mirror of https://github.com/logos-co/roadmap.git
3.3 KiB
3.3 KiB
| title | tags | date | lastmod | draft | description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023-09-11 Nomos weekly |
|
2023-09-11 | 2023-09-27 | false | 2023-09-11 Weekly update of Nomos |
nomos:
network privacy and mixnet:
research:
- Revised mathematical methods, such as the Poisson point process, etc., used in analysis of mixnets.
- Explored literature related to mixnets where approaches from differential privacy are used. The latter could lead to a more general privacy guarantee which is relevant to not only current but also future attacks on privacy.
development:
- Fixed a bug in the connection pool implementation https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/373
- Fixed Cargo.toml for nomos-network https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/380
- Added defaults to libp2p settings https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/388
- Fixed request handling in mixnode: https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/372
- Added benchmark code (in localhost): https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/375
- After trying to find existing solutions to routing strategies (routing first, privacy later), and not finding a proper solution, moved to thinking about a naive approach: https://www.notion.so/WIP-Proposal-Routing-7b034dcac64940eda25ee415806d0ec8
- Found using sync Mutex will lead to a block. https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/370
- Finish implementing the first version of retry for mixnode and mixclient https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/386
testnet:
development:
- Node config via environment variables: https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/382
- Observability and node configuration in testnet work in progress: https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/364 (Same draft PR as last week WIP).
- Resolving more GH Actions related issues:
private PoS:
research:
- Found an issue in vote propagation of the PPoS construction: When a vote is propagated upstream to the higher committee there is a chance that a malicious shadow in committee decides not to broadcast their vote to the committee members and send it only upstream. Then this "unseen" vote will block the possibility of reconstructing the most common committee_vote, and at the same time prove that other shadows have voted. The solution for that is to propagate a map of seen votes upstream alongside the vote, this enables the higher committee to select only the votes that are most commonly seen for building the committee_vote thus making that kind of malicious behavior detectable.
- Improving the PPoS description: working on selecting proper naming conventions, as currently there are voters, shadows, coins which are confusing. That is done in pair with revising the logic.
data availability:
research:
- A draft for private DA can be found here: https://www.notion.so/Data-Availability-Specification-c3961b681eba4ccdab2be9181e4207b4?d=d4e8d1bcd6224682ba74737100106e48#0c70202794214cbab626e51f7f1f7c24
development:
- Blobs in block: https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/368
- DA service architecture: https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/376
- Da service backend implementation: https://github.com/logos-co/nomos-node/pull/381