c7abc97545
* harden and speed up block sync The `GetBlockBy*` server implementation currently reads SSZ bytes from database, deserializes them into a Nim object then serializes them right back to SSZ - here, we eliminate the deser/ser steps and send the bytes straight to the network. Unfortunately, the snappy recoding must still be done because of differences in framing. Also, the quota system makes one giant request for quota right before sending all blocks - this means that a 1024 block request will be "paused" for a long time, then all blocks will be sent at once causing a spike in database reads which potentially will see the reading client time out before any block is sent. Finally, on the reading side we make several copies of blocks as they travel through various queues - this was not noticeable before but becomes a problem in two cases: bellatrix blocks are up to 10mb (instead of .. 30-40kb) and when backfilling, we process a lot more of them a lot faster. * fix status comparisons for nodes syncing from genesis (#3327 was a bit too hard) * don't hit database at all for post-altair slots in GetBlock v1 requests |
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| .. | ||
| README.md | ||
| eth2_discovery.nim | ||
| eth2_network.nim | ||
| faststreams_backend.nim | ||
| libp2p_json_serialization.nim | ||
| libp2p_streams_backend.nim | ||
| network_metadata.nim | ||
| peer_pool.nim | ||
| peer_scores.nim | ||
README.md
Networking
This folders hold a collection of modules to:
- configure the Eth2 P2P network
- discover, connect, and maintain quality Eth2 peers
Data received is handed other to the ../gossip_processing modules for validation.
Security concerns
- Collusion: part of the peer selection must be kept random. This avoids peers bringing all their friends and colluding against a beacon node.
- Denial-of-service: The beacon node must provide ways to handle burst of data that may come:
- from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
- from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks