nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/spec/signatures_batch.nim

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# beacon_chain
# Copyright (c) 2018-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
{.push raises: [].}
## This module contains signature verification helpers corresponding to those
## in signatures.nim, for use with signature sets / batch signature verification
## The functions follow the same structure and use the same arguments, except
## that the flow is split into separate collection and verification steps.
import
# Status lib
blscurve,
stew/byteutils,
results,
taskpools,
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bearssl/rand,
# Internal
"."/[helpers, beaconstate, forks, signatures],
"."/datatypes/[altair, bellatrix, phase0]
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export results, rand, altair, phase0, taskpools, signatures
type
BatchVerifier* = object
sigVerifCache*: BatchedBLSVerifierCache
## A cache for batch BLS signature verification contexts
rng*: ref HmacDrbgContext
## A reference to the Nimbus application-wide RNG
taskpool*: Taskpool
proc init*(
T: type BatchVerifier, rng: ref HmacDrbgContext,
taskpool: Taskpool): BatchVerifier =
BatchVerifier(
sigVerifCache: BatchedBLSVerifierCache.init(taskpool),
rng: rng,
taskpool: taskpool,
)
proc new*(
T: type BatchVerifier, rng: ref HmacDrbgContext,
taskpool: Taskpool): ref BatchVerifier =
(ref BatchVerifier)(
sigVerifCache: BatchedBLSVerifierCache.init(taskpool),
rng: rng,
taskpool: taskpool,
)
func `$`*(s: SignatureSet): string =
"(pubkey: 0x" & s.pubkey.toHex() &
", signing_root: 0x" & s.message.toHex() &
", signature: 0x" & s.signature.toHex() & ')'
# Important:
# - Due to lazy loading, when we do crypto verification
# and only then state-transition verification,
# there is no guarantee that pubkeys and signatures received are valid
# unlike when Nimbus did eager loading which ensured they were correct beforehand
func init(T: type SignatureSet,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signing_root: Eth2Digest,
signature: CookedSig): T =
## Add a new signature set triplet (pubkey, message, signature)
## to a collection of signature sets for batch verification.
(
blscurve.PublicKey(pubkey),
signing_root.data,
blscurve.Signature(signature)
)
func aggregateAttesters(
validatorIndices: openArray[uint64|ValidatorIndex],
validatorKeys: auto,
): Result[CookedPubKey, cstring] =
if validatorIndices.len == 0:
# Aggregation spec requires non-empty collection
# - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-04
# Consensus specs require at least one attesting index in attestation
# - https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.5.0-alpha.8/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#is_valid_indexed_attestation
return err("aggregateAttesters: no attesting indices")
let
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firstKey = validatorKeys.load(validatorIndices[0]).valueOr:
return err("aggregateAttesters: invalid attesting index")
var attestersAgg{.noinit.}: AggregatePublicKey
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attestersAgg.init(firstKey)
for i in 1 ..< validatorIndices.len:
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let key = validatorKeys.load(validatorIndices[i]).valueOr:
return err("aggregateAttesters: invalid attesting index")
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attestersAgg.aggregate(key)
ok(finish(attestersAgg))
func aggregateAttesters(
validatorIndices: openArray[uint64|ValidatorIndex],
bits: auto,
validatorKeys: auto,
): Result[CookedPubKey, cstring] =
if validatorIndices.len == 0:
# Aggregation spec requires non-empty collection
# - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-04
# Consensus specs require at least one attesting index in attestation
# - https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.6/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#is_valid_indexed_attestation
return err("aggregateAttesters: no attesting indices")
var attestersAgg{.noinit.}: AggregatePublicKey
var inited = false
for i in 0..<bits.len:
if bits[i]:
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let key = validatorKeys.load(validatorIndices[i]).valueOr:
return err("aggregateAttesters: invalid attesting index")
if inited:
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attestersAgg.aggregate(key)
else:
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attestersAgg = AggregatePublicKey.init(key)
inited = true
if not inited:
return err("aggregateAttesters:no attesting indices")
ok(finish(attestersAgg))
# Public API
# ------------------------------------------------------
# See also: verify_slot_signature
func slot_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest, slot: Slot,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_slot_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
# See also: verify_epoch_signature
func epoch_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest, epoch: Epoch,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_epoch_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, epoch)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
# See also: verify_block_signature
func block_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest, slot: Slot,
Store finalized block roots in database (3s startup) (#3320) * Store finalized block roots in database (3s startup) When the chain has finalized a checkpoint, the history from that point onwards becomes linear - this is exploited in `.era` files to allow constant-time by-slot lookups. In the database, we can do the same by storing finalized block roots in a simple sparse table indexed by slot, bringing the two representations closer to each other in terms of conceptual layout and performance. Doing so has a number of interesting effects: * mainnet startup time is improved 3-5x (3s on my laptop) * the _first_ startup might take slightly longer as the new index is being built - ~10s on the same laptop * we no longer rely on the beacon block summaries to load the full dag - this is a lot faster because we no longer have to look up each block by parent root * a collateral benefit is that we no longer need to load the full summaries table into memory - we get the RSS benefits of #3164 without the CPU hit. Other random stuff: * simplify forky block generics * fix withManyWrites multiple evaluation * fix validator key cache not being updated properly in chaindag read-only mode * drop pre-altair summaries from `kvstore` * recreate missing summaries from altair+ blocks as well (in case database has lost some to an involuntary restart) * print database startup timings in chaindag load log * avoid allocating superfluos state at startup * use a recursive sql query to load the summaries of the unfinalized blocks
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blck: Eth2Digest | SomeForkyBeaconBlock | BeaconBlockHeader,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_block_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, blck)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
# See also: verify_aggregate_and_proof_signature
func aggregate_and_proof_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
aggregate_and_proof: phase0.AggregateAndProof | electra.AggregateAndProof,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_aggregate_and_proof_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, aggregate_and_proof)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
# See also: verify_attestation_signature
func attestation_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
attestation_data: AttestationData,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_attestation_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, attestation_data)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
# See also: verify_voluntary_exit_signature
func voluntary_exit_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
voluntary_exit: VoluntaryExit,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_voluntary_exit_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, voluntary_exit)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
# See also: verify_sync_committee_message_signature
func sync_committee_message_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
slot: Slot, block_root: Eth2Digest,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_sync_committee_message_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, block_root)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
# See also: verify_sync_committee_selection_proof
func sync_committee_selection_proof_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
slot: Slot, subcommittee_index: SyncSubcommitteeIndex,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_sync_committee_selection_proof_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, subcommittee_index)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
func contribution_and_proof_signature_set*(
fork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
msg: ContributionAndProof,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_contribution_and_proof_signing_root(
fork, genesis_validators_root, msg)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
func bls_to_execution_change_signature_set*(
genesisFork: Fork, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
msg: BLSToExecutionChange,
pubkey: CookedPubKey, signature: CookedSig): SignatureSet =
let signing_root = compute_bls_to_execution_change_signing_root(
genesisFork, genesis_validators_root, msg)
SignatureSet.init(pubkey, signing_root, signature)
Light forward sync mechanism (#6515) * Initial commit. * Add hybrid syncing. * Compilation fixes. * Cast custom event for our purposes. * Instantiate AsyncEventQueue properly. * Fix mistype. * Further research on optimistic updates. * Fixing circular deps. * Add backfilling. * Add block download feature. * Add block store. * Update backfill information before storing block. * Use custom block verifier for backfilling sync. * Skip signature verification in backfilling. * Add one more generic reload to storeBackfillBlock(). * Add block verification debugging statements. * Add more debugging * Do not use database for backfilling, part 1. * Fix for stash. * Stash fixes part 2. * Prepare for testing. * Fix assertion. * Fix post-restart syncing process. * Update backfill loading log statement. Use proper backfill slot callback for sync manager. * Add handling of Duplicates. * Fix store duration and block backfilled log statements. * Add proper syncing state log statement. * Add snappy compression to beaconchain_file. Format syncing speed properly. * Add blobs verification. * Add `slot` number to file structure for easy navigation over stream of compressed objects. * Change database filename. * Fix structure size. * Add more consistency properties. * Fix checkRepair() issues. * Preparation to state rebuild process. * Add plain & compressed size. * Debugging snappy encode process. * Add one more debugging line. * Dump blocks. * One more filedump. * Fix chunk corruption code. * Fix detection issue. * Some fixes in state rebuilding process. * Add more clearance steps. * Move updateHead() back to block_processor. * Fix compilation issues. * Make code more async friendly. * Fix async issues. Add more information when proposer verification failed. * Fix 8192 slots issue. * Fix Future double completion issue. * Pass updateFlags to some of the core procedures. * Fix tests. * Improve initial sync handling mechanism. * Fix checkStateTransition() performance improvements. * Add some performance tuning and meters. * Light client performance tuning. * Remove debugging statement. * Use single file descriptor for blockchain file. * Attempt to fix LC. * Fix timeleft calculation when untrusted sync backfilling started right after LC block received. * Workaround for `chronicles` + `results` `error` issue. Remove some compilation warnings. Fix `CatchableError` leaks on Windows. * Address review comments. * Address review comments part 2. * Address review comments part 1. * Rebase and fix the issues. * Address review comments part 3. * Add tests and fix some issues in auto-repair mechanism. * Add tests to all_tests. * Rename binary test file to pass restrictions. * Add `bin` extension to excluded list. Recover binary test data. * Rename fixture file to .bin again. * Update AllTests. * Address review comments part 4. * Address review comments part 5 and fix tests. * Address review comments part 6. * Eliminate foldl and combine from blobs processing. Add some tests to ensure that checkResponse() also checks for correct order. * Fix forgotten place. * Post rebase fixes. * Add unique slots tests. * Optimize updateHead() code. * Add forgotten changes. * Address review comments on state as argument.
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proc collectProposerSignatureSet*(
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
blocks: openArray[ForkedSignedBeaconBlock],
validatorKeys: openArray[ImmutableValidatorData2],
fork: Fork,
genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest
): Result[void, string] =
mixin load
for forkedBlock in blocks:
let item =
withBlck(forkedBlock):
let
proposerKey =
validatorKeys.load(forkyBlck.message.proposer_index).valueOr:
let msg = "collectProposerSignatureSet: " &
"invalid proposer index (" &
$forkyBlck.message.proposer_index & ")"
return err(msg)
signature =
forkyBlck.signature.load().valueOr:
let msg = "collectProposerSignatureSet: " &
"cannot load signature (" &
$ forkyBlck.signature & ")"
return err(msg)
block_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root,
forkyBlck.message.slot, forkyBlck.root,
proposerKey, signature)
sigs.add(item)
ok()
proc collectSignatureSets*(
sigs: var seq[SignatureSet],
signed_block: ForkySignedBeaconBlock,
validatorKeys: openArray[ImmutableValidatorData2],
state: ForkedHashedBeaconState,
genesis_fork: Fork,
fix EIP-7044 implementation when using batch verification (#5953) In #5120, EIP-7044 support got added to the state transition function to force `CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION` to be used when validiting `VoluntaryExit` messages, irrespective of their `epoch`. In #5637, similar logic was added when batch verifying BLS signatures, which is used during gossip validation (libp2p gossipsub, and req/resp). However, that logic did not match the one introduced in #5120, and only uses `CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION` when a `VoluntaryExit`'s `epoch` was set to a value `>= CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH`. Otherwise, `BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION` would still be used when validating `VoluntaryExit`, e.g., with `epoch` set to `0`, as is the case in this Holesky block: - https://holesky.beaconcha.in/slot/1076985#voluntary-exits Extracting the correct logic from #5120 into a function, and reusing it when verifying BLS signatures fixes this issue, and also leverages the exhaustive EF test suite that covers the (correct) #5120 logic. This fix only affects networks that have EIP-7044 applied (post-Deneb). Without the fix, Deneb blocks with a `VoluntaryExit` with `epoch` set to `< CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH` incorrectly fail to validate despite being valid. Incorrect blocks that contain a malicious `VoluntaryExit` with `epoch` set to `< CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH` and signed using `BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION` _would_ pass the BLS verification stage, but subsequently fail the state transition logic. Such blocks would still correctly be labeled invalid.
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capella_fork_version: Version,
cache: var StateCache): Result[void, cstring] =
## Collect all signature verifications that process_block would normally do
## except deposits, in one go.
##
## This includes
## - Block proposer
## - Randao Reaveal
## - Proposer slashings
## - Attester slashings
## - Attestations
## - VoluntaryExits
## - SyncCommittee (Altair+)
## - BLS to execution changes (Capella+)
##
## We do not include deposits as they can be invalid while still leaving the
## block valid
# Metadata
# ----------------------------------------------------
mixin load
let
fork = getStateField(state, fork)
genesis_validators_root = getStateField(state, genesis_validators_root)
proposer_index = signed_block.message.proposer_index
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proposer_key = validatorKeys.load(proposer_index).valueOr:
return err("collectSignatureSets: invalid proposer index")
epoch = signed_block.message.slot.epoch()
doAssert genesis_fork.previous_version == genesis_fork.current_version
# 1. Block proposer
# ----------------------------------------------------
sigs.add block_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root,
signed_block.message.slot, signed_block.root,
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proposer_key, signed_block.signature.load.valueOr do:
return err("collectSignatureSets: cannot load signature"))
# 2. Randao Reveal
# ----------------------------------------------------
sigs.add epoch_signature_set(
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fork, genesis_validators_root, epoch, proposer_key,
signed_block.message.body.randao_reveal.load().valueOr do:
return err("collectSignatureSets: cannot load randao"))
# 3. Proposer slashings
# ----------------------------------------------------
# Denial-of-service:
# SSZ deserialization guarantees that blocks received from random sources
# including peer or RPC
# have at most MAX_PROPOSER_SLASHINGS proposer slashings.
for i in 0 ..< signed_block.message.body.proposer_slashings.len:
# don't use "items" for iterating over large type
# due to https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/14421
# fixed in 1.4.2
# Alias
template slashing: untyped = signed_block.message.body.proposer_slashings[i]
# Proposed block 1
block:
let
header = slashing.signed_header_1
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key = validatorKeys.load(header.message.proposer_index).valueOr:
return err("collectSignatureSets: invalid slashing proposer index 1")
sigs.add block_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root, header.message.slot, header.message,
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key, header.signature.load().valueOr do:
return err(
"collectSignatureSets: cannot load proposer slashing 1 signature"))
# Conflicting block 2
block:
let
header = slashing.signed_header_2
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key = validatorKeys.load(header.message.proposer_index).valueOr:
return err("collectSignatureSets: invalid slashing proposer index 2")
sigs.add block_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root, header.message.slot, header.message,
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key, header.signature.load().valueOr do:
return err(
"collectSignatureSets: cannot load proposer slashing 2 signature"))
# 4. Attester slashings
# ----------------------------------------------------
# Denial-of-service:
# SSZ deserialization guarantees that blocks received from random sources
# including peer or RPC
# have at most MAX_ATTESTER_SLASHINGS attester slashings.
for i in 0 ..< signed_block.message.body.attester_slashings.len:
# don't use "items" for iterating over large type
# due to https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/14421
# fixed in 1.4.2
# Alias
template slashing: untyped = signed_block.message.body.attester_slashings[i]
# Attestation 1
block:
let
key = ? aggregateAttesters(
slashing.attestation_1.attesting_indices.asSeq(), validatorKeys)
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sig = slashing.attestation_1.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("Invalid attestation slashing signature 1")
sigs.add attestation_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root, slashing.attestation_1.data, key, sig)
# Conflicting attestation 2
block:
let
key = ? aggregateAttesters(
slashing.attestation_2.attesting_indices.asSeq(), validatorKeys)
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sig = slashing.attestation_2.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("Invalid attestation slashing signature 2")
sigs.add attestation_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root, slashing.attestation_2.data, key, sig)
# 5. Attestations
# ----------------------------------------------------
# Denial-of-service:
# SSZ deserialization guarantees that blocks received from random sources
# including peer or RPC
# have at most MAX_ATTESTATIONS attestations.
for i in 0 ..< signed_block.message.body.attestations.len:
# don't use "items" for iterating over large type
# due to https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/14421
# fixed in 1.4.2
template attestation: untyped = signed_block.message.body.attestations[i]
when typeof(signed_block).kind < ConsensusFork.Electra:
let
key = ? aggregateAttesters(
get_attesting_indices(
state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits, cache),
validatorKeys)
else:
let
key = ? aggregateAttesters(
get_attesting_indices(
state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits,
attestation.committee_bits, cache),
validatorKeys)
let
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sig = attestation.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("Invalid attestation signature")
sigs.add attestation_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root, attestation.data, key, sig)
# 6. VoluntaryExits
# ----------------------------------------------------
# Denial-of-service:
# SSZ deserialization guarantees that blocks received from random sources
# including peer or RPC
# have at most MAX_VOLUNTARY_EXITS voluntary exits.
fix EIP-7044 implementation when using batch verification (#5953) In #5120, EIP-7044 support got added to the state transition function to force `CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION` to be used when validiting `VoluntaryExit` messages, irrespective of their `epoch`. In #5637, similar logic was added when batch verifying BLS signatures, which is used during gossip validation (libp2p gossipsub, and req/resp). However, that logic did not match the one introduced in #5120, and only uses `CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION` when a `VoluntaryExit`'s `epoch` was set to a value `>= CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH`. Otherwise, `BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION` would still be used when validating `VoluntaryExit`, e.g., with `epoch` set to `0`, as is the case in this Holesky block: - https://holesky.beaconcha.in/slot/1076985#voluntary-exits Extracting the correct logic from #5120 into a function, and reusing it when verifying BLS signatures fixes this issue, and also leverages the exhaustive EF test suite that covers the (correct) #5120 logic. This fix only affects networks that have EIP-7044 applied (post-Deneb). Without the fix, Deneb blocks with a `VoluntaryExit` with `epoch` set to `< CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH` incorrectly fail to validate despite being valid. Incorrect blocks that contain a malicious `VoluntaryExit` with `epoch` set to `< CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH` and signed using `BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION` _would_ pass the BLS verification stage, but subsequently fail the state transition logic. Such blocks would still correctly be labeled invalid.
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if signed_block.message.body.voluntary_exits.len > 0:
let voluntary_exit_fork = withConsensusFork(state.kind):
consensusFork.voluntary_exit_signature_fork(fork, capella_fork_version)
for i in 0 ..< signed_block.message.body.voluntary_exits.len:
# don't use "items" for iterating over large type
# due to https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/14421
# fixed in 1.4.2
template volex: untyped = signed_block.message.body.voluntary_exits[i]
let key = validatorKeys.load(volex.message.validator_index).valueOr:
return err("collectSignatureSets: invalid voluntary exit")
sigs.add voluntary_exit_signature_set(
# https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7044
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/deneb/beacon-chain.md#modified-process_voluntary_exit
fix EIP-7044 implementation when using batch verification (#5953) In #5120, EIP-7044 support got added to the state transition function to force `CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION` to be used when validiting `VoluntaryExit` messages, irrespective of their `epoch`. In #5637, similar logic was added when batch verifying BLS signatures, which is used during gossip validation (libp2p gossipsub, and req/resp). However, that logic did not match the one introduced in #5120, and only uses `CAPELLA_FORK_VERSION` when a `VoluntaryExit`'s `epoch` was set to a value `>= CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH`. Otherwise, `BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION` would still be used when validating `VoluntaryExit`, e.g., with `epoch` set to `0`, as is the case in this Holesky block: - https://holesky.beaconcha.in/slot/1076985#voluntary-exits Extracting the correct logic from #5120 into a function, and reusing it when verifying BLS signatures fixes this issue, and also leverages the exhaustive EF test suite that covers the (correct) #5120 logic. This fix only affects networks that have EIP-7044 applied (post-Deneb). Without the fix, Deneb blocks with a `VoluntaryExit` with `epoch` set to `< CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH` incorrectly fail to validate despite being valid. Incorrect blocks that contain a malicious `VoluntaryExit` with `epoch` set to `< CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH` and signed using `BELLATRIX_FORK_VERSION` _would_ pass the BLS verification stage, but subsequently fail the state transition logic. Such blocks would still correctly be labeled invalid.
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voluntary_exit_fork, genesis_validators_root, volex.message, key,
volex.signature.load.valueOr do:
return err(
"collectSignatureSets: cannot load voluntary exit signature"))
Speed up altair block processing 2x (#3115) * Speed up altair block processing >2x Like #3089, this PR drastially speeds up historical REST queries and other long state replays. * cache sync committee validator indices * use ~80mb less memory for validator pubkey mappings * batch-verify sync aggregate signature (fixes #2985) * document sync committee hack with head block vs sync message block * add batch signature verification failure tests Before: ``` ../env.sh nim c -d:release -r ncli_db --db:mainnet_0/db bench --start-slot:-1000 All time are ms Average, StdDev, Min, Max, Samples, Test Validation is turned off meaning that no BLS operations are performed 5830.675, 0.000, 5830.675, 5830.675, 1, Initialize DB 0.481, 1.878, 0.215, 59.167, 981, Load block from database 8422.566, 0.000, 8422.566, 8422.566, 1, Load state from database 6.996, 1.678, 0.042, 14.385, 969, Advance slot, non-epoch 93.217, 8.318, 84.192, 122.209, 32, Advance slot, epoch 20.513, 23.665, 11.510, 201.561, 981, Apply block, no slot processing 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database load 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database store ``` After: ``` 7081.422, 0.000, 7081.422, 7081.422, 1, Initialize DB 0.553, 2.122, 0.175, 66.692, 981, Load block from database 5439.446, 0.000, 5439.446, 5439.446, 1, Load state from database 6.829, 1.575, 0.043, 12.156, 969, Advance slot, non-epoch 94.716, 2.749, 88.395, 100.026, 32, Advance slot, epoch 11.636, 23.766, 4.889, 205.250, 981, Apply block, no slot processing 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database load 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database store ``` * add comment
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block:
when signed_block is phase0.SignedBeaconBlock:
discard
else:
# 7. SyncAggregate
# ----------------------------------------------------
withState(state):
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Altair:
if signed_block.message.body.sync_aggregate.sync_committee_bits.isZeros:
if signed_block.message.body.sync_aggregate.sync_committee_signature != ValidatorSig.infinity():
return err("collectSignatureSets: empty sync aggregates need signature of point at infinity")
else:
let
current_sync_committee =
forkyState.data.get_sync_committee_cache(cache).current_sync_committee
previous_slot = max(forkyState.data.slot, Slot(1)) - 1
beacon_block_root = get_block_root_at_slot(forkyState.data, previous_slot)
pubkey = ? aggregateAttesters(
current_sync_committee,
signed_block.message.body.sync_aggregate.sync_committee_bits,
validatorKeys)
sigs.add sync_committee_message_signature_set(
fork, genesis_validators_root, previous_slot, beacon_block_root,
pubkey,
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signed_block.message.body.sync_aggregate.sync_committee_signature.load().valueOr do:
return err("collectSignatureSets: cannot load signature"))
Speed up altair block processing 2x (#3115) * Speed up altair block processing >2x Like #3089, this PR drastially speeds up historical REST queries and other long state replays. * cache sync committee validator indices * use ~80mb less memory for validator pubkey mappings * batch-verify sync aggregate signature (fixes #2985) * document sync committee hack with head block vs sync message block * add batch signature verification failure tests Before: ``` ../env.sh nim c -d:release -r ncli_db --db:mainnet_0/db bench --start-slot:-1000 All time are ms Average, StdDev, Min, Max, Samples, Test Validation is turned off meaning that no BLS operations are performed 5830.675, 0.000, 5830.675, 5830.675, 1, Initialize DB 0.481, 1.878, 0.215, 59.167, 981, Load block from database 8422.566, 0.000, 8422.566, 8422.566, 1, Load state from database 6.996, 1.678, 0.042, 14.385, 969, Advance slot, non-epoch 93.217, 8.318, 84.192, 122.209, 32, Advance slot, epoch 20.513, 23.665, 11.510, 201.561, 981, Apply block, no slot processing 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database load 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database store ``` After: ``` 7081.422, 0.000, 7081.422, 7081.422, 1, Initialize DB 0.553, 2.122, 0.175, 66.692, 981, Load block from database 5439.446, 0.000, 5439.446, 5439.446, 1, Load state from database 6.829, 1.575, 0.043, 12.156, 969, Advance slot, non-epoch 94.716, 2.749, 88.395, 100.026, 32, Advance slot, epoch 11.636, 23.766, 4.889, 205.250, 981, Apply block, no slot processing 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database load 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0, Database store ``` * add comment
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block:
# 8. BLS to execution changes
when typeof(signed_block).kind >= ConsensusFork.Capella:
withState(state):
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Capella:
for bls_change in signed_block.message.body.bls_to_execution_changes:
let sig = bls_change.signature.load.valueOr:
return err("collectSignatureSets: cannot load BLS to execution change signature")
# Otherwise, expensive loadWithCache can be spammed with irrelevant pubkeys
? check_bls_to_execution_change(
genesis_fork, forkyState.data, bls_change, {skipBlsValidation})
let validator_pubkey =
bls_change.message.from_bls_pubkey.loadWithCache.valueOr:
return err("collectSignatureSets: cannot load BLS to execution change pubkey")
sigs.add bls_to_execution_change_signature_set(
genesis_fork, genesis_validators_root, bls_change.message,
validator_pubkey, sig)
ok()
proc batchVerify*(verifier: var BatchVerifier, sigs: openArray[SignatureSet]): bool =
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let bytes = verifier.rng[].generate(array[32, byte])
verifier.taskpool.batchVerify(verifier.sigVerifCache, sigs, bytes)