mirror of https://github.com/status-im/consul.git
168 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
168 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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layout: "docs"
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page_title: "ACL System"
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sidebar_current: "docs-internals-acl"
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description: |-
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Consul provides an optional Access Control List (ACL) system which can be used to control access to data and APIs. The ACL system is a Capability-based system that relies on tokens which can have fine grained rules applied to them. It is very similar to AWS IAM in many ways.
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---
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# ACL System
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Consul provides an optional Access Control List (ACL) system which can be used to control
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access to data and APIs. The ACL system is a
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[Capability-based system](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security) that relies
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on tokens to which fine grained rules can be applied. It is very similar to
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[AWS IAM](http://aws.amazon.com/iam/) in many ways.
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## ACL Design
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The ACL system is designed to be easy to use, fast to enforce, flexible to new
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policies, all while providing administrative insight. It has been modeled on
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the AWS IAM system, as well as the more general object-capability model. The system
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is modeled around "tokens".
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Every token has an ID, name, type and rule set. The ID is a randomly generated
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UUID, making it unfeasible to guess. The name is opaque and human readable.
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The type is either "client" meaning it cannot modify ACL rules, and is restricted
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by the provided rules, or is "management" and is allowed to perform all actions.
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The token ID is passed along with each RPC request to the servers. Agents
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[can be configured](/docs/agent/options.html) with `acl_token` to provide a default token,
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but the token can also be specified by a client on a [per-request basis](/docs/agent/http.html).
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ACLs are new as of Consul 0.4, meaning prior versions do not provide a token.
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This is handled by the special "anonymous" token. Anytime there is no token provided,
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the rules defined by that token are automatically applied. This allows
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policy to be enforced on legacy clients.
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Enforcement is always done by the server nodes. All servers must be [configured
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to provide](/docs/agent/options.html) an `acl_datacenter`, which enables
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ACL enforcement but also specifies the authoritative datacenter. Consul does not
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replicate data cross-WAN, and instead relies on [RPC forwarding](/docs/internal/architecture.html)
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to support Multi-Datacenter configurations. However, because requests can be
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made across datacenter boundaries, ACL tokens must be valid globally. To avoid
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replication issues, a single datacenter is considered authoritative and stores
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all the tokens.
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When a request is made to any non-authoritative server with a token, it must
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be resolved into the appropriate policy. This is done by reading the token
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from the authoritative server and caching a configurable `acl_ttl`. The implication
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of caching is that the cache TTL is an upper bound on the staleness of policy
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that is enforced. It is possible to set a zero TTL, but this has adverse
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performance impacts, as every request requires refreshing the policy.
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Another possible issue is an outage of the `acl_datacenter` or networking
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issues preventing access. In this case, it may be impossible for non-authoritative
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servers to resolve tokens. Consul provides a number of configurable `acl_down_policy`
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choices to tune behavior. It is possible to deny or permit all actions, or to ignore
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cache TTLs and enter a fail-safe mode.
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ACLs can also act in either a whitelist or blacklist mode depending
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on the configuration of `acl_default_policy`. If the default policy is
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to deny all actions, then token rules can be set to allow or whitelist
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actions. In the inverse, the allow all default behavior is a blacklist,
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where rules are used to prohibit actions.
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### Blacklist mode and `consul exec`
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If you set `acl_default_policy` to `deny`, the `anonymous` token won't have the
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permission to read the default `_rexec` prefix, and therefore token-less consul
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agents (using the `anonymous` token) won't be able to perform `consul exec`
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actions.
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There is a subtle interaction there. The agents will need permission to
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read/write to the `_rexec` prefix for `consul exec` to work properly. They use
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that as the transport for most data, only the edge trigger uses the event
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system.
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You can do this by allowing the `anonymous` token to access that prefix, or by
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providing tokens to the agents that enable it. The former can be done by giving
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this rule to the `anonymous` token:
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```javascript
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key "_rexec/" {
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policy = "write"
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}
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```
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### Bootstrapping ACLs
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Bootstrapping the ACL system is done by providing an initial `acl_master_token`
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[configuration](/docs/agent/options.html), which will be created as a
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"management" type token if it does not exist.
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## Rule Specification
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A core part of the ACL system is a rule language which is used
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to describe the policy that must be enforced. We make use of
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the [HashiCorp Configuration Language (HCL)](https://github.com/hashicorp/hcl/)
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to specify policy. This language is human readable and interoperable
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with JSON making it easy to machine generate.
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As of Consul 0.4, it is only possible to specify policies for the
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KV store. Specification in the HCL format looks like:
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```javascript
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# Default all keys to read-only
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key "" {
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policy = "read"
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}
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key "foo/" {
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policy = "write"
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}
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key "foo/private/" {
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# Deny access to the private dir
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policy = "deny"
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}
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# Default all services to allowing registration
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service "" {
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policy = "write"
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}
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service "secure" {
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# Deny registration access to secure service
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policy = "read"
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}
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```
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This is equivalent to the following JSON input:
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```javascript
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{
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"key": {
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"": {
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"policy": "read"
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},
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"foo/": {
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"policy": "write"
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},
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"foo/private": {
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"policy": "deny"
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}
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},
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"service": {
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"": {
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"policy": "write"
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},
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"secure": {
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"policy": "read"
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}
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}
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}
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```
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Key policies provide both a prefix and a policy. The rules are enforced
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using a longest-prefix match policy. This means we pick the most specific
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policy possible. The policy is either "read", "write" or "deny". A "write"
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policy implies "read", and there is no way to specify write-only. If there
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is no applicable rule, the `acl_default_policy` is applied.
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Services policies provide both a service name and a policy. The rules are
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enforced using an exact match policy. The default rule is provided using
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the empty string. The policy is either "read", "write", or "deny". A "write"
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policy implies "read", and there is no way to specify write-only. If there
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is no applicable rule, the `acl_default_policy` is applied. Currently, only
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the "write" level is enforced for registration of services. The policy for
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the "consul" service is always "write" as it is managed internally.
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