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The 3.11 table carried numbers from the ad-hoc analysis that preceded the sweep. Replaced with the values the checked-in run actually produces (MAP success 0.993/0.905/0.683 clock, 0.989/0.832/0.550 jitter), so every figure in the report is traceable to data/. The minimum-interval control likewise now quotes the committed 10.14s vs 10.22s and 0.858 vs 0.860. cover-traffic was the only study without a make target, and correlated-churn, cover-traffic and timing were missing from the simulator quick-start. Added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
106 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
106 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
# blend — a Monte-Carlo simulator for the Blend network
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Measures the Blend network on a seeded peer graph: propagation, adversary exposure,
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deanonymization, reliability under churn, messaging redundancy and cover traffic.
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Peering degree is the primary study axis and the one that ties the rest together —
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it trades off, simultaneously:
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- **propagation speed** — the full delay (ms) of a message: a random sender routes it along a
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`blend_hops`-relay Blend path (each relay a free-running timed-release mix node) and the last
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relay floods the whole network;
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- **adversary exposure** — with a fraction `f_adv` of adversarial nodes, how many honest nodes are
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peered with ≥1 adversary (**observed**) and how many are fully surrounded (**eclipsed**);
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- **deanonymization** — tying propagation to the adversary: how often a message's *whole* blend path
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is adversarial (**deanonymization** — the adversary owns the cascade end-to-end) and how often the
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honest sender is *additionally* peered with an adversary (**full deanonymization** — the message is
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tied back to its originator); and
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- **reliability under churn** — with a fraction `unresponsive_frac` of nodes that relay nothing, the
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**message success-delivery-rate** (fraction of messages that survive the whole blend cascade to a
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responsive final relay) and the flood **coverage** of those that do.
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The peer graph is a seeded random **d-regular** graph (exactly `degree` symmetric peers, identical
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for everyone from one global seed). This is static-graph analysis — no consensus — so it is far
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lighter than the TSI simulators and scales to **10⁶ nodes** (sparse CSR + sampled Dijkstra; the
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adversary metrics are exact at every N).
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## Model (all delays in ms)
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- **Link delay:** geographic base (metro 15 → antipodal 200 ms) + exponential transport jitter.
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- **Processing lag:** each node draws a fixed lag from a categorical distribution (default
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{10, 50, 100} ms at {0.5, 0.4, 0.1}), incurred every time it relays.
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- **Blend mixing:** each relay releases on a free-running clock whose successive intervals are
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Uniform{0…`max_blend_delay`} whole seconds; a held message waits for the relay's next release
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(the renewal residual). Mixing happens only at the `blend_hops` relays; the final flood is plain.
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- **Unresponsive nodes:** a random `unresponsive_frac` of the population relays nothing (its outgoing
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edges are removed). Relays are drawn from the whole node list *blind to responsiveness*, so a
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message dies if any relay on its path is unresponsive — the delivery-rate then tracks
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`(1−unresponsive_frac)^blend_hops`. Unresponsive nodes still *receive*, but they are routing holes,
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so a delivered flood can strand pockets; a higher peering degree supplies redundant paths that keep
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coverage high. This axis affects propagation only, not the adversary metrics.
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- **Deanonymization:** relays are picked *blind to who is adversarial*, so P(the whole blend path is
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adversarial) is the exact hypergeometric `C(n_adv, blend_hops) / C(N−1, blend_hops)` ≈
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`f_adv^blend_hops` (**deanon_rate**) — placement-independent, driven by path length, not degree.
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Multiplying by the fraction of honest nodes with ≥1 adversary peer (`observed_frac`, which the
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worst-case-coverage placement maximizes) gives **full_deanon_rate** — the honest sender is *also*
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directly exposed, so the message is tied to its originator. Lengthening the blend path is the
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dominant defence; a higher degree speeds propagation but *raises* the chance a sender directly
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touches the adversary. Both are exact at every N (no Monte-Carlo), like the other adversary metrics.
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- **Messaging redundancy:** `redundancy` R sends each emission over R *independent* blend cascades.
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A node receives the message from whichever cascade reaches it first (arrival times are combined
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element-wise), so it is delivered if any cascade delivers (`delivery = 1−(1−(1−u)^blend_hops)^R`)
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and captured if any cascade is whole-path-adversarial (`deanon = 1−(1−f_adv^blend_hops)^R`) — the
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same `1−(1−x)^R` law, so redundancy trades reliability against anonymity. It buys **no** extra
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coverage: a cascade only delivers if the sender could route to its relay, so every delivered
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cascade floods the sender's own component. R = 1 is the plain single-cascade model (default), to
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which the whole aggregation reduces exactly.
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- **Churn percolation:** the flood only crosses responsive nodes, so it lives on the responsive
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sub-graph — site percolation on a d-regular graph, whose giant component survives only while the
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responsive fraction exceeds `1/(degree−1)`. A network tolerates churn up to
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`u_c = 1 − 1/(degree−1)` (degree 3 → 0.5, degree 6 → 0.8, degree 16 → 0.93) and shatters above it;
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`configs/percolation.yaml` walks u across the threshold and `make verify` checks it.
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- **Correlated outages:** `n_regions` splits the network into equal-sized **failure domains** and
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`region_locality` places that share of each node's peers inside its own domain (the locality
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matchings keep the graph exactly d-regular). `churn_mode: regional` then fails whole domains
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instead of scattered nodes, at an identical dead-node count. Locality is what makes this differ
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from uniform churn at all — with region-blind peering, dropping whole regions removes a uniformly
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random node set. Clustered failure leaves the survivors fully connected (`frac_reached_live`
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stays ~1) while stranding the dead domains (`frac_reached` falls); see `configs/correlated-churn.yaml`.
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Regions are failure and peering domains only — link latency does not depend on them.
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- **Linkability over time** (`blend.linkability`): given the rates above and an emission cadence (one
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node emits per 30 s slot, chosen ∝ stake), the module derives the *time to link* an emitter
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(`≈ 30 s·ln(1/(1−α))/(stake·q)`, inverse in stake) and the *time to learn its stake* to a threshold
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from the count of attributable observations. See `configs/redundancy.yaml` and the report.
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## Quick start
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```
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make install # or reuse a sibling venv: PYTHONPATH=src <python> -m blend.sweep ...
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make smoke # fast end-to-end (every code path + 19 of 21 figure builders)
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make verify # analytic checks (closed forms + graph invariants)
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make test # unit tests
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make sweep # configs/default.yaml (N up to 1e5, both adversary modes)
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make sweep-fullscale # configs/fullscale.yaml (N up to 1e6, random-mode exact)
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make redundancy # configs/redundancy.yaml (R=1..4: delivery vs deanonymization)
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make percolation # configs/percolation.yaml (churn threshold u_c = 1-1/(degree-1))
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make correlated-churn # configs/correlated-churn.yaml (AS/region outages vs uniform churn)
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make cover-traffic # configs/cover-traffic.yaml (blending, mixing, the stake ceiling)
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make timing # configs/timing.yaml (jitter vs clock-tick release under attack)
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make figures RUN=runs/<dir>
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```
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## Outputs
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Three parquets per run: `propagation.parquet` (`full_delay_ms_*`, `delivery_rate`, `coverN_ms`, and
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two coverage columns — `frac_reached` over all nodes and `frac_reached_live` over the responsive
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ones, which diverge under correlated churn — vs degree / blend_hops / N / unresponsive_frac /
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`churn_mode` / `n_regions` / `region_locality` / redundancy), `adversary.parquet`
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(`observed_frac` / `eclipsed_frac` vs degree / f_adv / mode, random + worst-case envelope), and
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`deanon.parquet` (`deanon_rate` / `full_deanon_rate` vs degree / blend_hops / redundancy / f_adv /
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mode — propagation paths crossed with the adversary set). Figures render all three: delay vs degree /
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path length / N, observation and eclipse vs f_adv and degree, delivery and coverage vs the
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unresponsive fraction (with the `u_c = 1-1/(degree-1)` threshold), the deanonymization rates, and the
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time-to-link / stake-inference / redundancy curves derived from them by `linkability`.
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## Layout
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`src/blend/`: `graph` (matching-union CSR d-regular), `propagation` (Blend cascade), `mixclock`
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(release-clock residual), `adversary` (exact observation/eclipse + deanonymization + placement),
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`config`/`engine`/`sweep`/`metrics`, `plotting`. `configs/` sweeps, `tests/`, `scripts/` shims.
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Reports of record live outside the sim at `reports/blend/`.
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