logos-verified-proxy-module

Light-client-verified Ethereum JSON-RPC for Logos, wrapping status-im's nimbus_verified_proxy in its C library form (libverifproxy).

An ordinary RPC client forwards a request to a provider and trusts the answer. This module doesn't: it syncs the beacon-chain light client from a trusted block root and verifies every eth_* response against the attested execution state, requesting Merkle proofs from the (untrusted) provider. A provider that lies produces an error, not a wrong value.

No extra process, no local port — the verification runs in-process, and results come back over the normal Logos RPC surface.

Quick start

nix build && lm methods ./result/lib/verified_proxy_module_plugin.so

Get a trusted block root — this is the root of trust, so take it from a source you trust, not from the same provider you are about to verify:

curl -s https://beaconstate.info/eth/v1/beacon/headers/finalized | jq -r '.data.root'

config.json:

{
  "network": "mainnet",
  "trustedBlockRoot": "0x...",
  "executionApiUrls": ["wss://eth-mainnet.example/v2/<key>"],
  "beaconApiUrls":    ["https://beaconstate.info"]
}

Then:

logosctl call verified_proxy_module configure json:@config.json

logosctl call verified_proxy_module start && logosctl call verified_proxy_module status

logosctl call verified_proxy_module ethGetBalance 0xd8dA6BF26964aF9D7eEd9e03E53415D37aA96045 latest

The execution provider must support eth_getProof — verification is impossible without it. (Infura notably does not.)

API

Method	Notes
configure(config)	Validate and store config. Synchronous; starts nothing.
getConfig()	Effective config, credentials redacted. Use this to DISPLAY configuration.
getConfigUnredacted()	The same, unredacted, so a UI can repopulate a form. Treat as a credential.
defaultConfig(network)	A complete, ready-to-submit config for a network. trustedBlockRoot is left empty.
start()	Blocks until the light client initialises, bounded by startTimeoutMs.
stop()	Drains, then releases. See the note on drainTimeoutMs below — it is not a tight bound.
ok() / status()	Health probe and full state. status() never blocks on the proxy thread.
supportedNetworks()	The accepted networks with their chain ids and a default endpoint pair. Build a UI selector from this, not a hardcoded list.
fetchFinalizedRoot(beaconUrl)	Convenience: asks a beacon node for its current finalized root. Not a trust anchor — see below.
rpc(method, params)	Any method the proxy supports. params is a JSON-RPC array.
ethBlockNumber(), ethGetBalance(...), ethCall(...), …	Typed wrappers over the same path.

Events: proxyStarted, proxyStopped, proxyStateChanged.

All RPC methods are synchronous — they return the verified result, or an error, within callTimeoutMs. Consumers that want concurrency use the generated <method>Async twin on their side; the module is concurrency: "multi", so blocked callers do not stall each other.

rpc() and optimisticStateFetch

eth_call, eth_estimateGas and eth_createAccessList take a third positional parameter, optimisticStateFetch (a bool) — an upstream extension to the standard JSON-RPC signature. The typed wrappers supply it; anything calling rpc() with a hand-built params array must too.

The JSON-RPC endpoint

libverifproxy deliberately ships no server — library/verifproxy.nim imports json_rpc_backend (the client it calls providers with) and the in-process engine/rpc_frontend, but never json_rpc_frontend; the HTTP/WS server exists only in the standalone nimbus_verified_proxy binary, and its symbols are absent from the archive we link. So this module provides one.

Off by default — a module should not open a listening socket unless asked:

{ "httpServer": { "enabled": true, "host": "127.0.0.1", "port": 8545 } }

localEndpoint() returns the URL (or ""), and status().httpServer reports it. Every request is forwarded through the same verified proxyCall path the typed methods use — one verification path, one error shape.

curl -s -X POST -H 'content-type: application/json'   --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_blockNumber","params":[]}'   http://127.0.0.1:8545

Point ethers, viem, cast or eth_rpc_module's ChainConfig.endpoint at that URL and their reads become light-client-verified without any of them knowing this module exists.

Two adaptations make that actually true, rather than nearly true:

• eth_call, eth_estimateGas and eth_createAccessList (and their op_ twins) take a third positional parameter upstream, optimisticStateFetch, which the JSON-RPC spec does not have. Every stock client sends two and the library answers parameters missing. The endpoint appends the default, and leaves an explicitly-supplied third parameter alone.
• Bare-number results are rendered as hex quantities. Upstream's encoding is not uniform: eth_chainId and eth_gasPrice answer hex strings but eth_blockNumber answers a JSON number, which no client expects. Confined to this layer — rpc() and the typed methods still return exactly what the library produced.

Supported: batches, notifications (dispatched, no response), and the reserved error codes — -32700 parse, -32600 invalid request, -32601 method not found, -32602 invalid params, -32000 verification/backend failure.

It binds loopback by default and refuses anything but POST. This endpoint answers state queries, so exposing it beyond 127.0.0.1 is a deliberate act. There is no authentication: treat a non-loopback bind as publishing an open RPC node.

Configuration

Required: trustedBlockRoot (0x + 64 hex), executionApiUrls, beaconApiUrls. network is one of mainnet, sepolia, hoodi. OP-Stack L2 is enabled by setting opExecutionApiUrls (there is no op-* network name in the library's JSON config — that is a CLI-only option on the standalone binary).

Module-side knobs: callTimeoutMs (30000), startTimeoutMs (120000), drainTimeoutMs (2000 — a polling bound, see below), pumpIntervalMs (50), maxInFlight (64), httpServer (see above), keepAlive (off | interval | continuous), keepAliveIntervalMs (1000), autoStart (false). Upstream tuning lives under tuning.

Config is persisted to the host-provided per-instance directory and reloaded on load. VERIFIED_PROXY_MODULE_CONFIG (inline JSON or a path) supplies a deploy-time default.

Two fields are validated for safety, not tidiness

network and logLevel are whitelisted before they can reach the library, because an unrecognised value there reaches a Nim quit() that would terminate the whole host process:

• an unknown network reaches nimbus-eth2's getMetadataForNetwork, whose fallthrough is fatal + quit 1;
• a log level Nim's updateLogLevel rejects reaches setupLogging's quit 1.

Neither is validated upstream. Everything else — bad JSON, a missing trustedBlockRoot, a malformed URL — is already caught and turned into a NULL return, so validating it here only improves the error message.

The keep-alive is not optional

processVerifProxyTasks only advances chronos while a call is in flight, so an idle proxy does not advance its light client at all. The heartbeat (keepAlive: "interval", the default) issues eth_syncing, which drives the sync loop and touches no execution backend.

Measured on sepolia over a 5-minute idle:

	keepAlive: "off"	keepAlive: "continuous"
head at start	11532988	11532988
head after 5 min idle	11532949 — 39 blocks backwards	11533012 (+24, tracking)
latency of that call	3186 ms	0 ms
light-client headers tracked	3	26

"off" does not merely go stale: the reported head regresses, so a consumer polling block numbers sees time run backwards. Treat it as a diagnostic setting, not a deployment option.

Pump behaviour, measured

status().pump reports a histogram of how long processVerifProxyTasks blocks, split by whether a call was in flight. Over 15 minutes on sepolia (21,510 samples, 358 verified calls):

	idle	busy
<1ms	99.991%	88.8%
<500ms	—	98.1%
<2000ms	—	99.94%
max observed	—	3253 ms

Idle pumps essentially always return instantly, because chronos poll() is not entered when nothing is pending — so pumpIntervalMs (50ms) is what actually paces the idle loop, as intended.

Two consequences worth knowing:

• drainCommands() runs immediately before the poll, so worst-case command-queue latency equals worst-case pump duration, ~3.25s. Bounded, and far under a 30s callTimeoutMs, but not nothing.
• drainTimeoutMs is a polling bound: the drain loop checks its deadline between pump calls, so stop() — and the destructor join — can overshoot it by up to one pump duration. Measured stop() in that run: 1102 ms.

Verified reads have a much fatter latency tail than a plain RPC call: the worst single eth_blockNumber in that run took 12.6 s, against a 30 s default callTimeoutMs. Budget accordingly.

Known limitations

• State reads need a provider with a wide proof window. eth_getBalance, eth_getCode and eth_getTransactionCount resolve their proof against the light client's finalized header, which lags the chain head. Against free public sepolia providers this exceeds their eth_getProof window and the call fails with distance to target block exceeds maximum proof window; the backend is then marked ineligible for GetProof until it recovers. Reads that need no proof (eth_blockNumber, eth_chainId, eth_gasPrice, eth_getBlockByNumber) work fine. Point archiveUrls at a provider that serves historical proofs.
• Return encodings are not uniform. eth_blockNumber answers a JSON number; eth_chainId and eth_gasPrice answer hex strings; eth_getBlockByNumber and eth_syncing answer objects. There is no JSON-RPC envelope — the value is returned bare.
• logLevel is validated but inert. The library logs Logging configuration options not enabled in the current build, so the level is not applied at runtime. It still has to be whitelisted, because an invalid value reaches a quit() before that point.
• Sync observability is limited: there is no exported getter for the finalized/optimistic slot. status().state == "degraded" means "up, but heartbeats are failing", inferred from their error strings — three consecutive failures degrade, one success clears it. status().head is refreshed by a separate eth_blockNumber probe every fifth heartbeat, because eth_syncing answers a hardcoded false and cannot report it.
• fetchFinalizedRoot() exists because Basecamp sandboxes ui_qml plugins away from the network entirely — an XMLHttpRequest from a panel is refused with "sandboxed ui_qml modules may not use the network" — so a UI that wants to offer "fetch me a root" has to route it through a core module. It is a convenience for getting started, not part of the trust model: a root taken from the same endpoint you are about to verify against anchors nothing. For anything holding real value, obtain the root independently.

Development

nix build .#unit-tests && ./result-tests/bin/verified_proxy_module_tests

Unit tests link a mocked libverifproxy (tests.mockCLibs), so they never build the ~25-minute upstream toolchain. Unlike a synchronous mock, it queues completions and drains them only from the pump, so the cross-thread design is actually exercised.

nix build .#libverifproxy   # the upstream archive alone (slow, cached)

Licence

MIT / Apache-2.0, matching the Logos workspace.