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Merge pull request #2107 from bloxapp/honest_val_time_attack 

added best practices section according to https://github.com/ethereum…
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Danny Ryan 2020-11-04 07:36:27 -06:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
- [How to avoid slashing](#how-to-avoid-slashing)
- [Proposer slashing](#proposer-slashing)
- [Attester slashing](#attester-slashing)
- [Protection best practices](#protection-best-practices)
<!-- END doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update -->
<!-- /TOC -->
@ -608,3 +609,13 @@ Specifically, when signing an `Attestation`, a validator should perform the foll
2. Generate and broadcast attestation.
If the software crashes at some point within this routine, then when the validator comes back online, the hard disk has the record of the *potentially* signed/broadcast attestation and can effectively avoid slashing.
## Protection best practices
A validator client should be considered standalone and should consider the beacon node as untrusted. This means that the validator client should protect:
1) Private keys -- private keys should be protected from being exported accidentally or by an attacker.
2) Slashing -- before a validator client signs a message it should validate the data, check it against a local slashing database (do not sign a slashable attestation or block) and update its internal slashing database with the newly signed object.
3) Recovered validator -- Recovering a validator from a private key will result in an empty local slashing db. Best practice is to import (from a trusted source) that validator's attestation history. See [EIP 3076](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/3076/files) for a standard slashing interchange format.
4) Far future signing requests -- A validator client can be requested to sign a far into the future attestation, resulting in a valid non-slashable request. If the validator client signs this message, it will result in it blocking itself from attesting any other attestation until the beacon-chain reaches that far into the future epoch. This will result in an inactivity leak and potential ejection due to low balance.
A validator client should prevent itself from signing such requests by: a) keeping a local time clock if possible and following best practices to stop time server attacks and b) refusing to sign, by default, any message that has a large (>6h) gap from the current slashing protection database indicated a time "jump" or a long offline event. The administrator can manually override this protection to restart the validator after a genuine long offline event.