mirror of https://github.com/status-im/pluto.git
Updated security doc
This commit is contained in:
Julien Eluard
parent
7aa469c3b7
commit
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---
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title: Extensions - security/privacy
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revealOptions:
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transition: 'fade'
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---
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# Extensions
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## security/privacy
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---
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## Context
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- Extend status features natively, permissionless
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- Data based
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- Simple primitives: hooks, queries, events, views
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---
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# A simple language
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- No user defined logic (for now?)
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- Non turing complete language (only loop on finite set)
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- Can be analysed
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---
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# What can go wrong?
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- Crashes
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- Unauthorized actions
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- Data leaks
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- Replicate sensitive UI (chat messages/wallet)
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---
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# Crashes
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- Static analysis to detect incorrect syntax
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- Lightweight sandbox (React [error boundaries](https://reactjs.org/docs/error-boundaries.html), exception catching)
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---
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# Privacy
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What (*capabilities*) accessed by whom (*scope*) after which action (*trigger*).
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---
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# Capability-based security
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- An extension defines a set of capabilities and can only access those
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- Enhanced for decentralized world
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Note:
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- http://habitatchronicles.com/2017/05/what-are-capabilities/
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- https://agoric.com/about/
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- https://github.com/NuxiNL/cloudabi#capability-based-security
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- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security
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- https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/
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- https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/master/docs/the-book/sandboxing.md
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- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-overview.md#capability-oriented
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- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-capabilities.md
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- https://webassembly.org/docs/security/
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- https://developers.google.com/caja/
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- https://github.com/fastly/lucet/blob/master/SECURITY.md
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- https://sandstorm.io/how-it-works#capabilities
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- https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/ethereum-object-capabilities/3035
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- http://www.erights.org/elib/distrib/captp/index.html
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- http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/ode/index.html
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- http://zesty.ca/capmyths/usenix.pdf
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- https://github.com/danfinlay/capnode/tree/eip-712
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- https://w3c-ccg.github.io/ocap-ld/
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- https://medium.com/capabul/minimum-viable-consensus-algorithms-with-object-capabilities-6059f926ab88
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Simple security model, no [same-origin policy](https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/Same_Origin_Policy)
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---
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# Leveraging data
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- Capabilities fully inferred per hook
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- Surfaced to user for validation
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---
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# Example #1
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```clojure
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{views/hello
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[text "Hello"]
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hooks/wallet.settings.hello
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{:label "Test wallet settings"
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:view [hello]}}
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```
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Note:
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No capabilities required
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---
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# Example #2
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```clojure
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{views/hello
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[gallery] ;; or input
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hooks/wallet.settings.hello
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{:label "Test wallet settings"
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:view [hello]}}
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```
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Note:
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Some capability required, extension scope
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---
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# Example #3
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```clojure
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{views/hello
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[image {:url "http://..."}]
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hooks/wallet.settings.hello
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{:label "Test wallet settings"
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:view [hello]}}
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```
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Note:
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Scope remote
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Depends on the URL
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---
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# Example #4
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```clojure
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{views/hello
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[image {:url "..."}]
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hooks/wallet.settings.hello
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{:label "Test wallet settings"
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:view [hello]}}
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```
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Note:
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No scope issue
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---
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# Example #5
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```clojure
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{views/hello
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(let [url [store/get {:value "KEY"}]]
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[image {:url url}])
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hooks/wallet.settings.hello
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{:label "Test wallet settings"
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:view [hello]
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:on-open [http/get {...}]}}
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```
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Note:
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Send image issue: have all participants in a chat hit some HTTP endpoint with ethereum address and IPs
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Runtime check? User select scope, if doesn't match => fails
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---
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# Scope
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What can be done with data accessed
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- hook
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- extension
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- local
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- remote (HTTP, IPFS)
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---
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# Trigger
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What flow can lead to data leaks
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- user controlled (e.g. on button click)
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- extension controlled (on extension installation)
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Note:
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Scenario: on extension installation, access user address and send it using HTTP
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---
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# Runtime
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- necessary capabilities inferred
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- surfaced to end user
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- end user can *reduce* those
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- extension can be run with insufficient capabilities, some features won't work (sandboxing)
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---
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# Potential attack #1
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An extension uses OCR to read the seed from one of stored image
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- no such event currently
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- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
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- constrained by scope
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---
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# Potential attack #2
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An extension periodically makes screenshot of the whole screen
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- no such event currently
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- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
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- constrained by scope
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- trigger could include status state information (e.g. only activate after seed is backuped)
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---
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# Potential attack #3
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An extension replicates the whole status UI
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- constrained by scope
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- 3 words can't be accessed by extensions
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---
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# UX is a challenge
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- Security profile to only surface selected capabilities
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- JIT user validation?
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- Problematic events? (e.g. send a message on behalf of user)
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---
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# Risk level
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- Extracted from capabilities/scopes
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- Simplify user validation process
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---
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# Security profile
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- A set of capabilities/scopes a user is confortable with
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- Once enabled, matching extensions can be installed w/o user validation
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---
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# Open Questions
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- Mobile level permission is all or nothing
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- How to handle primitives created by 3rd parties? (future)
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251
docs/security.md
251
docs/security.md
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@ -1,29 +1,5 @@
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---
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title: Extensions - security/privacy
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revealOptions:
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transition: 'fade'
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---
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# Extensions
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## security/privacy
|
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|
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---
|
||||
|
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## Context
|
||||
|
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- Extend status features natively, permissionless
|
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- Data based
|
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- Simple primitives: hooks, queries, events, views
|
||||
|
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---
|
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|
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# A simple language
|
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|
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- No user defined logic (for now?)
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- Non turing complete language (only loop on finite set)
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- Can be analysed
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---
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Extensions are 3rd party chunk of data that can dynamically and permissionlessly modify Status behavior.
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How do we ensure Status security is preserved and no unauthorized data access is performed?
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# What can go wrong?
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@ -32,60 +8,68 @@ revealOptions:
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- Data leaks
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- Replicate sensitive UI (chat messages/wallet)
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|
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---
|
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## Crashes
|
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|
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# Crashes
|
||||
Static analysis is performed to detect incorrect syntax. Then a lightweight sandbox (React [error boundaries](https://reactjs.org/docs/error-boundaries.html), exception catching) act as safe guard.
|
||||
|
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- Static analysis to detect incorrect syntax
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- Lightweight sandbox (React [error boundaries](https://reactjs.org/docs/error-boundaries.html), exception catching)
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## Status hijacking
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---
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Any screen (including the wallet) can be recreated as an extension. Only Status has access to the 3 words, preventing users to be tricked into signing forged transactions.
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# Privacy
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## Privacy / Security
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What (*capabilities*) accessed by whom (*scope*) after which action (*trigger*).
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Status contains a number of private data and can potential trigger actions with consequences (signing a transaction).
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A user must be made aware of what an extension can do during its installation. The set of what can be done can be restricted by the user.
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---
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# Capability based security
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# Capability-based security
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The proposed solution to address security and privacy risks is to rely on [Capacity based security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security) tailored for decentralized architecture.
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This model is used by a number of modern stacks ([Fuchsia](https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/master/docs/the-book/sandboxing.md), [WASI](https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-capabilities.md) or even [Agoric](https://agoric.com/about/)).
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A good introduction to this model can be found [here](http://habitatchronicles.com/2017/05/what-are-capabilities/).
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- An extension defines a set of capabilities and can only access those
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- Enhanced for decentralized world
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Essentially each extension would run in an isolated sandbox with only pre-granted accesses. Extension then run under those capabilities and cannot access anything not provided.
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This is in contrast to hold user/permision model.
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Note:
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Extensions extend this model by puting emphasis on the localisation of the data (`scope`)
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|
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- http://habitatchronicles.com/2017/05/what-are-capabilities/
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- https://agoric.com/about/
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- https://github.com/NuxiNL/cloudabi#capability-based-security
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- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security
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- https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/
|
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- https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/master/docs/the-book/sandboxing.md
|
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- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-overview.md#capability-oriented
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- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-capabilities.md
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- https://webassembly.org/docs/security/
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- https://developers.google.com/caja/
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- https://github.com/fastly/lucet/blob/master/SECURITY.md
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- https://sandstorm.io/how-it-works#capabilities
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## Scope
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- https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/ethereum-object-capabilities/3035
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- http://www.erights.org/elib/distrib/captp/index.html
|
||||
- http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/ode/index.html
|
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- http://zesty.ca/capmyths/usenix.pdf
|
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- https://github.com/danfinlay/capnode/tree/eip-712
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- https://w3c-ccg.github.io/ocap-ld/
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- https://medium.com/capabul/minimum-viable-consensus-algorithms-with-object-capabilities-6059f926ab88
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Scope encompass what can be done with an identified piece of data. A data accessed but kept in the extension sandbox doesn't pose the same threat that the same send to arbitrary remote server.
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Simple security model, no [same-origin policy](https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/Same_Origin_Policy)
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---
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Scope can be:
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# Leveraging data
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- hook
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- extension
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- local
|
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- remote (HTTP, IPFS)
|
||||
|
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- Capabilities fully inferred per hook
|
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- Surfaced to user for validation
|
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## Trigger
|
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|
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---
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What flow can lead to data leaks. A user controlled leak (e.g. button click) has not the same meaning than an extension controlled one (e.g. triggered during extension activation).
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# Example #1
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## Runtime
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The capability required for an extension can be fully inferred dynamically by Status (due to their data nature).
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This set of capabilities is then exposed to end user. Users are free to restrict this set and grant them to the extension.
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An extension can always run with no capabilities, in a degraded sandboxed mode (e.g. some UI elements inactive, some events filtered).
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# UX is a challenge
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How to simply surface those informations and ensure end users make an informed decision?
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We want to prevent users clicking through those screens and accepting anything.
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## Risk level
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A level (e.g. a note - A, B .. E-) is extracted from capabnilities and scopes required. It aggregates all associated risks.
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## Security profile
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Users define a set of capabilities/scopes they are confortable with. Once enabled, matching extensions can be installed w/o validation.
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# Examples
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```clojure
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{views/hello
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|
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@ -96,13 +80,7 @@ Simple security model, no [same-origin policy](https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/
|
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:view [hello]}}
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```
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Note:
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|
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No capabilities required
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---
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# Example #2
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No specific capabilities required. No data is accessed
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```clojure
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{views/hello
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|
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@ -113,13 +91,7 @@ No capabilities required
|
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:view [hello]}}
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```
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Note:
|
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|
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Some capability required, extension scope
|
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|
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---
|
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|
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# Example #3
|
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Some capability required as `gallery` might leak user photo. No way to have them exported through this extension.
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|
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```clojure
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{views/hello
|
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|
|
@ -130,31 +102,7 @@ Some capability required, extension scope
|
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:view [hello]}}
|
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```
|
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|
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Note:
|
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|
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Scope remote
|
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Depends on the URL
|
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|
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---
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|
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# Example #4
|
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|
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```clojure
|
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{views/hello
|
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[image {:url "..."}]
|
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|
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hooks/wallet.settings.hello
|
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{:label "Test wallet settings"
|
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:view [hello]}}
|
||||
```
|
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|
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Note:
|
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|
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No scope issue
|
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|
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---
|
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|
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# Example #5
|
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Depending on the URL (e.g. `http` yes, `...` no) private data can be leaked.
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|
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```clojure
|
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{views/hello
|
||||
|
|
@ -167,99 +115,4 @@ No scope issue
|
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:on-open [http/get {...}]}}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Note:
|
||||
|
||||
Send image issue: have all participants in a chat hit some HTTP endpoint with ethereum address and IPs
|
||||
Runtime check? User select scope, if doesn't match => fails
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Scope
|
||||
|
||||
What can be done with data accessed
|
||||
|
||||
- hook
|
||||
- extension
|
||||
- local
|
||||
- remote (HTTP, IPFS)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Trigger
|
||||
|
||||
What flow can lead to data leaks
|
||||
|
||||
- user controlled (e.g. on button click)
|
||||
- extension controlled (on extension installation)
|
||||
|
||||
Note:
|
||||
|
||||
Scenario: on extension installation, access user address and send it using HTTP
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Runtime
|
||||
|
||||
- necessary capabilities inferred
|
||||
- surfaced to end user
|
||||
- end user can *reduce* those
|
||||
- extension can be run with insufficient capabilities, some features won't work (sandboxing)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Potential attack #1
|
||||
|
||||
An extension uses OCR to read the seed from one of stored image
|
||||
|
||||
- no such event currently
|
||||
- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
|
||||
- constrained by scope
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Potential attack #2
|
||||
|
||||
An extension periodically makes screenshot of the whole screen
|
||||
|
||||
- no such event currently
|
||||
- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
|
||||
- constrained by scope
|
||||
- trigger could include status state information (e.g. only activate after seed is backuped)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Potential attack #3
|
||||
|
||||
An extension replicates the whole status UI
|
||||
|
||||
- constrained by scope
|
||||
- 3 words can't be accessed by extensions
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# UX is a challenge
|
||||
|
||||
- Security profile to only surface selected capabilities
|
||||
- JIT user validation?
|
||||
- Problematic events? (e.g. send a message on behalf of user)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Risk level
|
||||
|
||||
- Extracted from capabilities/scopes
|
||||
- Simplify user validation process
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Security profile
|
||||
|
||||
- A set of capabilities/scopes a user is confortable with
|
||||
- Once enabled, matching extensions can be installed w/o user validation
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Open Questions
|
||||
|
||||
- Mobile level permission is all or nothing
|
||||
- How to handle primitives created by 3rd parties? (future)
|
||||
Some examples cannot be fully analyzed (e.g. depends on runtime data).
|
||||
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Reference in New Issue