**NOTICE**: This document is a work-in-progress for researchers and implementers. It reflects recent spec changes and takes precedence over the [Python proof-of-concept implementation](https://github.com/ethereum/beacon_chain).
This document represents the specification for Phase 0 of Ethereum 2.0 -- The Beacon Chain.
At the core of Ethereum 2.0 is a system chain called the "beacon chain". The beacon chain stores and manages the set of active proof-of-stake validators. In the initial deployment phases of Ethereum 2.0 the only mechanism to become a validator is to make a fixed-size one-way ETH deposit to a registration contract on the Ethereum 1.0 PoW chain. Induction as a validator happens after registration transaction receipts are processed by the beacon chain and after a queuing process. Deregistration is either voluntary or done forcibly as a penalty for misbehavior.
The primary source of load on the beacon chain are "attestations". Attestations simultaneously attest to a shard block and a corresponding beacon chain block. A sufficient number of attestations for the same shard block create a "crosslink", confirming the shard segment up to that shard block into the beacon chain. Crosslinks also serve as infrastructure for asynchronous cross-shard communication.
* **Validator** - a participant in the Casper/sharding consensus system. You can become one by depositing 32 ETH into the Casper mechanism.
* **Active validator set** - those validators who are currently participating, and which the Casper mechanism looks to produce and attest to blocks, crosslinks and other consensus objects.
* **Committee** - a (pseudo-) randomly sampled subset of the active validator set. When a committee is referred to collectively, as in "this committee attests to X", this is assumed to mean "some subset of that committee that contains enough validators that the protocol recognizes it as representing the committee".
* **Attester** - a validator that is part of a committee that needs to sign off on a beacon chain block while simultaneously creating a link (crosslink) to a recent shard block on a particular shard chain.
* **Crosslink** - a set of signatures from a committee attesting to a block in a shard chain, which can be included into the beacon chain. Crosslinks are the main means by which the beacon chain "learns about" the updated state of shard chains.
* **Slot** - a period of `SLOT_DURATION` seconds, during which one proposer has the ability to create a beacon chain block and some attesters have the ability to make attestations
* **Cycle** - a span of slots during which all validators get exactly one chance to make an attestation
* See a recommended min committee size of 111 [here](https://vitalik.ca/files/Ithaca201807_Sharding.pdf); our algorithm will generally ensure the committee size is at least half the target.
* The `SQRT_E_DROP_TIME` constant is the amount of time it takes for the quadratic leak to cut deposits of non-participating validators by ~39.4%.
* The `BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT` constant dictates the per-cycle interest rate assuming all validators are participating, assuming total deposits of 1 ETH. It corresponds to ~2.57% annual interest assuming 10 million participating ETH.
The initial deployment phases of Ethereum 2.0 are implemented without consensus changes to the PoW chain. A registration contract is added to the PoW chain to deposit ETH. This contract has a `registration` function which takes as arguments `pubkey`, `withdrawal_credentials`, `randao_commitment` as defined in a `ValidatorRecord` below. A BLS `proof_of_possession` of types `bytes` is given as a final argument.
The registration contract emits a log with the various arguments for consumption by the beacon chain. It does not do validation, pushing the registration logic to the beacon chain. In particular, the proof of possession (based on the BLS12-381 curve) is not verified by the registration contract.
Processing the beacon chain is fundamentally similar to processing a PoW chain in many respects. Clients download and process blocks, and maintain a view of what is the current "canonical chain", terminating at the current "head". However, because of the beacon chain's relationship with the existing PoW chain, and because it is a PoS chain, there are differences.
For a block on the beacon chain to be processed by a node, four conditions have to be met:
Beacon block production is significantly different because of the proof of stake mechanism. A client simply checks what it thinks is the canonical chain when it should create a block, and looks up what its slot number is; when the slot arrives, it either proposes or attests to a block as required. Note that this requires each node to have a clock that is roughly (ie. within `SLOT_DURATION` seconds) synchronized with the other nodes.
The beacon chain fork choice rule is a hybrid that combines justification and finality with Latest Message Driven (LMD) Greediest Heaviest Observed SubTree (GHOST). At any point in time a validator `v` subjectively calculates the beacon chain head as follows.
* Let `store` be the set of attestations and blocks that the validator `v` has observed and verified (in particular, block ancestors must be recursively verified). Attestations not part of any chain are still included in `store`.
* Let `finalized_head` be the finalized block with the highest slot number. (A block `B` is finalized if there is a descendant of `B` in `store` the processing of which sets `B` as finalized.)
* Let `justified_head` be the descendant of `finalized_head` with the highest slot number that has been justified for at least `CYCLE_LENGTH` slots. (A block `B` is justified is there is a descendant of `B` in `store` the processing of which sets `B` as justified.) If no such descendant exists set `justified_head` to `finalized_head`.
* Let `get_ancestor(store, block, slot)` be the ancestor of `block` with slot number `slot`. The `get_ancestor` function can be defined recursively as `def get_ancestor(store, block, slot): return block if block.slot == slot else get_ancestor(store, store.get_parent(block), slot)`.
* Let `get_latest_attestation(store, validator)` be the attestation with the highest slot number in `store` from `validator`. If several such attestations exist use the one the validator `v` observed first.
* The head is `lmd_ghost(store, justified_head)` where the function `lmd_ghost` is defined below. Note that the implementation below is suboptimal; there are implementations that compute the head in time logarithmic in slot count.
1. The per-block processing, which happens every block, and only affects a few parts of the `state`.
2. The inter-cycle state recalculation, which happens only if `block.slot >= last_state_recalculation_slot + CYCLE_LENGTH`, and affects the entire `state`.
The inter-cycle state recalculation generally focuses on changes to the validator set, including adjusting balances and adding and removing validators, as well as processing crosslinks and managing block justification/finalization, while the per-block processing generally focuses on verifying aggregate signatures and saving temporary records relating to the per-block activity in the `BeaconState`.
`get_block_hash(_, _, s)` should always return the block hash in the beacon chain at slot `s`, and `get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(_, s)` should not change unless the validator set changes.
We define another set of helpers to be used throughout: `bytes1(x): return x.to_bytes(1, 'big')`, `bytes2(x): return x.to_bytes(2, 'big')`, and so on for all integers, particularly 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 32.
Finally, we abstractly define `int_sqrt(n)` for use in reward/penalty calculations as the largest integer `k` such that `k**2 <= n`. Here is one possible implementation, though clients are free to use their own including standard libraries for [integer square root](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integer_square_root) if available and meet the specification.
The contract is at address `DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS`. When a user wishes to become a validator by moving their ETH from the 1.0 chain to the 2.0 chain, they should call the `deposit` function, sending along 32 ETH and providing as `deposit_params` a SimpleSerialize'd `DepositParams` object of the form:
If the user wishes to deposit more than `DEPOSIT_SIZE` ETH, they would need to make multiple calls. When the contract publishes a `ChainStart` log, this initializes the chain, calling `on_startup` with:
*`initial_validator_entries` equal to the list of data records published as HashChainValue logs so far, in the order in which they were published (oldest to newest).
*`genesis_time` equal to the `time` value published in the log
This routine should be run for every validator that is inducted as part of a log created on the PoW chain [TODO: explain where to check for these logs]. The status of the validators added after genesis is `PENDING_ACTIVATION`. These logs should be processed in the order in which they are emitted by the PoW chain.
The output of `get_block_hash` should not change, except that it will no longer throw for `current_slot - 1`. Also, check that the block's `ancestor_hashes` array was correctly updated, using the following algorithm:
* Verify that `justified_slot` is equal to `justification_source if slot >= block.slot - (block.slot % CYCLE_LENGTH) else prev_cycle_justification_source`
* Compute `full_parent_hashes` = `[get_block_hash(state, block, slot - CYCLE_LENGTH + i) for i in range(1, CYCLE_LENGTH - len(parent_hashes) + 1)] + parent_hashes` (eg, if `CYCLE_LENGTH = 4`, `slot = 5`, the actual block hashes starting from slot 0 are `Z A B C D E F G H I J`, and `parent_hashes = [D', E']` then `full_parent_hashes = [B, C, D' E']`). Note that when *creating* an attestation for a block, the hash of that block itself won't yet be in the `state`, so you would need to add it explicitly.
* Let `bit0_attestation_indices, bit1_attestation_indices = get_attestation_participants(state, obj)` (and verify that the method returns successfully)
* Let `bit0_group_public_key = BLSAddPubkeys(bit0_attestation_indices)` and `bit1_group_public_key = BLSAddPubkeys(bit1_attestation_indices)`.
Extend the list of `AttestationRecord` objects in the `state` with those included in the block, ordering the new additions in the same order as they came in the block, and replacing `obj.parent_hashes` with the calculated value of `full_parent_hashes`.
Let `proposal_hash = hash(ProposalSignedData(block.slot, 2**64 - 1, block_hash_without_sig))` where `block_hash_without_sig` is the hash of the block except setting `proposer_signature` to `[0, 0]`.
If `block.candidate_pow_receipt_root` is `x.candidate_pow_receipt_root` for some `x` in `state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots`, set `x.votes += 1`. Otherwise, append to `state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots` a new `CandidatePoWReceiptRootRecord(candidate_pow_receipt_root=block.candidate_pow_receipt_root, votes=1)`.
Verify that the quantity of each type of object in `block.specials` is less than or equal to its maximum (see table at the top). Verify that objects are sorted in order of `kind` (ie. `block.specials[i+1].kind >= block.specials[i].kind` for all `0 <= i < len(block.specials-1)`).
For each `SpecialRecord``obj` in `block.specials`, verify that its `kind` is one of the below values, and that `obj.data` deserializes according to the format for the given `kind`, then process it. The word "verify" when used below means that if the given verification check fails, the block containing that `SpecialRecord` is invalid.
* For each `vote`, verify that `BLSVerify(pubkey=aggregate_pubkey([validators[i].pubkey for i in vote_aggregate_sig_indices]), msg=vote_data, sig=vote_aggregate_sig, domain=get_domain(state, vote_data.slot, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION))` passes.
For each validator index `v` in `intersection`, if `state.validators[v].status` does not equal `PENALIZED`, then run `exit_validator(v, state, block, penalize=True, current_slot=block.slot)`
For each `proposal_signature`, verify that `BLSVerify(pubkey=validators[proposer_index].pubkey, msg=hash(proposal_data), sig=proposal_signature, domain=get_domain(state, proposal_data.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))` passes. Verify that `proposal1_data.slot == proposal2_data.slot` but `proposal1 != proposal2`. If `state.validators[proposer_index].status` does not equal `PENALIZED`, then run `exit_validator(proposer_index, state, penalize=True, current_slot=block.slot)`
Note that `deposit_data` in serialized form should be the `DepositParams` followed by 8 bytes for the `msg_value` and 8 bytes for the `timestamp`, or exactly the `deposit_data` in the PoW contract of which the hash was placed into the Merkle tree.
Use the following procedure to verify the `merkle_branch`, setting `leaf=serialized_deposit_data`, `depth=POW_CONTRACT_MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH` and `root=state.processed_pow_receipt_root`:
Repeat the steps in this section while `block.slot - last_state_recalculation_slot >= CYCLE_LENGTH`. For simplicity, we'll use `s` as `last_state_recalculation_slot`.
_Note: `last_state_recalculation_slot` will always be a multiple of `CYCLE_LENGTH`. In the "happy case", this process will trigger, and loop once, every time `block.slot` passes a new exact multiple of `CYCLE_LENGTH`, but if a chain skips more than an entire cycle then the loop may run multiple times, incrementing `last_state_recalculation_slot` by `CYCLE_LENGTH` with each iteration._
* Let `active_validators = [state.validators[i] for i in get_active_validator_indices(state.validators)]`.
* Let `total_balance = sum([balance_at_stake(v) for v in active_validators])`.
* Let `this_cycle_attestations = [a for a in state.pending_attestations if s <= a.slot < s + CYCLE_LENGTH]`. (note: this is the set of attestations _of slots in the cycle `s...s+CYCLE_LENGTH-1`_, not attestations _that got included in the chain during the cycle `s...s+CYCLE_LENGTH-1`_)
* Let `prev_cycle_attestations = [a for a in state.pending_attestations if s - CYCLE_LENGTH <= a.slot < s]`.
* Let `this_cycle_s_attestations = [a for a in this_cycle_attestations if get_block_hash(state, block, s) in a.parent_hashes and a.justified_slot == state.justification_source]`.
* Let `prev_s_attestations = [a for a in this_cycle_attestations + prev_cycle_attestations if get_block_hash(state, block, s - CYCLE_LENGTH) in a.parent_hashes and a.justified_slot == state.prev_cycle_justification_source]`.
* Let `s_attesters` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a) for a in this_cycle_s_attestations]`.
* Let `prev_s_attesters` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a) for a in prev_s_attestations]`.
* Let `total_balance_attesting_at_s = sum([balance_at_stake(v) for v in s_attesters])`.
* Let `total_balance_attesting_at_prev_s = sum([balance_at_stake(v) for v in prev_s_attesters])`.
* For every `ShardAndCommittee` object `obj` in `shard_and_committee_for_slots`, let:
*`attesting_validators(obj, shard_block_hash)` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a) for a in this_cycle_attestations + prev_cycle_attestations if a.shard == obj.shard and a.shard_block_hash == shard_block_hash]`
*`attesting_validators(obj)` be equal to `attesting_validators(obj, shard_block_hash)` for the value of `shard_block_hash` such that `sum([balance_at_stake(v) for v in attesting_validators(obj, shard_block_hash)])` is maximized (ties broken by favoring lower `shard_block_hash` values)
Let `inclusion_slot(a)` equal the slot in which attestation `a` was included, and `inclusion_distance(a) = inclusion_slot(a) - a.slot`. Let `inclusion_slot(v)` equal `inclusion_distance(a)` for the attestation `a` where `v` is in `get_attestation_participants(state, a)`, and define `inclusion_distance(v)` similarly. We define a function `adjust_for_inclusion_distance(magnitude, dist)` which adjusts the reward of an attestation based on how long it took to get included (the longer, the lower the reward). Returns a value between 0 and `magnitude`
* Set `state.justified_slot_bitfield = (state.justified_slot_bitfield * 2) % 2**64`.
* If `3 * total_balance_attesting_at_prev_s >= 2 * total_balance` then set `state.justified_slot_bitfield &= 2` (ie. flip the second lowest bit to 1) and `new_justification_source = prev_s`.
* If `3 * total_balance_attesting_at_s >= 2 * total_balance` then set `state.justified_slot_bitfield &= 1` (ie. flip the lowest bit to 1) and `new_justification_source = s`.
* If `justification_source == prev_s and state.justified_slot_bitfield % 4 == 3`, set `last_finalized_slot = justification_source`.
* If `justification_source == prev_s - 2 * CYCLE_LENGTH and state.justified_slot_bitfield % 16 in (15, 14)`, set `last_finalized_slot = justification_source`.
* If `justification_source == prev_s - CYCLE_LENGTH and state.justified_slot_bitfield % 8 == 7`, set `last_finalized_slot = justification_source`.
* Set `prev_cycle_justification_source = justification_source` and `justification_source = new_justification_source`.
* Let `quadratic_penalty_quotient = SQRT_E_DROP_TIME**2`. (The portion lost by offline validators after `D` cycles is about `D*D/2/quadratic_penalty_quotient`.)
* Let `time_since_finality = slot - last_finalized_slot`.
* Any active validator `v` not in `prev_s_attesters`, and any validator with `status == PENALIZED`, loses `balance_at_stake(v) // reward_quotient + balance_at_stake(v) * time_since_finality // quadratic_penalty_quotient`.
For each `v` in `prev_s_attesters`, the validator `proposer = get_beacon_proposer(state, inclusion_slot(v))` gains `balance_at_stake(proposer) // INCLUDER_REWARD_QUOTIENT`.
For every `ShardAndCommittee` object `obj` in `shard_and_committee_for_slots[:CYCLE_LENGTH]` (ie. the objects corresponding to the slot before the current one), for each `v in obj.committee`, where `v = state.validators[b]` adjust balances as follows:
* If for any `x` in `state.candidate_pow_receipt_root`, `x.votes * 2 >= POW_RECEIPT_ROOT_VOTING_PERIOD` set `state.processed_pow_receipt_root = x.receipt_root`.
* Let `start_shard = state.shard_and_committee_for_slots[0][0].shard`
* If `time_since_finality * CYCLE_LENGTH <= MIN_VALIDATOR_SET_CHANGE_INTERVAL` or `time_since_finality` is an exact power of 2, set `state.shard_and_committee_for_slots[CYCLE_LENGTH:] = get_new_shuffling(state.next_shuffling_seed, validators, start_shard)` and set `state.next_shuffling_seed = state.randao_mix`. Note that `start_shard` is not changed from last cycle.
* For any validator with index `v` with balance less than `MIN_ONLINE_DEPOSIT_SIZE` and status `ACTIVE`, run `exit_validator(v, state, block, penalize=False, current_slot=block.slot)`
We aim to have a STARK-friendly hash function `hash(x)` for the production launch of the beacon chain. While the standardisation process for a STARK-friendly hash function takes place—led by STARKware, who will produce a detailed report with recommendations—we use `BLAKE2b-512` as a placeholder. Specifically, we set `hash(x) := BLAKE2b-512(x)[0:32]` where the `BLAKE2b-512` algorithm is defined in [RFC 7693](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693) and the input `x` is of type `bytes`.
