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Danny Ryan 2018-12-11 11:16:24 -06:00
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specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md
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@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ All [validators](#dfn-validator):
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attestations = [a for a in this_epoch_attestations + previous_epoch_attestations if a.epoch_boundary_hash == get_block_hash(state, state.slot - 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH) and a.justified_slot == state.previous_justified_slot]`.
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attester_indices` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in previous_epoch_boundary_attestations]`.
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters = [state.validator_registry[i] for indices in previous_epoch_boundary_attester_indices for i in indices]`.
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in previous_epoch_boundary_attesters])`. *Note: this balance might be marginally different than the `this_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance` during the previous epoch transition. Due to the tight bound on validator churn each epoch and small per-epoch rewards/penalties, the potential balance difference is very low and only marginally affects consensus safety.*
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in previous_epoch_boundary_attesters])`. *Note: this balance might be marginally different than `this_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance` during the previous epoch transition. Due to the tight bound on validator churn each epoch and small per-epoch rewards/penalties, the potential balance difference is very low and only marginally affects consensus safety.*
For every `shard_committee` in `state.shard_committees_at_slots`: