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The a/d estimator credits the adversary only with the sender own links, which
understates it: to rule out that X was forwarding it need not hold X incoming
link, only have seen the message anywhere upstream. That gives
confidence = 1 / (1 + (1-f_adv)^L)
for L upstream hops, with the local model as the L=1 case.
L is not free -- the graph fixes it. A forwarder sits about halfway along a route
and the peer graph is low-diameter: mean hop distance 5.15 at degree 8, so L ~ 2.6.
Confidence rises from 0.56 to 0.64 at f_adv = 0.2, but 0.9 would need ~10 upstream
hops. The low diameter that makes propagation fast is exactly what starves the
adversary of observation points.
So the bracket closes near the local model rather than near certainty, and the
binary full_deanon treatment is NOT rescued by neighbourhood effects. Both ends
are reported rather than one being chosen, since confident attribution is a
threshold question: an adversary content with 0.64 attributes most senders, one
demanding 0.9 attributes almost none.
What remains unmodelled is an adversary combining this structural evidence with
the timing evidence of 3.11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>