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eth2.0-specs/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md

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Deneb -- Networking

This document contains the consensus-layer networking specification for Deneb.

The specification of these changes continues in the same format as the network specifications of previous upgrades, and assumes them as pre-requisite.

Table of contents

Modifications in Deneb

Constant

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

Preset

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

Name Value Description
KZG_COMMITMENT_INCLUSION_PROOF_DEPTH uint64(floorlog2(get_generalized_index(BeaconBlockBody, 'blob_kzg_commitments')) + 1 + ceillog2(MAX_BLOB_COMMITMENTS_PER_BLOCK)) (= 17) Merkle proof depth for blob_kzg_commitments list item

Configuration

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

Name Value Description
MAX_REQUEST_BLOCKS_DENEB 2**7 (= 128) Maximum number of blocks in a single request
MAX_REQUEST_BLOB_SIDECARS MAX_REQUEST_BLOCKS_DENEB * MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK Maximum number of blob sidecars in a single request
MIN_EPOCHS_FOR_BLOB_SIDECARS_REQUESTS 2**12 (= 4096 epochs, ~18 days) The minimum epoch range over which a node must serve blob sidecars
BLOB_SIDECAR_SUBNET_COUNT 6 The number of blob sidecar subnets used in the gossipsub protocol.

Containers

BlobSidecar

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

class BlobSidecar(Container):
    index: BlobIndex  # Index of blob in block
    blob: Blob
    kzg_commitment: KZGCommitment
    kzg_proof: KZGProof  # Allows for quick verification of kzg_commitment
    signed_block_header: SignedBeaconBlockHeader
    kzg_commitment_inclusion_proof: Vector[Bytes32, KZG_COMMITMENT_INCLUSION_PROOF_DEPTH]

BlobIdentifier

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

class BlobIdentifier(Container):
    block_root: Root
    index: BlobIndex

Helpers

verify_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof
def verify_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(blob_sidecar: BlobSidecar) -> bool:
    gindex = get_subtree_index(get_generalized_index(BeaconBlockBody, 'blob_kzg_commitments', blob_sidecar.index))
    return is_valid_merkle_branch(
        leaf=blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment.hash_tree_root(),
        branch=blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment_inclusion_proof,
        depth=KZG_COMMITMENT_INCLUSION_PROOF_DEPTH,
        index=gindex,
        root=blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.message.body_root,
    )

The gossip domain: gossipsub

Some gossip meshes are upgraded in the fork of Deneb to support upgraded types.

Topics and messages

Topics follow the same specification as in prior upgrades.

The beacon_block topic is modified to also support Deneb blocks and new topics are added per table below.

The voluntary_exit topic is implicitly modified despite the lock-in use of CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION for this message signature validation for EIP-7044.

The beacon_aggregate_and_proof and beacon_attestation_{subnet_id} topics are modified to support the gossip of attestations created in epoch N to be gossiped through the entire range of slots in epoch N+1 rather than only through one epoch of slots for EIP-7045.

The specification around the creation, validation, and dissemination of messages has not changed from the Capella document unless explicitly noted here.

The derivation of the message-id remains stable.

The new topics along with the type of the data field of a gossipsub message are given in this table:

Name Message Type
blob_sidecar_{subnet_id} BlobSidecar [New in Deneb:EIP4844]
Global topics
beacon_block

The type of the payload of this topic changes to the (modified) SignedBeaconBlock found in Deneb.

[Modified in Deneb:EIP4844]

New validation:

  • [REJECT] The length of KZG commitments is less than or equal to the limitation defined in Consensus Layer -- i.e. validate that len(body.signed_beacon_block.message.blob_kzg_commitments) <= MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK
beacon_aggregate_and_proof

[Modified in Deneb:EIP7045]

The following validation is removed:

  • [IGNORE] aggregate.data.slot is within the last ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE slots (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. aggregate.data.slot + ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot >= aggregate.data.slot (a client MAY queue future aggregates for processing at the appropriate slot).

The following validations are added in its place:

  • [IGNORE] aggregate.data.slot is equal to or earlier than the current_slot (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. aggregate.data.slot <= current_slot (a client MAY queue future aggregates for processing at the appropriate slot).
  • [IGNORE] the epoch of aggregate.data.slot is either the current or previous epoch (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot) in (get_previous_epoch(state), get_current_epoch(state))
Blob subnets
blob_sidecar_{subnet_id}

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

This topic is used to propagate blob sidecars, where each blob index maps to some subnet_id.

The following validations MUST pass before forwarding the blob_sidecar on the network, assuming the alias block_header = blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.message:

  • [REJECT] The sidecar's index is consistent with MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK -- i.e. blob_sidecar.index < MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK.
  • [REJECT] The sidecar is for the correct subnet -- i.e. compute_subnet_for_blob_sidecar(blob_sidecar.index) == subnet_id.
  • [IGNORE] The sidecar is not from a future slot (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. validate that block_header.slot <= current_slot (a client MAY queue future sidecars for processing at the appropriate slot).
  • [IGNORE] The sidecar is from a slot greater than the latest finalized slot -- i.e. validate that block_header.slot > compute_start_slot_at_epoch(store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)
  • [REJECT] The proposer signature of blob_sidecar.signed_block_header, is valid with respect to the block_header.proposer_index pubkey.
  • [IGNORE] The sidecar's block's parent (defined by block_header.parent_root) has been seen (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue sidecars for processing once the parent block is retrieved).
  • [REJECT] The sidecar's block's parent (defined by block_header.parent_root) passes validation.
  • [REJECT] The sidecar is from a higher slot than the sidecar's block's parent (defined by block_header.parent_root).
  • [REJECT] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the sidecar's block -- i.e. get_checkpoint_block(store, block_header.parent_root, store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root.
  • [REJECT] The sidecar's inclusion proof is valid as verified by verify_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(blob_sidecar).
  • [REJECT] The sidecar's blob is valid as verified by verify_blob_kzg_proof(blob_sidecar.blob, blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment, blob_sidecar.kzg_proof).
  • [IGNORE] The sidecar is the first sidecar for the tuple (block_header.slot, block_header.proposer_index, blob_sidecar.index) with valid header signature, sidecar inclusion proof, and kzg proof.
  • [REJECT] The sidecar is proposed by the expected proposer_index for the block's slot in the context of the current shuffling (defined by block_header.parent_root/block_header.slot). If the proposer_index cannot immediately be verified against the expected shuffling, the sidecar MAY be queued for later processing while proposers for the block's branch are calculated -- in such a case do not REJECT, instead IGNORE this message.
Attestation subnets
beacon_attestation_{subnet_id}

[Modified in Deneb:EIP7045]

The following validation is removed:

  • [IGNORE] attestation.data.slot is within the last ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE slots (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. attestation.data.slot + ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot >= attestation.data.slot (a client MAY queue future attestations for processing at the appropriate slot).

The following validations are added in its place:

  • [IGNORE] attestation.data.slot is equal to or earlier than the current_slot (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. attestation.data.slot <= current_slot (a client MAY queue future attestation for processing at the appropriate slot).
  • [IGNORE] the epoch of attestation.data.slot is either the current or previous epoch (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot) in (get_previous_epoch(state), get_current_epoch(state))

Transitioning the gossip

See gossip transition details found in the Altair document for details on how to handle transitioning gossip topics for this upgrade.

The Req/Resp domain

Messages

BeaconBlocksByRange v2

Protocol ID: /eth2/beacon_chain/req/beacon_blocks_by_range/2/

The Deneb fork-digest is introduced to the context enum to specify Deneb beacon block type.

Per context = compute_fork_digest(fork_version, genesis_validators_root):

fork_version Chunk SSZ type
GENESIS_FORK_VERSION phase0.SignedBeaconBlock
ALTAIR_FORK_VERSION altair.SignedBeaconBlock
BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION bellatrix.SignedBeaconBlock
CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION capella.SignedBeaconBlock
DENEB_FORK_VERSION deneb.SignedBeaconBlock

No more than MAX_REQUEST_BLOCKS_DENEB may be requested at a time.

BeaconBlocksByRoot v2

Protocol ID: /eth2/beacon_chain/req/beacon_blocks_by_root/2/

Per context = compute_fork_digest(fork_version, genesis_validators_root):

fork_version Chunk SSZ type
GENESIS_FORK_VERSION phase0.SignedBeaconBlock
ALTAIR_FORK_VERSION altair.SignedBeaconBlock
BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION bellatrix.SignedBeaconBlock
CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION capella.SignedBeaconBlock
DENEB_FORK_VERSION deneb.SignedBeaconBlock

No more than MAX_REQUEST_BLOCKS_DENEB may be requested at a time.

[Modified in Deneb:EIP4844] Clients SHOULD include a block in the response as soon as it passes the gossip validation rules. Clients SHOULD NOT respond with blocks that fail the beacon chain state transition.

BlobSidecarsByRoot v1

Protocol ID: /eth2/beacon_chain/req/blob_sidecars_by_root/1/

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

The <context-bytes> field is calculated as context = compute_fork_digest(fork_version, genesis_validators_root):

fork_version Chunk SSZ type
DENEB_FORK_VERSION deneb.BlobSidecar

Request Content:

(
  List[BlobIdentifier, MAX_REQUEST_BLOB_SIDECARS]
)

Response Content:

(
  List[BlobSidecar, MAX_REQUEST_BLOB_SIDECARS]
)

Requests sidecars by block root and index. The response is a list of BlobSidecar whose length is less than or equal to the number of requests. It may be less in the case that the responding peer is missing blocks or sidecars.

Before consuming the next response chunk, the response reader SHOULD verify the blob sidecar is well-formatted, has valid inclusion proof, and is correct w.r.t. the expected KZG commitments through verify_blob_kzg_proof.

No more than MAX_REQUEST_BLOB_SIDECARS may be requested at a time.

BlobSidecarsByRoot is primarily used to recover recent blobs (e.g. when receiving a block with a transaction whose corresponding blob is missing).

The response MUST consist of zero or more response_chunk. Each successful response_chunk MUST contain a single BlobSidecar payload.

Clients MUST support requesting sidecars since minimum_request_epoch, where minimum_request_epoch = max(finalized_epoch, current_epoch - MIN_EPOCHS_FOR_BLOB_SIDECARS_REQUESTS, DENEB_FORK_EPOCH). If any root in the request content references a block earlier than minimum_request_epoch, peers MAY respond with error code 3: ResourceUnavailable or not include the blob sidecar in the response.

Clients MUST respond with at least one sidecar, if they have it. Clients MAY limit the number of blocks and sidecars in the response.

Clients SHOULD include a sidecar in the response as soon as it passes the gossip validation rules. Clients SHOULD NOT respond with sidecars related to blocks that fail gossip validation rules. Clients SHOULD NOT respond with sidecars related to blocks that fail the beacon chain state transition

BlobSidecarsByRange v1

Protocol ID: /eth2/beacon_chain/req/blob_sidecars_by_range/1/

[New in Deneb:EIP4844]

The <context-bytes> field is calculated as context = compute_fork_digest(fork_version, genesis_validators_root):

fork_version Chunk SSZ type
DENEB_FORK_VERSION deneb.BlobSidecar

Request Content:

(
  start_slot: Slot
  count: uint64
)

Response Content:

(
  List[BlobSidecar, MAX_REQUEST_BLOB_SIDECARS]
)

Requests blob sidecars in the slot range [start_slot, start_slot + count), leading up to the current head block as selected by fork choice.

Before consuming the next response chunk, the response reader SHOULD verify the blob sidecar is well-formatted, has valid inclusion proof, and is correct w.r.t. the expected KZG commitments through verify_blob_kzg_proof.

BlobSidecarsByRange is primarily used to sync blobs that may have been missed on gossip and to sync within the MIN_EPOCHS_FOR_BLOB_SIDECARS_REQUESTS window.

The request MUST be encoded as an SSZ-container.

The response MUST consist of zero or more response_chunk. Each successful response_chunk MUST contain a single BlobSidecar payload.

Let blob_serve_range be [max(current_epoch - MIN_EPOCHS_FOR_BLOB_SIDECARS_REQUESTS, DENEB_FORK_EPOCH), current_epoch]. Clients MUST keep a record of blob sidecars seen on the epoch range blob_serve_range where current_epoch is defined by the current wall-clock time, and clients MUST support serving requests of blobs on this range.

Peers that are unable to reply to blob sidecar requests within the range blob_serve_range SHOULD respond with error code 3: ResourceUnavailable. Such peers that are unable to successfully reply to this range of requests MAY get descored or disconnected at any time.

Note: The above requirement implies that nodes that start from a recent weak subjectivity checkpoint MUST backfill the local blobs database to at least the range blob_serve_range to be fully compliant with BlobSidecarsByRange requests.

Note: Although clients that bootstrap from a weak subjectivity checkpoint can begin participating in the networking immediately, other peers MAY disconnect and/or temporarily ban such an un-synced or semi-synced client.

Clients MUST respond with at least the blob sidecars of the first blob-carrying block that exists in the range, if they have it, and no more than MAX_REQUEST_BLOB_SIDECARS sidecars.

Clients MUST include all blob sidecars of each block from which they include blob sidecars.

The following blob sidecars, where they exist, MUST be sent in consecutive (slot, index) order.

Slots that do not contain known blobs MUST be skipped, mimicking the behaviour of the BlocksByRange request. Only response chunks with known blobs should therefore be sent.

Clients MAY limit the number of blob sidecars in the response.

The response MUST contain no more than count * MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK blob sidecars.

Clients MUST respond with blob sidecars from their view of the current fork choice -- that is, blob sidecars as included by blocks from the single chain defined by the current head. Of note, blocks from slots before the finalization MUST lead to the finalized block reported in the Status handshake.

Clients MUST respond with blob sidecars that are consistent from a single chain within the context of the request.

After the initial blob sidecar, clients MAY stop in the process of responding if their fork choice changes the view of the chain in the context of the request.

Design decision rationale

Why are blobs relayed as a sidecar, separate from beacon blocks?

This "sidecar" design provides forward compatibility for further data increases by black-boxing is_data_available(): with full sharding is_data_available() can be replaced by data-availability-sampling (DAS) thus avoiding all blobs being downloaded by all beacon nodes on the network.

Such sharding design may introduce an updated BlobSidecar to identify the shard, but does not affect the BeaconBlock structure.