* reworked some of the das core specs, pr'd to check whether whether the conflicting type issue is centric to my machine or not
* bumped nim-blscurve to 9c6e80c6109133c0af3025654f5a8820282cff05, same as unstable
* bumped nim-eth2-scenarios, nim-nat-traversal at par with unstable, added more pathches, made peerdas devnet branch backward compatible, peerdas passing new ssz tests as per alpha3, disabled electra fixture tests, as branch hasn't been rebased for a while
* refactor test fixture files
* rm: serializeDataColumn
* refactor: took data columns extracted from blobs during block proposal to the heap
* disable blob broadcast in pd devnet
* fix addBlock in message router
* fix: data column iterator
* added debug checkpoints to check CI
* refactor if else conditions
* add: updated das core specs to alpha 3, and unit tests pass
* electra attestation updates
In Electra, we have two attestation formats: on-chain and on-network -
the former combines all committees of a slot in a single committee bit
list.
This PR makes a number of cleanups to move towards fixing this -
attestation packing however still needs to be fixed as it currently
creates attestations with a single committee only which is very
inefficient.
* more attestations in the blocks
* signing and aggregation fixes
* tool fix
* test, import
In split view situation, the canonical chain may only be served by a
tiny amount of peers, and branches may span long durations. Minority
branches may still have a large weight from attestations and should
be discovered. To assist with that, add a branch discovery module that
assists in such a situation by specifically targeting peers with unknown
histories and downloading from them, in addition to sync manager work
which handles popular branches.
When quarantining a block from block processor, we should also keep a
copy of its blobs. Otherwise, this involves more network roundtrips
to obtain information we already have. This is in line with how blobs
arrive from gossip and request manager sources. The existing flow does
not work when applying blocks from quarantine, which is addressed here.
When checking for `MissingParent`, it may be that the parent block was
already discovered as part of a prior run. In that case, it can be
loaded from storage and processed without having to rediscover the
entire branch from the network. This is similar to #6112 but for blocks
that are discovered via gossip / sync mgr instead of via request mgr.
When restarting beacon node, orphaned blocks remain in the database but
on startup, only the canonical chain as selected by fork choice loads.
When a new block is discovered that builds on top of an orphaned block,
the orphaned block is re-downloaded using sync/request manager, despite
it already being present on disk. Such queries can be answered locally
to improve discovery speed of alternate forks.
With checkpoint sync, the checkpoint block is typically unavailable at
the start, and only backfilled later. To avoid treating it as having
zero hash, execution disabled in some contexts, wrap the result of
`loadExecutionBlockHash` in `Opt` and handle block hash being unknown.
---------
Co-authored-by: Jacek Sieka <jacek@status.im>
Finish the rename started in #4809 to have a consistent naming.
`ExecutionPayloadHash` suggests hash over payload instead of block.
`BlockHash` is also the canonical name in engine API.
Full caches should not be used to mark blocks as unviable. The unviable
status is quite persistent and a block marked as such won't be processed
again once the cache empties. Problem originally introduced in #4808.
If the initial state replays cover the finalized head, import matching
`LightClientBootstrap` into database.
This also addresses this error when light client requests bootstrap from
the genesis slot on networks that launch with Altair enabled.
```
{"lvl":"DBG","ts":"2023-10-04 11:17:49.665+00:00","msg":"LC bootstrap unavailable: Sync committee branch not cached","topics":"chaindag_lc","slot":0}
```
Avoid marking blocks invalid when corresponding `blobSidecarsByRange`
returns an incomplete / incorrect response while syncing. The block
itself may still be valid in that scenario.
There are two conditions leading to `duplicate contribution` log.
Align the logs with the ones used for attestation aggregates,
so that the two conditions can be separated when reading logs.
With Capella, `bls_to_execution_change` SSE should be emitted on the
event stream whenever a new `SignedBLSToExecutionChange` is received.
Add this missing functionality for compatibility with beacon-API specs.
- https://github.com/ethereum/beacon-APIs/pull/248
Agnish Ghosh
Agnish Ghosh
Jacek Sieka
tersec
careworry
Etan Kissling