Made the cites work, finally!

papers/pricing/ethpricing.bib

@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@
 
 
 
-@techreport{ibm2011,
+@misc{ibm2011,
      title = {GPFS Scans 10 Billion Files in 43 Minutes},
-     author = {Richard F. Freitas, Joe Slember, Wayne Sawdon, and Lawrence Chiu},
+     author = {Richard F. Freitas, Joe Slember, Wayne Sawdon and Lawrence Chiu},
      year = {2011},
      institution = {IBM},
      month = {07},
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
   author={Kyle Croman, Christian Decker, Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Ari Juels},  
   Year={2017},
   Booktitle={3rd Workshop on Bitcoin and Blockchain Research},
-  Organization={International Financial Cryptography Association}
+  Organization={International Financial Cryptography Association},
   url={http://fc16.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/CDE+16.pdf}
 }
 
@@ -557,21 +557,21 @@
 	Year = {2017},
 	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html}}
 
-@article{li2018,
+@misc{li2018,
     Author = {Shengwu Li, Mohammad Akbarpour},
     Title = {Credible Mechanisms},
     Year = {2018},
     Url = {https://ssrn.com/abstract=3033208}
 }
 
-@article{rothkopf2007,
+@misc{rothkopf2007,
     Author = {Michael H Rothkopf},
     Title = {Thirteen Reasons Whythe Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical},
     Url = {https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~klarson/teaching/F08-886/Rothkopf.pdf},
     Year = {2007}
 }
 
-@article{poa-in-auctions,
+@misc{poa-in-auctions,
     Author = {Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardoa},
     Title = {The Price of Anarchy in Auctions},
     Url = {https://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/papers/jair.pdf},
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@
 
 @misc{fee-estimation,
     Author = {Alyssa Hertig},
-    Title = {How to Save on Bitcoin's Soaring Fees}
+    Title = {How to Save on Bitcoin's Soaring Fees},
     Url = {https://www.coindesk.com/save-bitcoins-soaring-fees/},
     Year = {2018}
 }
@@ -597,3 +597,11 @@
     Year = {2018},
     Author = {Project Chicago}
 }
+
+@misc{GHOST,
+    Url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.433.6590&rep=rep1&type=pdf},
+    Year = {2013},
+    Author = {Yonatan Sompolinsky, Aviv Zohar},
+    Title = {Accelerating Bitcoin's Transaction Processing: Fast Money Grows on Trees, Not Chains}
+}
+    

papers/pricing/ethpricing.tex

@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ We now propose an alternate resource pricing/limit rule that we believe provides
 \item In any particular block, let $w_{prev}$ be the amount of weight consumed in the previous block, and $minFee_{prev}$ be the previous block's $minFee$ value. See $minFee$ for this block to equal $minFee_{prev} * (1 + (\frac{w_{prev}}{w_{newmax}} - \frac{1}{2}) * adjSpeed$.
 \end{itemize}
 
-This rule is likely to outperform simple limits in terms of allocative efficiency for the reasons cited above, and also (except during sudden and extreme spikes) eliminates the issues with first and second price auctions described above. \footnote{In the specific case of storage pricing, a quirk in Ethereum gas pricing rules that allows storage to be (mostly) paid for before it is actually used allows for second-layer markets like GasToken\cite{GasToken} where gas can be burned to generate ``congealed storage use privileges'', which can then be used later. The possibility of doing this unintentionally creates efficiency gains similar to those described here.}
+This rule is likely to outperform simple limits in terms of allocative efficiency for the reasons cited above, and also (except during sudden and extreme spikes) eliminates the issues with first and second price auctions described above. \footnote{In the specific case of storage pricing, a quirk in Ethereum gas pricing rules that allows storage to be (mostly) paid for before it is actually used allows for second-layer markets like GasToken\cite{gastoken} where gas can be burned to generate ``congealed storage use privileges'', which can then be used later. The possibility of doing this unintentionally creates efficiency gains similar to those described here.}
 
 As a philosophical note, complex gas and fee policies are often criticized as being a form of economic ``central planning'', which is frowned upon because planners may not have aligned incentives and have less information than participants closer to the day-to-day economic activity. That said, note that \emph{any} transaction pricing policy, whether fee-based or limit-based, necessarily has centrally planned parameters. I would argue that the correct way to apply the Hayekian anti-central-planning intuition is to treat it as saying that central plans are less bad if those plans have \emph{lower Kolmogorov complexity}, a simple strict weight limit being an ideal example.