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# Ethereum 2.0 Phase 1 -- Custody Game
**Notice**: This document is a work-in-progress for researchers and implementers.
## Table of contents
<!-- TOC -->
- [Ethereum 2.0 Phase 1 -- Custody Game](#ethereum-20-phase-1----custody-game)
- [Table of contents](#table-of-contents)
- [Introduction](#introduction)
- [Terminology](#terminology)
- [Constants](#constants)
- [Misc](#misc)
- [Time parameters](#time-parameters)
- [Max operations per block](#max-operations-per-block)
- [Reward and penalty quotients](#reward-and-penalty-quotients)
- [Signature domains](#signature-domains)
- [Data structures](#data-structures)
- [Custody objects](#custody-objects)
- [`CustodyChunkChallenge`](#custodychunkchallenge)
- [`CustodyBitChallenge`](#custodybitchallenge)
- [`CustodyChunkChallengeRecord`](#custodychunkchallengerecord)
- [`CustodyBitChallengeRecord`](#custodybitchallengerecord)
- [`CustodyResponse`](#custodyresponse)
- [New beacon operations](#new-beacon-operations)
- [`CustodyKeyReveal`](#custodykeyreveal)
- [`EarlyDerivedSecretReveal`](#earlyderivedsecretreveal)
- [Phase 0 container updates](#phase-0-container-updates)
- [`Validator`](#validator)
- [`BeaconState`](#beaconstate)
- [`BeaconBlockBody`](#beaconblockbody)
- [Helpers](#helpers)
- [`typeof`](#typeof)
- [`empty`](#empty)
- [`get_crosslink_chunk_count`](#get_crosslink_chunk_count)
- [`get_custody_chunk_bit`](#get_custody_chunk_bit)
- [`get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period`](#get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period)
- [`get_validators_custody_reveal_period`](#get_validators_custody_reveal_period)
- [`get_chunk_bits_root`](#get_chunk_bits_root)
- [`replace_empty_or_append`](#replace_empty_or_append)
- [Per-block processing](#per-block-processing)
- [Operations](#operations)
- [Custody key reveals](#custody-key-reveals)
- [Early derived secret reveals](#early-derived-secret-reveals)
- [Chunk challenges](#chunk-challenges)
- [Bit challenges](#bit-challenges)
- [Custody responses](#custody-responses)
- [Per-epoch processing](#per-epoch-processing)
- [Handling of custody-related deadlines](#handling-of-custody-related-deadlines)
<!-- /TOC -->
## Introduction
This document details the beacon chain additions and changes in Phase 1 of Ethereum 2.0 to support the shard data custody game, building upon the [Phase 0](0_beacon-chain.md) specification.
## Terminology
* **Custody game**—
* **Custody period**—
* **Custody chunk**—
* **Custody chunk bit**—
* **Custody chunk challenge**—
* **Custody bit**—
* **Custody bit challenge**—
* **Custody key**—
* **Custody key reveal**—
* **Custody key mask**—
* **Custody response**—
* **Custody response deadline**—
## Constants
### Misc
| Name | Value |
| - | - |
| `BYTES_PER_SHARD_BLOCK` | `2**14` (= 16,384) |
| `BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK` | `2**9` (= 512) |
| `MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**8` (= 256) |
### Time parameters
| Name | Value | Unit | Duration |
| - | - | :-: | :-: |
| `MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days |
| `CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE` | `2**14` (= 16,384) | epochs | ~73 days |
| `RANDAO_PENALTY_EPOCHS` | `2**1` (= 2) | epochs | 12.8 minutes |
| `EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS` | `2**14` | epochs | ~73 days |
| `EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days |
| `CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days |
| `MAX_REVEAL_LATENESS_DECREMENT` | `2**7` (= 128) | epochs | ~14 hours |
### Max operations per block
| Name | Value |
| - | - |
| `MAX_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEALS` | `2**4` (= 16) |
| `MAX_EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEALS` | `1` |
| `MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNK_CHALLENGES` | `2**2` (= 4) |
| `MAX_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGES` | `2**2` (= 4) |
| `MAX_CUSTODY_RESPONSES` | `2**5` (= 32) |
### Reward and penalty quotients
| Name | Value |
| - | - |
| `EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEAL_SLOT_REWARD_MULTIPLE` | `2**1` (= 2) |
### Signature domains
| Name | Value |
| - | - |
| `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE` | `6` |
## Data structures
### Custody objects
#### `CustodyChunkChallenge`
```python
{
'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
'attestation': Attestation,
'chunk_index': 'uint64',
}
```
#### `CustodyBitChallenge`
```python
{
'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
'attestation': Attestation,
'challenger_index': ValidatorIndex,
'responder_key': BLSSignature,
'chunk_bits': Bitfield,
'signature': BLSSignature,
}
```
#### `CustodyChunkChallengeRecord`
```python
{
'challenge_index': 'uint64',
'challenger_index': ValidatorIndex,
'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
'deadline': Epoch,
'data_root': Hash,
'depth': 'uint64',
'chunk_index': 'uint64',
}
```
#### `CustodyBitChallengeRecord`
```python
{
'challenge_index': 'uint64',
'challenger_index': ValidatorIndex,
'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
'deadline': Epoch,
'data_root': Hash,
'chunk_count': 'uint64',
'chunk_bits_merkle_root': Hash,
'responder_key': BLSSignature,
}
```
#### `CustodyResponse`
```python
{
'challenge_index': 'uint64',
'chunk_index': 'uint64',
'chunk': ['byte', BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK],
'data_branch': [Hash],
'chunk_bits_branch': [Hash],
'chunk_bits_leaf': Hash,
}
```
### New beacon operations
#### `CustodyKeyReveal`
```python
{
# Index of the validator whose key is being revealed
'revealer_index': 'uint64',
# Reveal (masked signature)
'reveal': 'bytes96',
}
```
#### `EarlyDerivedSecretReveal`
Represents an early (punishable) reveal of one of the derived secrets, where derived secrets are RANDAO reveals and custody reveals (both are part of the same domain).
```python
{
# Index of the validator whose key is being revealed
'revealed_index': 'uint64',
# RANDAO epoch of the key that is being revealed
'epoch': 'uint64',
# Reveal (masked signature)
'reveal': 'bytes96',
# Index of the validator who revealed (whistleblower)
'masker_index': 'uint64',
# Mask used to hide the actual reveal signature (prevent reveal from being stolen)
'mask': 'bytes32',
}
```
### Phase 0 container updates
Add the following fields to the end of the specified container objects. Fields with underlying type `uint64` are initialized to `0` and list fields are initialized to `[]`.
#### `Validator`
```python
# next_custody_reveal_period is initialized to the custody period
# (of the particular validator) in which the validator is activated
# = get_validators_custody_reveal_period(...)
'next_custody_reveal_period': 'uint64',
'max_reveal_lateness': 'uint64',
```
#### `BeaconState`
```python
'custody_chunk_challenge_records': [CustodyChunkChallengeRecord],
'custody_bit_challenge_records': [CustodyBitChallengeRecord],
'custody_challenge_index': 'uint64',
# Future derived secrets already exposed; contains the indices of the exposed validator
# at RANDAO reveal period % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS
'exposed_derived_secrets': [['uint64'], EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS],
```
#### `BeaconBlockBody`
```python
'custody_chunk_challenges': [CustodyChunkChallenge],
'custody_bit_challenges': [CustodyBitChallenge],
'custody_responses': [CustodyResponse],
'custody_key_reveals': [CustodyKeyReveal],
'early_derived_secret_reveals': [EarlyDerivedSecretReveal],
```
## Helpers
### `typeof`
The `typeof` function accepts and SSZ object as a single input and returns the corresponding SSZ type.
### `empty`
The `empty` function accepts and SSZ type as input and returns an object of that type with all fields initialized to default values.
### `get_crosslink_chunk_count`
```python
def get_custody_chunk_count(attestation: Attestation) -> int:
crosslink_start_epoch = attestation.data.latest_crosslink.epoch
crosslink_end_epoch = slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot)
crosslink_crosslink_length = min(MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK, end_epoch - start_epoch)
chunks_per_epoch = 2 * BYTES_PER_SHARD_BLOCK * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH // BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK
return crosslink_crosslink_length * chunks_per_epoch
```
### `get_custody_chunk_bit`
```python
def get_custody_chunk_bit(key: BLSSignature, chunk: bytes) -> bool:
# TODO: Replace with something MPC-friendly, e.g. the Legendre symbol
return get_bitfield_bit(hash(challenge.responder_key + chunk), 0)
```
### `get_chunk_bits_root`
```python
def get_chunk_bits_root(chunk_bitfield: Bitfield) -> Bytes32:
aggregated_bits = bytearray([0] * 32)
for i in range(0, len(chunk_bitfield), 32):
for j in range(32):
aggregated_bits[j] ^= chunk_bitfield[i+j]
return hash(aggregated_bits)
```
### `get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period`
```python
def get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period(period: int, validator_index: ValidatorIndex) -> Epoch:
next_period_start = (period + 1) * EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD - validator_index % EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD
return next_period_start + CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING
```
### `get_validators_custody_reveal_period`
```python
def get_validators_custody_reveal_period(state: BeaconState,
validator_index: ValidatorIndex,
epoch: Epoch=None) -> int:
'''
This function returns the reveal period for a given validator.
If no epoch is supplied, the current epoch is assumed.
Note: This function implicitly requires that validators are not removed from the
validator set in fewer than EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD epochs
'''
epoch = get_current_epoch(state) if epoch is None else epoch
return (epoch + validator_index % EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD) // EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD
```
### `replace_empty_or_append`
```python
def replace_empty_or_append(list: List[Any], new_element: Any) -> int:
for i in range(len(list)):
if list[i] == empty(typeof(new_element)):
list[i] = new_element
return i
list.append(new_element)
return len(list) - 1
```
## Per-block processing
### Operations
Add the following operations to the per-block processing, in the order given below and after all other operations in Phase 0.
#### Custody key reveals
Verify that `len(block.body.custody_key_reveals) <= MAX_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEALS`.
For each `reveal` in `block.body.custody_key_reveals`, run the following function:
```python
def process_custody_key_reveal(state: BeaconState,
reveal: CustodyKeyReveal) -> None:
"""
Process ``CustodyKeyReveal`` operation.
Note that this function mutates ``state``.
"""
revealer = state.validator_registry[reveal.revealer_index]
epoch_to_sign = get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period(revealer.next_custody_reveal_period, reveal.revealed_index)
assert revealer.next_custody_reveal_period < get_validators_custody_reveal_period(state, reveal.revealed_index)
# Revealed validator is active or exited, but not withdrawn
assert is_slashable_validator(revealer, get_current_epoch(state))
# Verify signature
assert bls_verify(
pubkey=revealer.pubkey,
message_hash=hash_tree_root(epoch_to_sign),
signature=reveal.reveal,
domain=get_domain(
state=state,
domain_type=DOMAIN_RANDAO,
message_epoch=epoch_to_sign,
),
)
# Decrement max reveal lateness if response is timely
if revealer.next_custody_reveal_period == get_validators_custody_reveal_period(state, reveal.revealer_index) - 2:
revealer.max_reveal_lateness -= MAX_REVEAL_LATENESS_DECREMENT
revealer.max_reveal_lateness = max(revealed_validator.max_reveal_lateness, get_validators_custody_reveal_period(state, reveal.revealed_index) - revealer.next_custody_reveal_period)
# Process reveal
revealer.next_custody_reveal_period += 1
# Reward Block Preposer
proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state)
increase_balance(state, proposer_index, base_reward(state, index) // MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT)
```
##### Early derived secret reveals
Verify that `len(block.body.early_derived_secret_reveals) <= MAX_EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEALS`.
For each `reveal` in `block.body.early_derived_secret_reveals`, run the following function:
```python
def process_early_derived_secret_reveal(state: BeaconState,
reveal: EarlyDerivedSecretReveal) -> None:
"""
Process ``EarlyDerivedSecretReveal`` operation.
Note that this function mutates ``state``.
"""
revealed_validator = state.validator_registry[reveal.revealed_index]
masker = state.validator_registry[reveal.masker_index]
assert reveal.epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) + RANDAO_PENALTY_EPOCHS
assert reveal.epoch < get_current_epoch(state) + EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS
assert revealed_validator.slashed is False
assert reveal.revealed_index not in state.exposed_derived_secrets[reveal.epoch % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS]
# Verify signature correctness
masker = state.validator_registry[reveal.masker_index]
pubkeys = [revealed_validator.pubkey, masker.pubkey]
message_hashes = [
hash_tree_root(reveal.epoch),
reveal.mask,
]
assert bls_verify_multiple(
pubkeys=pubkeys,
message_hashes=message_hashes,
signature=reveal.reveal,
domain=get_domain(
state=state,
domain_type=DOMAIN_RANDAO,
message_epoch=reveal.epoch,
),
)
if reveal.epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) + CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING:
# Full slashing when the secret was revealed so early it may be a valid custody
# round key
slash_validator(state, reveal.revealed_index, reveal.masker_index)
else:
# Only a small penalty proportional to proposer slot reward for RANDAO reveal
# that does not interfere with the custody period
# The penalty is proportional to the max proposer reward
# Calculate penalty
max_proposer_slot_reward = (
get_base_reward(state, reveal.revealed_index) *
SLOTS_PER_EPOCH //
len(get_active_validator_indices(state, get_current_epoch(state))) //
PROPOSER_REWARD_QUOTIENT
)
penalty = max_proposer_slot_reward * EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEAL_SLOT_REWARD_MULTIPLE * (len(state.exposed_derived_secrets[reveal.epoch % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS]) + 1)
# Apply penalty
proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state)
whistleblower_index = reveal.masker_index
whistleblowing_reward = penalty // WHISTLEBLOWING_REWARD_QUOTIENT
proposer_reward = whistleblowing_reward // PROPOSER_REWARD_QUOTIENT
increase_balance(state, proposer_index, proposer_reward)
increase_balance(state, whistleblower_index, whistleblowing_reward - proposer_reward)
decrease_balance(state, reveal.revealed_index, penalty)
# Mark this derived secret as exposed so validator cannot be punished repeatedly
state.exposed_derived_secrets[reveal.epoch % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS].append(reveal.revealed_index)
```
#### Chunk challenges
Verify that `len(block.body.custody_chunk_challenges) <= MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNK_CHALLENGES`.
For each `challenge` in `block.body.custody_chunk_challenges`, run the following function:
```python
def process_chunk_challenge(state: BeaconState,
challenge: CustodyChunkChallenge) -> None:
# Verify the attestation
assert verify_indexed_attestation(state, convert_to_indexed(state, challenge.attestation))
# Verify it is not too late to challenge
assert slot_to_epoch(challenge.attestation.data.slot) >= get_current_epoch(state) - MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY
responder = state.validator_registry[challenge.responder_index]
assert responder.exit_epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) - MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY
# Verify the responder participated in the attestation
attesters = get_attesting_indices(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield)
assert challenge.responder_index in attesters
# Verify the challenge is not a duplicate
for record in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records:
assert (
record.data_root != challenge.attestation.data.crosslink.data_root or
record.chunk_index != challenge.chunk_index
)
# Verify depth
depth = math.log2(next_power_of_two(get_custody_chunk_count(challenge.attestation)))
assert challenge.chunk_index < 2**depth
# Add new chunk challenge record
new_record = CustodyChunkChallengeRecord(
challenge_index=state.custody_challenge_index,
challenger_index=get_beacon_proposer_index(state),
responder_index=challenge.responder_index
deadline=get_current_epoch(state) + CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE,
data_root=challenge.attestation.data.crosslink.data_root,
depth=depth,
chunk_index=challenge.chunk_index,
)
replace_empty_or_append(state.custody_chunk_challenge_records, new_record)
state.custody_challenge_index += 1
# Postpone responder withdrawability
responder.withdrawable_epoch = FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH
```
#### Bit challenges
Verify that `len(block.body.custody_bit_challenges) <= MAX_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGES`.
For each `challenge` in `block.body.custody_bit_challenges`, run the following function:
```python
def process_bit_challenge(state: BeaconState,
challenge: CustodyBitChallenge) -> None:
# Verify challenge signature
challenger = state.validator_registry[challenge.challenger_index]
assert bls_verify(
pubkey=challenger.pubkey,
message_hash=signing_root(challenge),
signature=challenge.signature,
domain=get_domain(state, get_current_epoch(state), DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE),
)
assert is_slashable_validator(challenger, get_current_epoch(state))
# Verify the attestation
assert verify_indexed_attestation(state, convert_to_indexed(state, challenge.attestation))
# Verify the attestation is eligible for challenging
responder = state.validator_registry[challenge.responder_index]
assert (slot_to_epoch(challenge.attestation.data.slot) + responder.max_reveal_lateness <=
get_validators_custody_reveal_period(state, challenge.responder_index))
# Verify the responder participated in the attestation
attesters = get_attesting_indices(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield)
assert challenge.responder_index in attesters
# A validator can be the challenger or responder for at most one challenge at a time
for record in state.custody_bit_challenge_records:
assert record.challenger_index != challenge.challenger_index
assert record.responder_index != challenge.responder_index
# Verify the responder is a valid custody key
epoch_to_sign = get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period(
get_validators_custody_reveal_period(
state=state,
index=challenge.responder_index,
epoch=slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot),
challenge.responder_index
)
assert bls_verify(
pubkey=responder.pubkey,
message_hash=hash_tree_root(epoch_to_sign),
signature=challenge.responder_key,
domain=get_domain(
state=state,
domain_type=DOMAIN_RANDAO,
message_epoch=epoch_to_sign,
),
)
# Verify the chunk count
chunk_count = get_custody_chunk_count(challenge.attestation)
assert verify_bitfield(challenge.chunk_bits, chunk_count)
# Verify the first bit of the hash of the chunk bits does not equal the custody bit
custody_bit = get_bitfield_bit(attestation.custody_bitfield, attesters.index(responder_index))
assert custody_bit != get_bitfield_bit(get_chunk_bits_root(challenge.chunk_bits), 0)
# Add new bit challenge record
new_record = CustodyBitChallengeRecord(
challenge_index=state.custody_challenge_index,
challenger_index=challenge.challenger_index,
responder_index=challenge.responder_index,
deadline=get_current_epoch(state) + CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE,
data_root=challenge.attestation.data.crosslink.data_root,
chunk_count=chunk_count,
chunk_bits_merkle_root=merkle_root(pad_to_power_of_2((challenge.chunk_bits))),
responder_key=challenge.responder_key,
)
replace_empty_or_append(state.custody_bit_challenge_records, new_record)
state.custody_challenge_index += 1
# Postpone responder withdrawability
responder.withdrawable_epoch = FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH
```
#### Custody responses
Verify that `len(block.body.custody_responses) <= MAX_CUSTODY_RESPONSES`.
For each `response` in `block.body.custody_responses`, run the following function:
```python
def process_custody_response(state: BeaconState,
response: CustodyResponse) -> None:
chunk_challenge = next(record for record in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records if record.challenge_index == response.challenge_index, None)
if chunk_challenge is not None:
return process_chunk_challenge_response(state, response, chunk_challenge)
bit_challenge = next(record for record in state.custody_bit_challenge_records if record.challenge_index == response.challenge_index, None)
if bit_challenge is not None:
return process_bit_challenge_response(state, response, bit_challenge)
assert False
```
```python
def process_chunk_challenge_response(state: BeaconState,
response: CustodyResponse,
challenge: CustodyChunkChallengeRecord) -> None:
# Verify chunk index
assert response.chunk_index == challenge.chunk_index
# Verify bit challenge data is null
assert response.chunk_bits_branch == [] and response.chunk_bits_leaf == ZERO_HASH
# Verify the chunk matches the crosslink data root
assert verify_merkle_branch(
leaf=hash_tree_root(response.chunk),
branch=response.data_branch,
depth=challenge.depth,
index=response.chunk_index,
root=challenge.data_root,
)
# Clear the challenge
records = state.custody_chunk_challenge_records
records[records.index(challenge)] = CustodyChunkChallengeRecord()
# Reward the proposer
proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state)
increase_balance(state, proposer_index, base_reward(state, index) // MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT)
```
```python
def process_bit_challenge_response(state: BeaconState,
response: CustodyResponse,
challenge: CustodyBitChallengeRecord) -> None:
# Verify chunk index
assert response.chunk_index < challenge.chunk_count
# Verify the chunk matches the crosslink data root
assert verify_merkle_branch(
leaf=hash_tree_root(response.chunk),
branch=response.data_branch,
depth=math.log2(next_power_of_two(challenge.chunk_count)),
index=response.chunk_index,
root=challenge.data_root,
)
# Verify the chunk bit leaf matches the challenge data
assert verify_merkle_branch(
leaf=response.chunk_bits_leaf,
branch=response.chunk_bits_branch,
depth=math.log2(next_power_of_two(challenge.chunk_count) // 256),
index=response.chunk_index // 256,
root=challenge.chunk_bits_merkle_root
)
# Verify the chunk bit does not match the challenge chunk bit
assert get_custody_chunk_bit(challenge.responder_key, response.chunk) != get_bitfield_bit(challenge.chunk_bits_leaf, response.chunk_index % 256)
# Clear the challenge
records = state.custody_bit_challenge_records
records[records.index(challenge)] = CustodyBitChallengeRecord()
# Slash challenger
slash_validator(state, challenge.challenger_index, challenge.responder_index)
```
## Per-epoch processing
### Handling of custody-related deadlines
Run `process_reveal_deadlines(state)` immediately after `process_ejections(state)`:
```python
def process_reveal_deadlines(state: BeaconState) -> None:
for index, validator in enumerate(state.validator_registry):
if (validator.latest_custody_reveal_period +
(CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE // EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD) <
get_validators_custody_reveal_period(state, index)):
slash_validator(state, index)
```
Run `process_challenge_deadlines(state)` immediately after `process_reveal_deadlines(state)`:
```python
def process_challenge_deadlines(state: BeaconState) -> None:
for challenge in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records:
if get_current_epoch(state) > challenge.deadline:
slash_validator(state, challenge.responder_index, challenge.challenger_index)
records = state.custody_chunk_challenge_records
records[records.index(challenge)] = CustodyChunkChallengeRecord()
for challenge in state.custody_bit_challenge_records:
if get_current_epoch(state) > challenge.deadline:
slash_validator(state, challenge.responder_index, challenge.challenger_index)
records = state.custody_bit_challenge_records
records[records.index(challenge)] = CustodyBitChallengeRecord()
```
Append this to `process_final_updates(state)`:
```python
# Clean up exposed RANDAO key reveals
state.exposed_derived_secrets[current_epoch % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS] = []
```
In `process_penalties_and_exits`, change the definition of `eligible` to the following (note that it is not a pure function because `state` is declared in the surrounding scope):
```python
def eligible(state: BeaconState, index: ValidatorIndex) -> bool:
validator = state.validator_registry[index]
# Cannot exit if there are still open chunk challenges
if len([record for record in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records if record.responder_index == index]) > 0:
return False
# Cannot exit if there are still open bit challenges
if len([record for record in state.custody_bit_challenge_records if record.responder_index == index]) > 0:
return False
# Cannot exit if you have not revealed all of your custody keys
elif validator.next_custody_reveal_period <= get_validators_custody_reveal_period(state, index, validator.exit_epoch):
return False
# Cannot exit if you already have
elif validator.withdrawable_epoch < FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH:
return False
# Return minimum time
else:
return current_epoch >= validator.exit_epoch + MIN_VALIDATOR_WITHDRAWAL_EPOCHS
```
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