54 KiB
Ethereum 2.0 Phase 0 -- The Beacon Chain
tags: spec
, eth2.0
, casper
, sharding
, beacon
NOTICE: This document is a work-in-progress for researchers and implementers. It reflects recent spec changes and takes precedence over the Python proof-of-concept implementation.
Introduction
This document represents the specification for Phase 0 of Ethereum 2.0 -- The Beacon Chain.
At the core of Ethereum 2.0 is a system chain called the "beacon chain". The beacon chain stores and manages the set of active proof-of-stake validators. In the initial deployment phases of Ethereum 2.0 the only mechanism to become a validator is to make a fixed-size one-way ETH deposit to a registration contract on the Ethereum 1.0 PoW chain. Induction as a validator happens after registration transaction receipts are processed by the beacon chain and after a queuing process. Deregistration is either voluntary or done forcibly as a penalty for misbehavior.
The primary source of load on the beacon chain are "attestations". Attestations simultaneously attest to a shard block and a corresponding beacon chain block. A sufficient number of attestations for the same shard block create a "crosslink", confirming the shard segment up to that shard block into the beacon chain. Crosslinks also serve as infrastructure for asynchronous cross-shard communication.
Terminology
- Validator - a participant in the Casper/sharding consensus system. You can become one by depositing 32 ETH into the Casper mechanism.
- Active validator set - those validators who are currently participating, and which the Casper mechanism looks to produce and attest to blocks, crosslinks and other consensus objects.
- Committee - a (pseudo-) randomly sampled subset of the active validator set. When a committee is referred to collectively, as in "this committee attests to X", this is assumed to mean "some subset of that committee that contains enough validators that the protocol recognizes it as representing the committee".
- Proposer - the validator that creates a beacon chain block
- Attester - a validator that is part of a committee that needs to sign off on a beacon chain block while simultaneously creating a link (crosslink) to a recent shard block on a particular shard chain.
- Beacon chain - the central PoS chain that is the base of the sharding system.
- Shard chain - one of the chains on which user transactions take place and account data is stored.
- Crosslink - a set of signatures from a committee attesting to a block in a shard chain, which can be included into the beacon chain. Crosslinks are the main means by which the beacon chain "learns about" the updated state of shard chains.
- Slot - a period of
SLOT_DURATION
seconds, during which one proposer has the ability to create a beacon chain block and some attesters have the ability to make attestations - Cycle - a span of slots during which all validators get exactly one chance to make an attestation
- Finalized, justified - see Casper FFG finalization here: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437
- Withdrawal period - number of slots between a validator exit and the validator balance being withdrawable
- Genesis time - the Unix time of the genesis beacon chain block at slot 0
Constants
Constant | Value | Unit | Approximation |
---|---|---|---|
SHARD_COUNT |
2**10 (= 1,024) | shards | |
DEPOSIT_SIZE |
2**5 (= 32) | ETH | |
MIN_ONLINE_DEPOSIT_SIZE |
2**4 (= 16) | ETH | |
GWEI_PER_ETH |
10**9 | Gwei/ETH | |
DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS |
TBD | - | |
TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE |
2**8 (= 256) | validators | |
GENESIS_TIME |
TBD | seconds | |
SLOT_DURATION |
6 | seconds | |
CYCLE_LENGTH |
2**6 (= 64) | slots | ~6 minutes |
MIN_VALIDATOR_SET_CHANGE_INTERVAL |
2**8 (= 256) | slots | ~25 minutes |
SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD |
2**17 (= 131,072) | slots | ~9 days |
MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY |
2**2 (= 4) | slots | ~24 seconds |
RANDAO_SLOTS_PER_LAYER |
2**12 (= 4096) | slots | ~7 hours |
SQRT_E_DROP_TIME |
2**18 (= 262,144) | slots | ~18 days |
WITHDRAWALS_PER_CYCLE |
2**2 (=4) | validators | 5.2m ETH in ~6 months |
MIN_WITHDRAWAL_PERIOD |
2**13 (= 8192) | slots | ~14 hours |
DELETION_PERIOD |
2**22 (= 4,194,304) | slots | ~290 days |
COLLECTIVE_PENALTY_CALCULATION_PERIOD |
2**20 (= 1,048,576) | slots | ~2.4 months |
SLASHING_WHISTLEBLOWER_REWARD_DENOMINATOR |
2**9 (= 512) | ||
BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT |
2**15 (= 32,768) | — | |
MAX_VALIDATOR_CHURN_QUOTIENT |
2**5 (= 32) | — | |
POW_HASH_VOTING_PERIOD |
2**10 (=1024) | - | |
POW_CONTRACT_MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH |
2**5 (=32) | - | |
LOGOUT_MESSAGE |
"LOGOUT" |
— | |
INITIAL_FORK_VERSION |
0 | — |
Notes
- See a recommended min committee size of 111 here https://vitalik.ca/files/Ithaca201807_Sharding.pdf); our algorithm will generally ensure the committee size is at least half the target.
- The
SQRT_E_DROP_TIME
constant is the amount of time it takes for the quadratic leak to cut deposits of non-participating validators by ~39.4%. - The
BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT
constant is the per-slot interest rate assuming all validators are participating, assuming total deposits of 1 ETH. It corresponds to ~3.88% annual interest assuming 10 million participating ETH. - At most
1/MAX_VALIDATOR_CHURN_QUOTIENT
of the validators can change during each validator set change.
Validator status codes
Name | Value |
---|---|
PENDING_ACTIVATION |
0 |
ACTIVE |
1 |
PENDING_EXIT |
2 |
PENDING_WITHDRAW |
3 |
WITHDRAWN |
4 |
PENALIZED |
127 |
Special record types
Name | Value | Maximum count |
---|---|---|
LOGOUT |
0 |
16 |
CASPER_SLASHING |
1 |
16 |
PROPOSER_SLASHING |
2 |
16 |
DEPOSIT_PROOF |
3 |
16 |
Validator set delta flags
Name | Value |
---|---|
ENTRY |
0 |
EXIT |
1 |
PoW chain registration contract
The initial deployment phases of Ethereum 2.0 are implemented without consensus changes to the PoW chain. A registration contract is added to the PoW chain to deposit ETH. This contract has a registration
function which takes as arguments pubkey
, withdrawal_shard
, withdrawal_address
, randao_commitment
as defined in a ValidatorRecord
below. A BLS proof_of_possession
of types bytes
is given as a final argument.
The registration contract emits a log with the various arguments for consumption by the beacon chain. It does not do validation, pushing the registration logic to the beacon chain. In particular, the proof of possession (based on the BLS12-381 curve) is not verified by the registration contract.
Data structures
Beacon chain blocks
A BeaconBlock
has the following fields:
{
# Slot number
'slot': 'uint64',
# Proposer RANDAO reveal
'randao_reveal': 'hash32',
# Recent PoW chain reference (receipt root)
'candidate_pow_receipt_root': 'hash32',
# Skip list of previous beacon block hashes
# i'th item is the most recent ancestor whose slot is a multiple of 2**i for i = 0, ..., 31
'ancestor_hashes': ['hash32'],
# State root
'state_root': 'hash32',
# Attestations
'attestations': [AttestationRecord],
# Specials (e.g. logouts, penalties)
'specials': [SpecialRecord],
# Proposer signature
'proposer_signature': ['uint256'],
}
An AttestationRecord
has the following fields:
{
# Slot number
'slot': 'uint64',
# Shard number
'shard': 'uint16',
# Beacon block hashes not part of the current chain, oldest to newest
'oblique_parent_hashes': ['hash32'],
# Shard block hash being attested to
'shard_block_hash': 'hash32',
# Last crosslink hash
'last_crosslink_hash': 'hash32',
# Root of data between last hash and this one
'shard_block_combined_data_root': 'hash32',
# Attester participation bitfield (1 bit per attester)
'attester_bitfield': 'bytes',
# Slot of last justified beacon block
'justified_slot': 'uint64',
# Hash of last justified beacon block
'justified_block_hash': 'hash32',
# BLS aggregate signature
'aggregate_sig': ['uint256']
}
A ProposalSignedData
has the following fields:
{
# Fork version
'fork_version': 'uint64',
# Slot number
'slot': 'uint64',
# Shard ID (or `2**64 - 1` for beacon chain)
'shard_id': 'uint64',
# Block hash
'block_hash': 'hash32',
}
An AttestationSignedData
has the following fields:
{
# Fork version
'fork_version': 'uint64',
# Slot number
'slot': 'uint64',
# Shard number
'shard': 'uint16',
# CYCLE_LENGTH parent hashes
'parent_hashes': ['hash32'],
# Shard block hash
'shard_block_hash': 'hash32',
# Last crosslink hash
'last_crosslink_hash': 'hash32',
# Root of data between last hash and this one
'shard_block_combined_data_root': 'hash32',
# Slot of last justified beacon block referenced in the attestation
'justified_slot': 'uint64'
}
A SpecialRecord
has the following fields:
{
# Kind
'kind': 'uint8',
# Data
'data': 'bytes'
}
Beacon chain state
The BeaconState
has the following fields:
{
# Slot of last validator set change
'validator_set_change_slot': 'uint64',
# List of validators
'validators': [ValidatorRecord],
# Most recent crosslink for each shard
'crosslinks': [CrosslinkRecord],
# Last cycle-boundary state recalculation
'last_state_recalculation_slot': 'uint64',
# Last finalized slot
'last_finalized_slot': 'uint64',
# Last justified slot
'last_justified_slot': 'uint64',
# Number of consecutive justified slots
'justified_streak': 'uint64',
# Committee members and their assigned shard, per slot
'shard_and_committee_for_slots': [[ShardAndCommittee]],
# Persistent shard committees
'persistent_committees': [['uint24']],
'persistent_committee_reassignments': [ShardReassignmentRecord],
# Randao seed used for next shuffling
'next_shuffling_seed': 'hash32',
# Total deposits penalized in the given withdrawal period
'deposits_penalized_in_period': ['uint64'],
# Hash chain of validator set changes (for light clients to easily track deltas)
'validator_set_delta_hash_chain': 'hash32'
# Current sequence number for withdrawals
'current_exit_seq': 'uint64',
# Genesis time
'genesis_time': 'uint64',
# PoW chain reference
'known_pow_receipt_root': 'hash32',
'candidate_pow_receipt_root': 'hash32',
'candidate_pow_receipt_root_votes': 'uint64',
# Parameters relevant to hard forks / versioning.
# Should be updated only by hard forks.
'pre_fork_version': 'uint64',
'post_fork_version': 'uint64',
'fork_slot_number': 'uint64',
# Attestations not yet processed
'pending_attestations': [AttestationRecord],
# recent beacon block hashes needed to process attestations, older to newer
'recent_block_hashes': ['hash32'],
# RANDAO state
'randao_mix': 'hash32'
}
A ValidatorRecord
has the following fields:
{
# BLS public key
'pubkey': 'uint256',
# Withdrawal shard number
'withdrawal_shard': 'uint16',
# Withdrawal address
'withdrawal_address': 'address',
# RANDAO commitment
'randao_commitment': 'hash32',
# Slot the RANDAO commitment was last changed
'randao_last_change': 'uint64',
# Balance in Gwei
'balance': 'uint64',
# Status code
'status': 'uint8',
# Slot when validator exited (or 0)
'exit_slot': 'uint64'
# Sequence number when validator exited (or 0)
'exit_seq': 'uint64'
}
A CrosslinkRecord
has the following fields:
{
# Slot number
'slot': 'uint64',
# Shard chain block hash
'shard_block_hash': 'hash32'
}
A ShardAndCommittee
object has the following fields:
{
# Shard number
'shard': 'uint16',
# Validator indices
'committee': ['uint24']
}
A ShardReassignmentRecord
object has the following fields:
{
# Which validator to reassign
'validator_index': 'uint24',
# To which shard
'shard': 'uint16',
# When
'slot': 'uint64'
}
Beacon chain processing
The beacon chain is the "main chain" of the PoS system. The beacon chain's main responsibilities are:
- Store and maintain the set of active, queued and exited validators
- Process crosslinks (see above)
- Process its own block-by-block consensus, as well as the finality gadget
Processing the beacon chain is fundamentally similar to processing a PoW chain in many respects. Clients download and process blocks, and maintain a view of what is the current "canonical chain", terminating at the current "head". However, because of the beacon chain's relationship with the existing PoW chain, and because it is a PoS chain, there are differences.
For a block on the beacon chain to be processed by a node, four conditions have to be met:
- The parent pointed to by the
ancestor_hashes[0]
has already been processed and accepted - An attestation from the proposer of the block (see later for definition) is included along with the block in the network message object
- The PoW chain block pointed to by the
pow_chain_reference
has already been processed and accepted - The node's local clock time is greater than or equal to the minimum timestamp as computed by
GENESIS_TIME + block.slot * SLOT_DURATION
If these conditions are not met, the client should delay processing the beacon block until the conditions are all satisfied.
Beacon block production is significantly different because of the proof of stake mechanism. A client simply checks what it thinks is the canonical chain when it should create a block, and looks up what its slot number is; when the slot arrives, it either proposes or attests to a block as required. Note that this requires each node to have a clock that is roughly (ie. within SLOT_DURATION
seconds) synchronized with the other nodes.
Beacon chain fork choice rule
The beacon chain uses the Casper FFG fork choice rule of "favor the chain containing the highest-slot-number justified block". To choose between chains that are all descended from the same justified block, the chain uses "immediate message driven GHOST" (IMD GHOST) to choose the head of the chain.
For a description see: https://ethresear.ch/t/beacon-chain-casper-ffg-rpj-mini-spec/2760
For an implementation with a network simulator see: https://github.com/ethereum/research/blob/master/clock_disparity/ghost_node.py
Here's an example of its working (green is finalized blocks, yellow is justified, grey is attestations):
Beacon chain state transition function
We now define the state transition function. At the high level, the state transition is made up of two parts:
- The per-block processing, which happens every block, and only affects a few parts of the
state
. - The inter-cycle state recalculation, which happens only if
block.slot >= last_state_recalculation_slot + CYCLE_LENGTH
, and affects the entirestate
.
The inter-cycle state recalculation generally focuses on changes to the validator set, including adjusting balances and adding and removing validators, as well as processing crosslinks and managing block justification/finalization, while the per-block processing generally focuses on verifying aggregate signatures and saving temporary records relating to the per-block activity in the BeaconState
.
Helper functions
Below are various helper functions.
The following is a function that gets active validator indices from the validator list:
def get_active_validator_indices(validators)
return [i for i, v in enumerate(validators) if v.status == ACTIVE]
The following is a function that shuffles the validator list:
def shuffle(values: List[Any],
seed: Hash32) -> List[Any]:
"""
Returns the shuffled ``values`` with seed as entropy.
"""
values_count = len(values)
# Entropy is consumed from the seed in 3-byte (24 bit) chunks.
rand_bytes = 3
# The highest possible result of the RNG.
rand_max = 2 ** (rand_bytes * 8) - 1
# The range of the RNG places an upper-bound on the size of the list that
# may be shuffled. It is a logic error to supply an oversized list.
assert values_count < rand_max
output = [x for x in values]
source = seed
index = 0
while index < values_count - 1:
# Re-hash the `source` to obtain a new pattern of bytes.
source = hash(source)
# Iterate through the `source` bytes in 3-byte chunks.
for position in range(0, 32 - (32 % rand_bytes), rand_bytes):
# Determine the number of indices remaining in `values` and exit
# once the last index is reached.
remaining = values_count - index
if remaining == 1:
break
# Read 3-bytes of `source` as a 24-bit big-endian integer.
sample_from_source = int.from_bytes(
source[position:position + rand_bytes], 'big'
)
# Sample values greater than or equal to `sample_max` will cause
# modulo bias when mapped into the `remaining` range.
sample_max = rand_max - rand_max % remaining
# Perform a swap if the consumed entropy will not cause modulo bias.
if sample_from_source < sample_max:
# Select a replacement index for the current index.
replacement_position = (sample_from_source % remaining) + index
# Swap the current index with the replacement index.
output[index], output[replacement_position] = output[replacement_position], output[index]
index += 1
else:
# The sample causes modulo bias. A new sample should be read.
pass
return output
Here's a function that splits a list into split_count
pieces:
def split(seq: List[Any], split_count: int) -> List[Any]:
"""
Returns the split ``seq`` in ``split_count`` pieces in protocol.
"""
list_length = len(seq)
return [
seq[(list_length * i // split_count): (list_length * (i + 1) // split_count)]
for i in range(split_count)
]
A helper method for readability:
def clamp(minval: int, maxval: int, x: int) -> int:
if x <= minval:
return minval
elif x >= maxval:
return maxval
else:
return x
Now, our combined helper method:
def get_new_shuffling(seed: Hash32,
validators: List[ValidatorRecord],
crosslinking_start_shard: int) -> List[List[ShardAndCommittee]]:
active_validators = get_active_validator_indices(validators)
committees_per_slot = clamp(
1,
SHARD_COUNT // CYCLE_LENGTH,
len(active_validators) // CYCLE_LENGTH // TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE,
)
output = []
# Shuffle with seed
shuffled_active_validator_indices = shuffle(active_validators, seed)
# Split the shuffled list into cycle_length pieces
validators_per_slot = split(shuffled_active_validator_indices, CYCLE_LENGTH)
for slot, slot_indices in enumerate(validators_per_slot):
# Split the shuffled list into committees_per_slot pieces
shard_indices = split(slot_indices, committees_per_slot)
shard_id_start = crosslinking_start_shard + slot * committees_per_slot
shards_and_committees_for_slot = [
ShardAndCommittee(
shard=(shard_id_start + shard_position) % SHARD_COUNT,
committee=indices
)
for shard_position, indices in enumerate(shard_indices)
]
output.append(shards_and_committees_for_slot)
return output
Here's a diagram of what's going on:
We also define two functions for retrieving data from the state:
def get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(state: BeaconState,
slot: int) -> List[ShardAndCommittee]:
earliest_slot_in_array = state.last_state_recalculation_slot - CYCLE_LENGTH
assert earliest_slot_in_array <= slot < earliest_slot_in_array + CYCLE_LENGTH * 2
return state.shard_and_committee_for_slots[slot - earliest_slot_in_array]
def get_block_hash(state: BeaconState,
current_block: BeaconBlock,
slot: int) -> Hash32:
earliest_slot_in_array = current_block.slot - len(state.recent_block_hashes)
assert earliest_slot_in_array <= slot < current_block.slot
return state.recent_block_hashes[slot - earliest_slot_in_array]
get_block_hash(_, _, s)
should always return the block hash in the beacon chain at slot s
, and get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(_, s)
should not change unless the validator set changes.
The following is a function that determines the proposer of a beacon block:
def get_beacon_proposer(state:BeaconState, slot: int) -> ValidatorRecord:
first_committee = get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(state, slot)[0]
index = first_committee[slot % len(first_committee)]
return state.validators[index]
We define another set of helpers to be used throughout: bytes1(x): return x.to_bytes(1, 'big')
, bytes2(x): return x.to_bytes(2, 'big')
, and so on for all integers, particularly 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 32.
We define a function to "add a link" to the validator hash chain, used when a validator is added or removed:
def add_validator_set_change_record(state: BeaconState,
index: int,
pubkey: int,
flag: int) -> None:
state.validator_set_delta_hash_chain = \
hash(state.validator_set_delta_hash_chain +
bytes1(flag) + bytes3(index) + bytes32(pubkey))
Finally, we abstractly define int_sqrt(n)
for use in reward/penalty calculations as the largest integer k
such that k**2 <= n
. Here is one possible implementation, though clients are free to use their own including standard libraries for integer square root if available and meet the specification.
def int_sqrt(n: int) -> int:
x = n
y = (x + 1) // 2
while y < x:
x = y
y = (x + n // x) // 2
return x
PoW chain contract
The beacon chain is initialized when a condition is met inside a contract on the existing PoW chain. This contract's code in Vyper is as follows:
HashChainValue: event({prev_tip: bytes32, data: bytes[2064], total_deposit_count: int128})
ChainStart: event({hash_chain_tip: bytes32, time: bytes[8]})
receipt_tree: bytes32[int128]
total_deposit_count: int128
@payable
@public
def deposit(deposit_params: bytes[2048]):
index:int128 = self.total_deposit_count + 2**POW_CONTRACT_MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH
msg_gwei_bytes8: bytes[8] = slice(as_bytes32(msg.value / 10**9), 24, 8)
timestamp_bytes8: bytes[8] = slice(s_bytes32(block.timestamp), 24, 8)
deposit_data: bytes[2064] = concat(deposit_params, msg_gwei_bytes8, timestamp_bytes8)
log.HashChainValue(self.receipt_tree[1], deposit_data, self.total_deposit_count)
self.receipt_tree[index] = sha3(deposit_data)
for i in range(POW_CONTRACT_MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH):
index //= 2
self.receipt_tree[index] = sha3(concat(self.receipt_tree[index * 2], self.receipt_tree[index * 2 + 1]))
self.total_deposit_count += 1
if self.total_deposit_count == 16384:
log.ChainStart(self.receipt_tree[1], timestamp_bytes8)
@public
@constant
def get_receipt_root() -> bytes32:
return self.receipt_tree[1]
The contract is at address DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS
. When a user wishes to become a validator by moving their ETH from the 1.0 chain to the 2.0 chain, they should call the deposit
function, sending along 32 ETH and providing as deposit_params
a SimpleSerialize'd DepositParams
object of the form:
{
'pubkey': 'int256',
'proof_of_possession': ['int256'],
'withdrawal_shard': 'int64',
'withdrawal_address`: 'bytes20',
'randao_commitment`: 'hash32'
}
If the user wishes to deposit more than DEPOSIT_SIZE
ETH, they would need to make multiple calls. When the contract publishes a ChainStart
log, this initializes the chain, calling on_startup
with:
initial_validator_entries
equal to the list of data records published as HashChainValue logs so far, in the order in which they were published (oldest to newest).genesis_time
equal to thetime
value published in the logpow_hash_chain_tip
equal to thehash_chain_tip
value published in the log
On startup
A valid block with slot 0
(the "genesis block") has the following values. Other validity rules (eg. requiring a signature) do not apply.
{
'slot': 0,
'randao_reveal': bytes32(0),
'candidate_pow_receipt_root': bytes32(0),
'ancestor_hashes': [bytes32(0) for i in range(32)],
'state_root': STARTUP_STATE_ROOT,
'attestations': [],
'specials': [],
'proposer_signature': [0, 0]
}
STARTUP_STATE_ROOT
is the root of the initial state, computed by running the following code:
def on_startup(initial_validator_entries: List[Any], genesis_time: uint64, pow_hash_chain_tip: Hash32) -> BeaconState:
# Induct validators
validators = []
for pubkey, proof_of_possession, withdrawal_shard, withdrawal_address, \
randao_commitment in initial_validator_entries:
add_validator(
validators=validators,
pubkey=pubkey,
proof_of_possession=proof_of_possession,
withdrawal_shard=withdrawal_shard,
withdrawal_address=withdrawal_address,
randao_commitment=randao_commitment,
current_slot=0,
status=ACTIVE,
)
# Setup state
x = get_new_shuffling(bytes([0] * 32), validators, 0)
crosslinks = [
CrosslinkRecord(
slot=0,
hash=bytes([0] * 32)
)
for i in range(SHARD_COUNT)
]
state = BeaconState(
validator_set_change_slot=0,
validators=validators,
crosslinks=crosslinks,
last_state_recalculation_slot=0,
last_finalized_slot=0,
last_justified_slot=0,
justified_streak=0,
shard_and_committee_for_slots=x + x,
persistent_committees=split(shuffle(validators, bytes([0] * 32)), SHARD_COUNT),
persistent_committee_reassignments=[],
deposits_penalized_in_period=[],
next_shuffling_seed=b'\x00'*32,
validator_set_delta_hash_chain=bytes([0] * 32), # stub
current_exit_seq=0,
genesis_time=genesis_time,
known_pow_hash_chain_tip=pow_hash_chain_tip,
processed_pow_hash_chain_tip=pow_hash_chain_tip,
candidate_pow_hash_chain_tip=bytes([0] * 32),
candidate_pow_hash_chain_tip_votes=0,
pre_fork_version=INITIAL_FORK_VERSION,
post_fork_version=INITIAL_FORK_VERSION,
fork_slot_number=0,
pending_attestations=[],
pending_specials=[],
recent_block_hashes=[bytes([0] * 32) for _ in range(CYCLE_LENGTH * 2)],
randao_mix=bytes([0] * 32) # stub
)
return state
The add_validator
routine is defined below.
Routine for adding a validator
This routine should be run for every validator that is inducted as part of a log created on the PoW chain [TODO: explain where to check for these logs]. The status of the validators added after genesis is PENDING_ACTIVATION
. These logs should be processed in the order in which they are emitted by the PoW chain.
First, a helper function:
def min_empty_validator(validators: List[ValidatorRecord], current_slot: int):
for i, v in enumerate(validators):
if v.status == WITHDRAWN and v.exit_slot <= current_slot - DELETION_PERIOD:
return i
return None
Now, to add a validator:
def add_validator(validators: List[ValidatorRecord],
pubkey: int,
proof_of_possession: bytes,
withdrawal_shard: int,
withdrawal_address: Address,
randao_commitment: Hash32,
status: int,
current_slot: int) -> int:
# if following assert fails, validator induction failed
# move on to next validator registration log
signed_message = as_bytes32(pubkey) + as_bytes2(withdrawal_shard) + withdrawal_address + randao_commitment
assert BLSVerify(pub=pubkey,
msg=hash(signed_message),
sig=proof_of_possession)
# Pubkey uniqueness
assert pubkey not in [v.pubkey for v in validators]
rec = ValidatorRecord(
pubkey=pubkey,
withdrawal_shard=withdrawal_shard,
withdrawal_address=withdrawal_address,
randao_commitment=randao_commitment,
randao_last_change=current_slot,
balance=DEPOSIT_SIZE * GWEI_PER_ETH,
status=status,
exit_slot=0,
exit_seq=0
)
index = min_empty_validator(validators)
if index is None:
validators.append(rec)
return len(validators) - 1
else:
validators[index] = rec
return index
Routine for removing a validator
def exit_validator(index, state, block, penalize, current_slot):
validator = state.validators[index]
validator.exit_slot = current_slot
validator.exit_seq = state.current_exit_seq
state.current_exit_seq += 1
if penalize:
validator.status = PENALIZED
whistleblower_xfer_amount = validator.deposit // SLASHING_WHISTLEBLOWER_REWARD_DENOMINATOR
validator.deposit -= whistleblower_xfer_amount
get_beacon_proposer(state, block.slot).deposit += whistleblower_xfer_amount
state.deposits_penalized_in_period[current_slot // COLLECTIVE_PENALTY_CALCULATION_PERIOD] += validator.balance
else:
validator.status = PENDING_EXIT
add_validator_set_change_record(state, index, validator.pubkey, EXIT)
On startup
Run the following code:
def on_startup(initial_validator_entries: List[Any]) -> BeaconState:
# Induct validators
validators = []
for pubkey, proof_of_possession, withdrawal_shard, withdrawal_address, \
randao_commitment in initial_validator_entries:
add_validator(
validators=validators,
pubkey=pubkey,
proof_of_possession=proof_of_possession,
withdrawal_shard=withdrawal_shard,
withdrawal_address=withdrawal_address,
randao_commitment=randao_commitment,
current_slot=0,
status=ACTIVE,
)
# Setup state
x = get_new_shuffling(bytes([0] * 32), validators, 0)
crosslinks = [
CrosslinkRecord(
slot=0,
hash=bytes([0] * 32)
)
for i in range(SHARD_COUNT)
]
state = BeaconState(
validator_set_change_slot=0,
validators=validators,
crosslinks=crosslinks,
last_state_recalculation_slot=0,
last_finalized_slot=0,
last_justified_slot=0,
justified_streak=0,
shard_and_committee_for_slots=x + x,
persistent_committees=split(shuffle(validators, bytes([0] * 32)), SHARD_COUNT),
persistent_committee_reassignments=[],
deposits_penalized_in_period=[],
next_shuffling_seed=b'\x00'*32,
validator_set_delta_hash_chain=bytes([0] * 32), # stub
pre_fork_version=INITIAL_FORK_VERSION,
post_fork_version=INITIAL_FORK_VERSION,
fork_slot_number=0,
pending_attestations=[],
recent_block_hashes=[bytes([0] * 32) for _ in range(CYCLE_LENGTH * 2)],
randao_mix=bytes([0] * 32) # stub
)
return state
Per-block processing
This procedure should be carried out every beacon block.
- Let
parent_hash
be the hash of the immediate previous beacon block (ie. equal toancestor_hashes[0]
). - Let
parent
be the beacon block with the hashparent_hash
First, set recent_block_hashes
to the output of the following:
def append_to_recent_block_hashes(old_block_hashes: List[Hash32],
parent_slot: int,
current_slot: int,
parent_hash: Hash32) -> List[Hash32]:
d = current_slot - parent_slot
return old_block_hashes + [parent_hash] * d
The output of get_block_hash
should not change, except that it will no longer throw for current_slot - 1
. Also, check that the block's ancestor_hashes
array was correctly updated, using the following algorithm:
def update_ancestor_hashes(parent_ancestor_hashes: List[Hash32],
parent_slot_number: int,
parent_hash: Hash32) -> List[Hash32]:
new_ancestor_hashes = copy.copy(parent_ancestor_hashes)
for i in range(32):
if parent_slot_number % 2**i == 0:
new_ancestor_hashes[i] = parent_hash
return new_ancestor_hashes
Verify attestations
For each AttestationRecord
object:
- Verify that
slot <= block.slot - MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY
andslot >= max(parent.slot - CYCLE_LENGTH + 1, 0)
. - Verify that
justified_slot
is equal to or earlier thanlast_justified_slot
. - Verify that
justified_block_hash
is the hash of the block in the current chain at the slot --justified_slot
. - Verify that either
last_crosslink_hash
orshard_block_hash
equalsstate.crosslinks[shard].shard_block_hash
. - Compute
parent_hashes
=[get_block_hash(state, block, slot - CYCLE_LENGTH + i) for i in range(1, CYCLE_LENGTH - len(oblique_parent_hashes) + 1)] + oblique_parent_hashes
(eg, ifCYCLE_LENGTH = 4
,slot = 5
, the actual block hashes starting from slot 0 areZ A B C D E F G H I J
, andoblique_parent_hashes = [D', E']
thenparent_hashes = [B, C, D' E']
). Note that when creating an attestation for a block, the hash of that block itself won't yet be in thestate
, so you would need to add it explicitly. - Let
attestation_indices
beget_shards_and_committees_for_slot(state, slot)[x]
, choosingx
so thatattestation_indices.shard
equals theshard
value provided to find the set of validators that is creating this attestation record. - Verify that
len(attester_bitfield) == ceil_div8(len(attestation_indices))
, whereceil_div8 = (x + 7) // 8
. Verify that bitslen(attestation_indices)....
and higher, if present (i.e.len(attestation_indices)
is not a multiple of 8), are all zero. - Derive a group public key by adding the public keys of all of the attesters in
attestation_indices
for whom the corresponding bit inattester_bitfield
(the ith bit is(attester_bitfield[i // 8] >> (7 - (i %8))) % 2
) equals 1. - Let
fork_version = pre_fork_version if slot < fork_slot_number else post_fork_version
. - Verify that
aggregate_sig
verifies using the group pubkey generated and the serialized form ofAttestationSignedData(fork_version, slot, shard, parent_hashes, shard_block_hash, last_crosslinked_hash, shard_block_combined_data_root, justified_slot)
as the message.
Extend the list of AttestationRecord
objects in the state
with those included in the block, ordering the new additions in the same order as they came in the block.
Verify proposer signature
Let proposal_hash = hash(ProposalSignedData(fork_version, block.slot, 2**64 - 1, block_hash_without_sig))
where block_hash_without_sig
is the hash of the block except setting proposer_signature
to [0, 0]
.
Verify that BLSVerify(pubkey=get_beacon_proposer(state, block.slot).pubkey, data=proposal_hash, sig=block.proposer_signature)
passes.
Verify and process RANDAO reveal
- Let
repeat_hash(x, n) = x if n == 0 else repeat_hash(hash(x), n-1)
. - Let `V = get_beacon_proposer(state, block.slot).
- Verify that
repeat_hash(block.randao_reveal, (block.slot - V.randao_last_change) // RANDAO_SLOTS_PER_LAYER + 1) == V.randao_commitment
- Set
state.randao_mix = xor(state.randao_mix, block.randao_reveal)
,V.randao_commitment = block.randao_reveal
,V.randao_last_change = block.slot
Finally, if block.candidate_pow_hash_chain_tip = state.candidate_pow_hash_chain_tip
, set state.candidate_hash_chain_tip_votes += 1
.
Process penalties, logouts and other special objects
Verify that the quantity of each type of object in block.specials
is less than or equal to its maximum (see table at the top). Verify that objects are sorted in order of kind
(ie. block.specials[i+1].kind >= block.specials[i].kind
for all 0 <= i < len(block.specials-1)
).
For each SpecialRecord
obj
in block.specials
, verify that its kind
is one of the below values, and that obj.data
deserializes according to the format for the given kind
, then process it. The word "verify" when used below means that if the given verification check fails, the block containing that SpecialRecord
is invalid.
LOGOUT
{
'validator_index': 'uint64',
'signature': '[uint256]'
}
Perform the following checks:
- Let
fork_version = pre_fork_version if block.slot < fork_slot_number else post_fork_version
. Verify thatBLSVerify(pubkey=validators[data.validator_index].pubkey, msg=hash(LOGOUT_MESSAGE + bytes8(fork_version)), sig=data.signature)
- Verify that
validators[validator_index].status == ACTIVE
.
Run exit_validator(data.validator_index, state, block, penalize=False, current_slot=block.slot)
.
CASPER_SLASHING
{
'vote1_aggregate_sig_indices': '[uint24]',
'vote1_data': AttestationSignedData,
'vote1_aggregate_sig': '[uint256]',
'vote2_aggregate_sig_indices': '[uint24]',
'vote2_data': AttestationSignedData,
'vote2_aggregate_sig': '[uint256]',
}
Perform the following checks:
- For each
aggregate_sig
, verify thatBLSVerify(pubkey=aggregate_pubkey([validators[i].pubkey for i in aggregate_sig_indices]), msg=vote_data, sig=aggsig)
passes. - Verify that
vote1_data != vote2_data
. - Let
intersection = [x for x in vote1_aggregate_sig_indices if x in vote2_aggregate_sig_indices]
. Verify thatlen(intersection) >= 1
. - Verify that
vote1_data.justified_slot < vote2_data.justified_slot < vote2_data.slot <= vote1_data.slot
.
For each validator index v
in intersection
, if state.validators[v].status
does not equal PENALIZED
, then run exit_validator(v, state, block, penalize=True, current_slot=block.slot)
PROPOSER_SLASHING
{
'proposer_index': 'uint24',
'proposal1_data': ProposalSignedData,
'proposal1_signature': '[uint256]',
'proposal2_data': ProposalSignedData,
'proposal1_signature': '[uint256]',
}
For each proposal_signature
, verify that BLSVerify(pubkey=validators[proposer_index].pubkey, msg=hash(proposal_data), sig=proposal_signature)
passes. Verify that proposal1_data.slot == proposal2_data.slot
but proposal1 != proposal2
. If state.validators[proposer_index].status
does not equal PENALIZED
, then run exit_validator(proposer_index, state, penalize=True, current_slot=block.slot)
DEPOSIT_PROOF
{
'merkle_branch': '[hash32]',
'merkle_tree_index': 'uint64',
'deposit_data': {
'deposit_params': DepositParams,
'msg_value': 'uint64',
'timestamp': 'uint64'
}
}
Note that deposit_data
in serialized form should be the DepositParams
followed by 8 bytes for the msg_value
and 8 bytes for the timestamp
, or exactly the deposit_data
in the PoW contract of which the hash was placed into the Merkle tree.
Use the following procedure to verify the merkle_branch
, setting leaf=serialized_deposit_data
, depth=POW_CONTRACT_MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH
and root=state.known_pow_receipt_root
:
def verify_merkle_branch(leaf: Hash32, branch: [Hash32], depth: int, index: int, root: Hash32) -> bool:
value = leaf
for i in range(depth):
if index % 2:
value = hash(branch[i], value)
else:
value = hash(value, branch[i])
return value == root
Verify that deposit_data.msg_value == DEPOSIT_SIZE
and block.slot - (deposit_data.timestamp - state.genesis_time) // SLOT_DURATION < DELETION_PERIOD
.
Run add_validator(validators, deposit_data.deposit_params.pubkey, deposit_data.deposit_params.proof_of_possession, deposit_data.deposit_params.withdrawal_shard, data.deposit_params.withdrawal_address, deposit_data.deposit_params.randao_commitment, PENDING_ACTIVATION, block.slot)
.
State recalculations (every CYCLE_LENGTH
slots)
Repeat while slot - last_state_recalculation_slot >= CYCLE_LENGTH
:
Adjust justified slots and crosslink status
For every slot s
in the range last_state_recalculation_slot - CYCLE_LENGTH ... last_state_recalculation_slot - 1
:
- Let
total_balance
be the total balance of active validators. - Let
total_balance_attesting_at_s
be the total balance of validators that attested to the beacon block at slots
. - If
3 * total_balance_attesting_at_s >= 2 * total_balance
setlast_justified_slot = max(last_justified_slot, s)
andjustified_streak += 1
. Otherwise setjustified_streak = 0
. - If
justified_streak >= CYCLE_LENGTH + 1
setlast_finalized_slot = max(last_finalized_slot, s - CYCLE_LENGTH - 1)
.
For every (shard, shard_block_hash)
tuple:
- Let
total_balance_attesting_to_h
be the total balance of validators that attested to the shard block with hashshard_block_hash
. - Let
total_committee_balance
be the total balance in the committee of validators that could have attested to the shard block with hashshard_block_hash
. - If
3 * total_balance_attesting_to_h >= 2 * total_committee_balance
, setcrosslinks[shard] = CrosslinkRecord(slot=last_state_recalculation_slot + CYCLE_LENGTH, hash=shard_block_hash)
.
Balance recalculations related to FFG rewards
Note: When applying penalties in the following balance recalculations implementers should make sure the uint64
does not underflow.
- Let
total_balance
be the total balance of active validators. - Let
total_balance_in_eth = total_balance // GWEI_PER_ETH
. - Let
reward_quotient = BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT * int_sqrt(total_balance_in_eth)
. (The per-slot maximum interest rate is1/reward_quotient
.) - Let
quadratic_penalty_quotient = SQRT_E_DROP_TIME**2
. (The portion lost by offline validators afterD
slots is aboutD*D/2/quadratic_penalty_quotient
.) - Let
time_since_finality = block.slot - last_finalized_slot
.
For every slot s
in the range last_state_recalculation_slot - CYCLE_LENGTH ... last_state_recalculation_slot - 1
:
- Let
total_balance_participating
be the total balance of validators that voted for the canonical beacon block at slots
. In the normal case every validator will be in one of theCYCLE_LENGTH
slots following slots
and so can vote for a block at slots
. - Let
B
be the balance of any given validator whose balance we are adjusting, not including any balance changes from this round of state recalculation. - If
time_since_finality <= 3 * CYCLE_LENGTH
adjust the balance of participating and non-participating validators as follows:- Participating validators gain
B // reward_quotient * (2 * total_balance_participating - total_balance) // total_balance
. (Note that this value may be negative.) - Non-participating validators lose
B // reward_quotient
.
- Participating validators gain
- Otherwise:
- Participating validators gain nothing.
- Non-participating validators lose
B // reward_quotient + B * time_since_finality // quadratic_penalty_quotient
.
In addition, validators with status == PENALIZED
lose B // reward_quotient + B * time_since_finality // quadratic_penalty_quotient
.
Balance recalculations related to crosslink rewards
For every shard number shard
for which a crosslink committee exists in the cycle prior to the most recent cycle (last_state_recalculation_slot - CYCLE_LENGTH ... last_state_recalculation_slot - 1
), let V
be the corresponding validator set. Let B
be the balance of any given validator whose balance we are adjusting, not including any balance changes from this round of state recalculation. For each shard
, V
:
- Let
total_balance_of_v
be the total balance ofV
. - Let
winning_shard_hash
be the hash that the largest total deposits signed for theshard
during the cycle. - Define a "participating validator" as a member of
V
that signed a crosslink ofwinning_shard_hash
. - Let
total_balance_of_v_participating
be the total balance of the subset ofV
that participated. - Let
time_since_last_confirmation = block.slot - crosslinks[shard].slot
. - Adjust balances as follows:
- Participating validators gain
B // reward_quotient * (2 * total_balance_of_v_participating - total_balance_of_v) // total_balance_of_v
. - Non-participating validators lose
B // reward_quotient
.
- Participating validators gain
PoW chain related rules
If last_state_recalculation_slot % POW_HASH_VOTING_PERIOD == 0
, then:
- If
state.candidate_hash_chain_tip_votes * 3 >= POW_HASH_VOTING_PERIOD * 2
, setstate.hash_chain_tip = state.candidate_hash_chain_tip
- Set
state.candidate_hash_chain_tip = block.candidate_pow_hash_chain_tip
- Set
state.candidate_hash_chain_tip_votes = 0
Validator set change
A validator set change can happen after a state recalculation if all of the following criteria are satisfied:
block.slot - state.validator_set_change_slot >= MIN_VALIDATOR_SET_CHANGE_INTERVAL
last_finalized_slot > state.validator_set_change_slot
- For every shard number
shard
inshard_and_committee_for_slots
,crosslinks[shard].slot > state.validator_set_change_slot
Then, run the following algorithm to update the validator set:
def change_validators(validators: List[ValidatorRecord], current_slot: int) -> None:
# The active validator set
active_validators = get_active_validator_indices(validators)
# The total balance of active validators
total_balance = sum([v.balance for i, v in enumerate(validators) if i in active_validators])
# The maximum total wei that can deposit+withdraw
max_allowable_change = max(
2 * DEPOSIT_SIZE * GWEI_PER_ETH,
total_balance // MAX_VALIDATOR_CHURN_QUOTIENT
)
# Go through the list start to end depositing+withdrawing as many as possible
total_changed = 0
for i in range(len(validators)):
if validators[i].status == PENDING_ACTIVATION:
validators[i].status = ACTIVE
total_changed += DEPOSIT_SIZE * GWEI_PER_ETH
add_validator_set_change_record(
state=state,
index=i,
pubkey=validators[i].pubkey,
flag=ENTRY
)
if validators[i].status == PENDING_EXIT:
validators[i].status = PENDING_WITHDRAW
validators[i].exit_slot = current_slot
total_changed += validators[i].balance
add_validator_set_change_record(
state=state,
index=i,
pubkey=validators[i].pubkey,
flag=EXIT
)
if total_changed >= max_allowable_change:
break
# Calculate the total ETH that has been penalized in the last ~2-3 withdrawal periods
period_index = current_slot // COLLECTIVE_PENALTY_CALCULATION_PERIOD
total_penalties = (
(state.deposits_penalized_in_period[period_index]) +
(state.deposits_penalized_in_period[period_index - 1] if period_index >= 1 else 0) +
(state.deposits_penalized_in_period[period_index - 2] if period_index >= 2 else 0)
)
# Separate loop to withdraw validators that have been logged out for long enough, and
# calculate their penalties if they were slashed
def withdrawable(v):
return v.status in (PENDING_WITHDRAW, PENALIZED) and current_slot >= v.exit_slot + MIN_WITHDRAWAL_PERIOD
withdrawable_validators = sorted(filter(withdrawable, validators), key=lambda v: v.exit_seq)
for v in withdrawable_validators[:WITHDRAWALS_PER_CYCLE]:
if v.status == PENALIZED:
v.balance -= v.balance * min(total_penalties * 3, total_balance) // total_balance
v.status = WITHDRAWN
v.exit_slot = current_slot
withdraw_amount = v.balance
...
# STUB: withdraw to shard chain
- Set
state.validator_set_change_slot = state.last_state_recalculation_slot
- Set
shard_and_committee_for_slots[:CYCLE_LENGTH] = shard_and_committee_for_slots[CYCLE_LENGTH:]
- Let
next_start_shard = (shard_and_committee_for_slots[-1][-1].shard + 1) % SHARD_COUNT
- Set
shard_and_committee_for_slots[CYCLE_LENGTH:] = get_new_shuffling(state.next_shuffling_seed, validators, next_start_shard)
- Set
state.next_shuffling_seed = state.randao_mix
If a validator set change does NOT happen
- Set
shard_and_committee_for_slots[:CYCLE_LENGTH] = shard_and_committee_for_slots[CYCLE_LENGTH:]
- Let
time_since_finality = block.slot - state.validator_set_change_slot
- Let
start_shard = shard_and_committee_for_slots[0][0].shard
- If
time_since_finality * CYCLE_LENGTH <= MIN_VALIDATOR_SET_CHANGE_INTERVAL
ortime_since_finality
is an exact power of 2, setshard_and_committee_for_slots[CYCLE_LENGTH:] = get_new_shuffling(state.next_shuffling_seed, validators, start_shard)
and setstate.next_shuffling_seed = state.randao_mix
. Note thatstart_shard
is not changed from last cycle.
Finally...
- Remove all attestation records older than slot
state.last_state_recalculation_slot
- Empty the
state.pending_specials
list - For any validator with index
v
with balance less thanMIN_ONLINE_DEPOSIT_SIZE
and statusACTIVE
, runexit_validator(v, state, block, penalize=False, current_slot=block.slot)
- Set
state.recent_block_hashes = state.recent_block_hashes[CYCLE_LENGTH:]
- Set
state.last_state_recalculation_slot += CYCLE_LENGTH
For any validator that was added or removed from the active validator list during this state recalculation:
- If the validator was removed, remove their index from the
persistent_committees
and remove anyShardReassignmentRecord
s containing their index frompersistent_committee_reassignments
. - If the validator was added with index
validator_index
:- let
assigned_shard = hash(state.randao_mix + bytes8(validator_index)) % SHARD_COUNT
- let
reassignment_record = ShardReassignmentRecord(validator_index=validator_index, shard=assigned_shard, slot=block.slot + SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD)
- Append
reassignment_record
to the end ofpersistent_committee_reassignments
- let
Now run the following code to reshuffle a few proposers:
active_validator_indices = get_active_validator_indices(validators)
num_validators_to_reshuffle = len(active_validator_indices) // SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD
for i in range(num_validators_to_reshuffle):
# Multiplying i to 2 to ensure we have different input to all the required hashes in the shuffling
# and none of the hashes used for entropy in this loop will be the same
vid = active_validator_indices[hash(state.randao_mix + bytes8(i * 2)) % len(active_validator_indices)]
new_shard = hash(state.randao_mix + bytes8(i * 2 + 1)) % SHARD_COUNT
shard_reassignment_record = ShardReassignmentRecord(
validator_index=vid,
shard=new_shard,
slot=block.slot + SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD
)
state.persistent_committee_reassignments.append(shard_reassignment_record)
while len(state.persistent_committee_reassignments) > 0 and state.persistent_committee_reassignments[0].slot <= block.slot:
rec = state.persistent_committee_reassignments.pop(0)
for committee in state.persistent_committees:
if rec.validator_index in committee:
committee.pop(
committee.index(rec.validator_index)
)
state.persistent_committees[rec.shard].append(rec.validator_index)
TODO
Note: This spec is ~65% complete.
Missing
- Specify the rules around acceptable values for
pow_chain_reference
(issue 58) - Specify the shard chain blocks, blobs, proposers, etc.
- Specify the deposit contract on the PoW chain in Vyper
- Specify the beacon chain genesis rules (issue 58)
- Specify the logic for proofs of custody, including slashing conditions
- Specify BLSVerify and rework the spec for BLS12-381 throughout
- Specify the constraints for
SpecialRecord
s (issue 43) - Specify the calculation and validation of
BeaconBlock.state_root
- Undergo peer review, security audits and formal verification
Documentation
- Specify the various assumptions (global clock, networking latency, validator honesty, validator liveness, etc.)
- Add an appendix on gossip networks and the offchain signature aggregation logic
- Add a glossary (in a separate
glossary.md
) to comprehensively and precisely define all the terms - Clearly document the various edge cases, e.g. with committee sizing
- Rework the document for readability
Possible modifications and additions
- Replace the IMD fork choice rule with LMD
- Homogenise types to
uint64
(PR 36) - Reduce the slot duration to 8 seconds
- Allow for the delayed inclusion of aggregated signatures
- Introduce a RANDAO slashing condition for early reveals
- Use a separate hash function for the proof of possession
- Rework the
ShardAndCommittee
data structures - Add a double-batched Merkle accumulator for historical beacon chain blocks
- Allow for deposits larger than 32 ETH, as well as deposit top-ups
- Add penalties for deposits below 32 ETH (or some other threshold)
- Add a
SpecialRecord
to (re)register
Appendix
Appendix A - Hash function
We aim to have a STARK-friendly hash function hash(x)
for the production launch of the beacon chain. While the standardisation process for a STARK-friendly hash function takes place—led by STARKware, who will produce a detailed report with recommendations—we use BLAKE2b-512
as a placeholder. Specifically, we set hash(x) := BLAKE2b-512(x)[0:32]
where the BLAKE2b-512
algorithm is defined in RFC 7693 and the input x
is of type bytes
.
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.