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add subset ignore rule to sync contributions as well

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Jacek Sieka 2022-03-18 08:48:00 +01:00
parent a0755c2e86
commit d5f4c46183
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2 changed files with 3 additions and 2 deletions
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1
specs/altair/p2p-interface.md
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@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ def get_sync_subcommittee_pubkeys(state: BeaconState, subcommittee_index: uint64
- _[REJECT]_ `contribution_and_proof.selection_proof` selects the validator as an aggregator for the slot -- i.e. `is_sync_committee_aggregator(contribution_and_proof.selection_proof)` returns `True`.
- _[REJECT]_ The aggregator's validator index is in the declared subcommittee of the current sync committee --
i.e. `state.validators[contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index].pubkey in get_sync_subcommittee_pubkeys(state, contribution.subcommittee_index)`.
- _[IGNORE]_ A valid sync committee contriubtion with equal `slot`, `beacon_block_root` and `subcommittee_index` whose `aggregation_bits` is non-strict superset has _not_ already been seen.
- _[IGNORE]_ The sync committee contribution is the first valid contribution received for the aggregator with index `contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index`
for the slot `contribution.slot` and subcommittee index `contribution.subcommittee_index`
(this requires maintaining a cache of size `SYNC_COMMITTEE_SIZE` for this topic that can be flushed after each slot).

4
specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md
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@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ Likewise, clients MUST NOT emit or propagate messages larger than this limit.
The optional `from` (1), `seqno` (3), `signature` (5) and `key` (6) protobuf fields are omitted from the message,
since messages are identified by content, anonymous, and signed where necessary in the application layer.
Starting from Gossipsub v1.1, clients MUST enforce this by applying the `StrictNoSign`
[signature policy](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#signature-policy-options).
[signature policy](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#signature-policy-options).
The `message-id` of a gossipsub message MUST be the following 20 byte value computed from the message data:
* If `message.data` has a valid snappy decompression, set `message-id` to the first 20 bytes of the `SHA256` hash of
@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ The following validations MUST pass before forwarding the `signed_aggregate_and_
(a client MAY queue future aggregates for processing at the appropriate slot).
- _[REJECT]_ The aggregate attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e. `aggregate.data.target.epoch ==
compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot)`
- _[IGNORE]_ The valid aggregate attestation defined by `hash_tree_root(aggregate.data)` whose `aggregator_bits` is a non-strict superset has _not_ already been seen
- _[IGNORE]_ A valid aggregate attestation defined by `hash_tree_root(aggregate.data)` whose `aggregation_bits` is a non-strict superset has _not_ already been seen.
(via aggregate gossip, within a verified block, or through the creation of an equivalent aggregate locally).
- _[IGNORE]_ The `aggregate` is the first valid aggregate received for the aggregator
with index `aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index` for the epoch `aggregate.data.target.epoch`.