|
||||
proc unsubscribe*(node: Eth2Node, topic: string) {.raises: [Defect, CatchableError].} =
|
||||
try:
|
||||
node.pubsub.unsubscribeAll(topic & "_snappy")
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -339,6 +339,7 @@ proc init*(T: type BeaconNode,
|
|||
verifQueues,
|
||||
chainDag, attestationPool, exitPool, validatorPool,
|
||||
quarantine,
|
||||
rng,
|
||||
proc(): BeaconTime = beaconClock.now())
|
||||
|
||||
var res = BeaconNode(
|
||||
|
@ -1167,16 +1168,16 @@ proc installMessageValidators(node: BeaconNode) =
|
|||
for it in 0'u64 ..< ATTESTATION_SUBNET_COUNT.uint64:
|
||||
closureScope:
|
||||
let ci = it
|
||||
node.network.addValidator(
|
||||
node.network.addAsyncValidator(
|
||||
getAttestationTopic(node.forkDigest, ci),
|
||||
# This proc needs to be within closureScope; don't lift out of loop.
|
||||
proc(attestation: Attestation): ValidationResult =
|
||||
node.processor[].attestationValidator(attestation, ci))
|
||||
proc(attestation: Attestation): Future[ValidationResult] =
|
||||
node.processor.attestationValidator(attestation, ci))
|
||||
|
||||
node.network.addValidator(
|
||||
node.network.addAsyncValidator(
|
||||
getAggregateAndProofsTopic(node.forkDigest),
|
||||
proc(signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof): ValidationResult =
|
||||
node.processor[].aggregateValidator(signedAggregateAndProof))
|
||||
proc(signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof): Future[ValidationResult] =
|
||||
node.processor.aggregateValidator(signedAggregateAndProof))
|
||||
|
||||
node.network.addValidator(
|
||||
node.topicBeaconBlocks,
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -166,6 +166,16 @@ proc blsVerify*(
|
|||
parsedKey.isSome() and
|
||||
parsedKey.get.verify(message, parsedSig.get())
|
||||
|
||||
proc blsVerify*(sigSet: SignatureSet): bool =
|
||||
## Unbatched verification
|
||||
## of 1 SignatureSet
|
||||
## tuple[pubkey: blscurve.PublicKey, message: array[32, byte], blscurve.signature: Signature]
|
||||
verify(
|
||||
sigSet.pubkey,
|
||||
sigSet.message,
|
||||
sigSet.signature
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func blsSign*(privkey: ValidatorPrivKey, message: openArray[byte]): ValidatorSig =
|
||||
## Computes a signature from a secret key and a message
|
||||
let sig = SecretKey(privkey).sign(message)
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -89,11 +89,35 @@ proc aggregateAttesters(
|
|||
aggPK.finish(attestersAgg)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
|
||||
proc aggregateAttesters(
|
||||
aggPK: var blscurve.PublicKey,
|
||||
attestation: IndexedAttestation,
|
||||
epochRef: auto
|
||||
): bool =
|
||||
mixin validator_keys
|
||||
|
||||
doAssert attestation.attesting_indices.len > 0
|
||||
var attestersAgg{.noInit.}: AggregatePublicKey
|
||||
attestersAgg.init(epochRef.validator_keys[attestation.attesting_indices[0]]
|
||||
.pubkey.loadWithCacheOrExitFalse())
|
||||
for i in 1 ..< attestation.attesting_indices.len:
|
||||
attestersAgg.aggregate(epochRef.validator_keys[attestation.attesting_indices[i]]
|
||||
.pubkey.loadWithCacheOrExitFalse())
|
||||
aggPK.finish(attestersAgg)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
|
||||
proc addIndexedAttestation(
|
||||
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
|
||||
attestation: IndexedAttestation,
|
||||
state: BeaconState
|
||||
): bool =
|
||||
## Add an indexed attestation for batched BLS verification
|
||||
## purposes
|
||||
## This only verifies cryptography, checking that
|
||||
## the indices are sorted and unique is not checked for example.
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Returns true if the indexed attestations was added to the batching buffer
|
||||
## Returns false if saniy checks failed (non-empty, keys are valid)
|
||||
if attestation.attesting_indices.len == 0:
|
||||
# Aggregation spec requires non-empty collection
|
||||
# - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-04
|
||||
|
@ -156,6 +180,125 @@ proc addAttestation(
|
|||
return false
|
||||
return true
|
||||
|
||||
# Public API
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
proc addAttestation*(
|
||||
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
|
||||
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
|
||||
epochRef: auto,
|
||||
attestation: Attestation
|
||||
): bool =
|
||||
## Add an attestation for batched BLS verification
|
||||
## purposes
|
||||
## This only verifies cryptography
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Returns true if the attestation was added to the batching buffer
|
||||
## Returns false if saniy checks failed (non-empty, keys are valid)
|
||||
## In that case the seq[SignatureSet] is unmodified
|
||||
mixin get_attesting_indices, validator_keys, pubkey
|
||||
|
||||
result = false
|
||||
|
||||
var attestersAgg{.noInit.}: AggregatePublicKey
|
||||
for valIndex in epochRef.get_attesting_indices(
|
||||
attestation.data,
|
||||
attestation.aggregation_bits):
|
||||
if not result: # first iteration
|
||||
attestersAgg.init(epochRef.validator_keys[valIndex]
|
||||
.loadWithCacheOrExitFalse())
|
||||
result = true
|
||||
else:
|
||||
attestersAgg.aggregate(epochRef.validator_keys[valIndex]
|
||||
.loadWithCacheOrExitFalse())
|
||||
|
||||
if not result:
|
||||
# There was no attesters
|
||||
return false
|
||||
|
||||
var attesters{.noinit.}: blscurve.PublicKey
|
||||
attesters.finish(attestersAgg)
|
||||
|
||||
return sigs.addSignatureSet(
|
||||
attesters,
|
||||
attestation.data,
|
||||
attestation.signature,
|
||||
genesis_validators_root,
|
||||
fork,
|
||||
attestation.data.target.epoch,
|
||||
DOMAIN_BEACON_ATTESTER)
|
||||
|
||||
proc addIndexedAttestation*(
|
||||
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
|
||||
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
|
||||
epochRef: auto,
|
||||
attestation: IndexedAttestation,
|
||||
): bool =
|
||||
## Add an indexed attestation for batched BLS verification
|
||||
## purposes
|
||||
## This only verifies cryptography, checking that
|
||||
## the indices are sorted and unique is not checked for example.
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Returns true if the indexed attestations was added to the batching buffer
|
||||
## Returns false if saniy checks failed (non-empty, keys are valid)
|
||||
## In that case the seq[SignatureSet] is unmodified
|
||||
if attestation.attesting_indices.len == 0:
|
||||
# Aggregation spec requires non-empty collection
|
||||
# - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-04
|
||||
# Eth2 spec requires at least one attesting indice in slashing
|
||||
# - https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#is_valid_indexed_attestation
|
||||
return false
|
||||
|
||||
var aggPK {.noInit.}: blscurve.PublicKey
|
||||
if not aggPK.aggregateAttesters(attestation, epochRef):
|
||||
return false
|
||||
|
||||
return sigs.addSignatureSet(
|
||||
aggPK,
|
||||
attestation.data,
|
||||
attestation.signature,
|
||||
genesis_validators_root,
|
||||
fork,
|
||||
attestation.data.target.epoch,
|
||||
DOMAIN_BEACON_ATTESTER)
|
||||
|
||||
proc addSlotSignature*(
|
||||
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
|
||||
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
|
||||
slot: Slot,
|
||||
pubkey: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||||
signature: ValidatorSig): bool =
|
||||
|
||||
let epoch = compute_epoch_at_slot(slot)
|
||||
return sigs.addSignatureSet(
|
||||
pubkey.loadWithCacheOrExitFalse(),
|
||||
sszObj = slot,
|
||||
signature,
|
||||
genesis_validators_root,
|
||||
fork,
|
||||
epoch,
|
||||
DOMAIN_SELECTION_PROOF
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
proc addAggregateAndProofSignature*(
|
||||
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
|
||||
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
|
||||
aggregate_and_proof: AggregateAndProof,
|
||||
pubkey: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||||
signature: ValidatorSig
|
||||
): bool =
|
||||
|
||||
let epoch = compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate_and_proof.aggregate.data.slot)
|
||||
return sigs.addSignatureSet(
|
||||
pubkey.loadWithCacheOrExitFalse(),
|
||||
sszObj = aggregate_and_proof,
|
||||
signature,
|
||||
genesis_validators_root,
|
||||
fork,
|
||||
epoch,
|
||||
DOMAIN_AGGREGATE_AND_PROOF
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
proc collectSignatureSets*(
|
||||
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
|
||||
signed_block: SignedBeaconBlock,
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ proc sendAttestation*(
|
|||
getAttestationTopic(node.forkDigest, subnet_index), attestation)
|
||||
|
||||
# Ensure node's own broadcast attestations end up in its attestation pool
|
||||
discard node.processor[].attestationValidator(
|
||||
discard node.processor.attestationValidator(
|
||||
attestation, subnet_index, false)
|
||||
|
||||
beacon_attestations_sent.inc()
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import
|
|||
../beacon_chain/spec/[crypto, datatypes, digest, validator, state_transition,
|
||||
helpers, beaconstate, presets, network],
|
||||
../beacon_chain/[beacon_node_types, extras, beacon_clock],
|
||||
../beacon_chain/gossip_processing/gossip_validation,
|
||||
../beacon_chain/gossip_processing/[gossip_validation, batch_validation],
|
||||
../beacon_chain/fork_choice/[fork_choice_types, fork_choice],
|
||||
../beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/[block_quarantine, blockchain_dag, block_clearance, attestation_pool],
|
||||
# Test utilities
|
||||
|
@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ suiteReport "Attestation validation " & preset():
|
|||
pool = newClone(AttestationPool.init(chainDag, quarantine))
|
||||
state = newClone(chainDag.headState)
|
||||
cache = StateCache()
|
||||
batchCrypto = BatchCrypto.new(keys.newRng())
|
||||
# Slot 0 is a finalized slot - won't be making attestations for it..
|
||||
check:
|
||||
process_slots(state.data, state.data.data.slot + 1, cache)
|
||||
|
@ -439,27 +440,27 @@ suiteReport "Attestation validation " & preset():
|
|||
beaconTime = attestation.data.slot.toBeaconTime()
|
||||
|
||||
check:
|
||||
validateAttestation(pool[], attestation, beaconTime, subnet, true).isOk
|
||||
validateAttestation(pool, batchCrypto, attestation, beaconTime, subnet, true).waitFor().isOk
|
||||
|
||||
# Same validator again
|
||||
validateAttestation(pool[], attestation, beaconTime, subnet, true).error()[0] ==
|
||||
validateAttestation(pool, batchCrypto, attestation, beaconTime, subnet, true).waitFor().error()[0] ==
|
||||
ValidationResult.Ignore
|
||||
|
||||
pool[].nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(0) # reset for test
|
||||
check:
|
||||
# Wrong subnet
|
||||
validateAttestation(pool[], attestation, beaconTime, subnet + 1, true).isErr
|
||||
validateAttestation(pool, batchCrypto, attestation, beaconTime, subnet + 1, true).waitFor().isErr
|
||||
|
||||
pool[].nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(0) # reset for test
|
||||
check:
|
||||
# Too far in the future
|
||||
validateAttestation(
|
||||
pool[], attestation, beaconTime - 1.seconds, subnet + 1, true).isErr
|
||||
pool, batchCrypto, attestation, beaconTime - 1.seconds, subnet + 1, true).waitFor().isErr
|
||||
|
||||
pool[].nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(0) # reset for test
|
||||
check:
|
||||
# Too far in the past
|
||||
validateAttestation(
|
||||
pool[], attestation,
|
||||
pool, batchCrypto, attestation,
|
||||
beaconTime - (SECONDS_PER_SLOT * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH - 1).int.seconds,
|
||||
subnet + 1, true).isErr
|
||||
subnet + 1, true).waitFor().isErr
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue