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merge in dev and resolve conflicts

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Carl Beekhuizen 2019-06-30 21:54:30 +02:00
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3
scripts/build_spec.py
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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ from function_puller import (
from argparse import ArgumentParser from argparse import ArgumentParser
from typing import ( from typing import (
Dict, Dict,
List,
Optional, Optional,
) )
@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ def apply_constants_preset(preset: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
def strip_comments(raw: str) -> str: def strip_comments(raw: str) -> str:
comment_line_regex = re.compile('^\s+# ') comment_line_regex = re.compile(r'^\s+# ')
lines = raw.split('\n') lines = raw.split('\n')
out = [] out = []
for line in lines: for line in lines:

14
specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md
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@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ The following values are (non-configurable) constants used throughout the specif
| `JUSTIFICATION_BITS_LENGTH` | `4` | | `JUSTIFICATION_BITS_LENGTH` | `4` |
| `ENDIANNESS` | `'little'` | | `ENDIANNESS` | `'little'` |
* For the safety of crosslinks, `TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE` exceeds [the recommended minimum committee size of 111](https://vitalik.ca/files/Ithaca201807_Sharding.pdf); with sufficient active validators (at least `SLOTS_PER_EPOCH * TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE`), the shuffling algorithm ensures committee sizes of at least `TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE`. (Unbiasable randomness with a Verifiable Delay Function (VDF) will improve committee robustness and lower the safe minimum committee size.) - For the safety of crosslinks, `TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE` exceeds [the recommended minimum committee size of 111](https://vitalik.ca/files/Ithaca201807_Sharding.pdf); with sufficient active validators (at least `SLOTS_PER_EPOCH * TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE`), the shuffling algorithm ensures committee sizes of at least `TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE`. (Unbiasable randomness with a Verifiable Delay Function (VDF) will improve committee robustness and lower the safe minimum committee size.)
### Gwei values ### Gwei values
@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ The following values are (non-configurable) constants used throughout the specif
| `MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK` | `2**6` (= 64) | epochs | ~7 hours | | `MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK` | `2**6` (= 64) | epochs | ~7 hours |
| `MIN_EPOCHS_TO_INACTIVITY_PENALTY` | `2**2` (= 4) | epochs | 25.6 minutes | | `MIN_EPOCHS_TO_INACTIVITY_PENALTY` | `2**2` (= 4) | epochs | 25.6 minutes |
* `MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK` should be a small constant times `SHARD_COUNT // SLOTS_PER_EPOCH`. - `MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK` should be a small constant times `SHARD_COUNT // SLOTS_PER_EPOCH`.
### State list lengths ### State list lengths
@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ The following values are (non-configurable) constants used throughout the specif
| `INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` | `2**25` (= 33,554,432) | | `INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` | `2**25` (= 33,554,432) |
| `MIN_SLASHING_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` | `2**5` (= 32) | | `MIN_SLASHING_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` | `2**5` (= 32) |
* The `INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` equals `INVERSE_SQRT_E_DROP_TIME**2` where `INVERSE_SQRT_E_DROP_TIME := 2**12 epochs` (about 18 days) is the time it takes the inactivity penalty to reduce the balance of non-participating validators to about `1/sqrt(e) ~= 60.6%`. Indeed, the balance retained by offline validators after `n` epochs is about `(1 - 1/INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT)**(n**2/2)`; so after `INVERSE_SQRT_E_DROP_TIME` epochs, it is roughly `(1 - 1/INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT)**(INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT/2) ~= 1/sqrt(e)`. - The `INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT` equals `INVERSE_SQRT_E_DROP_TIME**2` where `INVERSE_SQRT_E_DROP_TIME := 2**12 epochs` (about 18 days) is the time it takes the inactivity penalty to reduce the balance of non-participating validators to about `1/sqrt(e) ~= 60.6%`. Indeed, the balance retained by offline validators after `n` epochs is about `(1 - 1/INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT)**(n**2/2)`; so after `INVERSE_SQRT_E_DROP_TIME` epochs, it is roughly `(1 - 1/INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT)**(INACTIVITY_PENALTY_QUOTIENT/2) ~= 1/sqrt(e)`.
### Max operations per block ### Max operations per block
@ -1116,9 +1116,9 @@ def slash_validator(state: BeaconState,
Before the Ethereum 2.0 genesis has been triggered, and for every Ethereum 1.0 block, let `candidate_state = initialize_beacon_state_from_eth1(eth1_block_hash, eth1_timestamp, deposits)` where: Before the Ethereum 2.0 genesis has been triggered, and for every Ethereum 1.0 block, let `candidate_state = initialize_beacon_state_from_eth1(eth1_block_hash, eth1_timestamp, deposits)` where:
* `eth1_block_hash` is the hash of the Ethereum 1.0 block - `eth1_block_hash` is the hash of the Ethereum 1.0 block
* `eth1_timestamp` is the Unix timestamp corresponding to `eth1_block_hash` - `eth1_timestamp` is the Unix timestamp corresponding to `eth1_block_hash`
* `deposits` is the sequence of all deposits, ordered chronologically, up to the block with hash `eth1_block_hash` - `deposits` is the sequence of all deposits, ordered chronologically, up to the block with hash `eth1_block_hash`
```python ```python
def initialize_beacon_state_from_eth1(eth1_block_hash: Hash, def initialize_beacon_state_from_eth1(eth1_block_hash: Hash,
@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ Let `genesis_block = BeaconBlock(state_root=hash_tree_root(genesis_state))`.
## Beacon chain state transition function ## Beacon chain state transition function
The post-state corresponding to a pre-state `state` and a block `block` is defined as `state_transition(state, block)`. State transitions that trigger an unhandled excpetion (e.g. a failed `assert` or an out-of-range list access) are considered invalid. The post-state corresponding to a pre-state `state` and a block `block` is defined as `state_transition(state, block)`. State transitions that trigger an unhandled exception (e.g. a failed `assert` or an out-of-range list access) are considered invalid.
```python ```python
def state_transition(state: BeaconState, block: BeaconBlock, validate_state_root: bool=False) -> BeaconState: def state_transition(state: BeaconState, block: BeaconBlock, validate_state_root: bool=False) -> BeaconState:

4
specs/core/0_deposit-contract.md
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@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ The amount of ETH (rounded down to the closest Gwei) sent to the deposit contrac
One of the `DepositData` fields is `withdrawal_credentials`. It is a commitment to credentials for withdrawing validator balance (e.g. to another validator, or to shards). The first byte of `withdrawal_credentials` is a version number. As of now, the only expected format is as follows: One of the `DepositData` fields is `withdrawal_credentials`. It is a commitment to credentials for withdrawing validator balance (e.g. to another validator, or to shards). The first byte of `withdrawal_credentials` is a version number. As of now, the only expected format is as follows:
* `withdrawal_credentials[:1] == BLS_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX_BYTE` - `withdrawal_credentials[:1] == BLS_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX_BYTE`
* `withdrawal_credentials[1:] == hash(withdrawal_pubkey)[1:]` where `withdrawal_pubkey` is a BLS pubkey - `withdrawal_credentials[1:] == hash(withdrawal_pubkey)[1:]` where `withdrawal_pubkey` is a BLS pubkey
The private key corresponding to `withdrawal_pubkey` will be required to initiate a withdrawal. It can be stored separately until a withdrawal is required, e.g. in cold storage. The private key corresponding to `withdrawal_pubkey` will be required to initiate a withdrawal. It can be stored separately until a withdrawal is required, e.g. in cold storage.

8
specs/core/0_fork-choice.md
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@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ This document is the beacon chain fork choice spec, part of Ethereum 2.0 Phase 0
The head block root associated with a `store` is defined as `get_head(store)`. At genesis, let `store = get_genesis_store(genesis_state)` and update `store` by running: The head block root associated with a `store` is defined as `get_head(store)`. At genesis, let `store = get_genesis_store(genesis_state)` and update `store` by running:
* `on_tick(time)` whenever `time > store.time` where `time` is the current Unix time - `on_tick(time)` whenever `time > store.time` where `time` is the current Unix time
* `on_block(block)` whenever a block `block` is received - `on_block(block)` whenever a block `block` is received
* `on_attestation(attestation)` whenever an attestation `attestation` is received - `on_attestation(attestation)` whenever an attestation `attestation` is received
*Notes*: *Notes*:
@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ def on_attestation(store: Store, attestation: Attestation) -> None:
# Cannot calculate the current shuffling if have not seen the target # Cannot calculate the current shuffling if have not seen the target
assert target.root in store.blocks assert target.root in store.blocks
# Attestations cannot be from future epochs. If they are, delay consideration until the epoch arrivesr # Attestations cannot be from future epochs. If they are, delay consideration until the epoch arrives
base_state = store.block_states[target.root].copy() base_state = store.block_states[target.root].copy()
assert store.time >= base_state.genesis_time + compute_epoch_start_slot(target.epoch) * SECONDS_PER_SLOT assert store.time >= base_state.genesis_time + compute_epoch_start_slot(target.epoch) * SECONDS_PER_SLOT

25
specs/core/1_custody-game.md
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@ -56,18 +56,18 @@ This document details the beacon chain additions and changes in Phase 1 of Ether
## Terminology ## Terminology
* **Custody game**— - **Custody game**—
* **Custody period**— - **Custody period**—
* **Custody chunk**— - **Custody chunk**—
* **Custody chunk bit**— - **Custody chunk bit**—
* **Custody chunk challenge**— - **Custody chunk challenge**—
* **Custody bit**— - **Custody bit**—
* **Custody bit challenge**— - **Custody bit challenge**—
* **Custody key**— - **Custody key**—
* **Custody key reveal**— - **Custody key reveal**—
* **Custody key mask**— - **Custody key mask**—
* **Custody response**— - **Custody response**—
* **Custody response deadline**— - **Custody response deadline**—
## Constants ## Constants
@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ This document details the beacon chain additions and changes in Phase 1 of Ether
| - | - | | - | - |
| `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE` | `6` | | `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE` | `6` |
### TODO PLACEHOLDER ### TODO PLACEHOLDER
| Name | Value | | Name | Value |

24
specs/core/1_shard-data-chains.md
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@ -282,10 +282,10 @@ def compute_crosslink_data_root(blocks: Sequence[ShardBlock]) -> Bytes32:
Let: Let:
* `beacon_blocks` be the `BeaconBlock` list such that `beacon_blocks[slot]` is the canonical `BeaconBlock` at slot `slot` - `beacon_blocks` be the `BeaconBlock` list such that `beacon_blocks[slot]` is the canonical `BeaconBlock` at slot `slot`
* `beacon_state` be the canonical `BeaconState` after processing `beacon_blocks[-1]` - `beacon_state` be the canonical `BeaconState` after processing `beacon_blocks[-1]`
* `valid_shard_blocks` be the list of valid `ShardBlock`, recursively defined - `valid_shard_blocks` be the list of valid `ShardBlock`, recursively defined
* `candidate` be a candidate `ShardBlock` for which validity is to be determined by running `is_valid_shard_block` - `candidate` be a candidate `ShardBlock` for which validity is to be determined by running `is_valid_shard_block`
```python ```python
def is_valid_shard_block(beacon_blocks: Sequence[BeaconBlock], def is_valid_shard_block(beacon_blocks: Sequence[BeaconBlock],
@ -349,9 +349,9 @@ def is_valid_shard_block(beacon_blocks: Sequence[BeaconBlock],
Let: Let:
* `valid_shard_blocks` be the list of valid `ShardBlock` - `valid_shard_blocks` be the list of valid `ShardBlock`
* `beacon_state` be the canonical `BeaconState` - `beacon_state` be the canonical `BeaconState`
* `candidate` be a candidate `ShardAttestation` for which validity is to be determined by running `is_valid_shard_attestation` - `candidate` be a candidate `ShardAttestation` for which validity is to be determined by running `is_valid_shard_attestation`
```python ```python
def is_valid_shard_attestation(valid_shard_blocks: Sequence[ShardBlock], def is_valid_shard_attestation(valid_shard_blocks: Sequence[ShardBlock],
@ -376,11 +376,11 @@ def is_valid_shard_attestation(valid_shard_blocks: Sequence[ShardBlock],
Let: Let:
* `shard` be a valid `Shard` - `shard` be a valid `Shard`
* `shard_blocks` be the `ShardBlock` list such that `shard_blocks[slot]` is the canonical `ShardBlock` for shard `shard` at slot `slot` - `shard_blocks` be the `ShardBlock` list such that `shard_blocks[slot]` is the canonical `ShardBlock` for shard `shard` at slot `slot`
* `beacon_state` be the canonical `BeaconState` - `beacon_state` be the canonical `BeaconState`
* `valid_attestations` be the set of valid `Attestation` objects, recursively defined - `valid_attestations` be the set of valid `Attestation` objects, recursively defined
* `candidate` be a candidate `Attestation` which is valid under Phase 0 rules, and for which validity is to be determined under Phase 1 rules by running `is_valid_beacon_attestation` - `candidate` be a candidate `Attestation` which is valid under Phase 0 rules, and for which validity is to be determined under Phase 1 rules by running `is_valid_beacon_attestation`
```python ```python
def is_valid_beacon_attestation(shard: Shard, def is_valid_beacon_attestation(shard: Shard,

50
specs/validator/0_beacon-chain-validator.md
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@ -86,8 +86,9 @@ Validator public keys are [G1 points](../bls_signature.md#g1-points) on the [BLS
A secondary withdrawal private key, `withdrawal_privkey`, must also be securely generated along with the resultant `withdrawal_pubkey`. This `withdrawal_privkey` does not have to be available for signing during the normal lifetime of a validator and can live in "cold storage". A secondary withdrawal private key, `withdrawal_privkey`, must also be securely generated along with the resultant `withdrawal_pubkey`. This `withdrawal_privkey` does not have to be available for signing during the normal lifetime of a validator and can live in "cold storage".
The validator constructs their `withdrawal_credentials` via the following: The validator constructs their `withdrawal_credentials` via the following:
* Set `withdrawal_credentials[:1] == BLS_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX_BYTE`.
* Set `withdrawal_credentials[1:] == hash(withdrawal_pubkey)[1:]`. - Set `withdrawal_credentials[:1] == BLS_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX_BYTE`.
- Set `withdrawal_credentials[1:] == hash(withdrawal_pubkey)[1:]`.
### Submit deposit ### Submit deposit
@ -95,11 +96,11 @@ In Phase 0, all incoming validator deposits originate from the Ethereum 1.0 proo
To submit a deposit: To submit a deposit:
* Pack the validator's [initialization parameters](#initialization) into `deposit_data`, a [`DepositData`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#depositdata) SSZ object. - Pack the validator's [initialization parameters](#initialization) into `deposit_data`, a [`DepositData`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#depositdata) SSZ object.
* Let `amount` be the amount in Gwei to be deposited by the validator where `MIN_DEPOSIT_AMOUNT <= amount <= MAX_EFFECTIVE_BALANCE`. - Let `amount` be the amount in Gwei to be deposited by the validator where `MIN_DEPOSIT_AMOUNT <= amount <= MAX_EFFECTIVE_BALANCE`.
* Set `deposit_data.amount = amount`. - Set `deposit_data.amount = amount`.
* Let `signature` be the result of `bls_sign` of the `signing_root(deposit_data)` with `domain=compute_bls_domain(DOMAIN_DEPOSIT)`. (Deposits are valid regardless of fork version, `compute_bls_domain` will default to zeroes there). - Let `signature` be the result of `bls_sign` of the `signing_root(deposit_data)` with `domain=compute_bls_domain(DOMAIN_DEPOSIT)`. (Deposits are valid regardless of fork version, `compute_bls_domain` will default to zeroes there).
* Send a transaction on the Ethereum 1.0 chain to `DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` executing `def deposit(pubkey: bytes[48], withdrawal_credentials: bytes[32], signature: bytes[96])` along with a deposit of `amount` Gwei. - Send a transaction on the Ethereum 1.0 chain to `DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` executing `def deposit(pubkey: bytes[48], withdrawal_credentials: bytes[32], signature: bytes[96])` along with a deposit of `amount` Gwei.
*Note*: Deposits made for the same `pubkey` are treated as for the same validator. A singular `Validator` will be added to `state.validators` with each additional deposit amount added to the validator's balance. A validator can only be activated when total deposits for the validator pubkey meet or exceed `MAX_EFFECTIVE_BALANCE`. *Note*: Deposits made for the same `pubkey` are treated as for the same validator. A singular `Validator` will be added to `state.validators` with each additional deposit amount added to the validator's balance. A validator can only be activated when total deposits for the validator pubkey meet or exceed `MAX_EFFECTIVE_BALANCE`.
@ -292,8 +293,8 @@ A validator should create and broadcast the attestation halfway through the `slo
First, the validator should construct `attestation_data`, an [`AttestationData`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#attestationdata) object based upon the state at the assigned slot. First, the validator should construct `attestation_data`, an [`AttestationData`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#attestationdata) object based upon the state at the assigned slot.
* Let `head_block` be the result of running the fork choice during the assigned slot. - Let `head_block` be the result of running the fork choice during the assigned slot.
* Let `head_state` be the state of `head_block` processed through any empty slots up to the assigned slot using `process_slots(state, slot)`. - Let `head_state` be the state of `head_block` processed through any empty slots up to the assigned slot using `process_slots(state, slot)`.
##### LMD GHOST vote ##### LMD GHOST vote
@ -301,25 +302,26 @@ Set `attestation_data.beacon_block_root = signing_root(head_block)`.
##### FFG vote ##### FFG vote
* Set `attestation_data.source_epoch = head_state.current_justified_epoch`. - Set `attestation_data.source_epoch = head_state.current_justified_epoch`.
* Set `attestation_data.source_root = head_state.current_justified_root`. - Set `attestation_data.source_root = head_state.current_justified_root`.
* Set `attestation_data.target_epoch = get_current_epoch(head_state)` - Set `attestation_data.target_epoch = get_current_epoch(head_state)`
* Set `attestation_data.target_root = epoch_boundary_block_root` where `epoch_boundary_block_root` is the root of block at the most recent epoch boundary. - Set `attestation_data.target_root = epoch_boundary_block_root` where `epoch_boundary_block_root` is the root of block at the most recent epoch boundary.
*Note*: `epoch_boundary_block_root` can be looked up in the state using: *Note*: `epoch_boundary_block_root` can be looked up in the state using:
* Let `start_slot = compute_epoch_start_slot(get_current_epoch(head_state))`.
* Let `epoch_boundary_block_root = signing_root(head_block) if start_slot == head_state.slot else get_block_root(state, start_slot)`. - Let `start_slot = compute_epoch_start_slot(get_current_epoch(head_state))`.
- Let `epoch_boundary_block_root = signing_root(head_block) if start_slot == head_state.slot else get_block_root(state, start_slot)`.
##### Crosslink vote ##### Crosslink vote
Construct `attestation_data.crosslink` via the following. Construct `attestation_data.crosslink` via the following.
* Set `attestation_data.crosslink.shard = shard` where `shard` is the shard associated with the validator's committee. - Set `attestation_data.crosslink.shard = shard` where `shard` is the shard associated with the validator's committee.
* Let `parent_crosslink = head_state.current_crosslinks[shard]`. - Let `parent_crosslink = head_state.current_crosslinks[shard]`.
* Set `attestation_data.crosslink.start_epoch = parent_crosslink.end_epoch`. - Set `attestation_data.crosslink.start_epoch = parent_crosslink.end_epoch`.
* Set `attestation_data.crosslink.end_epoch = min(attestation_data.target_epoch, parent_crosslink.end_epoch + MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK)`. - Set `attestation_data.crosslink.end_epoch = min(attestation_data.target_epoch, parent_crosslink.end_epoch + MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK)`.
* Set `attestation_data.crosslink.parent_root = hash_tree_root(head_state.current_crosslinks[shard])`. - Set `attestation_data.crosslink.parent_root = hash_tree_root(head_state.current_crosslinks[shard])`.
* Set `attestation_data.crosslink.data_root = ZERO_HASH`. *Note*: This is a stub for Phase 0. - Set `attestation_data.crosslink.data_root = ZERO_HASH`. *Note*: This is a stub for Phase 0.
#### Construct attestation #### Construct attestation
@ -331,13 +333,13 @@ Set `attestation.data = attestation_data` where `attestation_data` is the `Attes
##### Aggregation bits ##### Aggregation bits
* Let `attestation.aggregation_bits` be a `Bitlist[MAX_INDICES_PER_ATTESTATION]` where the bits at the index in the aggregated validator's `committee` is set to `0b1`. - Let `attestation.aggregation_bits` be a `Bitlist[MAX_INDICES_PER_ATTESTATION]` where the bits at the index in the aggregated validator's `committee` is set to `0b1`.
*Note*: Calling `get_attesting_indices(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits)` should return a list of length equal to 1, containing `validator_index`. *Note*: Calling `get_attesting_indices(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits)` should return a list of length equal to 1, containing `validator_index`.
##### Custody bits ##### Custody bits
* Let `attestation.custody_bits` be a `Bitlist[MAX_INDICES_PER_ATTESTATION]` filled with zeros of length `len(committee)`. - Let `attestation.custody_bits` be a `Bitlist[MAX_INDICES_PER_ATTESTATION]` filled with zeros of length `len(committee)`.
*Note*: This is a stub for Phase 0. *Note*: This is a stub for Phase 0.
@ -376,6 +378,7 @@ To avoid "proposer slashings", a validator must not sign two conflicting [`Beaco
*In Phase 0, as long as the validator does not sign two different beacon blocks for the same epoch, the validator is safe against proposer slashings.* *In Phase 0, as long as the validator does not sign two different beacon blocks for the same epoch, the validator is safe against proposer slashings.*
Specifically, when signing a `BeaconBlock`, a validator should perform the following steps in the following order: Specifically, when signing a `BeaconBlock`, a validator should perform the following steps in the following order:
1. Save a record to hard disk that a beacon block has been signed for the `epoch=compute_slot_epoch(block.slot)`. 1. Save a record to hard disk that a beacon block has been signed for the `epoch=compute_slot_epoch(block.slot)`.
2. Generate and broadcast the block. 2. Generate and broadcast the block.
@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ If the software crashes at some point within this routine, then when the validat
To avoid "attester slashings", a validator must not sign two conflicting [`AttestationData`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#attestationdata) objects, i.e. two attestations that satisfy [`is_slashable_attestation_data`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#is_slashable_attestation_data). To avoid "attester slashings", a validator must not sign two conflicting [`AttestationData`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#attestationdata) objects, i.e. two attestations that satisfy [`is_slashable_attestation_data`](../core/0_beacon-chain.md#is_slashable_attestation_data).
Specifically, when signing an `Attestation`, a validator should perform the following steps in the following order: Specifically, when signing an `Attestation`, a validator should perform the following steps in the following order:
1. Save a record to hard disk that an attestation has been signed for source (i.e. `attestation_data.source_epoch`) and target (i.e. `compute_slot_epoch(attestation_data.slot)`). 1. Save a record to hard disk that an attestation has been signed for source (i.e. `attestation_data.source_epoch`) and target (i.e. `compute_slot_epoch(attestation_data.slot)`).
2. Generate and broadcast attestation. 2. Generate and broadcast attestation.

2
specs/validator/0_beacon-node-validator-api.md
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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ This document outlines a minimal application programming interface (API) which i
The API is a REST interface, accessed via HTTP, designed for use as a local communications protocol between binaries. Currently, the only supported return data type is JSON. The API is a REST interface, accessed via HTTP, designed for use as a local communications protocol between binaries. Currently, the only supported return data type is JSON.
## Background ## Background
The beacon node maintains the state of the beacon chain by communicating with other beacon nodes in the Ethereum 2.0 network. Conceptually, it does not maintain keypairs that participate with the beacon chain. The beacon node maintains the state of the beacon chain by communicating with other beacon nodes in the Ethereum 2.0 network. Conceptually, it does not maintain keypairs that participate with the beacon chain.
The validator client is a conceptually separate entity which utilizes private keys to perform validator related tasks, called "duties", on the beacon chain. These duties include the production of beacon blocks and signing of attestations. The validator client is a conceptually separate entity which utilizes private keys to perform validator related tasks, called "duties", on the beacon chain. These duties include the production of beacon blocks and signing of attestations.
@ -19,7 +20,6 @@ The goal of this specification is to promote interoperability between beacon nod
This specification is derived from a proposal and discussion on Issues [#1011](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/1011) and [#1012](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/1012). This specification is derived from a proposal and discussion on Issues [#1011](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/1011) and [#1012](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/1012).
## Specification ## Specification
The API specification has been written in [OpenAPI 3.0](https://swagger.io/docs/specification/about/) and is provided in the [beacon_node_oapi.yaml](beacon_node_oapi.yaml) file alongside this document. The API specification has been written in [OpenAPI 3.0](https://swagger.io/docs/specification/about/) and is provided in the [beacon_node_oapi.yaml](beacon_node_oapi.yaml) file alongside this document.