**NOTICE**: This document is a work-in-progress for researchers and implementers. It reflects recent spec changes and takes precedence over the [Python proof-of-concept implementation](https://github.com/ethereum/beacon_chain).
At the center of Ethereum 2.0 is a system chain called the "beacon chain". The beacon chain stores and manages the set of active proof-of-stake validators. In the initial deployment phases of Ethereum 2.0 the only mechanism to become a validator is to make a fixed-size one-way ETH deposit to a registration contract on the Ethereum 1.0 PoW chain. Induction as a validator happens after registration transaction receipts are processed by the beacon chain and after a queuing process. Deregistration is either voluntary or done forcibly as a penalty for misbehavior.
The primary source of load on the beacon chain are "attestations". Attestations simultaneously attest to a shard block and a corresponding beacon chain block. A sufficient number of attestations for the same shard block create a "crosslink", confirming the shard segment up to that shard block into the beacon chain. Crosslinks also serve as infrastructure for asynchronous cross-shard communication.
* **Validator** - a participant in the Casper/sharding consensus system. You can become one by depositing 32 ETH into the Casper mechanism.
* **Active validator set** - those validators who are currently participating, and which the Casper mechanism looks to produce and attest to blocks, crosslinks and other consensus objects.
* **Committee** - a (pseudo-) randomly sampled subset of the active validator set. When a committee is referred to collectively, as in "this committee attests to X", this is assumed to mean "some subset of that committee that contains enough validators that the protocol recognizes it as representing the committee".
* **Proposer** - the validator that creates a block
* **Attester** - a validator that is part of a committee that needs to sign off on a block.
* **Beacon chain** - the central PoS chain that is the base of the sharding system.
* **Crosslink** - a set of signatures from a committee attesting to a block in a shard chain, which can be included into the beacon chain. Crosslinks are the main means by which the beacon chain "learns about" the updated state of shard chains.
* **Slot** - a period of `SLOT_DURATION` seconds, during which one proposer has the ability to create a block and some attesters have the ability to make attestations
* **Cycle** - a span of blocks during which all validators get exactly one chance to make an attestation (unless a validator set change happens inside of one)
* The `SQRT_E_DROP_TIME` constant is the amount of time it takes for the quadratic leak to cut deposits of non-participating validators by ~39.4%.
* The `BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT` constant is the per-slot interest rate assuming all validators are participating, assuming total deposits of 1 ETH. It corresponds to ~3.88% annual interest assuming 10 million participating ETH.
The initial deployment phases of Ethereum 2.0 are implemented without consensus changes to the PoW chain. A registration contract is added to the PoW chain to deposit ETH. This contract has a `registration` function which takes as arguments `pubkey`, `withdrawal_shard`, `withdrawal_address`, `randao_commitment` as defined in a `ValidatorRecord` below. A BLS `proof_of_possession` of types `bytes` is given as a final argument.
The registration contract emits a log with the various arguments for consumption by the beacon chain. It does not do validation, pushing the registration logic to the beacon chain. In particular, the proof of possession (based on the BLS12-381 curve) is not verified by the registration contract.
Processing the beacon chain is fundamentally similar to processing a PoW chain in many respects. Clients download and process blocks, and maintain a view of what is the current "canonical chain", terminating at the current "head". However, because of the beacon chain's relationship with the existing PoW chain, and because it is a PoS chain, there are differences.
For a block on the beacon chain to be processed by a node, four conditions have to be met:
Block production is significantly different because of the proof of stake mechanism. A client simply checks what it thinks is the canonical chain when it should create a block, and looks up what its slot number is; when the slot arrives, it either proposes or attests to a block as required. Note that this requires each node to have a clock that is roughly (ie. within `SLOT_DURATION` seconds) synchronized with the other nodes.
The beacon chain uses the Casper FFG fork choice rule of "favor the chain containing the highest-slot-number justified block". To choose between chains that are all descended from the same justified block, the chain uses "immediate message driven GHOST" (IMD GHOST) to choose the head of the chain.
For a description see: **https://ethresear.ch/t/beacon-chain-casper-ffg-rpj-mini-spec/2760**
For an implementation with a network simulator see: **https://github.com/ethereum/research/blob/master/clock_disparity/ghost_node.py**
Here's an example of its working (green is finalized blocks, yellow is justified, grey is attestations):
![](https://vitalik.ca/files/RPJ.png)
## Beacon chain state transition function
We now define the state transition function. At the high level, the state transition is made up of two parts:
2. The crystallized state recalculation, which happens only if `block.slot >= last_state_recalculation_slot + CYCLE_LENGTH`, and affects the `CrystallizedState` and `ActiveState`
The crystallized state recalculation generally focuses on changes to the validator set, including adjusting balances and adding and removing validators, as well as processing crosslinks and managing block justification, and the per-block processing generally focuses on verifying aggregate signatures and saving temporary records relating to the in-block activity in the `ActiveState`.
### Helper functions
We start off by defining some helper algorithms. First, the function that selects the active validators:
`get_block_hash(_, _, s)` should always return the block in the chain at slot `s`, and `get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(_, s)` should not change unless the validator set changes.
Finally, we abstractly define `int_sqrt(n)` for use in reward/penalty calculations as the largest integer `k` such that `k**2 <= n`. Here is one possible implementation, though clients are free to use their own including standard libraries for [integer square root](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integer_square_root) if available and meet the specification.
The `CrystallizedState()` and `ActiveState()` constructors should initialize all values to zero bytes, an empty value or an empty array depending on context. The `add_validator` routine is defined below.
This routine should be run for every validator that is inducted as part of a log created on the PoW chain [TODO: explain where to check for these logs]. These logs should be processed in the order in which they are emitted by the PoW chain. Define `min_empty_validator(validators)` as a function that returns the lowest validator index `i` such that `validators[i].status == WITHDRAWN`, otherwise `None`.
First, set `recent_block_hashes` to the output of the following, where `parent_hash` is the hash of the immediate previous block (ie. must be equal to `ancestor_hashes[0]`):
The output of `get_block_hash` should not change, except that it will no longer throw for `current_slot - 1`, and will now throw for `current_slot - CYCLE_LENGTH * 2 - 1`. Also, check that the block's `ancestor_hashes` array was correctly updated, using the following algorithm:
* Verify that the `justified_slot` and `justified_block_hash` given are in the chain and are equal to or earlier than the `last_justified_slot` in the crystallized state.
* Compute `parent_hashes` = `[get_block_hash(active_state, block, slot - CYCLE_LENGTH + i) for i in range(1, CYCLE_LENGTH - len(oblique_parent_hashes) + 1)] + oblique_parent_hashes` (eg, if `CYCLE_LENGTH = 4`, `slot = 5`, the actual block hashes starting from slot 0 are `Z A B C D E F G H I J`, and `oblique_parent_hashes = [D', E']` then `parent_hashes = [B, C, D' E']`). Note that when *creating* an attestation for a block, the hash of that block itself won't yet be in the `active_state`, so you would need to add it explicitly.
* Let `attestation_indices` be `get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(crystallized_state, slot)[x]`, choosing `x` so that `attestation_indices.shard` equals the `shard` value provided to find the set of validators that is creating this attestation record.
* Verify that `len(attester_bitfield) == ceil_div8(len(attestation_indices))`, where `ceil_div8 = (x + 7) // 8`. Verify that bits `len(attestation_indices)....` and higher, if present (i.e. `len(attestation_indices)` is not a multiple of 8), are all zero
* Derive a group public key by adding the public keys of all of the attesters in `attestation_indices` for whom the corresponding bit in `attester_bitfield` (the ith bit is `(attester_bitfield[i // 8] >> (7 - (i %8))) % 2`) equals 1
* Verify that `aggregate_sig` verifies using the group pubkey generated and the serialized form of `AttestationSignedData(version, slot, shard, parent_hashes, shard_block_hash, justified_slot)` as the message.
Extend the list of `AttestationRecord` objects in the `active_state` with those included in the block, ordering the new additions in the same order as they came in the block. Similarly extend the list of `SpecialRecord` objects in the `active_state` with those included in the block.
Let `curblock_proposer_index` be the validator index of the `block.slot % len(get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(crystallized_state, block.slot)[0].committee)`'th attester in `get_shards_and_committees_for_slot(crystallized_state, block.slot)[0]`, and `parent_proposer_index` be the validator index of the parent block, calculated similarly. Verify that an attestation from the `parent_proposer_index`'th validator is part of the first (ie. item 0 in the array) `AttestationRecord` object; this attester can be considered to be the proposer of the parent block. In general, when a block is produced, it is broadcasted at the network layer along with the attestation from its proposer.
* Verify that `repeat_hash(block.randao_reveal, (block.slot - V.randao_last_reveal) // RANDAO_SLOTS_PER_LAYER + 1) == V.randao_commitment`, and set `active_state.randao_mix = xor(active_state.randao_mix, block.randao_reveal)` and append to `ActiveState.pending_specials` a `SpecialObject(kind=RANDAO_CHANGE, data=[bytes8(curblock_proposer_index), block.randao_reveal])`.
* Let `total_committee_balance` be the total balance in the committee of validators that could have attested to the shard block with hash `shard_block_hash`.
* Let `quadratic_penalty_quotient = SQRT_E_DROP_TIME**2`. (The portion lost by offline validators after `D` slots is about `D*D/2/quadratic_penalty_quotient`.)
* Let `time_since_finality = block.slot - last_finalized_slot`.
* Let `total_balance_participating` be the total balance of validators that voted for the canonical beacon chain block at slot `s`. In the normal case every validator will be in one of the `CYCLE_LENGTH` slots following slot `s` and so can vote for a block at slot `s`.
* Let `B` be the balance of any given validator whose balance we are adjusting, not including any balance changes from this round of state recalculation.
* If `time_since_finality <= 3 * CYCLE_LENGTH` adjust the balance of participating and non-participating validators as follows:
* Participating validators gain `B // reward_quotient * (2 * total_balance_participating - total_balance) // total_balance`. (Note that this value may be negative.)
For every shard number `shard` for which a crosslink committee exists in the cycle prior to the most recent cycle (`last_state_recalculation_slot - CYCLE_LENGTH ... last_state_recalculation_slot - 1`), let `V` be the corresponding validator set. Let `B` be the balance of any given validator whose balance we are adjusting, not including any balance changes from this round of state recalculation. For each `shard`, `V`:
In addition, validators with `status == PENALIZED` lose `B // reward_quotient + B * sum([time_since_last_confirmation(c) for c in committees]) // len(committees) // quadratic_penalty_quotient`, where `committees` is the set of committees processed and `time_since_last_confirmation(c)` is the value of `time_since_last_confirmation` in committee `c`.
* **[covers logouts]**: If `obj.kind == LOGOUT`, interpret `data[0]` as a validator index as an `int32` and `data[1]` as a signature. If `BLSVerify(pubkey=validators[data[0]].pubkey, msg=hash(LOGOUT_MESSAGE + bytes8(version)), sig=data[1])`, where `version = pre_fork_version if slot < fork_slot_number else post_fork_version`, and `validators[i].status == ACTIVE`, run `exit_validator(data[0], crystallized_state, penalize=False, current_slot=block.slot)`
* **[covers `NO_DBL_VOTE`, `NO_SURROUND`, `NO_DBL_PROPOSE` slashing conditions]:** If `obj.kind == CASPER_SLASHING`, interpret `data[0]` as a list of concatenated `int32` values where each value represents an index into `validators`, `data[1]` as the data being signed and `data[2]` as an aggregate signature. Interpret `data[3:6]` similarly. Verify that both signatures are valid, that the two signatures are signing distinct data, and that they are either signing the same slot number, or that one surrounds the other (ie. `source1 < source2 < target2 < target1`). Let `indices` be the list of indices in both signatures; verify that its length is at least 1. For each validator index `v` in `indices`, if its `status` does not equal `PENALIZED`, then run `exit_validator(v, crystallized_state, penalize=True, current_slot=block.slot)`
* **[covers RANDAO updates]**: If `obj.kind == RANDAO_REVEAL`, interpret `data[0]` as an integer and `data[1]` as a hash32. Set `validators[data[0]].randao_commitment = data[1]`.
* For any validator with index `v` with balance less than `MIN_ONLINE_DEPOSIT_SIZE` and status `ACTIVE`, run `exit_validator(v, crystallized_state, penalize=False, current_slot=block.slot)`
We aim to have a STARK-friendly hash function `hash(x)` for the production launch of the beacon chain. While the standardisation process for a STARK-friendly hash function takes place—led by STARKware, who will produce a detailed report with recommendations—we use `BLAKE2b-512` as a placeholder. Specifically, we set `hash(x) := BLAKE2b-512(x)[0:32]` where the `BLAKE2b-512` algorithm is defined in [RFC 7693](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693) and the input `x` is of type `bytes`.