This is an accompanying document to [Ethereum 2.0 Phase 0 -- The Beacon Chain](./beacon-chain.md), which describes the expected actions of a "validator" participating in the Ethereum 2.0 protocol.
This document represents the expected behavior of an "honest validator" with respect to Phase 0 of the Ethereum 2.0 protocol. This document does not distinguish between a "node" (i.e. the functionality of following and reading the beacon chain) and a "validator client" (i.e. the functionality of actively participating in consensus). The separation of concerns between these (potentially) two pieces of software is left as a design decision that is out of scope.
A validator is an entity that participates in the consensus of the Ethereum 2.0 protocol. This is an optional role for users in which they can post ETH as collateral and verify and attest to the validity of blocks to seek financial returns in exchange for building and securing the protocol. This is similar to proof-of-work networks in which miners provide collateral in the form of hardware/hash-power to seek returns in exchange for building and securing the protocol.
All terminology, constants, functions, and protocol mechanics defined in the [Phase 0 -- The Beacon Chain](./beacon-chain.md) and [Phase 0 -- Deposit Contract](./deposit-contract.md) doc are requisite for this document and used throughout. Please see the Phase 0 doc before continuing and use as a reference throughout.
Validator public keys are [G1 points](beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures) on the [BLS12-381 curve](https://z.cash/blog/new-snark-curve). A private key, `privkey`, must be securely generated along with the resultant `pubkey`. This `privkey` must be "hot", that is, constantly available to sign data throughout the lifetime of the validator.
In Phase 0, all incoming validator deposits originate from the Ethereum 1.0 chain defined by `DEPOSIT_CHAIN_ID` and `DEPOSIT_NETWORK_ID`. Deposits are made to the [deposit contract](./deposit-contract.md) located at `DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS`.
- Let `signature` be the result of `bls.Sign` of the `compute_signing_root(deposit_message, domain)` with `domain=compute_domain(DOMAIN_DEPOSIT)`. (_Warning_: Deposits _must_ be signed with `GENESIS_FORK_VERSION`, calling `compute_domain` without a second argument defaults to the correct version).
- Send a transaction on the Ethereum 1.0 chain to `DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` executing `def deposit(pubkey: bytes[48], withdrawal_credentials: bytes[32], signature: bytes[96], deposit_data_root: bytes32)` along with a deposit of `amount` Gwei.
*Note*: Deposits made for the same `pubkey` are treated as for the same validator. A singular `Validator` will be added to `state.validators` with each additional deposit amount added to the validator's balance. A validator can only be activated when total deposits for the validator pubkey meet or exceed `MAX_EFFECTIVE_BALANCE`.
Deposits cannot be processed into the beacon chain until the Eth1 block in which they were deposited or any of its descendants is added to the beacon chain `state.eth1_data`. This takes _a minimum_ of `ETH1_FOLLOW_DISTANCE` Eth1 blocks (~8 hours) plus `EPOCHS_PER_ETH1_VOTING_PERIOD` epochs (~6.8 hours). Once the requisite Eth1 data is added, the deposit will normally be added to a beacon chain block and processed into the `state.validators` within an epoch or two. The validator is then in a queue to be activated.
Once a validator has been processed and added to the beacon state's `validators`, the validator's `validator_index` is defined by the index into the registry at which the [`ValidatorRecord`](./beacon-chain.md#validator) contains the `pubkey` specified in the validator's deposit. A validator's `validator_index` is guaranteed to not change from the time of initial deposit until the validator exits and fully withdraws. This `validator_index` is used throughout the specification to dictate validator roles and responsibilities at any point and should be stored locally.
In normal operation, the validator is quickly activated, at which point the validator is added to the shuffling and begins validation after an additional `MAX_SEED_LOOKAHEAD` epochs (25.6 minutes).
The function [`is_active_validator`](./beacon-chain.md#is_active_validator) can be used to check if a validator is active during a given epoch. Usage is as follows:
*Note*: There is a maximum validator churn per finalized epoch, so the delay until activation is variable depending upon finality, total active validator balance, and the number of validators in the queue to be activated.
A validator can get committee assignments for a given epoch using the following helper via `get_committee_assignment(state, epoch, validator_index)` where `epoch <= next_epoch`.
A validator can use the following function to see if they are supposed to propose during a slot. This function can only be run with a `state` of the slot in question. Proposer selection is only stable within the context of the current epoch.
*Note*: To see if a validator is assigned to propose during the slot, the beacon state must be in the epoch in question. At the epoch boundaries, the validator must run an epoch transition into the epoch to successfully check the proposal assignment of the first slot.
* Calculate the committees per slot for the next epoch: `committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(state, next_epoch)`
* Calculate the subnet index: `subnet_id = compute_subnet_for_attestation(committees_per_slot, slot, committee_index)`
* Find peers of the pubsub topic `beacon_attestation_{subnet_id}`.
* If an _insufficient_ number of current peers are subscribed to the topic, the validator must discover new peers on this topic. Via the discovery protocol, find peers with an ENR containing the `attnets` entry such that `ENR["attnets"][subnet_id] == True`. Then validate that the peers are still persisted on the desired topic by requesting `GetMetaData` and checking the resulting `attnets` field.
*Note*: If the validator is _not_ assigned to be an aggregator, the validator only needs sufficient number of peers on the topic to be able to publish messages. The validator does not need to _subscribe_ and listen to all messages on the topic.
A validator has two primary responsibilities to the beacon chain: [proposing blocks](#block-proposal) and [creating attestations](#attestations-1). Proposals happen infrequently, whereas attestations should be created once per epoch.
Set `block.slot = slot` where `slot` is the current slot at which the validator has been selected to propose. The `parent` selected must satisfy that `parent.slot < block.slot`.
*Note*: There might be "skipped" slots between the `parent` and `block`. These skipped slots are processed in the state transition function without per-block processing.
Set `block.proposer_index = validator_index` where `validator_index` is the validator chosen to propose at this slot. The private key mapping to `state.validators[validator_index].pubkey` is used to sign the block.
Up to `MAX_PROPOSER_SLASHINGS`, [`ProposerSlashing`](./beacon-chain.md#proposerslashing) objects can be included in the `block`. The proposer slashings must satisfy the verification conditions found in [proposer slashings processing](./beacon-chain.md#proposer-slashings). The validator receives a small "whistleblower" reward for each proposer slashing found and included.
Up to `MAX_ATTESTER_SLASHINGS`, [`AttesterSlashing`](./beacon-chain.md#attesterslashing) objects can be included in the `block`. The attester slashings must satisfy the verification conditions found in [attester slashings processing](./beacon-chain.md#attester-slashings). The validator receives a small "whistleblower" reward for each attester slashing found and included.
Up to `MAX_ATTESTATIONS`, aggregate attestations can be included in the `block`. The attestations added must satisfy the verification conditions found in [attestation processing](./beacon-chain.md#attestations). To maximize profit, the validator should attempt to gather aggregate attestations that include singular attestations from the largest number of validators whose signatures from the same epoch have not previously been added on chain.
If there are any unprocessed deposits for the existing `state.eth1_data` (i.e. `state.eth1_data.deposit_count > state.eth1_deposit_index`), then pending deposits _must_ be added to the block. The expected number of deposits is exactly `min(MAX_DEPOSITS, eth1_data.deposit_count - state.eth1_deposit_index)`. These [`deposits`](./beacon-chain.md#deposit) are constructed from the `Deposit` logs from the [Eth1 deposit contract](./deposit-contract.md) and must be processed in sequential order. The deposits included in the `block` must satisfy the verification conditions found in [deposits processing](./beacon-chain.md#deposits).
The `proof` for each deposit must be constructed against the deposit root contained in `state.eth1_data` rather than the deposit root at the time the deposit was initially logged from the 1.0 chain. This entails storing a full deposit merkle tree locally and computing updated proofs against the `eth1_data.deposit_root` as needed. See [`minimal_merkle.py`](https://github.com/ethereum/research/blob/master/spec_pythonizer/utils/merkle_minimal.py) for a sample implementation.
Up to `MAX_VOLUNTARY_EXITS`, [`VoluntaryExit`](./beacon-chain.md#voluntaryexit) objects can be included in the `block`. The exits must satisfy the verification conditions found in [exits processing](./beacon-chain.md#voluntary-exits).
Set `block.state_root = hash_tree_root(state)` of the resulting `state` of the `parent -> block` state transition.
*Note*: To calculate `state_root`, the validator should first run the state transition function on an unsigned `block` containing a stub for the `state_root`.
It is useful to be able to run a state transition function (working on a copy of the state) that does _not_ validate signatures or state root for this purpose:
A validator is expected to create, sign, and broadcast an attestation during each epoch. The `committee`, assigned `index`, and assigned `slot` for which the validator performs this role during an epoch are defined by `get_committee_assignment(state, epoch, validator_index)`.
A validator should create and broadcast the `attestation` to the associated attestation subnet when either (a) the validator has received a valid block from the expected block proposer for the assigned `slot` or (b) one-third of the `slot` has transpired (`SECONDS_PER_SLOT / 3` seconds after the start of `slot`) -- whichever comes _first_.
*Note*: Although attestations during `GENESIS_EPOCH` do not count toward FFG finality, these initial attestations do give weight to the fork choice, are rewarded, and should be made.
First, the validator should construct `attestation_data`, an [`AttestationData`](./beacon-chain.md#attestationdata) object based upon the state at the assigned slot.
- Set `attestation_data.source = head_state.current_justified_checkpoint`.
- Set `attestation_data.target = Checkpoint(epoch=get_current_epoch(head_state), root=epoch_boundary_block_root)` where `epoch_boundary_block_root` is the root of block at the most recent epoch boundary.
Set `attestation.data = attestation_data` where `attestation_data` is the `AttestationData` object defined in the previous section, [attestation data](#attestation-data).
- Let `attestation.aggregation_bits` be a `Bitlist[MAX_VALIDATORS_PER_COMMITTEE]` of length `len(committee)`, where the bit of the index of the validator in the `committee` is set to `0b1`.
*Note*: Calling `get_attesting_indices(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits)` should return a list of length equal to 1, containing `validator_index`.
Some validators are selected to locally aggregate attestations with a similar `attestation_data` to their constructed `attestation` for the assigned `slot`.
Collect `attestations` seen via gossip during the `slot` that have an equivalent `attestation_data` to that constructed by the validator. If `len(attestations) > 0`, create an `aggregate_attestation: Attestation` with the following fields.
Set `aggregate_attestation.data = attestation_data` where `attestation_data` is the `AttestationData` object that is the same for each individual attestation being aggregated.
Let `aggregate_attestation.aggregation_bits` be a `Bitlist[MAX_VALIDATORS_PER_COMMITTEE]` of length `len(committee)`, where each bit set from each individual attestation is set to `0b1`.
If the validator is selected to aggregate (`is_aggregator`), then they broadcast their best aggregate as a `SignedAggregateAndProof` to the global aggregate channel (`beacon_aggregate_and_proof`) two-thirds of the way through the `slot`-that is, `SECONDS_PER_SLOT * 2 / 3` seconds after the start of `slot`.
`AggregateAndProof` messages are signed by the aggregator and broadcast inside of `SignedAggregateAndProof` objects to prevent a class of DoS attacks and message forgeries.
Then `signed_aggregate_and_proof = SignedAggregateAndProof(message=aggregate_and_proof, signature=signature)` is constructed and broadast. Where `signature` is obtained from:
Because Phase 0 does not have shards and thus does not have Shard Committees, there is no stable backbone to the attestation subnets (`beacon_attestation_{subnet_id}`). To provide this stability, each validator must:
* Maintain advertisement of the randomly selected subnets in their node's ENR `attnets` entry by setting the randomly selected `subnet_id` bits to `True` (e.g. `ENR["attnets"][subnet_id] = True`) for all persistent attestation subnets
* Set the lifetime of each random subscription to a random number of epochs between `EPOCHS_PER_RANDOM_SUBNET_SUBSCRIPTION` and `2 * EPOCHS_PER_RANDOM_SUBNET_SUBSCRIPTION]`. At the end of life for a subscription, select a new random subnet, update subnet subscriptions, and publish an updated ENR
*Note*: When preparing for a hard fork, a validator must select and subscribe to random subnets of the future fork versioning at least `EPOCHS_PER_RANDOM_SUBNET_SUBSCRIPTION` epochs in advance of the fork. These new subnets for the fork are maintained in addition to those for the current fork until the fork occurs. After the fork occurs, let the subnets from the previous fork reach the end of life with no replacements.
"Slashing" is the burning of some amount of validator funds and immediate ejection from the active validator set. In Phase 0, there are two ways in which funds can be slashed: [proposer slashing](#proposer-slashing) and [attester slashing](#attester-slashing). Although being slashed has serious repercussions, it is simple enough to avoid being slashed all together by remaining _consistent_ with respect to the messages a validator has previously signed.
*Note*: Signed data must be within a sequential `Fork` context to conflict. Messages cannot be slashed across diverging forks. If the previous fork version is 1 and the chain splits into fork 2 and 102, messages from 1 can slashable against messages in forks 1, 2, and 102. Messages in 2 cannot be slashable against messages in 102, and vice versa.
To avoid "proposer slashings", a validator must not sign two conflicting [`BeaconBlock`](./beacon-chain.md#beaconblock) where conflicting is defined as two distinct blocks within the same slot.
If the software crashes at some point within this routine, then when the validator comes back online, the hard disk has the record of the *potentially* signed/broadcast block and can effectively avoid slashing.
To avoid "attester slashings", a validator must not sign two conflicting [`AttestationData`](./beacon-chain.md#attestationdata) objects, i.e. two attestations that satisfy [`is_slashable_attestation_data`](./beacon-chain.md#is_slashable_attestation_data).
1. Save a record to hard disk that an attestation has been signed for source (i.e. `attestation_data.source.epoch`) and target (i.e. `attestation_data.target.epoch`).
If the software crashes at some point within this routine, then when the validator comes back online, the hard disk has the record of the *potentially* signed/broadcast attestation and can effectively avoid slashing.
A validator client should be considered standalone and should consider the beacon node as untrusted. This means that the validator client should protect:
1) Private keys -- private keys should be protected from being exported accidentally or by an attacker.
2) Slashing -- before a validator client signs a message it should validate the data, check it against a local slashing database (do not sign a slashable attestation or block) and update its internal slashing database with the newly signed object.
3) Recovered validator -- Recovering a validator from a private key will result in an empty local slashing db. Best practice is to import (from a trusted source) that validator's attestation history. See [EIP 3076](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/3076/files) for a standard slashing interchange format.
4) Far future signing requests -- A validator client can be requested to sign a far into the future attestation, resulting in a valid non-slashable request. If the validator client signs this message, it will result in it blocking itself from attesting any other attestation until the beacon-chain reaches that far into the future epoch. This will result in an inactivity penalty and potential ejection due to low balance.
A validator client should prevent itself from signing such requests by: a) keeping a local time clock if possible and following best practices to stop time server attacks and b) refusing to sign, by default, any message that has a large (>6h) gap from the current slashing protection database indicated a time "jump" or a long offline event. The administrator can manually override this protection to restart the validator after a genuine long offline event.
