There is a bug in the error handling code for the Agent cache subsystem discovered:
1. NotifyCallback calls notifyBlockingQuery which calls getWithIndex in
a loop (which backs off on-error up to 1 minute)
2. getWithIndex calls fetch if there’s no valid entry in the cache
3. fetch starts a goroutine which calls Fetch on the cache-type, waits
for a while (again with backoff up to 1 minute for errors) and then
calls fetch to trigger a refresh
The end result being that every 1 minute notifyBlockingQuery spawns an
ancestry of goroutines that essentially lives forever.
This PR ensures that the goroutine started by `fetch` cancels any prior
goroutine spawned by the same line for the same key.
In isolated testing where a cache type was tweaked to indefinitely
error, this patch prevented goroutine counts from skyrocketing.
In practice this was masked by #14956 and was only uncovered fixing the
other bug.
go test ./agent -run TestAgentConnectCALeafCert_goodNotLocal
would fail when only #14956 was fixed.
Fixes a `go vet` warning caused by the pragma.DoNotCopy on the protobuf
message type.
Originally I'd hoped we wouldn't need any reflection in the proxycfg hot
path, but it seems proto.Clone is the only supported way to copy a message.
Adds a user-configurable rate limiter to proxycfg snapshot delivery,
with a default limit of 250 updates per second.
This addresses a problem observed in our load testing of Consul
Dataplane where updating a "global" resource such as a wildcard
intention or the proxy-defaults config entry could starve the Raft or
Memberlist goroutines of CPU time, causing general cluster instability.
Replaces the reflection-based implementation of proxycfg's
ConfigSnapshot.Clone with code generated by deep-copy.
While load testing server-based xDS (for consul-dataplane) we discovered
this method is extremely expensive. The ConfigSnapshot struct, directly
or indirectly, contains a copy of many of the structs in the agent/structs
package, which creates a large graph for copystructure.Copy to traverse
at runtime, on every proxy reconfiguration.
When peering through mesh gateways we expect outbound dials to peer
servers to flow through the local mesh gateway addresses.
Now when establishing a peering we get a list of dial addresses as a
ring buffer that includes local mesh gateway addresses if the local DC
is configured to peer through mesh gateways. The ring buffer includes
the mesh gateway addresses first, but also includes the remote server
addresses as a fallback.
This fallback is present because it's possible that direct egress from
the servers may be allowed. If not allowed then the leader will cycle
back to a mesh gateway address through the ring.
When attempting to dial the remote servers we retry up to a fixed
timeout. If using mesh gateways we also have an initial wait in
order to allow for the mesh gateways to configure themselves.
Note that if we encounter a permission denied error we do not retry
since that error indicates that the secret in the peering token is
invalid.
Tu Nguyen
R.B. Boyer
Dhia Ayachi
Iryna Shustava
David Yu
Dan Upton
Chris S. Kim
Kyle Havlovitz
Derek Menteer
Freddy
Tyler Wendlandt
Alessandro De Blasis
Michael Klein
wenincode
freddygv
malizz
Jasmine W
Jasmine W