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Stop changing the crystallized state in the RANDAO reveals.

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vbuterin 2018-10-11 13:06:37 -04:00 committed by GitHub
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specs/beacon-chain.md
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@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ The primary source of load on the beacon chain are "attestations". Attestations
| - | :-: |
| `LOGOUT` | `0` |
| `CASPER_SLASHING` | `1` |
| `RANDAO_CHANGE` | `2` |
**Validator set delta flags**
@ -604,7 +605,7 @@ Extend the list of `AttestationRecord` objects in the `active_state` with those
Let `proposer_index` be the validator index of the `parent.slot % len(get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(crystallized_state, parent.slot)[0].committee)`'th attester in `get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(crystallized_state, parent.slot)[0]`. Verify that an attestation from this validator is part of the first (ie. item 0 in the array) `AttestationRecord` object; this attester can be considered to be the proposer of the parent block. In general, when a block is produced, it is broadcasted at the network layer along with the attestation from its proposer.
Additionally, verify that `hash(block.randao_reveal) == crystallized_state.validators[proposer_index].randao_commitment`, and set `active_state.randao_mix = xor(active_state.randao_mix, block.randao_reveal)` and `crystallized_state.validators[proposer_index].randao_commitment = block.randao_reveal`.
Additionally, verify that `hash(block.randao_reveal) == crystallized_state.validators[proposer_index].randao_commitment`, and set `active_state.randao_mix = xor(active_state.randao_mix, block.randao_reveal)` and append to `ActiveState.pending_specials` a `SpecialObject(kind=RANDAO_CHANGE, data=[bytes8(proposer_index), block.randao_reveal])`.
### State recalculations (every `CYCLE_LENGTH` slots)
@ -663,14 +664,16 @@ In addition, validators with `status == PENALIZED` lose `B // reward_quotient +
For each `SpecialRecord` `obj` in `active_state.pending_specials`:
* **[covers logouts]**: If `obj.type == LOGOUT`, interpret `data[0]` as a validator index as an `int32` and `data[1]` as a signature. If `BLSVerify(pubkey=validators[data[0]].pubkey, msg=hash(LOGOUT_MESSAGE), sig=data[1])`, and `validators[i].status == ACTIVE`, set `validators[i].status = PENDING_EXIT` and `validators[i].exit_slot = current_slot`
* **[covers `NO_DBL_VOTE`, `NO_SURROUND`, `NO_DBL_PROPOSE` slashing conditions]:** If `obj.type == CASPER_SLASHING`, interpret `data[0]` as a list of concatenated `int32` values where each value represents an index into `validators`, `data[1]` as the data being signed and `data[2]` as an aggregate signature. Interpret `data[3:6]` similarly. Verify that both signatures are valid, that the two signatures are signing distinct data, and that they are either signing the same slot number, or that one surrounds the other (ie. `source1 < source2 < target2 < target1`). Let `indices` be the list of indices in both signatures; verify that its length is at least 1. For each validator index `v` in `indices`, if its `status` does not equal `PENALIZED`, then:
* **[covers logouts]**: If `obj.kind == LOGOUT`, interpret `data[0]` as a validator index as an `int32` and `data[1]` as a signature. If `BLSVerify(pubkey=validators[data[0]].pubkey, msg=hash(LOGOUT_MESSAGE), sig=data[1])`, and `validators[i].status == ACTIVE`, set `validators[i].status = PENDING_EXIT` and `validators[i].exit_slot = current_slot`
* **[covers `NO_DBL_VOTE`, `NO_SURROUND`, `NO_DBL_PROPOSE` slashing conditions]:** If `obj.kind == CASPER_SLASHING`, interpret `data[0]` as a list of concatenated `int32` values where each value represents an index into `validators`, `data[1]` as the data being signed and `data[2]` as an aggregate signature. Interpret `data[3:6]` similarly. Verify that both signatures are valid, that the two signatures are signing distinct data, and that they are either signing the same slot number, or that one surrounds the other (ie. `source1 < source2 < target2 < target1`). Let `indices` be the list of indices in both signatures; verify that its length is at least 1. For each validator index `v` in `indices`, if its `status` does not equal `PENALIZED`, then:
1. Set its `exit_slot` to equal the current `slot`
2. Set its `status` to `PENALIZED`
3. Set `crystallized_state.deposits_penalized_in_period[slot // WITHDRAWAL_PERIOD] += validators[v].balance`, extending the array if needed
4. Run `add_validator_set_change_record(crystallized_state, v, validators[v].pubkey, EXIT)`
* **[covers RANDAO updates]**: If `obj.kind == RANDAO_REVEAL`, interpret `data[0]` as an integer and `data[1]` as a hash32. Set `validators[data[0]].randao_commitment = data[1]`.
#### Finally...
* Set `crystallized_state.last_state_recalculation_slot += CYCLE_LENGTH`