pluto/docs/presentations/security.md

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Extensions

security/privacy

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Context

• Extend status features natively, permissionless
• Data based
• Simple primitives: hooks, queries, events, views

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A simple language

• No user defined logic (for now?)
• Non turing complete language (only loop on finite set)
• Can be analysed

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What can go wrong?

• Crashes
• Unauthorized actions
• Data leaks
• Replicate sensitive UI (chat messages/wallet)

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Crashes

• Static analysis to detect incorrect syntax
• Lightweight sandbox (React error boundaries, exception catching)

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Privacy

What (capabilities) accessed by whom (scope) after which action (trigger).

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Capability-based security

• An extension defines a set of capabilities and can only access those
• Enhanced for decentralized world

Note:

• http://habitatchronicles.com/2017/05/what-are-capabilities/

• https://agoric.com/about/

• https://github.com/NuxiNL/cloudabi#capability-based-security

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security

• https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/

• https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/master/docs/the-book/sandboxing.md

• https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-overview.md#capability-oriented

• https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-capabilities.md

• https://webassembly.org/docs/security/

• https://developers.google.com/caja/

• https://github.com/fastly/lucet/blob/master/SECURITY.md

• https://sandstorm.io/how-it-works#capabilities

• https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/ethereum-object-capabilities/3035

• http://www.erights.org/elib/distrib/captp/index.html

• http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/ode/index.html

• http://zesty.ca/capmyths/usenix.pdf

• https://github.com/danfinlay/capnode/tree/eip-712

• https://w3c-ccg.github.io/ocap-ld/

• https://medium.com/capabul/minimum-viable-consensus-algorithms-with-object-capabilities-6059f926ab88

Simple security model, no same-origin policy

Leveraging data

• Capabilities fully inferred per hook
• Surfaced to user for validation

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Example #1

{views/hello
 [text "Hello"]
 
 hooks/wallet.settings.hello
 {:label   "Test wallet settings"
  :view    [hello]}}

Note:

No capabilities required

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Example #2

{views/hello
 [gallery] ;; or input
 
 hooks/wallet.settings.hello
 {:label   "Test wallet settings"
  :view    [hello]}}

Note:

Some capability required, extension scope

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Example #3

{views/hello
 [image {:url "http://..."}]
 
 hooks/wallet.settings.hello
 {:label   "Test wallet settings"
  :view    [hello]}}

Note:

Scope remote Depends on the URL

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Example #4

{views/hello
 [image {:url "..."}]
 
 hooks/wallet.settings.hello
 {:label   "Test wallet settings"
  :view    [hello]}}

Note:

No scope issue

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Example #5

{views/hello
 (let [url [store/get {:value "KEY"}]]
  [image {:url url}])
 
 hooks/wallet.settings.hello
 {:label   "Test wallet settings"
  :view    [hello]
  :on-open [http/get {...}]}}

Note:

Send image issue: have all participants in a chat hit some HTTP endpoint with ethereum address and IPs Runtime check? User select scope, if doesn't match => fails

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Scope

What can be done with data accessed

• hook
• extension
• local
• remote (HTTP, IPFS)

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Trigger

What flow can lead to data leaks

• user controlled (e.g. on button click)
• extension controlled (on extension installation)

Note:

Scenario: on extension installation, access user address and send it using HTTP

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Runtime

• necessary capabilities inferred
• surfaced to end user
• end user can reduce those
• extension can be run with insufficient capabilities, some features won't work (sandboxing)

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Potential attack #1

An extension uses OCR to read the seed from one of stored image

• no such event currently
• not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
• constrained by scope

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Potential attack #2

An extension periodically makes screenshot of the whole screen

• no such event currently
• not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
• constrained by scope
• trigger could include status state information (e.g. only activate after seed is backuped)

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Potential attack #3

An extension replicates the whole status UI

• constrained by scope
• 3 words can't be accessed by extensions

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UX is a challenge

• Security profile to only surface selected capabilities
• JIT user validation?
• Problematic events? (e.g. send a message on behalf of user)

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Risk level

• Extracted from capabilities/scopes
• Simplify user validation process

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Security profile

• A set of capabilities/scopes a user is confortable with
• Once enabled, matching extensions can be installed w/o user validation

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Open Questions

• Mobile level permission is all or nothing
• How to handle primitives created by 3rd parties? (future)