eth2.0-specs/test_libs/pyspec/eth2spec/test/helpers/custody.py

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from eth2spec.test.helpers.keys import privkeys
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from eth2spec.utils.bls import bls_sign, bls_aggregate_signatures
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from eth2spec.utils.hash_function import hash
from eth2spec.utils.ssz.ssz_typing import Bitlist, BytesN, Bitvector
from eth2spec.utils.ssz.ssz_impl import chunkify, pack, hash_tree_root
from eth2spec.utils.merkle_minimal import get_merkle_tree, get_merkle_proof
BYTES_PER_CHUNK = 32
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def get_valid_early_derived_secret_reveal(spec, state, epoch=None):
current_epoch = spec.get_current_epoch(state)
revealed_index = spec.get_active_validator_indices(state, current_epoch)[-1]
masker_index = spec.get_active_validator_indices(state, current_epoch)[0]
if epoch is None:
epoch = current_epoch + spec.CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING
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# Generate the secret that is being revealed
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reveal = bls_sign(
message_hash=hash_tree_root(spec.Epoch(epoch)),
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privkey=privkeys[revealed_index],
domain=spec.get_domain(
state=state,
domain_type=spec.DOMAIN_RANDAO,
message_epoch=epoch,
),
)
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# Generate the mask (any random 32 bytes that don't reveal the masker's secret will do)
mask = hash(reveal)
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# Generate masker's signature on the mask
masker_signature = bls_sign(
message_hash=mask,
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privkey=privkeys[masker_index],
domain=spec.get_domain(
state=state,
domain_type=spec.DOMAIN_RANDAO,
message_epoch=epoch,
),
)
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masked_reveal = bls_aggregate_signatures([reveal, masker_signature])
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return spec.EarlyDerivedSecretReveal(
revealed_index=revealed_index,
epoch=epoch,
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reveal=masked_reveal,
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masker_index=masker_index,
mask=mask,
)
def get_valid_custody_key_reveal(spec, state, period=None):
current_epoch = spec.get_current_epoch(state)
revealer_index = spec.get_active_validator_indices(state, current_epoch)[0]
revealer = state.validators[revealer_index]
if period is None:
period = revealer.next_custody_secret_to_reveal
epoch_to_sign = spec.get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period(period, revealer_index)
# Generate the secret that is being revealed
reveal = bls_sign(
message_hash=hash_tree_root(spec.Epoch(epoch_to_sign)),
privkey=privkeys[revealer_index],
domain=spec.get_domain(
state=state,
domain_type=spec.DOMAIN_RANDAO,
message_epoch=epoch_to_sign,
),
)
return spec.CustodyKeyReveal(
revealer_index=revealer_index,
reveal=reveal,
)
def bitlist_from_int(max_len, num_bits, n):
return Bitlist[max_len](*[(n >> i) & 0b1 for i in range(num_bits)])
def get_valid_bit_challenge(spec, state, attestation, invalid_custody_bit=False):
beacon_committee = spec.get_beacon_committee(
state,
attestation.data.slot,
attestation.data.crosslink.shard,
)
responder_index = beacon_committee[0]
challenger_index = beacon_committee[-1]
epoch = spec.get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period(attestation.data.target.epoch,
responder_index)
# Generate the responder key
responder_key = bls_sign(
message_hash=hash_tree_root(spec.Epoch(epoch)),
privkey=privkeys[responder_index],
domain=spec.get_domain(
state=state,
domain_type=spec.DOMAIN_RANDAO,
message_epoch=epoch,
),
)
chunk_count = spec.get_custody_chunk_count(attestation.data.crosslink)
chunk_bits = bitlist_from_int(spec.MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS, chunk_count, 0)
n = 0
while spec.get_chunk_bits_root(chunk_bits) == attestation.custody_bits[0] ^ invalid_custody_bit:
chunk_bits = bitlist_from_int(spec.MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS, chunk_count, n)
n += 1
return spec.CustodyBitChallenge(
responder_index=responder_index,
attestation=attestation,
challenger_index=challenger_index,
responder_key=responder_key,
chunk_bits=chunk_bits,
)
def custody_chunkify(spec, x):
chunks = [bytes(x[i:i + spec.BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK]) for i in range(0, len(x), spec.BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK)]
chunks[-1] = chunks[-1].ljust(spec.BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK, b"\0")
return chunks
def get_valid_custody_response(spec, state, bit_challenge, custody_data, challenge_index, invalid_chunk_bit=False):
chunks = custody_chunkify(spec, custody_data)
chunk_index = len(chunks) - 1
chunk_bit = spec.get_custody_chunk_bit(bit_challenge.responder_key, chunks[chunk_index])
while chunk_bit == bit_challenge.chunk_bits[chunk_index] ^ invalid_chunk_bit:
chunk_index -= 1
chunk_bit = spec.get_custody_chunk_bit(bit_challenge.responder_key, chunks[chunk_index])
chunks_hash_tree_roots = [hash_tree_root(BytesN[spec.BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK](chunk)) for chunk in chunks]
chunks_hash_tree_roots += [
hash_tree_root(BytesN[spec.BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK](b"\0" * spec.BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK))
for i in range(2 ** spec.ceillog2(len(chunks)) - len(chunks))]
data_tree = get_merkle_tree(chunks_hash_tree_roots)
data_branch = get_merkle_proof(data_tree, chunk_index)
bitlist_chunk_index = chunk_index // BYTES_PER_CHUNK
bitlist_chunks = chunkify(pack(bit_challenge.chunk_bits))
bitlist_tree = get_merkle_tree(bitlist_chunks, pad_to=spec.MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS // 256)
bitlist_chunk_branch = get_merkle_proof(bitlist_tree, chunk_index // 256) + \
[len(bit_challenge.chunk_bits).to_bytes(32, "little")]
bitlist_chunk_index = chunk_index // 256
chunk_bits_leaf = Bitvector[256](bit_challenge.chunk_bits[bitlist_chunk_index * 256:
(bitlist_chunk_index + 1) * 256])
return spec.CustodyResponse(
challenge_index=challenge_index,
chunk_index=chunk_index,
chunk=BytesN[spec.BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK](chunks[chunk_index]),
data_branch=data_branch,
chunk_bits_branch=bitlist_chunk_branch,
chunk_bits_leaf=chunk_bits_leaf,
)
def get_custody_test_vector(bytelength):
ints = bytelength // 4
return b"".join(i.to_bytes(4, "little") for i in range(ints))
def get_custody_merkle_root(data):
return get_merkle_tree(chunkify(data))[-1][0]