Merge branch 'master' into prev-balance-note
This commit is contained in:
Danny Ryan
commit
70a577a786
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@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
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|||
- [Beacon chain fork choice rule](#beacon-chain-fork-choice-rule)
|
||||
- [Beacon chain state transition function](#beacon-chain-state-transition-function)
|
||||
- [Helper functions](#helper-functions)
|
||||
- [`hash`](#hash)
|
||||
- [`is_active_validator`](#is_active_validator)
|
||||
- [`get_active_validator_indices`](#get_active_validator_indices)
|
||||
- [`shuffle`](#shuffle)
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|
|
@ -64,27 +65,32 @@
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|||
- [`clamp`](#clamp)
|
||||
- [`get_new_shuffling`](#get_new_shuffling)
|
||||
- [`get_shard_committees_at_slot`](#get_shard_committees_at_slot)
|
||||
- [`get_block_hash`](#get_block_hash)
|
||||
- [`get_block_root`](#get_block_root)
|
||||
- [`get_beacon_proposer_index`](#get_beacon_proposer_index)
|
||||
- [`get_updated_ancestor_hashes`](#get_updated_ancestor_hashes)
|
||||
- [`merkle_root`](#merkle_root)
|
||||
- [`get_attestation_participants`](#get_attestation_participants)
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||||
- [`bytes1`, `bytes2`, ...](#bytes1-bytes2-)
|
||||
- [`get_effective_balance`](#get_effective_balance)
|
||||
- [`get_new_validator_registry_delta_chain_tip`](#get_new_validator_registry_delta_chain_tip)
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- [`get_fork_version`](#get_fork_version)
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||||
- [`get_domain`](#get_domain)
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||||
- [`SSZTreeHash`](#ssztreehash)
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- [`hash_tree_root`](#hash_tree_root)
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- [`verify_casper_votes`](#verify_casper_votes)
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||||
- [`integer_squareroot`](#integer_squareroot)
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||||
- [`BLSVerify`](#blsverify)
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||||
- [`bls_verify`](#bls_verify)
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||||
- [`bls_verify_multiple`](#bls_verify_multiple)
|
||||
- [On startup](#on-startup)
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||||
- [Routine for processing deposits](#routine-for-processing-deposits)
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||||
- [Routine for updating validator status](#routine-for-updating-validator-status)
|
||||
- [Per-slot processing](#per-slot-processing)
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||||
- [Misc counters](#misc-counters)
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||||
- [Block roots](#block-roots)
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||||
- [Per-block processing](#per-block-processing)
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||||
- [Slot](#slot)
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||||
- [Proposer signature](#proposer-signature)
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||||
- [RANDAO](#randao)
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||||
- [PoW receipt root](#pow-receipt-root)
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- [Block operations](#block-operations)
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||||
- [Operations](#operations)
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||||
- [Proposer slashings](#proposer-slashings-1)
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||||
- [Casper slashings](#casper-slashings-1)
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||||
- [Attestations](#attestations-1)
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||||
|
|
@ -97,14 +103,14 @@
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|||
- [Justification](#justification)
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||||
- [Finalization](#finalization)
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||||
- [Crosslinks](#crosslinks)
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||||
- [Justification and finalization rewards and penalties](#justification-and-finalization-rewards-and-penalties)
|
||||
- [Crosslink rewards and penalties](#crosslink-rewards-and-penalties)
|
||||
- [Rewards and penalties](#rewards-and-penalties)
|
||||
- [Justification and finalization](#justification-and-finalization)
|
||||
- [Attestation inclusion](#attestation-inclusion)
|
||||
- [Crosslinks](#crosslinks-1)
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- [Validator registry](#validator-registry)
|
||||
- [Proposer reshuffling](#proposer-reshuffling)
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||||
- [Final updates](#final-updates)
|
||||
- [State root processing](#state-root-processing)
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||||
- [Appendix](#appendix)
|
||||
- [Appendix A - Hash function](#appendix-a---hash-function)
|
||||
- [References](#references)
|
||||
- [Normative](#normative)
|
||||
- [Informative](#informative)
|
||||
|
|
@ -154,6 +160,7 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
| `BEACON_CHAIN_SHARD_NUMBER` | `2**64 - 1` | - |
|
||||
| `BLS_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX_BYTE` | `0x00` | - |
|
||||
| `MAX_CASPER_VOTES` | `2**10` (= 1,024) | votes |
|
||||
| `LATEST_BLOCK_ROOTS_COUNT` | `2**13` (= 8,192) | block roots |
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||||
|
||||
* For the safety of crosslinks a minimum committee size of 111 is [recommended](https://vitalik.ca/files/Ithaca201807_Sharding.pdf). (Unbiasable randomness with a Verifiable Delay Function (VDF) will improve committee robustness and lower the safe minimum committee size.) The shuffling algorithm generally ensures (assuming sufficient validators) committee sizes at least `TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE // 2`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -191,7 +198,7 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
|
||||
| Name | Value |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
| `BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**11` (= 2,048) |
|
||||
| `BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**10` (= 1,024) |
|
||||
| `WHISTLEBLOWER_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**9` (= 512) |
|
||||
| `INCLUDER_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**3` (= 8) |
|
||||
| `INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` | `2**34` (= 17,179,869,184) |
|
||||
|
|
@ -311,18 +318,18 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
'slot': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Shard number
|
||||
'shard': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Hash of the signed beacon block
|
||||
'beacon_block_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Hash of the ancestor at the epoch boundary
|
||||
'epoch_boundary_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Shard block hash being attested to
|
||||
'shard_block_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Last crosslink hash
|
||||
'latest_crosslink_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Hash of root of the signed beacon block
|
||||
'beacon_block_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Hash of root of the ancestor at the epoch boundary
|
||||
'epoch_boundary_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Shard block's hash of root
|
||||
'shard_block_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Last crosslink's hash of root
|
||||
'latest_crosslink_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Slot of the last justified beacon block
|
||||
'justified_slot': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Hash of the last justified beacon block
|
||||
'justified_block_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
'justified_block_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -370,7 +377,7 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
```python
|
||||
{
|
||||
# Minimum slot for processing exit
|
||||
'slot': 'unit64',
|
||||
'slot': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Index of the exiting validator
|
||||
'validator_index': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Validator signature
|
||||
|
|
@ -388,7 +395,7 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
'slot': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Skip list of ancestor beacon block hashes
|
||||
# i'th item is the most recent ancestor whose slot is a multiple of 2**i for i = 0, ..., 31
|
||||
'ancestor_hashes': ['hash32'],
|
||||
'parent_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
'state_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
'randao_reveal': 'hash32',
|
||||
'candidate_pow_receipt_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
|
|
@ -419,8 +426,8 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
'slot': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Shard number (`BEACON_CHAIN_SHARD_NUMBER` for beacon chain)
|
||||
'shard': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Block hash
|
||||
'block_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Block's hash of root
|
||||
'block_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -456,9 +463,10 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
|
||||
# Recent state
|
||||
'latest_crosslinks': [CrosslinkRecord],
|
||||
'latest_block_hashes': ['hash32'], # Needed to process attestations, older to newer
|
||||
'latest_block_roots': ['hash32'], # Needed to process attestations, older to newer
|
||||
'latest_penalized_exit_balances': ['uint64'], # Balances penalized at every withdrawal period
|
||||
'latest_attestations': [PendingAttestationRecord],
|
||||
'batched_block_roots': ['hash32'],
|
||||
|
||||
# PoW receipt root
|
||||
'processed_pow_receipt_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
|
|
@ -477,7 +485,7 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
# RANDAO commitment
|
||||
'randao_commitment': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Slots the proposer has skipped (i.e. layers of RANDAO expected)
|
||||
'randao_skips': 'uint64',
|
||||
'randao_layers': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Balance in Gwei
|
||||
'balance': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Status code
|
||||
|
|
@ -496,7 +504,7 @@ Unless otherwise indicated, code appearing in `this style` is to be interpreted
|
|||
# Slot number
|
||||
'slot': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Shard block hash
|
||||
'shard_block_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
'shard_block_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -655,7 +663,7 @@ Processing the beacon chain is similar to processing the Ethereum 1.0 chain. Cli
|
|||
|
||||
For a beacon chain block, `block`, to be processed by a node, the following conditions must be met:
|
||||
|
||||
* The parent block with `SSZTreeHash` `block.ancestor_hashes[0]` has been processed and accepted.
|
||||
* The parent block with root `block.parent_root` has been processed and accepted.
|
||||
* The node has processed its `state` up to slot, `block.slot - 1`.
|
||||
* The Ethereum 1.0 block pointed to by the `state.processed_pow_receipt_root` has been processed and accepted.
|
||||
* The node's local clock time is greater than or equal to `state.genesis_time + block.slot * SLOT_DURATION`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -708,6 +716,12 @@ The per-slot transitions generally focus on verifying aggregate signatures and s
|
|||
|
||||
Note: The definitions below are for specification purposes and are not necessarily optimal implementations.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `hash`
|
||||
|
||||
The hash function is denoted by `hash`. In Phase 0 the beacon chain is deployed with the same hash function as Ethereum 1.0, i.e. Keccak-256 (also incorrectly known as SHA3).
|
||||
|
||||
Note: We aim to migrate to a S[T/N]ARK-friendly hash function in a future Ethereum 2.0 deployment phase.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `is_active_validator`
|
||||
```python
|
||||
def is_active_validator(validator: ValidatorRecord) -> bool:
|
||||
|
|
@ -869,20 +883,20 @@ def get_shard_committees_at_slot(state: BeaconState,
|
|||
return state.shard_committees_at_slots[slot - earliest_slot_in_array]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `get_block_hash`
|
||||
#### `get_block_root`
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
def get_block_hash(state: BeaconState,
|
||||
def get_block_root(state: BeaconState,
|
||||
slot: int) -> Hash32:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Returns the block hash at a recent ``slot``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
earliest_slot_in_array = state.slot - len(state.latest_block_hashes)
|
||||
earliest_slot_in_array = state.slot - len(state.latest_block_roots)
|
||||
assert earliest_slot_in_array <= slot < state.slot
|
||||
return state.latest_block_hashes[slot - earliest_slot_in_array]
|
||||
return state.latest_block_roots[slot - earliest_slot_in_array]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`get_block_hash(_, s)` should always return `SSZTreeHash` of the block in the beacon chain at slot `s`, and `get_shard_committees_at_slot(_, s)` should not change unless the [validator](#dfn-validator) registry changes.
|
||||
`get_block_root(_, s)` should always return `hash_tree_root` of the block in the beacon chain at slot `s`, and `get_shard_committees_at_slot(_, s)` should not change unless the [validator](#dfn-validator) registry changes.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `get_beacon_proposer_index`
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -896,16 +910,14 @@ def get_beacon_proposer_index(state: BeaconState,
|
|||
return first_committee[slot % len(first_committee)]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `get_updated_ancestor_hashes`
|
||||
#### `merkle_root`
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
def get_updated_ancestor_hashes(latest_block: BeaconBlock,
|
||||
latest_hash: Hash32) -> List[Hash32]:
|
||||
new_ancestor_hashes = copy.deepcopy(latest_block.ancestor_hashes)
|
||||
for i in range(32):
|
||||
if latest_block.slot % 2**i == 0:
|
||||
new_ancestor_hashes[i] = latest_hash
|
||||
return new_ancestor_hashes
|
||||
def merkle_root(values):
|
||||
o = [0] * len(values) + values
|
||||
for i in range(len(values)-1, 0, -1):
|
||||
o[i] = hash(o[i*2] + o[i*2+1])
|
||||
return o[1]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `get_attestation_participants`
|
||||
|
|
@ -987,9 +999,9 @@ def get_domain(fork_data: ForkData,
|
|||
) * 2**32 + domain_type
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `SSZTreeHash`
|
||||
#### `hash_tree_root`
|
||||
|
||||
`SSZTreeHash` is a function for hashing objects into a single root utilizing a hash tree structure. `SSZTreeHash` is defined in the [SimpleSerialize spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/simple-serialize.md#tree-hash).
|
||||
`hash_tree_root` is a function for hashing objects into a single root utilizing a hash tree structure. `hash_tree_root` is defined in the [SimpleSerialize spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/simple-serialize.md#tree-hash).
|
||||
|
||||
#### `verify_casper_votes`
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1000,7 +1012,7 @@ def verify_casper_votes(state: BeaconState, votes: SlashableVoteData) -> bool:
|
|||
|
||||
pubs = [aggregate_pubkey([state.validators[i].pubkey for i in votes.aggregate_signature_poc_0_indices]),
|
||||
aggregate_pubkey([state.validators[i].pubkey for i in votes.aggregate_signature_poc_1_indices])]
|
||||
return BLSMultiVerify(pubkeys=pubs, msgs=[SSZTreeHash(votes)+bytes1(0), SSZTreeHash(votes)+bytes1(1), sig=aggregate_signature)
|
||||
return bls_verify_multiple(pubkeys=pubs, messages=[hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(0), hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(1), signature=aggregate_signature)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `integer_squareroot`
|
||||
|
|
@ -1018,9 +1030,13 @@ def integer_squareroot(n: int) -> int:
|
|||
return x
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `BLSVerify`
|
||||
#### `bls_verify`
|
||||
|
||||
`BLSVerify` is a function for verifying a BLS12-381 signature, defined in the [BLS Verification spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/bls_verify.md).
|
||||
`bls_verify` is a function for verifying a BLS12-381 signature, defined in the [BLS Verification spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/bls_verify.md#bls_verify).
|
||||
|
||||
#### `bls_verify_multiple`
|
||||
|
||||
`bls_verify_multiple` is a function for verifying a BLS12-381 signature constructed from multiple messages, defined in the [BLS Verification spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/bls_verify.md#bls_verify_multiple).
|
||||
|
||||
### On startup
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1030,7 +1046,7 @@ A valid block with slot `INITIAL_SLOT_NUMBER` (a "genesis block") has the follow
|
|||
{
|
||||
'header': BeaconBlockHeader(
|
||||
slot=INITIAL_SLOT_NUMBER,
|
||||
ancestor_hashes=[ZERO_HASH for i in range(32)],
|
||||
parent_hash=ZERO_HASH,
|
||||
state_root=STARTUP_STATE_ROOT,
|
||||
randao_reveal=ZERO_HASH,
|
||||
candidate_pow_receipt_root=ZERO_HASH,
|
||||
|
|
@ -1082,11 +1098,11 @@ def on_startup(initial_validator_deposits: List[Deposit],
|
|||
finalized_slot=INITIAL_SLOT_NUMBER,
|
||||
|
||||
# Recent state
|
||||
latest_crosslinks=[CrosslinkRecord(slot=INITIAL_SLOT_NUMBER, shard_block_hash=ZERO_HASH) for _ in range(SHARD_COUNT)],
|
||||
latest_block_hashes=[ZERO_HASH for _ in range(EPOCH_LENGTH * 2)],
|
||||
latest_crosslinks=[CrosslinkRecord(slot=INITIAL_SLOT_NUMBER, shard_block_root=ZERO_HASH) for _ in range(SHARD_COUNT)],
|
||||
latest_block_roots=[ZERO_HASH for _ in range(LATEST_BLOCK_ROOTS_COUNT)],
|
||||
latest_penalized_exit_balances=[],
|
||||
latest_attestations=[],
|
||||
|
||||
batched_block_roots=[]
|
||||
# PoW receipt root
|
||||
processed_pow_receipt_root=processed_pow_receipt_root,
|
||||
candidate_pow_receipt_roots=[],
|
||||
|
|
@ -1142,10 +1158,10 @@ def process_deposit(state: BeaconState,
|
|||
Process a deposit from Ethereum 1.0.
|
||||
Note that this function mutates ``state``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
assert BLSVerify(
|
||||
pub=pubkey,
|
||||
msg=hash(bytes32(pubkey) + withdrawal_credentials + randao_commitment),
|
||||
sig=proof_of_possession,
|
||||
assert bls_verify(
|
||||
pubkey=pubkey,
|
||||
message=hash(bytes32(pubkey) + withdrawal_credentials + randao_commitment),
|
||||
signature=proof_of_possession,
|
||||
domain=get_domain(
|
||||
state.fork_data,
|
||||
state.slot,
|
||||
|
|
@ -1160,7 +1176,7 @@ def process_deposit(state: BeaconState,
|
|||
pubkey=pubkey,
|
||||
withdrawal_credentials=withdrawal_credentials,
|
||||
randao_commitment=randao_commitment,
|
||||
randao_skips=0,
|
||||
randao_layers=0,
|
||||
balance=deposit,
|
||||
status=PENDING_ACTIVATION,
|
||||
latest_status_change_slot=state.slot,
|
||||
|
|
@ -1291,43 +1307,46 @@ def exit_validator(state: BeaconState,
|
|||
|
||||
Below are the processing steps that happen at every slot.
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `latest_block` be the latest `BeaconBlock` that was processed in the chain.
|
||||
* Let `latest_hash` be the `SSZTreeHash` of `latest_block`.
|
||||
* Set `state.slot += 1`
|
||||
* Set `state.latest_block_hashes = state.latest_block_hashes + [latest_hash]`. (The output of `get_block_hash` should not change, except that it will no longer throw for `state.slot - 1`).
|
||||
### Misc counters
|
||||
|
||||
If there is a block from the proposer for `state.slot`, we process that incoming block:
|
||||
* Set `state.slot += 1`.
|
||||
* Set `state.validator_registry[get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)].randao_layers += 1`.
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `block` be that associated incoming block.
|
||||
* Verify that `block.slot == state.slot`
|
||||
* Verify that `block.ancestor_hashes` equals `get_updated_ancestor_hashes(latest_block, latest_hash)`.
|
||||
### Block roots
|
||||
|
||||
If there is no block from the proposer at state.slot:
|
||||
* Let `previous_block_root` be the `tree_hash_root` of the previous beacon block processed in the chain.
|
||||
* Set `state.latest_block_roots = state.latest_block_roots[1:] + [previous_block_root]`.
|
||||
* If `state.slot % LATEST_BLOCK_ROOTS_COUNT == 0` append `merkle_root(state.latest_block_roots)` to `state.batched_block_roots`.
|
||||
|
||||
* Set `state.validator_registry[get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)].randao_skips += 1`.
|
||||
* Skip all other per-slot processing. Move directly to [per-epoch processing](#per-epoch-processing).
|
||||
## Per-block processing
|
||||
|
||||
Below are the processing steps that happen at every `block`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Slot
|
||||
|
||||
* Verify that `block.slot == state.slot`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Proposer signature
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `block_hash_without_sig` be the `SSZTreeHash` of `block` where `block.signature` is set to `[0, 0]`.
|
||||
* Let `proposal_hash = SSZTreeHash(ProposalSignedData(state.slot, BEACON_CHAIN_SHARD_NUMBER, block_hash_without_sig))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `BLSVerify(pubkey=state.validator_registry[get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)].pubkey, data=proposal_hash, sig=block.signature, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, state.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))`.
|
||||
* Let `block_without_signature_root` be the `hash_tree_root` of `block` where `block.signature` is set to `[0, 0]`.
|
||||
* Let `proposal_root = hash_tree_root(ProposalSignedData(state.slot, BEACON_CHAIN_SHARD_NUMBER, block_without_signature_root))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `bls_verify(pubkey=state.validator_registry[get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)].pubkey, data=proposal_root, signature=block.signature, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, state.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))`.
|
||||
|
||||
### RANDAO
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `repeat_hash(x, n) = x if n == 0 else repeat_hash(hash(x), n-1)`.
|
||||
* Let `proposer = state.validator_registry[get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)]`.
|
||||
* Verify that `repeat_hash(block.randao_reveal, proposer.randao_skips + 1) == proposer.randao_commitment`.
|
||||
* Verify that `repeat_hash(block.randao_reveal, proposer.randao_layers) == proposer.randao_commitment`.
|
||||
* Set `state.randao_mix = xor(state.randao_mix, block.randao_reveal)`.
|
||||
* Set `proposer.randao_commitment = block.randao_reveal`.
|
||||
* Set `proposer.randao_skips = 0`.
|
||||
* Set `proposer.randao_layers = 0`.
|
||||
|
||||
### PoW receipt root
|
||||
|
||||
* If `block.candidate_pow_receipt_root` is `x.candidate_pow_receipt_root` for some `x` in `state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots`, set `x.votes += 1`.
|
||||
* Otherwise, append to `state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots` a new `CandidatePoWReceiptRootRecord(candidate_pow_receipt_root=block.candidate_pow_receipt_root, votes=1)`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Block operations
|
||||
### Operations
|
||||
|
||||
#### Proposer slashings
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1336,11 +1355,11 @@ Verify that `len(block.body.proposer_slashings) <= MAX_PROPOSER_SLASHINGS`.
|
|||
For each `proposer_slashing` in `block.body.proposer_slashings`:
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `proposer = state.validator_registry[proposer_slashing.proposer_index]`.
|
||||
* Verify that `BLSVerify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, msg=SSZTreeHash(proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1), sig=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_1, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `BLSVerify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, msg=SSZTreeHash(proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2), sig=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_2, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `bls_verify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, message=hash_tree_root(proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1), signature=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_1, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `bls_verify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, message=hash_tree_root(proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2), signature=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_2, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot == proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot`.
|
||||
* Verify that `proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.shard == proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.shard`.
|
||||
* Verify that `proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.block_hash != proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.block_hash`.
|
||||
* Verify that `proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.block_root != proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.block_root`.
|
||||
* Verify that `proposer.status != EXITED_WITH_PENALTY`.
|
||||
* Run `update_validator_status(state, proposer_slashing.proposer_index, new_status=EXITED_WITH_PENALTY)`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1368,12 +1387,12 @@ For each `attestation` in `block.body.attestations`:
|
|||
* Verify that `attestation.data.slot + MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY <= state.slot`.
|
||||
* Verify that `attestation.data.slot + EPOCH_LENGTH >= state.slot`.
|
||||
* Verify that `attestation.data.justified_slot` is equal to `state.justified_slot if attestation.data.slot >= state.slot - (state.slot % EPOCH_LENGTH) else state.previous_justified_slot`.
|
||||
* Verify that `attestation.data.justified_block_hash` is equal to `get_block_hash(state, attestation.data.justified_slot)`.
|
||||
* Verify that either `attestation.data.latest_crosslink_hash` or `attestation.data.shard_block_hash` equals `state.latest_crosslinks[shard].shard_block_hash`.
|
||||
* Verify that `attestation.data.justified_block_root` is equal to `get_block_root(state, attestation.data.justified_slot)`.
|
||||
* Verify that either `attestation.data.latest_crosslink_root` or `attestation.data.shard_block_root` equals `state.latest_crosslinks[shard].shard_block_root`.
|
||||
* `aggregate_signature` verification:
|
||||
* Let `participants = get_attestation_participants(state, attestation.data, attestation.participation_bitfield)`.
|
||||
* Let `group_public_key = BLSAddPubkeys([state.validator_registry[v].pubkey for v in participants])`.
|
||||
* Verify that `BLSVerify(pubkey=group_public_key, msg=SSZTreeHash(attestation.data) + bytes1(0), sig=attestation.aggregate_signature, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, attestation.data.slot, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `bls_verify(pubkey=group_public_key, message=hash_tree_root(attestation.data) + bytes1(0), signature=attestation.aggregate_signature, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, attestation.data.slot, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION))`.
|
||||
* [TO BE REMOVED IN PHASE 1] Verify that `attestation.data.shard_block_hash == ZERO_HASH`.
|
||||
* Append `PendingAttestationRecord(data=attestation.data, participation_bitfield=attestation.participation_bitfield, custody_bitfield=attestation.custody_bitfield, slot_included=state.slot)` to `state.latest_attestations`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1420,7 +1439,7 @@ Verify that `len(block.body.exits) <= MAX_EXITS`.
|
|||
For each `exit` in `block.body.exits`:
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `validator = state.validator_registry[exit.validator_index]`.
|
||||
* Verify that `BLSVerify(pubkey=validator.pubkey, msg=ZERO_HASH, sig=exit.signature, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, exit.slot, DOMAIN_EXIT))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `bls_verify(pubkey=validator.pubkey, message=ZERO_HASH, signature=exit.signature, domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, exit.slot, DOMAIN_EXIT))`.
|
||||
* Verify that `validator.status == ACTIVE`.
|
||||
* Verify that `state.slot >= exit.slot`.
|
||||
* Verify that `state.slot >= validator.latest_status_change_slot + SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1451,30 +1470,45 @@ All [validators](#dfn-validator):
|
|||
|
||||
* Let `active_validators = [state.validator_registry[i] for i in get_active_validator_indices(state.validator_registry)]`.
|
||||
* Let `total_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in active_validators])`.
|
||||
* Let `base_reward_quotient = BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT * integer_squareroot(total_balance // GWEI_PER_ETH)`.
|
||||
* Let `base_reward(v) = get_effective_balance(v) // base_reward_quotient` for any validator `v`.
|
||||
|
||||
[Validators](#dfn-Validator) justifying the epoch boundary block at the start of the current epoch:
|
||||
[Validators](#dfn-Validator) validators attesting during the current epoch:
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `this_epoch_attestations = [a for a in state.latest_attestations if state.slot - EPOCH_LENGTH <= a.data.slot < state.slot]`. (Note: this is the set of attestations of slots in the epoch `state.slot-EPOCH_LENGTH...state.slot-1`, _not_ attestations that got included in the chain during the epoch `state.slot-EPOCH_LENGTH...state.slot-1`.)
|
||||
* Let `this_epoch_boundary_attestations = [a for a in this_epoch_attestations if a.data.epoch_boundary_hash == get_block_hash(state, state.slot-EPOCH_LENGTH) and a.justified_slot == state.justified_slot]`.
|
||||
* Validators justifying the epoch boundary block at the start of the current epoch:
|
||||
* Let `this_epoch_boundary_attestations = [a for a in this_epoch_attestations if a.data.epoch_boundary_root == get_block_root(state, state.slot-EPOCH_LENGTH) and a.justified_slot == state.justified_slot]`.
|
||||
* Let `this_epoch_boundary_attester_indices` be the union of the [validator](#dfn-validator) index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in this_epoch_boundary_attestations]`.
|
||||
* Let `this_epoch_boundary_attesters = [state.validator_registry[i] for indices in this_epoch_boundary_attester_indices for i in indices]`.
|
||||
* Let `this_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in this_epoch_boundary_attesters])`.
|
||||
|
||||
[Validators](#dfn-Validator) justifying the epoch boundary block at the start of the previous epoch:
|
||||
[Validators](#dfn-Validator) attesting during the previous epoch:
|
||||
|
||||
* Validators that made an attestation during the previous epoch:
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_attestations = [a for a in state.latest_attestations if state.slot - 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH <= a.slot < state.slot - EPOCH_LENGTH]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attestations = [a for a in this_epoch_attestations + previous_epoch_attestations if a.epoch_boundary_hash == get_block_hash(state, state.slot - 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH) and a.justified_slot == state.previous_justified_slot]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_attester_indices` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in previous_epoch_attestations]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_attesters = [state.validator_registry[i] for indices in previous_epoch_attester_indices for i in indices]`.
|
||||
* Validators targeting the previous justified hash:
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_justified_attestations = [a for a in this_epoch_attestations + previous_epoch_attestations if a.justified_slot == state.previous_justified_slot]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_justified_attester_indices` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in previous_epoch_justified_attestations]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_justified_attesters = [state.validator_registry[i] for indices in previous_epoch_justified_attester_indices for i in indices]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_justified_attesting_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in previous_epoch_justified_attesters])`.
|
||||
* Validators justifying the epoch boundary block at the start of the previous epoch:
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attestations = [a for a in previous_epoch_justified_attestations if a.epoch_boundary_root == get_block_root(state, state.slot - 2 * EPOCH_LENGTH)]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attester_indices` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in previous_epoch_boundary_attestations]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters = [state.validator_registry[i] for indices in previous_epoch_boundary_attester_indices for i in indices]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in previous_epoch_boundary_attesters])`. *Note: this balance might be marginally different than `this_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance` during the previous epoch transition. Due to the tight bound on validator churn each epoch and small per-epoch rewards/penalties, the potential balance difference is very low and only marginally affects consensus safety.*
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in previous_epoch_boundary_attesters])`.
|
||||
* Validators attesting to the expected beacon chain head during the previous epoch:
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_head_attestations = [a for a in previous_epoch_attestations if a.beacon_block_root == get_block_root(state, a.slot)]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_head_attester_indices` be the union of the validator index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in previous_epoch_head_attestations]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_head_attesters = [state.validator_registry[i] for indices in previous_epoch_head_attester_indices for i in indices]`.
|
||||
* Let `previous_epoch_head_attesting_balance = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in previous_epoch_head_attesters])`.
|
||||
|
||||
_Note_: `previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance` balance might be marginally different than `this_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance` during the previous epoch transition. Due to the tight bound on validator churn each epoch and small per-epoch rewards/penalties, the potential balance difference is very low and only marginally affects consensus safety.
|
||||
|
||||
For every `shard_committee` in `state.shard_committees_at_slots`:
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `attesting_validators(shard_committee, shard_block_hash)` be the union of the [validator](#dfn-validator) index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in this_epoch_attestations + previous_epoch_attestations if a.shard == shard_committee.shard and a.shard_block_hash == shard_block_hash]`.
|
||||
* Let `winning_hash(shard_committee)` be equal to the value of `shard_block_hash` such that `sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in attesting_validators(shard_committee, shard_block_hash)])` is maximized (ties broken by favoring lower `shard_block_hash` values).
|
||||
* Let `attesting_validators(shard_committee)` be equal to `attesting_validators(shard_committee, winning_hash(shard_committee))` for convenience.
|
||||
* Let `attesting_validators(shard_committee, shard_block_root)` be the union of the [validator](#dfn-validator) index sets given by `[get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield) for a in this_epoch_attestations + previous_epoch_attestations if a.shard == shard_committee.shard and a.shard_block_root == shard_block_root]`.
|
||||
* Let `winning_root(shard_committee)` be equal to the value of `shard_block_root` such that `sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in attesting_validators(shard_committee, shard_block_root)])` is maximized (ties broken by favoring lower `shard_block_root` values).
|
||||
* Let `attesting_validators(shard_committee)` be equal to `attesting_validators(shard_committee, winning_root(shard_committee))` for convenience.
|
||||
* Let `total_attesting_balance(shard_committee)` be the sum of the balances-at-stake of `attesting_validators(shard_committee)`.
|
||||
* Let `total_balance(shard_committee) = sum([get_effective_balance(v) for v in shard_committee.committee])`.
|
||||
* Let `inclusion_slot(v) = a.slot_included` for the attestation `a` where `v` is in `get_attestation_participants(state, a.data, a.participation_bitfield)`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1516,9 +1550,17 @@ Set `state.finalized_slot = state.previous_justified_slot` if any of the followi
|
|||
|
||||
For every `shard_committee` in `state.shard_committees_at_slots`:
|
||||
|
||||
* Set `state.latest_crosslinks[shard] = CrosslinkRecord(slot=state.slot, shard_block_hash=winning_hash(shard_committee))` if `3 * total_attesting_balance(shard_committee) >= 2 * total_balance(shard_committee)`.
|
||||
* Set `state.latest_crosslinks[shard] = CrosslinkRecord(slot=state.slot, block_root=winning_root(shard_committee))` if `3 * total_attesting_balance(shard_committee) >= 2 * total_balance(shard_committee)`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Justification and finalization rewards and penalties
|
||||
### Rewards and penalties
|
||||
|
||||
First, we define some additional helpers:
|
||||
|
||||
* Let `base_reward_quotient = BASE_REWARD_QUOTIENT * integer_squareroot(total_balance // GWEI_PER_ETH)`.
|
||||
* Let `base_reward(v) = get_effective_balance(v) // base_reward_quotient // 4` for any validator `v`.
|
||||
* Let `inactivity_penalty(v, slots_since_finality) = base_reward(v) + get_effective_balance(v) * slots_since_finality // INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` for any validator `v`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Justification and finalization
|
||||
|
||||
Note: When applying penalties in the following balance recalculations implementers should make sure the `uint64` does not underflow.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1526,17 +1568,28 @@ Note: When applying penalties in the following balance recalculations implemente
|
|||
|
||||
Case 1: `slots_since_finality <= 4 * EPOCH_LENGTH`:
|
||||
|
||||
* Expected FFG source:
|
||||
* Any [validator](#dfn-validator) `v` in `previous_epoch_justified_attesters` gains `adjust_for_inclusion_distance(base_reward(v) * previous_epoch_justified_attesting_balance // total_balance, inclusion_distance(v))`.
|
||||
* Any [active validator](#dfn-active-validator) `v` not in `previous_epoch_justified_attesters` loses `base_reward(v)`.
|
||||
* Expected FFG target:
|
||||
* Any [validator](#dfn-validator) `v` in `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters` gains `adjust_for_inclusion_distance(base_reward(v) * previous_epoch_boundary_attesting_balance // total_balance, inclusion_distance(v))`.
|
||||
* Any [active validator](#dfn-active-validator) `v` not in `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters` loses `base_reward(v)`.
|
||||
* Expected beacon chain head:
|
||||
* Any [validator](#dfn-validator) `v` in `previous_epoch_head_attesters` gains `adjust_for_inclusion_distance(base_reward(v) * previous_epoch_head_attesting_balance // total_balance, inclusion_distance(v))`.
|
||||
* Any [active validator](#dfn-active-validator) `v` not in `previous_epoch_head_attesters` loses `base_reward(v)`.
|
||||
|
||||
Case 2: `slots_since_finality > 4 * EPOCH_LENGTH`:
|
||||
|
||||
* Any [validator](#dfn-validator) in `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters` sees their balance unchanged.
|
||||
* Any [active validator](#dfn-active-validator) `v` not in `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters`, and any [validator](#dfn-validator) with `status == EXITED_WITH_PENALTY`, loses `base_reward(v) + get_effective_balance(v) * slots_since_finality // INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT`.
|
||||
* Any [active validator](#dfn-active-validator) `v` not in `previous_epoch_justified_attesters`, loses `inactivity_penalty(v, slots_since_finality)`.
|
||||
* Any [active validator](#dfn-active-validator) `v` not in `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters`, loses `inactivity_penalty(v, slots_since_finality)`.
|
||||
* Any [active validator](#dfn-active-validator) `v` not in `previous_epoch_head_attesters`, loses `inactivity_penalty(v, slots_since_finality)`.
|
||||
* Any [validator](#dfn-validator) with `status == EXITED_WITH_PENALTY`, loses `3 * inactivity_penalty(v, slots_since_finality)`.
|
||||
|
||||
For each `v` in `previous_epoch_boundary_attesters`, we determine the proposer `proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state, inclusion_slot(v))` and set `state.validator_registry[proposer_index].balance += base_reward(v) // INCLUDER_REWARD_QUOTIENT`.
|
||||
#### Attestation inclusion
|
||||
|
||||
### Crosslink rewards and penalties
|
||||
For each `v` in `previous_epoch_attesters`, we determine the proposer `proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state, inclusion_slot(v))` and set `state.validator_registry[proposer_index].balance += base_reward(v) // INCLUDER_REWARD_QUOTIENT`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Crosslinks
|
||||
|
||||
For every `shard_committee` in `state.shard_committees_at_slots[:EPOCH_LENGTH]` (i.e. the objects corresponding to the epoch before the current one), for each `v` in `[state.validator_registry[index] for index in shard_committee.committee]`, adjust balances as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1656,16 +1709,10 @@ while len(state.persistent_committee_reassignments) > 0 and state.persistent_com
|
|||
### Final updates
|
||||
|
||||
* Remove any `attestation` in `state.latest_attestations` such that `attestation.data.slot < state.slot - EPOCH_LENGTH`.
|
||||
* Set `state.latest_block_hashes = state.latest_block_hashes[EPOCH_LENGTH:]`.
|
||||
|
||||
## State root processing
|
||||
|
||||
Verify `block.state_root == SSZTreeHash(state)` if there exists a `block` for the slot being processed.
|
||||
|
||||
# Appendix
|
||||
## Appendix A - Hash function
|
||||
|
||||
In Phase 0 the beacon chain is deployed with the same hash function as Ethereum 1.0, i.e. Keccak-256 (also incorrectly known as SHA3). We aim to migrate to a S[T/N]ARK-friendly hash function in a future Ethereum 2.0 deployment phase.
|
||||
Verify `block.state_root == hash_tree_root(state)` if there exists a `block` for the slot being processed.
|
||||
|
||||
# References
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ A `ShardBlock` object has the following fields:
|
|||
'slot': 'uint64',
|
||||
# What shard is it on
|
||||
'shard_id': 'uint64',
|
||||
# Parent block hash
|
||||
'parent_hash': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Parent block's hash of root
|
||||
'parent_root': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Beacon chain block
|
||||
'beacon_chain_ref': 'hash32',
|
||||
# Depth of the Merkle tree
|
||||
|
|
@ -62,16 +62,16 @@ A `ShardBlock` object has the following fields:
|
|||
|
||||
For a block on a shard to be processed by a node, the following conditions must be met:
|
||||
|
||||
* The `ShardBlock` pointed to by `parent_hash` has already been processed and accepted
|
||||
* The `ShardBlock` pointed to by `parent_root` has already been processed and accepted
|
||||
* The signature for the block from the _proposer_ (see below for definition) of that block is included along with the block in the network message object
|
||||
|
||||
To validate a block header on shard `shard_id`, compute as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
* Verify that `beacon_chain_ref` is the hash of a block in the beacon chain with slot less than or equal to `slot`. Verify that `beacon_chain_ref` is equal to or a descendant of the `beacon_chain_ref` specified in the `ShardBlock` pointed to by `parent_hash`.
|
||||
* Verify that `beacon_chain_ref` is the hash of a block in the beacon chain with slot less than or equal to `slot`. Verify that `beacon_chain_ref` is equal to or a descendant of the `beacon_chain_ref` specified in the `ShardBlock` pointed to by `parent_root`.
|
||||
* Let `state` be the state of the beacon chain block referred to by `beacon_chain_ref`. Let `validators` be `[validators[i] for i in state.current_persistent_committees[shard_id]]`.
|
||||
* Assert `len(attester_bitfield) == ceil_div8(len(validators))`
|
||||
* Let `proposer_index = hash(state.randao_mix + bytes8(shard_id) + bytes8(slot)) % len(validators)`. Let `msg` be the block but with the `block.signature` set to `[0, 0]`. Verify that `BLSVerify(pub=validators[proposer_index].pubkey, msg=hash(msg), sig=block.signature, domain=get_domain(state, slot, SHARD_PROPOSER_DOMAIN))` passes.
|
||||
* Generate the `group_public_key` by adding the public keys of all the validators for whom the corresponding position in the bitfield is set to 1. Verify that `BLSVerify(pub=group_public_key, msg=parent_hash, sig=block.aggregate_sig, domain=get_domain(state, slot, SHARD_ATTESTER_DOMAIN))` passes.
|
||||
* Generate the `group_public_key` by adding the public keys of all the validators for whom the corresponding position in the bitfield is set to 1. Verify that `BLSVerify(pub=group_public_key, msg=parent_root, sig=block.aggregate_sig, domain=get_domain(state, slot, SHARD_ATTESTER_DOMAIN))` passes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Block Merklization helper
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ At network layer, we expect a shard block header to be broadcast along with its
|
|||
|
||||
A node should sign a crosslink only if the following conditions hold. **If a node has the capability to perform the required level of verification, it should NOT follow chains on which a crosslink for which these conditions do NOT hold has been included, or a sufficient number of signatures have been included that during the next state recalculation, a crosslink will be registered.**
|
||||
|
||||
First, the conditions must recursively apply to the crosslink referenced in `last_crosslink_hash` for the same shard (unless `last_crosslink_hash` equals zero, in which case we are at the genesis).
|
||||
First, the conditions must recursively apply to the crosslink referenced in `last_crosslink_root` for the same shard (unless `last_crosslink_root` equals zero, in which case we are at the genesis).
|
||||
|
||||
Second, we verify the `shard_block_combined_data_root`. Let `h` be the slot _immediately after_ the slot of the shard block included by the last crosslink, and `h+n-1` be the slot number of the block directly referenced by the current `shard_block_hash`. Let `B[i]` be the block at slot `h+i` in the shard chain. Let `bodies[0] .... bodies[n-1]` be the bodies of these blocks and `roots[0] ... roots[n-1]` the data roots. If there is a missing slot in the shard chain at position `h+i`, then `bodies[i] == b'\x00' * shard_block_maxbytes(state[i])` and `roots[i]` be the Merkle root of the empty data. Define `compute_merkle_root` be a simple Merkle root calculating function that takes as input a list of objects, where the list's length must be an exact power of two. We define the function for computing the combined data root as follows:
|
||||
Second, we verify the `shard_block_combined_data_root`. Let `h` be the slot _immediately after_ the slot of the shard block included by the last crosslink, and `h+n-1` be the slot number of the block directly referenced by the current `shard_block_root`. Let `B[i]` be the block at slot `h+i` in the shard chain. Let `bodies[0] .... bodies[n-1]` be the bodies of these blocks and `roots[0] ... roots[n-1]` the data roots. If there is a missing slot in the shard chain at position `h+i`, then `bodies[i] == b'\x00' * shard_block_maxbytes(state[i])` and `roots[i]` be the Merkle root of the empty data. Define `compute_merkle_root` be a simple Merkle root calculating function that takes as input a list of objects, where the list's length must be an exact power of two. We define the function for computing the combined data root as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
ZERO_ROOT = merkle_root(bytes([0] * SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,4 +121,4 @@ Verify that the `shard_block_combined_data_root` is the output of these function
|
|||
|
||||
### Shard block fork choice rule
|
||||
|
||||
The fork choice rule for any shard is LMD GHOST using the validators currently assigned to that shard, but instead of being rooted in the genesis it is rooted in the block referenced in the most recent accepted crosslink (ie. `state.crosslinks[shard].shard_block_hash`). Only blocks whose `beacon_chain_ref` is the block in the main beacon chain at the specified `slot` should be considered (if the beacon chain skips a slot, then the block at that slot is considered to be the block in the beacon chain at the highest slot lower than a slot).
|
||||
The fork choice rule for any shard is LMD GHOST using the validators currently assigned to that shard, but instead of being rooted in the genesis it is rooted in the block referenced in the most recent accepted crosslink (ie. `state.crosslinks[shard].shard_block_root`). Only blocks whose `beacon_chain_ref` is the block in the main beacon chain at the specified `slot` should be considered (if the beacon chain skips a slot, then the block at that slot is considered to be the block in the beacon chain at the highest slot lower than a slot).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ return typ(**values), item_index
|
|||
|
||||
### Tree Hash
|
||||
|
||||
The below `SSZTreeHash` algorithm is defined recursively in the case of lists and containers, and it outputs a value equal to or less than 32 bytes in size. For the final output only (ie. not intermediate outputs), if the output is less than 32 bytes, right-zero-pad it to 32 bytes. The goal is collision resistance *within* each type, not between types.
|
||||
The below `hash_tree_root` algorithm is defined recursively in the case of lists and containers, and it outputs a value equal to or less than 32 bytes in size. For the final output only (ie. not intermediate outputs), if the output is less than 32 bytes, right-zero-pad it to 32 bytes. The goal is collision resistance *within* each type, not between types.
|
||||
|
||||
Refer to [Appendix A](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/master/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md#appendix-a---hash-function) of Phase 0 of the [Eth2.0 specs](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs) for a definition of the hash function used below, `hash(x)`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -435,13 +435,13 @@ def merkle_hash(lst):
|
|||
return hash(chunkz[0] + datalen)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To `SSZTreeHash` a list, we simply do:
|
||||
To `hash_tree_root` a list, we simply do:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
return merkle_hash([SSZTreeHash(item) for item in value])
|
||||
return merkle_hash([hash_tree_root(item) for item in value])
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Where the inner `SSZTreeHash` is a recursive application of the tree-hashing function (returning less than 32 bytes for short single values).
|
||||
Where the inner `hash_tree_root` is a recursive application of the tree-hashing function (returning less than 32 bytes for short single values).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Container
|
||||
|
|
@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ Where the inner `SSZTreeHash` is a recursive application of the tree-hashing fun
|
|||
Recursively tree hash the values in the container in order sorted by key, and return the hash of the concatenation of the results.
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
return hash(b''.join([SSZTreeHash(getattr(x, field)) for field in sorted(value.fields)))
|
||||
return hash(b''.join([hash_tree_root(getattr(x, field)) for field in sorted(value.fields)))
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue