Merge pull request #83 from ethereum/JustinDrake-patch-1

Move from signed integers to unsigned integers
This commit is contained in:
Danny Ryan 2018-10-16 13:00:26 -05:00 committed by GitHub
commit d0ff8cdece
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1 changed files with 32 additions and 30 deletions

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@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ A `BeaconBlock` has the following fields:
```python
{
# Slot number
'slot': 'int64',
'slot': 'uint64',
# Proposer RANDAO reveal
'randao_reveal': 'hash32',
# Recent PoW chain reference (block hash)
@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ An `AttestationRecord` has the following fields:
```python
{
# Slot number
'slot': 'int64',
'slot': 'uint64',
# Shard number
'shard': 'int16',
'shard': 'uint16',
# Block hashes not part of the current chain, oldest to newest
'oblique_parent_hashes': ['hash32'],
# Shard block hash being attested to
@ -127,11 +127,11 @@ An `AttestationRecord` has the following fields:
# Attester participation bitfield (1 bit per attester)
'attester_bitfield': 'bytes',
# Slot of last justified block
'justified_slot': 'int64',
'justified_slot': 'uint64',
# Hash of last justified block
'justified_block_hash': 'hash32',
# BLS aggregate signature
'aggregate_sig': ['int256']
'aggregate_sig': ['uint256']
}
```
@ -140,17 +140,17 @@ An `AttestationSignedData` has the following fields:
```python
{
# Chain version
'version': 'int64',
'version': 'uint64',
# Slot number
'slot': 'int64',
'slot': 'uint64',
# Shard number
'shard': 'int16',
'shard': 'uint16',
# 31 parent hashes
'parent_hashes': ['hash32'],
# Shard block hash
'shard_block_hash': 'hash32',
# Slot of last justified block referenced in the attestation
'justified_slot': 'int64'
'justified_slot': 'uint64'
}
```
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ A `SpecialRecord` has the following fields:
```python
{
# Kind
'kind': 'int8',
'kind': 'uint8',
# Data
'data': ['bytes']
}
@ -189,30 +189,30 @@ The `CrystallizedState` has the following fields:
```python
{
# Slot of last validator set change
'validator_set_change_slot': 'int64',
'validator_set_change_slot': 'uint64',
# List of validators
'validators': [ValidatorRecord],
# Most recent crosslink for each shard
'crosslinks': [CrosslinkRecord],
# Last crystallized state recalculation
'last_state_recalculation_slot': 'int64',
'last_state_recalculation_slot': 'uint64',
# Last finalized slot
'last_finalized_slot': 'int64',
'last_finalized_slot': 'uint64',
# Last justified slot
'last_justified_slot': 'int64',
'last_justified_slot': 'uint64',
# Number of consecutive justified slots
'justified_streak': 'int64',
'justified_streak': 'uint64',
# Committee members and their assigned shard, per slot
'shard_and_committee_for_slots': [[ShardAndCommittee]],
# Total deposits penalized in the given withdrawal period
'deposits_penalized_in_period': ['int32'],
'deposits_penalized_in_period': ['uint32'],
# Hash chain of validator set changes (for light clients to easily track deltas)
'validator_set_delta_hash_chain': 'hash32'
# Parameters relevant to hard forks / versioning.
# Should be updated only by hard forks.
'pre_fork_version': 'int32',
'post_fork_version': 'int32',
'fork_slot_number': 'int64',
'pre_fork_version': 'uint32',
'post_fork_version': 'uint32',
'fork_slot_number': 'uint64',
}
```
@ -221,21 +221,21 @@ A `ValidatorRecord` has the following fields:
```python
{
# BLS public key
'pubkey': 'int256',
'pubkey': 'uint256',
# Withdrawal shard number
'withdrawal_shard': 'int16',
'withdrawal_shard': 'uint16',
# Withdrawal address
'withdrawal_address': 'address',
# RANDAO commitment
'randao_commitment': 'hash32',
# Slot the RANDAO commitment was last changed
'randao_last_change': 'int64',
'randao_last_change': 'uint64',
# Balance
'balance': 'int64',
'balance': 'uint64',
# Status code
'status': 'int8',
'status': 'uint8',
# Slot when validator exited (or 0)
'exit_slot': 'int64'
'exit_slot': 'uint64'
}
```
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ A `CrosslinkRecord` has the following fields:
# Since last validator set change?
'recently_changed': 'bool',
# Slot number
'slot': 'int64',
'slot': 'uint64',
# Beacon chain block hash
'shard_block_hash': 'hash32'
}
@ -257,9 +257,9 @@ A `ShardAndCommittee` object has the following fields:
```python
{
# Shard number
'shard': 'int16',
'shard': 'uint16',
# Validator indices
'committee': ['int24']
'committee': ['uint24']
}
```
@ -670,6 +670,8 @@ For every `(shard, shard_block_hash)` tuple:
#### Balance recalculations related to FFG rewards
Note: When applying penalties in the following balance recalculations implementers should make sure the `uint64` does not underflow.
* Let `total_balance` be the total balance of active validators.
* Let `total_balance_in_eth = total_balance // GWEI_PER_ETH`.
* Let `reward_quotient = BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT * int_sqrt(total_balance_in_eth)`. (The per-slot maximum interest rate is `1/reward_quotient`.)
@ -706,8 +708,8 @@ In addition, validators with `status == PENALIZED` lose `B // reward_quotient +
For each `SpecialRecord` `obj` in `active_state.pending_specials`:
* **[covers logouts]**: If `obj.kind == LOGOUT`, interpret `data[0]` as a validator index as an `int32` and `data[1]` as a signature. If `BLSVerify(pubkey=validators[data[0]].pubkey, msg=hash(LOGOUT_MESSAGE + bytes8(version)), sig=data[1])`, where `version = pre_fork_version if slot < fork_slot_number else post_fork_version`, and `validators[i].status == ACTIVE`, run `exit_validator(data[0], crystallized_state, penalize=False, current_slot=block.slot)`
* **[covers `NO_DBL_VOTE`, `NO_SURROUND`, `NO_DBL_PROPOSE` slashing conditions]:** If `obj.kind == CASPER_SLASHING`, interpret `data[0]` as a list of concatenated `int32` values where each value represents an index into `validators`, `data[1]` as the data being signed and `data[2]` as an aggregate signature. Interpret `data[3:6]` similarly. Verify that both signatures are valid, that the two signatures are signing distinct data, and that they are either signing the same slot number, or that one surrounds the other (ie. `source1 < source2 < target2 < target1`). Let `indices` be the list of indices in both signatures; verify that its length is at least 1. For each validator index `v` in `indices`, if its `status` does not equal `PENALIZED`, then run `exit_validator(v, crystallized_state, penalize=True, current_slot=block.slot)`
* **[covers logouts]**: If `obj.kind == LOGOUT`, interpret `data[0]` as a validator index as an `uint32` and `data[1]` as a signature. If `BLSVerify(pubkey=validators[data[0]].pubkey, msg=hash(LOGOUT_MESSAGE + bytes8(version)), sig=data[1])`, where `version = pre_fork_version if slot < fork_slot_number else post_fork_version`, and `validators[i].status == ACTIVE`, run `exit_validator(data[0], crystallized_state, penalize=False, current_slot=block.slot)`
* **[covers `NO_DBL_VOTE`, `NO_SURROUND`, `NO_DBL_PROPOSE` slashing conditions]:** If `obj.kind == CASPER_SLASHING`, interpret `data[0]` as a list of concatenated `uint32` values where each value represents an index into `validators`, `data[1]` as the data being signed and `data[2]` as an aggregate signature. Interpret `data[3:6]` similarly. Verify that both signatures are valid, that the two signatures are signing distinct data, and that they are either signing the same slot number, or that one surrounds the other (ie. `source1 < source2 < target2 < target1`). Let `indices` be the list of indices in both signatures; verify that its length is at least 1. For each validator index `v` in `indices`, if its `status` does not equal `PENALIZED`, then run `exit_validator(v, crystallized_state, penalize=True, current_slot=block.slot)`
* **[covers RANDAO updates]**: If `obj.kind == RANDAO_REVEAL`, interpret `data[0]` as an integer and `data[1]` as a hash32. Set `validators[data[0]].randao_commitment = data[1]`.
#### Finally...