- Implement all the required glue code to make things executable
- Implement a dummy KZG trusted setup
Co-authored-by: Hsiao-Wei Wang <hsiaowei.eth@gmail.com>
`LightClientUpdate` structures currently use different merkle proof root
depending on the presence of `finalized_header`. By always rooting it in
the same state (the `attested_header.state_root`), logic gets simpler.
Caveats:
- In periods of extended non-finality, `update.finalized_header` may now
be outdated by several sync committee periods. The old implementation
rejected such updates as the `next_sync_committee` in them was stale,
but the new implementation can properly handle this case.
- The `next_sync_committee` can no longer be considered finalized based
on `is_finality_update`. Instead, waiting until `finalized_header` is
in the `attested_header`'s sync committee period is now necessary.
- Because `update.finalized_header > store.finalized_header` no longer
holds (for updates with finality), an `is_better_update` helper is
added to improve `best_valid_update` tracking (in the past, finalized
updates with supermajority participation would always directly apply)
This PR builds on prior work from:
- @hwwhww at https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/2829
Various cleanups and minor fixes:
- Consistent terminology:
- `signed_block` -> `attested_block`
- `finalized_block_header` -> `finalized_header`
- `snapshot_period` -> `store_period`
- Use correct block in finality test (`blocks[-1]` instead of new one)
- Add `signed_block_header` func to get header from `SignedBeaconBlock`
- Remove `block_header` from `get_sync_aggregate` helper arguments
- Use `state_transition_with_full_block` as shortcut for multiple calls
- Have `finalized_header` actually be header instead of full block body
- Consistent ordering of `assert` to match structure definition
The producer of `LightClientUpdate` structures usually does not know how
far the `LightClientStore` on the client side has advanced. Updates are
currently rejected when including a redundant `next_sync_committee` not
advancing the `LightClientStore`. Behaviour is changed to allow this.
The `fork_version` field in `LightClientUpdate` can be derived from the
`update.signature_slot` value by consulting the locally configured fork
schedule. The light client already needs access to the fork schedule to
determine the `GeneralizedIndex` values used for merkle proofs, and the
memory layouts of the structures (including `LightClientUpdate`). The
`fork_version` itself is network dependent and doesn't reveal that info.
* t push base design for partial withdrawals
* moor tests
* clean up withdrawals naming
* make partial withdrawal randomized tests better
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Alex Stokes <r.alex.stokes@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hsiao-Wei Wang <hsiaowei.eth@gmail.com>
* fix mainnet brokn test
* name swap
* lint
Co-authored-by: Alex Stokes <r.alex.stokes@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hsiao-Wei Wang <hsiaowei.eth@gmail.com>
As the sync committee signs the previous block, the situation arises at
every sync committee period boundary, that the new sync committee signs
a block in the previous sync committee period. The light client cannot
reliably detect this condition (e.g., assume that this is the case when
it is currently on the last slot of a sync committee period), because
the last couple slots of a sync committee period may not have a block.
For example, when receiving a `LightClientUpdate` that is constructed
as in the following illustration, it is unknown whether `sync_aggregate`
was signed by the current or next sync committee at `attested_header`.
```
slot N N + 1 | N + 2 (slot not sent!)
|
+-----------------+ \ / | +----------------+
| attested_header | <--- X ----|---- | sync_aggregate |
+-----------------+ / \ | +----------------+
missed |
|
sync committee
period boundary
```
This patch addresses this edge case by including the slot at which the
`sync_aggregate` was created into the `LightClientUpdate` object.
Note that the `signature_slot` cannot be trusted beyond the purpose of
signature verification, as it could be manipulated to any other slot
within the same sync committee period and fork version, without making
the `sync_aggregate` invalid.
Documentation on how to call `prepare_execution_payload` had the params
for `safe_block_hash` and `finalized_block` hash flipped compared to the
function definition. Also updated tests for consistency.
Hsiao-Wei Wang
George Kadianakis
Etan Kissling
Alex Stokes
Danny Ryan
Justin Traglia
Dmitrii Shmatko
Mikhail Kalinin