Merge pull request #1799 from ethereum/bls_v2

Update to IETF BLS draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-02 + draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07

setup.py

@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ setup(
         "eth-utils>=1.3.0,<2",
         "eth-typing>=2.1.0,<3.0.0",
         "pycryptodome==3.9.4",
-        "py_ecc==2.0.0",
+        "py_ecc==4.0.0",
         "dataclasses==0.6",
         "remerkleable==0.1.13",
         "ruamel.yaml==0.16.5",

specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md

@@ -607,16 +607,18 @@ def bytes_to_int(data: bytes) -> uint64:
 
 #### BLS Signatures
 
-Eth2 makes use of BLS signatures as specified in the [IETF draft BLS specification](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-00). Specifically, eth2 uses the `BLS_SIG_BLS12381G2-SHA256-SSWU-RO-_POP_` ciphersuite which implements the following interfaces:
+Eth2 makes use of BLS signatures as specified in the [IETF draft BLS specification draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-02](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-02) but uses [Hashing to Elliptic Curves - draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07) instead of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06. Specifically, eth2 uses the `BLS_SIG_BLS12381G2_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_POP_` ciphersuite which implements the following interfaces:
 
 - `def Sign(SK: int, message: Bytes) -> BLSSignature`
 - `def Verify(PK: BLSPubkey, message: Bytes, signature: BLSSignature) -> bool`
 - `def Aggregate(signatures: Sequence[BLSSignature]) -> BLSSignature`
 - `def FastAggregateVerify(PKs: Sequence[BLSPubkey], message: Bytes, signature: BLSSignature) -> bool`
-- `def AggregateVerify(pairs: Sequence[PK: BLSPubkey, message: Bytes], signature: BLSSignature) -> bool`
+- `def AggregateVerify(PKs: Sequence[BLSPubkey], messages: Sequence[Bytes], signature: BLSSignature) -> bool`
 
 Within these specifications, BLS signatures are treated as a module for notational clarity, thus to verify a signature `bls.Verify(...)` is used.
 
+*Note*: The non-standard configuration of the BLS and hash to curve specs is temporary and will be resolved once IETF releases BLS spec draft 3.
+
 ### Predicates
 
 #### `is_active_validator`

specs/phase0/validator.md

@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ def is_aggregator(state: BeaconState, slot: Slot, index: CommitteeIndex, slot_si
 
 If the validator is selected to aggregate (`is_aggregator()`), they construct an aggregate attestation via the following.
 
-Collect `attestations` seen via gossip during the `slot` that have an equivalent `attestation_data` to that constructed by the validator, and create an `aggregate_attestation: Attestation` with the following fields.
+Collect `attestations` seen via gossip during the `slot` that have an equivalent `attestation_data` to that constructed by the validator. If `len(attestations) > 0`, create an `aggregate_attestation: Attestation` with the following fields.
 
 ##### Data
 

specs/phase1/beacon-chain.md

@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@
     - [Updated `is_valid_indexed_attestation`](#updated-is_valid_indexed_attestation)
     - [`is_shard_attestation`](#is_shard_attestation)
     - [`is_winning_attestation`](#is_winning_attestation)
+    - [`optional_aggregate_verify`](#optional_aggregate_verify)
+    - [`optional_fast_aggregate_verify`](#optional_fast_aggregate_verify)
   - [Block processing](#block-processing)
     - [Operations](#operations)
       - [New Attestation processing](#new-attestation-processing)
@@ -110,6 +112,7 @@ Configuration is not namespaced. Instead it is strictly an extension;
 | `DOMAIN_SHARD_PROPOSAL` | `DomainType('0x80000000')` | |
 | `DOMAIN_SHARD_COMMITTEE` | `DomainType('0x81000000')` | |
 | `DOMAIN_LIGHT_CLIENT` | `DomainType('0x82000000')` | |
+| `NO_SIGNATURE` | `BLSSignature(b'\x00' * 96)` | |
 
 ## Updated containers
 
@@ -596,7 +599,7 @@ def is_valid_indexed_attestation(state: BeaconState, indexed_attestation: Indexe
                     all_signing_roots.append(compute_signing_root(attestation_wrapper, domain))
                 else:
                     assert not cbit
-        return bls.AggregateVerify(zip(all_pubkeys, all_signing_roots), signature=attestation.signature)
+        return bls.AggregateVerify(all_pubkeys, all_signing_roots, signature=attestation.signature)
 ```
 
 #### `is_shard_attestation`
@@ -633,6 +636,36 @@ def is_winning_attestation(state: BeaconState,
     )
 ```
 
+#### `optional_aggregate_verify`
+
+```python
+def optional_aggregate_verify(pubkeys: Sequence[BLSPubkey],
+                              messages: Sequence[Bytes32],
+                              signature: BLSSignature) -> bool:
+    """
+    If ``pubkeys`` is an empty list, the given ``signature`` should be a stub ``NO_SIGNATURE``.
+    Otherwise, verify it with standard BLS AggregateVerify API.
+    """
+    if len(pubkeys) == 0:
+        return signature == NO_SIGNATURE
+    else:
+        return bls.AggregateVerify(pubkeys, messages, signature)
+```
+
+#### `optional_fast_aggregate_verify`
+
+```python
+def optional_fast_aggregate_verify(pubkeys: Sequence[BLSPubkey], message: Bytes32, signature: BLSSignature) -> bool:
+    """
+    If ``pubkeys`` is an empty list, the given ``signature`` should be a stub ``NO_SIGNATURE``.
+    Otherwise, verify it with standard BLS FastAggregateVerify API.
+    """
+    if len(pubkeys) == 0:
+        return signature == NO_SIGNATURE
+    else:
+        return bls.FastAggregateVerify(pubkeys, message, signature)
+```
+
 ### Block processing
 
 ```python
@@ -764,7 +797,7 @@ def apply_shard_transition(state: BeaconState, shard: Shard, transition: ShardTr
         for header in headers
     ]
     # Verify combined proposer signature
-    assert bls.AggregateVerify(zip(pubkeys, signing_roots), signature=transition.proposer_signature_aggregate)
+    assert optional_aggregate_verify(pubkeys, signing_roots, transition.proposer_signature_aggregate)
 
     # Save updated state
     state.shard_states[shard] = transition.shard_states[len(transition.shard_states) - 1]
@@ -942,12 +975,7 @@ def process_light_client_signatures(state: BeaconState, block_body: BeaconBlockB
     slot = compute_previous_slot(state.slot)
     signing_root = compute_signing_root(get_block_root_at_slot(state, slot),
                                         get_domain(state, DOMAIN_LIGHT_CLIENT, compute_epoch_at_slot(slot)))
-    if len(signer_pubkeys) == 0:
+    assert optional_fast_aggregate_verify(signer_pubkeys, signing_root, block_body.light_client_signature)
-        # TODO: handle the empty light_client_signature case?
-        assert block_body.light_client_signature == BLSSignature()
-        return
-    else:
-        assert bls.FastAggregateVerify(signer_pubkeys, signing_root, signature=block_body.light_client_signature)
 ```
 
 ### Epoch transition

specs/phase1/custody-game.md

@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ def process_early_derived_secret_reveal(state: BeaconState, reveal: EarlyDerived
 
     domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_RANDAO, reveal.epoch)
     signing_roots = [compute_signing_root(root, domain) for root in [hash_tree_root(reveal.epoch), reveal.mask]]
-    assert bls.AggregateVerify(zip(pubkeys, signing_roots), reveal.reveal)
+    assert bls.AggregateVerify(pubkeys, signing_roots, reveal.reveal)
 
     if reveal.epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) + CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING:
         # Full slashing when the secret was revealed so early it may be a valid custody

specs/phase1/shard-transition.md

@@ -277,10 +277,13 @@ def get_shard_transition(beacon_state: BeaconState,
     proposer_signatures = []
     for proposal in proposals:
         shard_block_lengths.append(len(proposal.message.body))
-        if proposal.signature != BLSSignature():
+        if proposal.signature != NO_SIGNATURE:
             proposer_signatures.append(proposal.signature)
 
-    proposer_signature_aggregate = bls.Aggregate(proposer_signatures)
+    if len(proposer_signatures) > 0:
+        proposer_signature_aggregate = bls.Aggregate(proposer_signatures)
+    else:
+        proposer_signature_aggregate = NO_SIGNATURE
 
     return ShardTransition(
         start_slot=start_slot,

tests/core/pyspec/eth2spec/test/helpers/keys.py

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ from py_ecc.bls import G2ProofOfPossession as bls
 from eth2spec.phase0 import spec
 
 privkeys = [i + 1 for i in range(spec.SLOTS_PER_EPOCH * 256)]
-pubkeys = [bls.PrivToPub(privkey) for privkey in privkeys]
+pubkeys = [bls.SkToPk(privkey) for privkey in privkeys]
 pubkey_to_privkey = {pubkey: privkey for privkey, pubkey in zip(privkeys, pubkeys)}

tests/core/pyspec/eth2spec/utils/bls.py

@@ -25,17 +25,32 @@ def only_with_bls(alt_return=None):
 
 @only_with_bls(alt_return=True)
 def Verify(PK, message, signature):
-    return bls.Verify(PK, message, signature)
+    try:
+        result = bls.Verify(PK, message, signature)
+    except Exception:
+        result = False
+    finally:
+        return result
 
 
 @only_with_bls(alt_return=True)
-def AggregateVerify(pairs, signature):
+def AggregateVerify(pubkeys, messages, signature):
-    return bls.AggregateVerify(pairs, signature)
+    try:
+        result = bls.AggregateVerify(pubkeys, messages, signature)
+    except Exception:
+        result = False
+    finally:
+        return result
 
 
 @only_with_bls(alt_return=True)
-def FastAggregateVerify(PKs, message, signature):
+def FastAggregateVerify(pubkeys, message, signature):
-    return bls.FastAggregateVerify(PKs, message, signature)
+    try:
+        result = bls.FastAggregateVerify(pubkeys, message, signature)
+    except Exception:
+        result = False
+    finally:
+        return result
 
 
 @only_with_bls(alt_return=STUB_SIGNATURE)
@@ -56,3 +71,8 @@ def signature_to_G2(signature):
 @only_with_bls(alt_return=STUB_PUBKEY)
 def AggregatePKs(pubkeys):
     return bls._AggregatePKs(pubkeys)
+
+
+@only_with_bls(alt_return=STUB_SIGNATURE)
+def SkToPk(SK):
+    return bls.SkToPk(SK)

tests/formats/bls/README.md

@@ -5,11 +5,10 @@ We do not recommend rolling your own crypto or using an untested BLS library.
 
 The BLS test suite runner has the following handlers:
 
-- [`aggregate_pubkeys`](./aggregate_pubkeys.md)
+- [`aggregate_verify`](./aggregate_verify.md)
-- [`aggregate_sigs`](./aggregate_sigs.md)
+- [`aggregate`](./aggregate.md)
-- [`msg_hash_g2_compressed`](./msg_hash_g2_compressed.md)
+- [`fast_aggregate_verify`](./fast_aggregate_verify.md)
-- [`msg_hash_g2_uncompressed`](./msg_hash_g2_uncompressed.md)
+- [`sign`](./sign.md)
-- [`priv_to_pub`](./priv_to_pub.md)
+- [`verify`](./verify.md)
-- [`sign_msg`](./sign_msg.md)
 
 *Note*: Signature-verification and aggregate-verify test cases are not yet supported.

tests/formats/bls/aggregate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Test format: BLS signature aggregation
+
+A BLS signature aggregation combines a series of signatures into a single signature.
+
+## Test case format
+
+The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
+
+```yaml
+input: List[BLS Signature] -- list of input BLS signatures
+output: BLS Signature -- expected output, single BLS signature or empty.
+```
+
+- `BLS Signature` here is encoded as a string: hexadecimal encoding of 96 bytes (192 nibbles), prefixed with `0x`.
+- No output value if the input is invalid.
+
+## Condition
+
+The `aggregate` handler should aggregate the signatures in the `input`, and the result should match the expected `output`.

tests/formats/bls/aggregate_pubkeys.md

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Test format: BLS pubkey aggregation
-
-A BLS pubkey aggregation combines a series of pubkeys into a single pubkey.
-
-## Test case format
-
-The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
-
-```yaml
-input: List[BLS Pubkey] -- list of input BLS pubkeys
-output: BLS Pubkey -- expected output, single BLS pubkey
-```
-
-`BLS Pubkey` here is encoded as a string: hexadecimal encoding of 48 bytes (96 nibbles), prefixed with `0x`.
-
-
-## Condition
-
-The `aggregate_pubkeys` handler should aggregate the keys in the `input`, and the result should match the expected `output`.

tests/formats/bls/aggregate_sigs.md

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Test format: BLS signature aggregation
-
-A BLS signature aggregation combines a series of signatures into a single signature.
-
-## Test case format
-
-The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
-
-```yaml
-input: List[BLS Signature] -- list of input BLS signatures
-output: BLS Signature -- expected output, single BLS signature
-```
-
-`BLS Signature` here is encoded as a string: hexadecimal encoding of 96 bytes (192 nibbles), prefixed with `0x`.
-
-
-## Condition
-
-The `aggregate_sigs` handler should aggregate the signatures in the `input`, and the result should match the expected `output`.

tests/formats/bls/aggregate_verify.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Test format: BLS sign message
+
+Verify the signature against the given pubkeys and one messages.
+
+## Test case format
+
+The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
+
+```yaml
+input:
+  pubkeys: List[bytes48] -- the pubkeys
+  messages: List[bytes32] -- the messages
+  signature: bytes96 -- the signature to verify against pubkeys and messages
+output: bool  -- VALID or INVALID
+```
+
+All byte(s) fields are encoded as strings, hexadecimal encoding, prefixed with `0x`.

tests/formats/bls/fast_aggregate_verify.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Test format: BLS sign message
+
+Verify the signature against the given pubkeys and one message.
+
+## Test case format
+
+The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
+
+```yaml
+input:
+  pubkeys: List[bytes48] -- the pubkey
+  message: bytes32 -- the message
+  signature: bytes96 -- the signature to verify against pubkeys and message
+output: bool  -- VALID or INVALID
+```
+
+All byte(s) fields are encoded as strings, hexadecimal encoding, prefixed with `0x`.

tests/formats/bls/msg_hash_g2_compressed.md

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Test format: BLS hash-compressed
-
-A BLS compressed-hash to G2.
-
-## Test case format
-
-The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
-
-```yaml
-input: 
-  message: bytes32
-  domain: bytes8   -- the BLS domain
-output: List[bytes48] -- length of two
-```
-
-All byte(s) fields are encoded as strings, hexadecimal encoding, prefixed with `0x`.
-
-
-## Condition
-
-The `msg_hash_g2_compressed` handler should hash the `message`, with the given `domain`, to G2 with compression, and the result should match the expected `output`.

tests/formats/bls/msg_hash_g2_uncompressed.md

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Test format: BLS hash-uncompressed
-
-A BLS uncompressed-hash to G2.
-
-## Test case format
-
-The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
-
-```yaml
-input:
-  message: bytes32
-  domain: bytes8   -- the BLS domain
-output: List[List[bytes48]] -- 3 lists, each a length of two
-```
-
-All byte(s) fields are encoded as strings, hexadecimal encoding, prefixed with `0x`.
-
-
-## Condition
-
-The `msg_hash_g2_uncompressed` handler should hash the `message`, with the given `domain`, to G2, without compression, and the result should match the expected `output`.

tests/formats/bls/priv_to_pub.md

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Test format: BLS private key to pubkey
-
-A BLS private key to public key conversion.
-
-## Test case format
-
-The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
-
-```yaml
-input: bytes32 -- the private key
-output: bytes48 -- the public key
-```
-
-All byte(s) fields are encoded as strings, hexadecimal encoding, prefixed with `0x`.
-
-
-## Condition
-
-The `priv_to_pub` handler should compute the public key for the given private key `input`, and the result should match the expected `output`.

tests/formats/bls/sign.md

@@ -10,13 +10,7 @@ The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
 input:
   privkey: bytes32 -- the private key used for signing
   message: bytes32 -- input message to sign (a hash)
-  domain: bytes8   -- the BLS domain
 output: bytes96    -- expected signature
 ```
 
 All byte(s) fields are encoded as strings, hexadecimal encoding, prefixed with `0x`.
-
-
-## Condition
-
-The `sign_msg` handler should sign the given `message`, with `domain`, using the given `privkey`, and the result should match the expected `output`.

tests/formats/bls/verify.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Test format: BLS sign message
+
+Verify the signature against the given one pubkey and one message.
+
+## Test case format
+
+The test data is declared in a `data.yaml` file:
+
+```yaml
+input:
+  pubkey: bytes48 -- the pubkey
+  message: bytes32 -- the message
+  signature: bytes96 -- the signature to verify against pubkey and message
+output: bool  -- VALID or INVALID
+```
+
+All byte(s) fields are encoded as strings, hexadecimal encoding, prefixed with `0x`.

tests/generators/bls/README.md

@@ -1,21 +1,11 @@
 # BLS Test Generator
 
-Explanation of BLS12-381 type hierarchy
+The [BLS Signature APIs](../../../specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures)
-The base unit is bytes48 of which only 381 bits are used
 
-- FQ: uint381 modulo field modulus
+Information on the format of the tests can be found in the [BLS test formats documentation](../../formats/bls/README.md).
-- FQ2: (FQ, FQ)
-- G2: (FQ2, FQ2, FQ2)
 
 ## Resources
 
-- [Eth2 spec](../../../specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures)
+- [IETF BLS Signature Scheme](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature/)
 - [Finite Field Arithmetic](http://www.springeronline.com/sgw/cda/pageitems/document/cda_downloaddocument/0,11996,0-0-45-110359-0,00.pdf)
 - Chapter 2 of [Elliptic Curve Cryptography](http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/ecc/). Darrel Hankerson, Alfred Menezes, and Scott Vanstone
-- [Zcash BLS parameters](https://github.com/zkcrypto/pairing/tree/master/src/bls12_381)
-- [Trinity implementation](https://github.com/ethereum/trinity/blob/master/eth2/_utils/bls.py)
-
-## Comments
-
-Compared to Zcash, Ethereum specs always requires the compressed form (c_flag / most significant bit always set).
-Also note that pubkeys and privkeys are reversed.

tests/generators/bls/main.py

@@ -10,20 +10,16 @@ from eth_utils import (
 )
 from gen_base import gen_runner, gen_typing
 
-from py_ecc import bls
+from eth2spec.utils import bls
 from hashlib import sha256
 
 from eth2spec.test.context import PHASE0
 
+
 def hash(x):
     return sha256(x).digest()
 
 
-F2Q_COEFF_LEN = 48
-G2_COMPRESSED_Z_LEN = 48
-DST = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.DST
-
-
 def int_to_hex(n: int, byte_length: int = None) -> str:
     byte_value = int_to_big_endian(n)
     if byte_length:
@@ -49,11 +45,15 @@ PRIVKEYS = [
     hex_to_int('0x00000000000000000000000000000000328388aff0d4a5b7dc9205abd374e7e98f3cd9f3418edb4eafda5fb16473d216'),
 ]
 
+Z1_PUBKEY = b'\xc0' + b'\x00' * 47
+NO_SIGNATURE = b'\x00' * 96
+Z2_SIGNATURE = b'\xc0' + b'\x00' * 95
+
 
 def case01_sign():
     for privkey in PRIVKEYS:
         for message in MESSAGES:
-            sig = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Sign(privkey, message)
+            sig = bls.Sign(privkey, message)
             identifier = f'{int_to_hex(privkey)}_{encode_hex(message)}'
             yield f'sign_case_{(hash(bytes(identifier, "utf-8"))[:8]).hex()}', {
                 'input': {
@@ -68,9 +68,10 @@ def case02_verify():
     for i, privkey in enumerate(PRIVKEYS):
         for message in MESSAGES:
             # Valid signature
-            signature = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Sign(privkey, message)
+            signature = bls.Sign(privkey, message)
-            pubkey = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.PrivToPub(privkey)
+            pubkey = bls.SkToPk(privkey)
             identifier = f'{encode_hex(pubkey)}_{encode_hex(message)}'
+            assert bls.Verify(pubkey, message, signature)
             yield f'verify_valid_case_{(hash(bytes(identifier, "utf-8"))[:8]).hex()}', {
                 'input': {
                     'pubkey': encode_hex(pubkey),
@@ -81,8 +82,9 @@ def case02_verify():
             }
 
             # Invalid signatures -- wrong pubkey
-            wrong_pubkey = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.PrivToPub(PRIVKEYS[(i + 1) % len(PRIVKEYS)])
+            wrong_pubkey = bls.SkToPk(PRIVKEYS[(i + 1) % len(PRIVKEYS)])
             identifier = f'{encode_hex(wrong_pubkey)}_{encode_hex(message)}'
+            assert not bls.Verify(wrong_pubkey, message, signature)
             yield f'verify_wrong_pubkey_case_{(hash(bytes(identifier, "utf-8"))[:8]).hex()}', {
                 'input': {
                     'pubkey': encode_hex(wrong_pubkey),
@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ def case02_verify():
             # Invalid signature -- tampered with signature
             tampered_signature = signature[:-4] + b'\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF'
             identifier = f'{encode_hex(pubkey)}_{encode_hex(message)}'
+            assert not bls.Verify(pubkey, message, tampered_signature)
             yield f'verify_tampered_signature_case_{(hash(bytes(identifier, "utf-8"))[:8]).hex()}', {
                 'input': {
                     'pubkey': encode_hex(pubkey),
@@ -104,26 +107,51 @@ def case02_verify():
                 'output': False,
             }
 
+        # Valid pubkey and signature with the point at infinity
+        assert bls.Verify(Z1_PUBKEY, message, Z2_SIGNATURE)
+        yield f'verify_infinity_pubkey_and_infinity_signature', {
+            'input': {
+                'pubkey': encode_hex(Z1_PUBKEY),
+                'message': encode_hex(message),
+                'signature': encode_hex(Z2_SIGNATURE),
+            },
+            'output': True,
+        }
+
 
 def case03_aggregate():
     for message in MESSAGES:
-        sigs = [bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Sign(privkey, message) for privkey in PRIVKEYS]
+        sigs = [bls.Sign(privkey, message) for privkey in PRIVKEYS]
         yield f'aggregate_{encode_hex(message)}', {
             'input': [encode_hex(sig) for sig in sigs],
-            'output': encode_hex(bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Aggregate(sigs)),
+            'output': encode_hex(bls.Aggregate(sigs)),
         }
 
+    # Invalid pubkeys -- len(pubkeys) == 0
+    try:
+        bls.Aggregate([])
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    else:
+        raise Exception("Should have been INVALID")
+
+    yield f'aggregate_na_pubkeys', {
+        'input': [],
+        'output': None,
+    }
+
 
 def case04_fast_aggregate_verify():
     for i, message in enumerate(MESSAGES):
         privkeys = PRIVKEYS[:i + 1]
-        sigs = [bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Sign(privkey, message) for privkey in privkeys]
+        sigs = [bls.Sign(privkey, message) for privkey in privkeys]
-        aggregate_signature = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Aggregate(sigs)
+        aggregate_signature = bls.Aggregate(sigs)
-        pubkeys = [bls.G2ProofOfPossession.PrivToPub(privkey) for privkey in privkeys]
+        pubkeys = [bls.SkToPk(privkey) for privkey in privkeys]
         pubkeys_serial = [encode_hex(pubkey) for pubkey in pubkeys]
 
         # Valid signature
         identifier = f'{pubkeys_serial}_{encode_hex(message)}'
+        assert bls.FastAggregateVerify(pubkeys, message, aggregate_signature)
         yield f'fast_aggregate_verify_valid_{(hash(bytes(identifier, "utf-8"))[:8]).hex()}', {
             'input': {
                 'pubkeys': pubkeys_serial,
@@ -134,9 +162,10 @@ def case04_fast_aggregate_verify():
         }
 
         # Invalid signature -- extra pubkey
-        pubkeys_extra = pubkeys + [bls.G2ProofOfPossession.PrivToPub(PRIVKEYS[-1])]
+        pubkeys_extra = pubkeys + [bls.SkToPk(PRIVKEYS[-1])]
         pubkeys_extra_serial = [encode_hex(pubkey) for pubkey in pubkeys_extra]
         identifier = f'{pubkeys_extra_serial}_{encode_hex(message)}'
+        assert not bls.FastAggregateVerify(pubkeys_extra, message, aggregate_signature)
         yield f'fast_aggregate_verify_extra_pubkey_{(hash(bytes(identifier, "utf-8"))[:8]).hex()}', {
             'input': {
                 'pubkeys': pubkeys_extra_serial,
@@ -149,6 +178,7 @@ def case04_fast_aggregate_verify():
         # Invalid signature -- tampered with signature
         tampered_signature = aggregate_signature[:-4] + b'\xff\xff\xff\xff'
         identifier = f'{pubkeys_serial}_{encode_hex(message)}'
+        assert not bls.FastAggregateVerify(pubkeys, message, tampered_signature)
         yield f'fast_aggregate_verify_tampered_signature_{(hash(bytes(identifier, "utf-8"))[:8]).hex()}', {
             'input': {
                 'pubkeys': pubkeys_serial,
@@ -158,37 +188,88 @@ def case04_fast_aggregate_verify():
             'output': False,
         }
 
+    # Invalid pubkeys and signature -- len(pubkeys) == 0 and signature == Z1_SIGNATURE
+    assert not bls.FastAggregateVerify([], message, Z2_SIGNATURE)
+    yield f'fast_aggregate_verify_na_pubkeys_and_infinity_signature', {
+        'input': {
+            'pubkeys': [],
+            'message': encode_hex(message),
+            'signature': encode_hex(Z2_SIGNATURE),
+        },
+        'output': False,
+    }
+
+    # Invalid pubkeys and signature -- len(pubkeys) == 0 and signature == 0x00...
+    assert not bls.FastAggregateVerify([], message, NO_SIGNATURE)
+    yield f'fast_aggregate_verify_na_pubkeys_and_na_signature', {
+        'input': {
+            'pubkeys': [],
+            'message': encode_hex(message),
+            'signature': encode_hex(NO_SIGNATURE),
+        },
+        'output': False,
+    }
+
 
 def case05_aggregate_verify():
-    pairs = []
+    pubkeys = []
+    pubkeys_serial = []
+    messages = []
+    messages_serial = []
     sigs = []
     for privkey, message in zip(PRIVKEYS, MESSAGES):
-        sig = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Sign(privkey, message)
+        sig = bls.Sign(privkey, message)
-        pubkey = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.PrivToPub(privkey)
+        pubkey = bls.SkToPk(privkey)
-        pairs.append({
+        pubkeys.append(pubkey)
-            'pubkey': encode_hex(pubkey),
+        pubkeys_serial.append(encode_hex(pubkey))
-            'message': encode_hex(message),
+        messages.append(message)
-        })
+        messages_serial.append(encode_hex(message))
         sigs.append(sig)
 
-    aggregate_signature = bls.G2ProofOfPossession.Aggregate(sigs)
+    aggregate_signature = bls.Aggregate(sigs)
+    assert bls.AggregateVerify(pubkeys, messages, aggregate_signature)
     yield f'aggregate_verify_valid', {
         'input': {
-            'pairs': pairs,
+            'pubkeys': pubkeys_serial,
+            'messages': messages_serial,
             'signature': encode_hex(aggregate_signature),
         },
         'output': True,
     }
 
     tampered_signature = aggregate_signature[:4] + b'\xff\xff\xff\xff'
+    assert not bls.AggregateVerify(pubkey, messages, tampered_signature)
     yield f'aggregate_verify_tampered_signature', {
         'input': {
-            'pairs': pairs,
+            'pubkeys': pubkeys_serial,
+            'messages': messages_serial,
             'signature': encode_hex(tampered_signature),
         },
         'output': False,
     }
 
+    # Invalid pubkeys and signature -- len(pubkeys) == 0 and signature == Z1_SIGNATURE
+    assert not bls.AggregateVerify([], [], Z2_SIGNATURE)
+    yield f'aggregate_verify_na_pubkeys_and_infinity_signature', {
+        'input': {
+            'pubkeys': [],
+            'messages': [],
+            'signature': encode_hex(Z2_SIGNATURE),
+        },
+        'output': False,
+    }
+
+    # Invalid pubkeys and signature -- len(pubkeys) == 0 and signature == 0x00...
+    assert not bls.AggregateVerify([], [], NO_SIGNATURE)
+    yield f'aggregate_verify_na_pubkeys_and_na_signature', {
+        'input': {
+            'pubkeys': [],
+            'messages': [],
+            'signature': encode_hex(NO_SIGNATURE),
+        },
+        'output': False,
+    }
+
 
 def create_provider(handler_name: str,
                     test_case_fn: Callable[[], Iterable[Tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]]]) -> gen_typing.TestProvider:

tests/generators/bls/requirements.txt

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-py_ecc==2.0.0
+py_ecc==4.0.0
 eth-utils==1.6.0
 ../../core/gen_helpers
 ../../../