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https://github.com/logos-storage/logos-storage-research.git
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168 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
168 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Dagger
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theme: solarized
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revealOptions:
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controls: false
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progress: false
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transition: 'fade'
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---
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# Dagger
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Decentralized Storage
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Note:
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Briefly describe what Dagger is.
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---
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## Why Dagger?
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Note:
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Decentralized storage is a fundamentally unsolved problem.
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P2P storage hasn't taken off, why?
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Without reliable storage, dapps won't take off.
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Needs same guarantees as cloud storage, and then some.
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---
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## Reliability
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predictable
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accessible
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Note:
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Reliability is the property that is most lacking in p2p storage networks.
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Predictable storage duration.
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Storage is always accessible to you.
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---
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## Tweak the protocol?
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Note:
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Why is reliability missing in existing networks?
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Is there something we can tweak in the protocol?
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Bittorrent and IPFS became specialized networks around popular data.
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Blockchains require block data to run the blockchain.
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For generic storage, we can't tweak the storage protocol, we need incentives.
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---
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## Incentives
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storage
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bandwidth
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Note:
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Free market to handle resource allocation
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Incentives have multiple purposes
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Incentives compensate for resources
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Incentives provide security; it makes economic sense to stick to the rules
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Storage incentives provide storage reliability
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Bandwidth incentives provide retrievability (dynamic CDN)
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Bandwidth incentives prevent denial of service, spamming
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Incentives encourage participation in the network
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---
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## Proofs
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data possession
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retrievability
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Note:
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How do we achieve reliability?
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Proof of data possession over time
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Proof of retrievability (interactive)
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Prevents data withholding (ransomware), we do not have legal recourse like cloud services
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---
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proof of data possession
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Note:
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Proof of storage.
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File is divided into chunks.
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Over time, proofs of different randomly selected chunks are requested
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---
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proof of data possession
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Note:
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We improve on this scheme by making sampling events dependent on each other.
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This increases the odds of detecting missing chunks over time.
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---
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proof of retrievability
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 <!-- .element: width="70%"-->
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Note:
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Prevents data withholding (ransomware)
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The prover does not know when it's being verified
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---
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## global cloud storage market
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`$` 61 billion in 2020
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`$` 390 billion in 2028
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Note:
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source: https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/cloud-storage-market-102773/s
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---
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## Privacy & Anonymity
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Note:
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Dagger layer: identities used for incentives and payments are pseudonymous.
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Libp2p layer: peer identity is pseudonymous.
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IP layer: depending on the need, there are several solutions to choose from
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---
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## Network Overview
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---
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## Software Stack
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---
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## Research agenda
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- proofs for large data sets
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- formal/emperical evidence
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- consensus engine
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Note:
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Small proofs, constant size, aggregatable, computationally light
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Zero knowledge proofs
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Formal proofs/emperical evidence that our algorithms have the desired properties
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Model the network to observe emergent properties
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How does the storage network interact with a consensus engine
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