nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/state_transition.nim

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# beacon_chain
# Copyright (c) 2018 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
# State transition, as described in
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#beacon-chain-state-transition-function
#
# The purpose of this code right is primarily educational, to help piece
# together the mechanics of the beacon state and to discover potential problem
# areas. The entry point is `updateState` which is at the bottom of the file!
#
# General notes about the code (TODO):
# * It's inefficient - we quadratically copy, allocate and iterate when there
# are faster options
# * Weird styling - the sections taken from the spec use python styling while
# the others use NEP-1 - helps grepping identifiers in spec
# * We mix procedural and functional styles for no good reason, except that the
# spec does so also.
# * There are no tests, and likely lots of bugs.
# * For validators, sometimes indices are used and sometimes instances - this
# causes unnecessary friction in some sections
# * For indices, we get a mix of uint64, Uint24 and int - this is currently
# swept under the rug with casts
# * The spec uses uint64 for data types, but functions in the spec often assume
# signed bigint semantics - under- and overflows ensue
# * Sane error handling is missing in most cases (yay, we'll get the chance to
# debate exceptions again!)
# When updating the code, add TODO sections to mark where there are clear
# improvements to be made - other than that, keep things similar to spec for
# now.
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import
chronicles, math, options, sequtils,
./extras, ./ssz, ./work_pool,
./spec/[beaconstate, crypto, datatypes, digest, helpers, validator],
milagro_crypto
type
UpdateFlag* = enum
skipValidation
UpdateFlags* = set[UpdateFlag]
func flatten[T](v: openArray[seq[T]]): seq[T] =
# TODO not in nim - doh.
for x in v: result.add x
func verifyProposerSignature(state: BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock): bool =
## When creating the block, the proposer will sign a version of the block that
## doesn't contain the data (chicken and egg), then add the signature to that
## block.
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#proposer-signature
var blck_without_sig = blck
blck_without_sig.signature = ValidatorSig()
let
signed_data = ProposalSignedData(
slot: state.slot,
shard: BEACON_CHAIN_SHARD_NUMBER,
block_root: hash_tree_root_final(blck_without_sig)
)
proposal_hash = hash_tree_root_final(signed_data)
proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)
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bls_verify(
state.validator_registry[proposer_index].pubkey,
proposal_hash.data, blck.signature,
get_domain(state.fork_data, state.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))
func processRandao(
state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock, flags: UpdateFlags): bool =
## When a validator signs up, they will commit an hash to the block,
## the randao_commitment - this hash is the result of a secret value
## hashed n times.
## The first time the proposer proposes a block, they will hash their secret
## value n-1 times, and provide that as "reveal" - now everyone else can
## verify the reveal by hashing once.
## The next time the proposer proposes, they will reveal the secret value
## hashed n-2 times and so on, and everyone will verify that it matches n-1.
##
## Effectively, the block proposer can only reveal n - 1 times, so better pick
## a large N!
##
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#randao
let
proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)
proposer = addr state.validator_registry[proposer_index]
if skipValidation notin flags:
# Check that proposer commit and reveal match
if repeat_hash(blck.randao_reveal, proposer.randao_layers) !=
proposer.randao_commitment:
return false
# Update state and proposer now that we're alright
let mix = state.slot mod LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH
for i, b in state.latest_randao_mixes[mix].data:
state.latest_randao_mixes[mix].data[i] = b xor blck.randao_reveal.data[i]
proposer.randao_commitment = blck.randao_reveal
proposer.randao_layers = 0
return true
func processPoWReceiptRoot(state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock) =
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#pow-receipt-root
for x in state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots.mitems():
if blck.candidate_pow_receipt_root == x.candidate_pow_receipt_root:
x.votes += 1
return
state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots.add CandidatePoWReceiptRootRecord(
candidate_pow_receipt_root: blck.candidate_pow_receipt_root,
votes: 1
)
proc processProposerSlashings(state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock): bool =
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#proposer-slashings-1
if len(blck.body.proposer_slashings) > MAX_PROPOSER_SLASHINGS:
warn("PropSlash: too many!",
proposer_slashings = len(blck.body.proposer_slashings))
return false
for proposer_slashing in blck.body.proposer_slashings:
let proposer = addr state.validator_registry[proposer_slashing.proposer_index]
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if not bls_verify(
proposer.pubkey,
hash_tree_root_final(proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1).data,
proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_1,
get_domain(
state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot,
DOMAIN_PROPOSAL)):
warn("PropSlash: invalid signature 1")
return false
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if not bls_verify(
proposer.pubkey,
hash_tree_root_final(proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2).data,
proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_2,
get_domain(
state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot,
DOMAIN_PROPOSAL)):
warn("PropSlash: invalid signature 2")
return false
if not (proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot ==
proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot):
warn("PropSlash: slot mismatch")
return false
if not (proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.shard ==
proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.shard):
warn("PropSlash: shard mismatch")
return false
if not (proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.block_root ==
proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.block_root):
warn("PropSlash: block root mismatch")
return false
if not (proposer.status != EXITED_WITH_PENALTY):
warn("PropSlash: wrong status")
return false
update_validator_status(
state, proposer_slashing.proposer_index, EXITED_WITH_PENALTY)
return true
func verify_slashable_vote_data(state: BeaconState, vote_data: SlashableVoteData): bool =
if len(vote_data.aggregate_signature_poc_0_indices) +
len(vote_data.aggregate_signature_poc_1_indices) > MAX_CASPER_VOTES:
return false
let pubs = [
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bls_aggregate_pubkeys(mapIt(vote_data.aggregate_signature_poc_0_indices,
state.validator_registry[it].pubkey)),
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bls_aggregate_pubkeys(mapIt(vote_data.aggregate_signature_poc_1_indices,
state.validator_registry[it].pubkey))]
# TODO
# return bls_verify_multiple(pubs, [hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(0), hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(1), signature=aggregate_signature)
return true
proc indices(vote: SlashableVoteData): seq[Uint24] =
vote.aggregate_signature_poc_0_indices &
vote.aggregate_signature_poc_1_indices
proc processCasperSlashings(state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock): bool =
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#casper-slashings-1
if len(blck.body.casper_slashings) > MAX_CASPER_SLASHINGS:
warn("CaspSlash: too many!")
return false
for casper_slashing in blck.body.casper_slashings:
let
slashable_vote_data_1 = casper_slashing.slashable_vote_data_1
slashable_vote_data_2 = casper_slashing.slashable_vote_data_2
intersection = filterIt(
indices(slashable_vote_data_1), it in indices(slashable_vote_data_2))
if not (slashable_vote_data_1.data != slashable_vote_data_2.data):
warn("CaspSlash: invalid data")
return false
if not (len(intersection) >= 1):
warn("CaspSlash: no intersection")
return false
if not (
is_double_vote(slashable_vote_data_1.data, slashable_vote_data_2.data) or
is_surround_vote(slashable_vote_data_1.data, slashable_vote_data_2.data)):
warn("CaspSlash: surround or double vote check failed")
return false
if not verify_slashable_vote_data(state, slashable_vote_data_1):
warn("CaspSlash: invalid votes 1")
return false
if not verify_slashable_vote_data(state, slashable_vote_data_2):
warn("CaspSlash: invalid votes 2")
return false
for i in intersection:
if state.validator_registry[i].status != EXITED_WITH_PENALTY:
update_validator_status(state, i, EXITED_WITH_PENALTY)
return true
proc processAttestations(state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock): bool =
## Each block includes a number of attestations that the proposer chose. Each
## attestation represents an update to a specific shard and is signed by a
## committee of validators.
## Here we make sanity checks for each attestation and it to the state - most
## updates will happen at the epoch boundary where state updates happen in
## bulk.
##
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#attestations-1
if blck.body.attestations.len > MAX_ATTESTATIONS:
warn("Attestation: too many!", attestations = blck.body.attestations.len)
return false
if not allIt(blck.body.attestations, checkAttestation(state, it)):
return false
# All checks passed - update state
state.latest_attestations.add mapIt(blck.body.attestations,
PendingAttestationRecord(
data: it.data,
participation_bitfield: it.participation_bitfield,
custody_bitfield: it.custody_bitfield,
slot_included: state.slot,
)
)
return true
proc processDeposits(state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock): bool =
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#deposits-1
# TODO! Spec writing in progress
true
proc processExits(state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock): bool =
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#exits-1
if len(blck.body.exits) > MAX_EXITS:
warn("Exit: too many!")
return false
for exit in blck.body.exits:
let validator = state.validator_registry[exit.validator_index]
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if not bls_verify(
validator.pubkey, ZERO_HASH.data, exit.signature,
get_domain(state.fork_data, exit.slot, DOMAIN_EXIT)):
warn("Exit: invalid signature")
return false
if not (validator.status == ACTIVE):
warn("Exit: validator not active")
return false
if not (state.slot >= exit.slot):
warn("Exit: bad slot")
return false
if not (state.slot >=
validator.latest_status_change_slot +
SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD):
warn("Exit: not within committee change period")
update_validator_status(state, exit.validator_index, ACTIVE_PENDING_EXIT)
return true
proc process_ejections(state: var BeaconState) =
## Iterate through the validator registry and eject active validators with
## balance below ``EJECTION_BALANCE``
##
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#ejections
for index, validator in state.validator_registry:
if is_active_validator(validator) and validator.balance < EJECTION_BALANCE:
update_validator_status(state, index.Uint24, EXITED_WITHOUT_PENALTY)
func processSlot(state: var BeaconState, previous_block_root: Eth2Digest) =
## Time on the beacon chain moves in slots. Every time we make it to a new
## slot, a proposer cleates a block to represent the state of the beacon
## chain at that time. In case the proposer is missing, it may happen that
## the no block is produced during the slot.
##
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#per-slot-processing
state.slot += 1
state.validator_registry[
get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)].randao_layers += 1
state.latest_randao_mixes[state.slot mod LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH] =
state.latest_randao_mixes[(state.slot - 1) mod LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH]
state.latest_block_roots[(state.slot - 1) mod LATEST_BLOCK_ROOTS_LENGTH] =
previous_block_root
if state.slot mod LATEST_BLOCK_ROOTS_LENGTH == 0:
state.batched_block_roots.add(merkle_root(state.latest_block_roots))
proc processBlock(
state: var BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock, flags: UpdateFlags): bool =
## When there's a new block, we need to verify that the block is sane and
## update the state accordingly
# TODO when there's a failure, we should reset the state!
# TODO probably better to do all verification first, then apply state changes
if not (blck.slot == state.slot):
warn("Unexpected block slot number")
return false
# Spec does not have this check explicitly, but requires that this condition
# holds - so we give verify it as well - this would happen naturally if
# `blck.parent_root` was used in `processSlot` - but that doesn't cut it for
# blockless slot processing.
if not (blck.parent_root ==
state.latest_block_roots[(state.slot - 1) mod LATEST_BLOCK_ROOTS_LENGTH]):
warn("Unexpected parent root")
return false
if skipValidation notin flags:
# TODO Technically, we could make processBlock take a generic type instead
# of BeaconBlock - we would then have an intermediate `ProposedBlock`
# type that omits some fields - this way, the compiler would guarantee
# that we don't try to access fields that don't have a value yet
if not verifyProposerSignature(state, blck):
warn("Proposer signature not valid")
return false
if not processRandao(state, blck, flags):
warn("Randao reveal failed")
return false
processPoWReceiptRoot(state, blck)
if not processProposerSlashings(state, blck):
return false
if not processCasperSlashings(state, blck):
return false
if not processAttestations(state, blck):
return false
if not processDeposits(state, blck):
return false
if not processExits(state, blck):
return false
process_ejections(state)
return true
func get_attesters(
state: BeaconState,
attestations: openArray[PendingAttestationRecord]): seq[Uint24] =
# Union of attesters that participated in some attestations
# TODO spec - add as helper?
deduplicate(flatten(mapIt(attestations,
get_attestation_participants(state, it.data, it.participation_bitfield))))
func adjust_for_inclusion_distance[T](magnitude: T, dist: T): T =
magnitude div 2 + (magnitude div 2) * MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY div dist
func boundary_attestations(
state: BeaconState, boundary_hash: Eth2Digest,
attestations: openArray[PendingAttestationRecord]
): seq[PendingAttestationRecord] =
# TODO spec - add as helper?
filterIt(attestations,
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it.data.epoch_boundary_root == boundary_hash and
it.data.justified_slot == state.justified_slot)
func sum_effective_balances(
state: BeaconState, validator_indices: openArray[Uint24]): uint64 =
# TODO spec - add as helper?
sum(mapIt(
validator_indices, get_effective_balance(state.validator_registry[it]))
)
func lowerThan(candidate, current: Eth2Digest): bool =
# return true iff candidate is "lower" than current, per spec rule:
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# "ties broken by favoring lower `shard_block_root` values"
# TODO spec - clarify hash ordering..
for i, v in current.data:
if v > candidate.data[i]: return true
return false
func processEpoch(state: var BeaconState) =
## https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#per-epoch-processing
if state.slot mod EPOCH_LENGTH != 0:
return
# Precomputation
let
active_validator_indices =
get_active_validator_indices(state.validator_registry)
total_balance = sum_effective_balances(state, active_validator_indices)
total_balance_in_eth = total_balance div GWEI_PER_ETH
# The per-slot maximum interest rate is `2/reward_quotient`.)
base_reward_quotient =
BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT * integer_squareroot(total_balance_in_eth)
func base_reward(v: ValidatorRecord): uint64 =
get_effective_balance(v) div base_reward_quotient.uint64 div 4
func inactivity_penalty(
v: ValidatorRecord, slots_since_finality: uint64): uint64 =
base_reward(v) +
get_effective_balance(v) *
slots_since_finality div INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT
# TODO doing this with iterators failed:
# https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/9827
let
this_epoch_attestations =
filterIt(state.latest_attestations,
state.slot <= it.data.slot + EPOCH_LENGTH and
it.data.slot < state.slot)
this_epoch_boundary_attestations =
boundary_attestations(
state, get_block_root(state, state.slot-EPOCH_LENGTH),
this_epoch_attestations)
this_epoch_boundary_attesters =
get_attesters(state, this_epoch_attestations)
this_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance =
sum_effective_balances(state, this_epoch_boundary_attesters)
let
previous_epoch_attestations = filterIt(
state.latest_attestations,
state.slot <= it.data.slot + 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH and
it.data.slot + EPOCH_LENGTH < state.slot)
let
previous_epoch_attesters =
get_attesters(state, previous_epoch_attestations)
let # Previous epoch justified
previous_epoch_justified_attestations = filterIt(
concat(this_epoch_attestations, previous_epoch_attestations),
it.data.justified_slot == state.previous_justified_slot
)
previous_epoch_justified_attesters =
get_attesters(state, previous_epoch_justified_attestations)
previous_epoch_justified_attesting_balance =
sum_effective_balances(state, previous_epoch_justified_attesters)
let # Previous epoch boundary
# TODO check this with spec...
negative_uint_hack =
if state.slot < 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH: 0'u64 else: state.slot - 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH
previous_epoch_boundary_attestations =
boundary_attestations(
state, get_block_root(state, negative_uint_hack),
previous_epoch_attestations)
previous_epoch_boundary_attesters =
get_attesters(state, previous_epoch_boundary_attestations)
previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance =
sum_effective_balances(state, previous_epoch_boundary_attesters)
let # Previous epoch head
previous_epoch_head_attestations =
filterIt(
previous_epoch_attestations,
it.data.beacon_block_root == get_block_root(state, it.data.slot))
previous_epoch_head_attesters =
get_attesters(state, previous_epoch_head_attestations)
previous_epoch_head_attesting_balance =
sum_effective_balances(state, previous_epoch_head_attesters)
# TODO this is really hairy - we cannot capture `state` directly, but we
# can capture a pointer to it - this is safe because we don't leak
# these closures outside this scope, but still..
let statePtr = state.addr
func attesting_validators(
shard_committee: ShardCommittee, shard_block_root: Eth2Digest): seq[Uint24] =
let shard_block_attestations =
filterIt(concat(this_epoch_attestations, previous_epoch_attestations),
it.data.shard == shard_committee.shard and
it.data.shard_block_root == shard_block_root)
get_attesters(statePtr[], shard_block_attestations)
func winning_hash(obj: ShardCommittee): Eth2Digest =
# * Let `winning_hash(obj)` be the winning `shard_block_root` value.
# ... such that `sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in attesting_validators(obj, shard_block_root)])`
# is maximized (ties broken by favoring lower `shard_block_root` values).
let candidates =
mapIt(
filterIt(concat(this_epoch_attestations, previous_epoch_attestations),
it.data.shard == obj.shard),
it.data.shard_block_root)
# TODO not covered by spec!
if candidates.len == 0:
return
var max_hash = candidates[0]
var max_val =
sum_effective_balances(statePtr[], attesting_validators(obj, max_hash))
for candidate in candidates[1..^1]:
let val = sum_effective_balances(statePtr[], attesting_validators(obj, candidate))
if val > max_val or (val == max_val and candidate.lowerThan(max_hash)):
max_hash = candidate
max_val = val
max_hash
func attesting_validators(obj: ShardCommittee): seq[Uint24] =
attesting_validators(obj, winning_hash(obj))
func total_attesting_balance(obj: ShardCommittee): uint64 =
sum_effective_balances(statePtr[], attesting_validators(obj))
func total_balance_sac(obj: ShardCommittee): uint64 =
sum_effective_balances(statePtr[], obj.committee)
func inclusion_slot(v: Uint24): uint64 =
for a in statePtr[].latest_attestations:
if v in get_attestation_participants(statePtr[], a.data, a.participation_bitfield):
return a.slot_included
doAssert false # shouldn't happen..
func inclusion_distance(v: Uint24): uint64 =
for a in statePtr[].latest_attestations:
if v in get_attestation_participants(statePtr[], a.data, a.participation_bitfield):
return a.slot_included - a.data.slot
doAssert false # shouldn't happen..
block: # Receipt roots
if state.slot mod POW_RECEIPT_ROOT_VOTING_PERIOD == 0:
for x in state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots:
if x.votes * 2 >= POW_RECEIPT_ROOT_VOTING_PERIOD:
state.processed_pow_receipt_root = x.candidate_pow_receipt_root
break
state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots = @[]
block: # Justification
state.previous_justified_slot = state.justified_slot
# TODO where's that bitfield type when you need it?
# TODO why are all bits kept?
state.justification_bitfield = state.justification_bitfield shl 1
# TODO Spec - underflow
if state.slot >= 2'u64 * EPOCH_LENGTH:
if 3'u64 * previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance >=
2'u64 * total_balance:
state.justification_bitfield = state.justification_bitfield or 2
state.justified_slot = state.slot - 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH
if 3'u64 * this_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance >=
2'u64 * total_balance:
state.justification_bitfield = state.justification_bitfield or 1
state.justified_slot = state.slot - 1 * EPOCH_LENGTH
block: # Finalization
if
(state.previous_justified_slot + 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH == state.slot and
state.justification_bitfield mod 4 == 3) or
(state.previous_justified_slot + 3 * EPOCH_LENGTH == state.slot and
state.justification_bitfield mod 8 == 7) or
(state.previous_justified_slot + 4 * EPOCH_LENGTH == state.slot and
state.justification_bitfield mod 16 in [15'u64, 14]):
state.finalized_slot = state.justified_slot
block: # Crosslinks
for sac in state.shard_committees_at_slots:
for shard_committee in sac:
if 3'u64 * total_attesting_balance(shard_committee) >=
2'u64 * total_balance_sac(shard_committee):
state.latest_crosslinks[shard_committee.shard] = CrosslinkRecord(
slot: state.latest_state_recalculation_slot + EPOCH_LENGTH,
shard_block_root: winning_hash(shard_committee))
block: # Justification and finalization
let
slots_since_finality = state.slot - state.finalized_slot
proc update_balance(attesters: openArray[Uint24], attesting_balance: uint64) =
# TODO Spec - add helper?
for v in attesters:
statePtr.validator_registry[v].balance += adjust_for_inclusion_distance(
base_reward(statePtr.validator_registry[v]) *
attesting_balance div total_balance, inclusion_distance(v))
for v in active_validator_indices:
if v notin attesters:
statePtr.validator_registry[v].balance -=
base_reward(statePtr.validator_registry[v])
if slots_since_finality <= 4'u64 * EPOCH_LENGTH:
# Expected FFG source
update_balance(
previous_epoch_justified_attesters,
previous_epoch_justified_attesting_balance)
# Expected FFG target:
update_balance(
previous_epoch_boundary_attesters,
previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance)
# Expected beacon chain head:
update_balance(
previous_epoch_head_attesters,
previous_epoch_head_attesting_balance)
else:
for v in active_validator_indices:
let validator = addr state.validator_registry[v]
if v notin previous_epoch_justified_attesters:
validator[].balance -=
inactivity_penalty(validator[], slots_since_finality)
if v notin previous_epoch_boundary_attesters:
validator[].balance -=
inactivity_penalty(validator[], slots_since_finality)
if v notin previous_epoch_head_attesters:
validator[].balance -=
inactivity_penalty(validator[], slots_since_finality)
if validator[].status == EXITED_WITH_PENALTY:
validator[].balance -=
3'u64 * inactivity_penalty(validator[], slots_since_finality)
block: # Attestation inclusion
for v in previous_epoch_attesters:
let proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state, inclusion_slot(v))
state.validator_registry[proposer_index].balance +=
base_reward(state.validator_registry[v]) div INCLUDER_REWARD_QUOTIENT
block: # Crosslinks
for sac in state.shard_committees_at_slots[0 ..< EPOCH_LENGTH]:
for obj in sac:
for vindex in obj.committee:
let v = state.validator_registry[vindex].addr
if vindex in attesting_validators(obj):
v.balance += adjust_for_inclusion_distance(
base_reward(v[]) * total_attesting_balance(obj) div
total_balance_sac(obj),
inclusion_distance(vindex))
else:
v.balance -= base_reward(v[])
block: # Validator registry
if state.finalized_slot > state.validator_registry_latest_change_slot and
allIt(state.shard_committees_at_slots,
allIt(it,
state.latest_crosslinks[it.shard].slot >
state.validator_registry_latest_change_slot)):
update_validator_registry(state)
state.validator_registry_latest_change_slot = state.slot
for i in 0..<EPOCH_LENGTH:
state.shard_committees_at_slots[i] =
state.shard_committees_at_slots[EPOCH_LENGTH + i]
let next_start_shard =
(state.shard_committees_at_slots[^1][^1].shard + 1) mod SHARD_COUNT
for i, v in get_new_shuffling(
state.latest_randao_mixes[
(state.slot - EPOCH_LENGTH) mod LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH],
state.validator_registry, next_start_shard):
state.shard_committees_at_slots[i + EPOCH_LENGTH] = v
else:
# If a validator registry change does NOT happen
for i in 0..<EPOCH_LENGTH:
state.shard_committees_at_slots[i] =
state.shard_committees_at_slots[EPOCH_LENGTH + i]
let slots_since_finality =
state.slot - state.validator_registry_latest_change_slot
let start_shard = state.shard_committees_at_slots[0][0].shard
if slots_since_finality * EPOCH_LENGTH <=
MIN_VALIDATOR_REGISTRY_CHANGE_INTERVAL or
is_power_of_2(slots_since_finality):
for i, v in get_new_shuffling(
state.latest_randao_mixes[
(state.slot - EPOCH_LENGTH) mod LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH],
state.validator_registry, start_shard):
state.shard_committees_at_slots[i + EPOCH_LENGTH] = v
# Note that `start_shard` is not changed from the last epoch.
block: # Proposer reshuffling
let num_validators_to_reshuffle =
len(active_validator_indices) div
SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD.int
for i in 0..<num_validators_to_reshuffle:
# Multiplying i to 2 to ensure we have different input to all the required hashes in the shuffling
# and none of the hashes used for entropy in this loop will be the same
# TODO Modulo of hash value.. hm...
let
validator_index = 0.Uint24 # TODO active_validator_indices[hash(state.latest_randao_mixes[state.slot % LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH] + bytes8(i * 2)) % len(active_validator_indices)]
new_shard = 0'u64 # TODO hash(state.randao_mix + bytes8(i * 2 + 1)) mod SHARD_COUNT
shard_reassignment_record = ShardReassignmentRecord(
validator_index: validator_index,
shard: new_shard,
slot: state.slot + SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD
)
state.persistent_committee_reassignments.add(shard_reassignment_record)
while len(state.persistent_committee_reassignments) > 0 and
state.persistent_committee_reassignments[0].slot <= state.slot:
let reassignment = state.persistent_committee_reassignments[0]
state.persistent_committee_reassignments.delete(0)
for committee in state.persistent_committees.mitems():
if reassignment.validator_index in committee:
committee.delete(committee.find(reassignment.validator_index))
state.persistent_committees[reassignment.shard.int].add(
reassignment.validator_index)
block: # Final updates
state.latest_attestations.keepItIf(
not (it.data.slot + EPOCH_LENGTH < state.slot)
)
proc verifyStateRoot(state: BeaconState, blck: BeaconBlock): bool =
let state_root = hash_tree_root_final(state)
if state_root != blck.state_root:
warn("Block: root verification failed",
block_state_root = blck.state_root, state_root)
false
else:
true
proc updateState*(state: BeaconState, previous_block_root: Eth2Digest,
new_block: Option[BeaconBlock], flags: UpdateFlags):
tuple[state: BeaconState, block_ok: bool] =
## Time in the beacon chain moves by slots. Every time (haha.) that happens,
## we will update the beacon state. Normally, the state updates will be driven
## by the contents of a new block, but it may happen that the block goes
## missing - the state updates happen regardless.
## Each call to this function will advance the state by one slot - new_block,
## if present, must match that slot.
##
## The flags are used to specify that certain validations should be skipped
## for the new block. This is done during block proposal, to create a state
## whose hash can be included in the new block.
#
# TODO this function can be written with a loop inside to handle all empty
# slots up to the slot of the new_block - but then again, why not eagerly
# update the state as time passes? Something to ponder...
# One reason to keep it this way is that you need to look ahead if you're
# the block proposer, though in reality we only need a partial update for
# that
# TODO check to which extent this copy can be avoided (considering forks etc),
# for now, it serves as a reminder that we need to handle invalid blocks
# somewhere..
# TODO many functions will mutate `state` partially without rolling back
# the changes in case of failure (look out for `var BeaconState` and
# bool return values...)
# TODO There's a discussion about what this function should do, and when:
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/284
var new_state = state
# Per-slot updates - these happen regardless if there is a block or not
processSlot(new_state, previous_block_root)
if new_block.isSome():
# Block updates - these happen when there's a new block being suggested
# by the block proposer. Every actor in the network will update its state
# according to the contents of this block - but first they will validate
# that the block is sane.
# TODO what should happen if block processing fails?
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/293
if processBlock(new_state, new_block.get(), flags):
# Block ok so far, proceed with state update
processEpoch(new_state)
# This is a bit awkward - at the end of processing we verify that the
# state we arrive at is what the block producer thought it would be -
# meaning that potentially, it could fail verification
if skipValidation in flags or verifyStateRoot(new_state, new_block.get()):
# State root is what it should be - we're done!
return (new_state, true)
# Block processing failed, have to start over
new_state = state
processSlot(new_state, previous_block_root)
processEpoch(new_state)
(new_state, false)
else:
# Skip all per-block processing. Move directly to epoch processing
# prison. Do not do any block updates when passing go.
# Heavy updates that happen for every epoch - these never fail (or so we hope)
processEpoch(new_state)
(new_state, true)