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e4d3d3a0f7
The a/d estimator credits the adversary only with the sender own links, which
understates it: to rule out that X was forwarding it need not hold X incoming
link, only have seen the message anywhere upstream. That gives
confidence = 1 / (1 + (1-f_adv)^L)
for L upstream hops, with the local model as the L=1 case.
L is not free -- the graph fixes it. A forwarder sits about halfway along a route
and the peer graph is low-diameter: mean hop distance 5.15 at degree 8, so L ~ 2.6.
Confidence rises from 0.56 to 0.64 at f_adv = 0.2, but 0.9 would need ~10 upstream
hops. The low diameter that makes propagation fast is exactly what starves the
adversary of observation points.
So the bracket closes near the local model rather than near certainty, and the
binary full_deanon treatment is NOT rescued by neighbourhood effects. Both ends
are reported rather than one being chosen, since confident attribution is a
threshold question: an adversary content with 0.64 attributes most senders, one
demanding 0.9 attributes almost none.
What remains unmodelled is an adversary combining this structural evidence with
the timing evidence of 3.11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
175 lines
8.8 KiB
Python
175 lines
8.8 KiB
Python
"""Deanonymization metrics: exact closed forms + a Monte-Carlo tie to the actual draw.
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A *deanonymization* event is a round whose whole blend path is adversarial; *full* deanonymization
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additionally requires the honest sender to be directly peered with an adversary. Relays are drawn
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uniformly blind to who is adversarial, so both rates are exact (no sampling in production)."""
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import numpy as np
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from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, deanon_metrics, place_adversary
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from blend.config import SimConfig
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from blend.engine import run_graph_cell
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from blend.graph import build_graph
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def test_deanon_rate_hand_computed():
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# n=4, 2 adversaries, honest sender leaves 3 nodes (2 adversarial) in the relay pool;
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# k=2 distinct relays both adversarial: C(2,2)/C(3,2) = 1/3.
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dz = deanon_metrics(n=4, n_adv=2, observed_frac=0.5, blend_hops=2)
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assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - 1.0 / 3.0) < 1e-12
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assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - (1.0 / 3.0) * 0.5) < 1e-12
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def test_deanon_rate_zero_when_too_few_adversaries():
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assert deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=1, observed_frac=0.9, blend_hops=2)["deanon_rate"] == 0.0
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assert deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=0, observed_frac=0.0, blend_hops=1)["deanon_rate"] == 0.0
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# too few adversaries -> no full deanonymization either
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too_few = deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=1, observed_frac=0.9, blend_hops=2)
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assert too_few["full_deanon_rate"] == 0.0
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def test_full_deanon_is_deanon_times_observed():
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dz = deanon_metrics(n=5000, n_adv=1000, observed_frac=0.73, blend_hops=3)
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assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - dz["deanon_rate"] * 0.73) < 1e-12
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assert dz["full_deanon_rate"] <= dz["deanon_rate"] + 1e-12
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def test_deanon_rate_is_placement_independent_but_full_is_not():
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"""The whole-path-adversarial rate depends only on the adversary COUNT; the full rate also
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tracks how many honest nodes are peered with an adversary, which the worst case maximizes."""
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g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=2000, degree=6, graph_seed=0))
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rng = np.random.default_rng(0)
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rand = adversary_metrics(g, place_adversary(g, 0.2, "random", rng, 10**9))
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wc = adversary_metrics(g, place_adversary(g, 0.2, "worstcase_coverage", rng, 10**9))
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assert rand["n_adv"] == wc["n_adv"] # same budget
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dz_rand = deanon_metrics(g.n, rand["n_adv"], rand["observed_frac"], 3)
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dz_wc = deanon_metrics(g.n, wc["n_adv"], wc["observed_frac"], 3)
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assert abs(dz_rand["deanon_rate"] - dz_wc["deanon_rate"]) < 1e-12 # placement-independent
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assert dz_wc["full_deanon_rate"] >= dz_rand["full_deanon_rate"] - 1e-12 # worst case >= random
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def test_deanon_asymptotic_fadv_power():
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# C(A,k)/C(n-1,k) -> f_adv^k for large n.
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f, k, n = 0.3, 3, 20000
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dz = deanon_metrics(n=n, n_adv=int(round(f * n)), observed_frac=0.5, blend_hops=k)
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assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - f ** k) < 0.002
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def test_deanon_matches_direct_sampling():
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"""Closed form == empirical rate of the exact honest-sender/blind-relay draw the sim uses."""
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f, k = 0.33, 2
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cfg = SimConfig(n_nodes=1500, degree=8, graph_seed=3, f_adv=f, blend_hops=k)
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g = build_graph(cfg)
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mask = place_adversary(g, f, "random", np.random.default_rng(1), cfg.worstcase_max_n)
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adv = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
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dz = deanon_metrics(g.n, adv["n_adv"], adv["observed_frac"], k)
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counts = np.add.reduceat(mask[g.indices].astype(np.int32), g.indptr[:-1])
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observed_node = counts >= 1
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honest = np.where(~mask)[0]
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n = g.n
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rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
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trials, d_hit, fd_hit = 40_000, 0, 0
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for _ in range(trials):
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s = int(rng.choice(honest))
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r = rng.choice(n - 1, size=k, replace=False)
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r[r >= s] += 1
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if mask[r].all():
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d_hit += 1
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fd_hit += int(observed_node[s])
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assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - d_hit / trials) < max(0.006, 0.1 * dz["deanon_rate"])
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assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - fd_hit / trials) < max(0.006, 0.12 * dz["full_deanon_rate"])
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def test_engine_emits_deanon_rows():
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base = SimConfig(n_nodes=1000, degree=8, graph_seed=0, n_placements=2)
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prop_grid = [(2, 0), (3, 0)] # distinct blend_hops = {2, 3}
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adv_grid = [(0.2, "random"), (0.0, "random")]
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prop_rows, adv_rows, deanon_rows, _ = run_graph_cell(base, prop_grid, [0.0], [1], adv_grid)
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# one deanon row per (placement, distinct blend_hops, redundancy)
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assert len(deanon_rows) == len(adv_rows) * 2
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cols = {"n_nodes", "degree", "blend_hops", "redundancy", "f_adv", "adversary_mode",
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"graph_seed", "placement_rep", "n_adv", "n_honest", "observed_frac",
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"deanon_rate", "full_deanon_rate"}
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assert cols <= set(deanon_rows[0])
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assert {row["blend_hops"] for row in deanon_rows} == {2, 3}
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for row in deanon_rows:
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assert 0.0 <= row["full_deanon_rate"] <= row["deanon_rate"] + 1e-12
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if row["f_adv"] == 0.0:
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assert row["deanon_rate"] == 0.0 # no adversary -> no deanonymization
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# --- attribution confidence -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_attribution_confidence_endpoints_and_monotonicity():
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"""d/(2d-a): the 0.5 prior with no watched links, certainty when every link is watched."""
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from blend.adversary import attribution_confidence
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d = 8
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assert abs(float(attribution_confidence(0, d)) - 0.5) < 1e-12
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assert abs(float(attribution_confidence(d, d)) - 1.0) < 1e-12
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vals = [float(attribution_confidence(a, d)) for a in range(d + 1)]
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assert all(b > a for a, b in zip(vals, vals[1:], strict=False))
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assert abs(vals[1] - 1 / (2 - 1 / 8)) < 1e-12 # one peer buys only ~0.53
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def test_confidence_does_not_depend_on_the_number_of_relays():
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"""The conditioning event fixes the relays as adversarial, so an honest sender is not one of
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them; the path length cannot enter the estimator."""
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import inspect
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from blend.adversary import attribution_confidence
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src = inspect.getsource(attribution_confidence)
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assert "blend_hops" not in src and "hops" not in src.split('"""')[2]
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def test_high_confidence_attribution_equals_the_eclipse_condition():
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"""At degree 8, 90% confidence needs a >= 8 -- every peer adversarial. So the confidence-
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weighted attribution collapses onto eclipse, not onto observed."""
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from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, attribution_metrics, place_adversary
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g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=0))
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for f in (0.33, 0.5):
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mask = place_adversary(g, f, "random", np.random.default_rng(0), 10**9)
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am = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
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at = attribution_metrics(g, mask)
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assert abs(at["attributable_frac_90"] - am["eclipsed_frac"]) < 1e-12
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assert abs(at["attributable_frac_50"] - am["observed_frac"]) < 1e-12 # >=1 peer clears 0.5
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def test_confident_attribution_is_far_rarer_than_observation():
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"""The correction that matters: observed_frac massively overstates confident attribution."""
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from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, attribution_metrics, place_adversary
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g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=1))
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mask = place_adversary(g, 0.2, "random", np.random.default_rng(1), 10**9)
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am = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
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at = attribution_metrics(g, mask)
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assert am["observed_frac"] > 0.8
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assert at["attributable_frac_90"] < 1e-4
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assert at["attribution_conf_mean"] < 0.6 # one or two peers buys very little
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def test_neighbourhood_confidence_reduces_to_the_local_model_at_one_hop():
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from blend.adversary import neighbourhood_confidence
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for f in (0.1, 0.2, 0.33):
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assert abs(neighbourhood_confidence(f, 1.0) - 1.0 / (1.0 + (1 - f))) < 1e-12
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def test_confidence_rises_with_route_length_but_needs_an_unrealistic_one_for_certainty():
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"""Seeing the message anywhere upstream rules out forwarding, so a longer route helps the
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adversary -- but reaching 0.9 needs ~10 upstream hops at f_adv=0.2, and a low-diameter peer
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graph offers about 2.6."""
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from blend.adversary import neighbourhood_confidence
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vals = [neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, L) for L in (1, 2, 5, 10, 20)]
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assert all(b > a for a, b in zip(vals, vals[1:], strict=False))
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assert neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, 2.6) < 0.7 # realistic route: still not confident
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assert neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, 10) > 0.9 # needs ~4x the real route length
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def test_measured_route_length_leaves_attribution_uncertain():
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"""The bracket closes near the local model, not near certainty."""
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from blend.adversary import mean_upstream_hops, neighbourhood_confidence
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g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=0))
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L = mean_upstream_hops(g, np.random.default_rng(0), samples=12)
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assert 1.5 < L < 4.0 # low-diameter graph, short routes
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assert 0.55 < neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, L) < 0.75
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