Separate document for phase 1 custody game (#818)

The 1-round custody game has been implemented. Many bugs squashed, and a bunch of polishing done. Miscellaneous known issues (~8 of them) to be resolved in separate, smaller, PRs.
2019-03-28 22:54:39 +00:00 · 2019-03-28 22:54:39 +00:00 · 1082c68fef
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+# Ethereum 2.0 Phase 1 -- Custody Game
+
+**NOTICE**: This spec is a work-in-progress for researchers and implementers.
+
+## Table of contents
+
+<!-- TOC -->
+
+- [Ethereum 2.0 Phase 1 -- Custody Game](#ethereum-20-phase-1----custody-game)
+    - [Table of contents](#table-of-contents)
+    - [Introduction](#introduction)
+    - [Terminology](#terminology)
+    - [Constants](#constants)
+        - [Misc](#misc)
+        - [Time parameters](#time-parameters)
+        - [Max transactions per block](#max-transactions-per-block)
+        - [Signature domains](#signature-domains)
+    - [Data structures](#data-structures)
+        - [Custody objects](#custody-objects)
+            - [`CustodyChunkChallenge`](#custodychunkchallenge)
+            - [`CustodyBitChallenge`](#custodybitchallenge)
+            - [`CustodyChunkChallengeRecord`](#custodychunkchallengerecord)
+            - [`CustodyBitChallengeRecord`](#custodybitchallengerecord)
+            - [`CustodyResponse`](#custodyresponse)
+            - [`CustodyKeyReveal`](#custodykeyreveal)
+        - [Phase 0 container updates](#phase-0-container-updates)
+            - [`Validator`](#validator)
+            - [`BeaconState`](#beaconstate)
+            - [`BeaconBlockBody`](#beaconblockbody)
+    - [Helpers](#helpers)
+        - [`get_crosslink_chunk_count`](#get_crosslink_chunk_count)
+        - [`get_custody_chunk_bit`](#get_custody_chunk_bit)
+        - [`epoch_to_custody_period`](#epoch_to_custody_period)
+        - [`verify_custody_key`](#verify_custody_key)
+    - [Per-block processing](#per-block-processing)
+        - [Transactions](#transactions)
+            - [Custody reveals](#custody-reveals)
+            - [Chunk challenges](#chunk-challenges)
+            - [Bit challenges](#bit-challenges)
+            - [Custody responses](#custody-responses)
+    - [Per-epoch processing](#per-epoch-processing)
+
+<!-- /TOC -->
+
+## Introduction
+
+This document details the beacon chain additions and changes in Phase 1 of Ethereum 2.0 to support the shard data custody game, building upon the [phase 0](0_beacon-chain.md) specification.
+
+## Terminology
+
+* **Custody game**:
+* **Custody period**:
+* **Custody chunk**:
+* **Custody chunk bit**:
+* **Custody chunk challenge**:
+* **Custody bit**:
+* **Custody bit challenge**:
+* **Custody key**:
+* **Custody key reveal**:
+* **Custody key mask**:
+* **Custody response**:
+* **Custody response deadline**:
+
+## Constants
+
+### Misc
+
+| Name | Value |
+| - | - |
+| `BYTES_PER_SHARD_BLOCK` | `2**14` (= 16,384) |
+| `BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK` | `2**9` (= 512) |
+| `MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**8` (= 256) |
+
+### Time parameters
+
+| Name | Value | Unit | Duration |
+| - | - | :-: | :-: |
+| `MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days |
+| `EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days |
+| `CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE` | `2**14` (= 16,384) | epochs | ~73 days |
+
+### Max transactions per block
+
+| Name | Value |
+| - | - |
+| `MAX_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEALS` | `2**4` (= 16) |
+| `MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNK_CHALLENGES` | `2**2` (= 4) |
+| `MAX_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGES` | `2**2` (= 4) |
+| `MAX_CUSTODY_RESPONSES` | `2**5` (= 32) |
+
+### Signature domains
+
+| Name | Value |
+| - | - |
+| `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEAL` | `6` |
+| `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE` | `7` |
+
+## Data structures
+
+### Custody objects
+
+#### `CustodyChunkChallenge`
+
+```python
+{
+    'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'attestation': Attestation,
+    'chunk_index': 'uint64',
+}
+```
+
+#### `CustodyBitChallenge`
+
+```python
+{
+    'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'attestation': Attestation,
+    'challenger_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'responder_key': BLSSignature,
+    'chunk_bits': Bitfield,
+    'signature': BLSSignature,
+}
+```
+
+#### `CustodyChunkChallengeRecord`
+
+```python
+{
+    'challenge_index': 'uint64',
+    'challenger_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'deadline': Epoch,
+    'crosslink_data_root': Hash,
+    'depth': 'uint64',
+    'chunk_index': 'uint64',
+}
+```
+
+#### `CustodyBitChallengeRecord`
+
+```python
+{
+    'challenge_index': 'uint64',
+    'challenger_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'responder_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'deadline': Epoch,
+    'crosslink_data_root': Hash,
+    'chunk_bits': Bitfield,
+    'responder_key': BLSSignature,
+}
+```
+
+#### `CustodyResponse`
+
+```python
+{
+    'challenge_index': 'uint64',
+    'chunk_index': 'uint64',
+    'chunk': ['byte', BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK],
+    'branch': [Hash],
+}
+```
+
+#### `CustodyKeyReveal`
+
+```python
+{
+    'revealer_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'period': 'uint64',
+    'key': BLSSignature,
+    'masker_index': ValidatorIndex,
+    'mask': Hash,
+}
+```
+
+### Phase 0 container updates
+
+Add the following fields to the end of the specified container objects. Fields with underlying type `uint64` are initialized to `0` and list fields are initialized to `[]`.
+
+#### `Validator`
+
+```python
+    'custody_reveal_index': 'uint64',
+    'max_reveal_lateness': 'uint64',
+```
+
+#### `BeaconState`
+
+```python
+    'custody_chunk_challenge_records': [CustodyChunkChallengeRecord],
+    'custody_bit_challenge_records': [CustodyBitChallengeRecord],
+    'custody_challenge_index': 'uint64',
+```
+
+#### `BeaconBlockBody`
+
+```python
+    'custody_key_reveals': [CustodyKeyReveal],
+    'custody_chunk_challenges': [CustodyChunkChallenge],
+    'custody_bit_challenges': [CustodyBitChallenge],
+    'custody_responses': [CustodyResponse],
+```
+
+## Helpers
+
+### `get_crosslink_chunk_count`
+
+```python
+def get_custody_chunk_count(attestation: Attestation) -> int:
+    crosslink_start_epoch = attestation.data.latest_crosslink.epoch
+    crosslink_end_epoch = slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot)
+    crosslink_crosslink_length = min(MAX_CROSSLINK_EPOCHS, end_epoch - start_epoch)
+    chunks_per_epoch = 2 * BYTES_PER_SHARD_BLOCK * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH // BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK
+    return crosslink_crosslink_length * chunks_per_epoch
+```
+
+### `get_custody_chunk_bit`
+
+```python
+def get_custody_chunk_bit(key: BLSSignature, chunk: bytes) -> bool:
+    # TODO: Replace with something MPC-friendly, e.g. the Legendre symbol
+    return get_bitfield_bit(hash(challenge.responder_key + chunk), 0)
+```
+
+### `epoch_to_custody_period`
+
+```python
+def epoch_to_custody_period(epoch: Epoch) -> int:
+    return epoch // EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD
+```
+
+### `verify_custody_key`
+
+```python
+def verify_custody_key(state: BeaconState, reveal: CustodyKeyReveal) -> bool:
+    # Case 1: non-masked non-punitive non-early reveal
+    pubkeys = [state.validator_registry[reveal.revealer_index].pubkey]
+    message_hashes = [hash_tree_root(reveal.period)]
+
+    # Case 2: masked punitive early reveal
+    # Masking prevents proposer stealing the whistleblower reward
+    # Secure under the aggregate extraction infeasibility assumption
+    # See pages 11-12 of https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/aggreg.pdf
+    if reveal.mask != ZERO_HASH:
+        pubkeys.append(state.validator_registry[reveal.masker_index].pubkey)
+        message_hashes.append(reveal.mask)
+
+    return bls_verify_multiple(
+        pubkeys=pubkeys,
+        message_hashes=message_hashes,
+        signature=reveal.key,
+        domain=get_domain(
+            fork=state.fork,
+            epoch=reveal.period * EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD,
+            domain_type=DOMAIN_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEAL,
+        ),
+    )
+```
+
+## Per-block processing
+
+### Transactions
+
+Add the following transactions to the per-block processing, in order the given below and after all other transactions in phase 0.
+
+#### Custody reveals
+
+Verify that `len(block.body.custody_key_reveals) <= MAX_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEALS`.
+
+For each `reveal` in `block.body.custody_key_reveals`, run the following function:
+
+```python
+def process_custody_reveal(state: BeaconState,
+                           reveal: CustodyKeyReveal) -> None:
+    assert verify_custody_key(state, reveal)
+    revealer = state.validator_registry[reveal.revealer_index]
+    current_custody_period = epoch_to_custody_period(get_current_epoch(state))
+
+    # Case 1: non-masked non-punitive non-early reveal
+    if reveal.mask == ZERO_HASH:
+        assert reveal.period == epoch_to_custody_period(revealer.activation_epoch) + revealer.custody_reveal_index
+        # Revealer is active or exited
+        assert is_active_validator(revealer, get_current_epoch(state)) or revealer.exit_epoch > get_current_epoch(state)
+        revealer.custody_reveal_index += 1
+        revealer.max_reveal_lateness = max(revealer.max_reveal_lateness, current_custody_period - reveal.period)
+        proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)
+        increase_balance(state, proposer_index, base_reward(state, index) // MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT)
+
+    # Case 2: masked punitive early reveal
+    else:
+        assert reveal.period > current_custody_period
+        assert revealer.slashed is False
+        slash_validator(state, reveal.revealer_index, reveal.masker_index)
+```
+
+#### Chunk challenges
+
+Verify that `len(block.body.custody_chunk_challenges) <= MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNK_CHALLENGES`.
+
+For each `challenge` in `block.body.custody_chunk_challenges`, run the following function:
+
+```python
+def process_chunk_challenge(state: BeaconState,
+                            challenge: CustodyChunkChallenge) -> None:
+    # Verify the attestation
+    assert verify_standalone_attestation(state, convert_to_standalone(state, challenge.attestation))
+    # Verify it is not too late to challenge
+    assert slot_to_epoch(challenge.attestation.data.slot) >= get_current_epoch(state) - MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY
+    responder = state.validator_registry[challenge.responder_index]
+    assert responder.exit_epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) - MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY
+    # Verify the responder participated in the attestation
+    attesters = get_attestation_participants(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield)
+    assert challenge.responder_index in attesters
+    # Verify the challenge is not a duplicate
+    for record in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records:
+        assert (
+            record.crosslink_data_root != challenge.attestation.data.crosslink_data_root or
+            record.chunk_index != challenge.chunk_index
+        )
+    # Verify depth
+    depth = math.log2(next_power_of_two(get_custody_chunk_count(challenge.attestation)))
+    assert challenge.chunk_index < 2**depth
+    # Add new chunk challenge record
+    state.custody_chunk_challenge_records.append(CustodyChunkChallengeRecord(
+        challenge_index=state.custody_challenge_index,
+        challenger_index=get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot),
+        responder_index=challenge.responder_index
+        deadline=get_current_epoch(state) + CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE,
+        crosslink_data_root=challenge.attestation.data.crosslink_data_root,
+        depth=depth,
+        chunk_index=challenge.chunk_index,
+    ))
+    state.custody_challenge_index += 1
+    # Postpone responder withdrawability
+    responder.withdrawable_epoch = FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH
+```
+
+#### Bit challenges
+
+Verify that `len(block.body.custody_bit_challenges) <= MAX_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGES`.
+
+For each `challenge` in `block.body.custody_bit_challenges`, run the following function:
+
+```python
+def process_bit_challenge(state: BeaconState,
+                          challenge: CustodyBitChallenge) -> None:
+    # Verify challenge signature
+    challenger = state.validator_registry[challenge.challenger_index]
+    assert bls_verify(
+        pubkey=challenger.pubkey,
+        message_hash=signed_root(challenge),
+        signature=challenge.signature,
+        domain=get_domain(state, get_current_epoch(state), DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE),
+    )
+    # Verify the challenger is not slashed
+    assert challenger.slashed is False
+    # Verify the attestation
+    assert verify_standalone_attestation(state, convert_to_standalone(state, challenge.attestation))
+    # Verify the attestation is eligible for challenging
+    responder = state.validator_registry[challenge.responder_index]
+    min_challengeable_epoch = responder.exit_epoch - EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD * (1 + responder.max_reveal_lateness)
+    assert min_challengeable_epoch <= slot_to_epoch(challenge.attestation.data.slot) 
+    # Verify the responder participated in the attestation
+    attesters = get_attestation_participants(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield)
+    assert challenge.responder_index in attesters
+    # A validator can be the challenger or responder for at most one challenge at a time
+    for record in state.custody_bit_challenge_records:
+        assert record.challenger_index != challenge.challenger_index
+        assert record.responder_index != challenge.responder_index
+    # Verify the responder key
+    assert verify_custody_key(state, CustodyKeyReveal(
+        revealer_index=challenge.responder_index,
+        period=epoch_to_custody_period(slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot)),
+        key=challenge.responder_key,
+        masker_index=0,
+        mask=ZERO_HASH,
+    ))
+    # Verify the chunk count
+    chunk_count = get_custody_chunk_count(challenge.attestation)
+    assert verify_bitfield(challenge.chunk_bits, chunk_count)
+    # Verify the xor of the chunk bits does not equal the custody bit
+    chunk_bits_xor = 0b0
+    for i in range(chunk_count):
+        chunk_bits_xor ^ get_bitfield_bit(challenge.chunk_bits, i)
+    custody_bit = get_bitfield_bit(attestation.custody_bitfield, attesters.index(responder_index))
+    assert custody_bit != chunk_bits_xor
+    # Add new bit challenge record
+    state.custody_bit_challenge_records.append(CustodyBitChallengeRecord(
+        challenge_index=state.custody_challenge_index,
+        challenger_index=challenge.challenger_index,
+        responder_index=challenge.responder_index,
+        deadline=get_current_epoch(state) + CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE
+        crosslink_data_root=challenge.attestation.crosslink_data_root,
+        chunk_bits=challenge.chunk_bits,
+        responder_key=challenge.responder_key,
+    ))
+    state.custody_challenge_index += 1
+    # Postpone responder withdrawability
+    responder.withdrawable_epoch = FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH
+```
+
+#### Custody responses
+
+Verify that `len(block.body.custody_responses) <= MAX_CUSTODY_RESPONSES`.
+
+For each `response` in `block.body.custody_responses`, run the following function:
+
+```python
+def process_custody_response(state: BeaconState,
+                             response: CustodyResponse) -> None:
+    chunk_challenge = next(record for record in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records if record.challenge_index == response.challenge_index, None)
+    if chunk_challenge is not None:
+        return process_chunk_challenge_response(state, response, chunk_challenge)
+
+    bit_challenge = next(record for record in state.custody_bit_challenge_records if record.challenge_index == response.challenge_index, None)
+    if bit_challenge is not None:
+        return process_bit_challenge_response(state, response, bit_challenge)
+
+    assert False
+```
+
+```python
+def process_chunk_challenge_response(state: BeaconState,
+                                     response: CustodyResponse,
+                                     challenge: CustodyChunkChallengeRecord) -> None:
+    # Verify chunk index
+    assert response.chunk_index == challenge.chunk_index
+    # Verify the chunk matches the crosslink data root
+    assert verify_merkle_branch(
+        leaf=hash_tree_root(response.chunk),
+        branch=response.branch,
+        depth=challenge.depth,
+        index=response.chunk_index,
+        root=challenge.crosslink_data_root,
+    )
+    # Clear the challenge
+    state.custody_chunk_challenge_records.remove(challenge)
+    # Reward the proposer
+    proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)
+    increase_balance(state, proposer_index, base_reward(state, index) // MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT)
+```
+
+```python
+def process_bit_challenge_response(state: BeaconState,
+                                   response: CustodyResponse,
+                                   challenge: CustodyBitChallengeRecord) -> None:
+    # Verify chunk index
+    assert response.chunk_index < len(challenge.chunk_bits)
+    # Verify the chunk matches the crosslink data root
+    assert verify_merkle_branch(
+        leaf=hash_tree_root(response.chunk),
+        branch=response.branch,
+        depth=math.log2(next_power_of_two(len(challenge.chunk_bits))),
+        index=response.chunk_index,
+        root=challenge.crosslink_data_root,
+    )
+    # Verify the chunk bit does not match the challenge chunk bit
+    assert get_custody_chunk_bit(challenge.responder_key, response.chunk) != get_bitfield_bit(challenge.chunk_bits, response.chunk_index)
+    # Clear the challenge
+    state.custody_bit_challenge_records.remove(challenge)
+    # Slash challenger
+    slash_validator(state, challenge.challenger_index, challenge.responder_index)
+```
+
+## Per-epoch processing
+
+Run `process_challenge_deadlines(state)` immediately after `process_ejections(state)`:
+
+```python
+def process_challenge_deadlines(state: BeaconState) -> None:
+    for challenge in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records:
+        if get_current_epoch(state) > challenge.deadline:
+            slash_validator(state, challenge.responder_index, challenge.challenger_index)
+            state.custody_chunk_challenge_records.remove(challenge)
+
+    for challenge in state.custody_bit_challenge_records:
+        if get_current_epoch(state) > challenge.deadline:
+            slash_validator(state, challenge.responder_index, challenge.challenger_index)
+            state.custody_bit_challenge_records.remove(challenge)
+```
+
+In `process_penalties_and_exits`, change the definition of `eligible` to the following (note that it is not a pure function because `state` is declared in the surrounding scope):
+
+```python
+def eligible(index):
+    validator = state.validator_registry[index]
+    # Cannot exit if there are still open chunk challenges
+    if len([record for record in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records if record.responder_index == index]) > 0:
+        return False
+    # Cannot exit if you have not revealed all of your custody keys
+    elif epoch_to_custody_period(revealer.activation_epoch) + validator.custody_reveal_index <= epoch_to_custody_period(validator.exit_epoch):
+        return False
+    # Cannot exit if you already have
+    elif validator.withdrawable_epoch < FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH:
+        return False
+    # Return minimum time
+    else:
+        return current_epoch >= validator.exit_epoch + MIN_VALIDATOR_WITHDRAWAL_EPOCHS
+```