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"""Deanonymization metrics: exact closed forms + a Monte-Carlo tie to the actual draw.
A *deanonymization* event is a round whose whole blend path is adversarial; *full* deanonymization
additionally requires the honest sender to be directly peered with an adversary. Relays are drawn
uniformly blind to who is adversarial, so both rates are exact (no sampling in production)."""
import numpy as np
from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, deanon_metrics, place_adversary
from blend.config import SimConfig
from blend.engine import run_graph_cell
from blend.graph import build_graph
def test_deanon_rate_hand_computed():
# n=4, 2 adversaries, honest sender leaves 3 nodes (2 adversarial) in the relay pool;
# k=2 distinct relays both adversarial: C(2,2)/C(3,2) = 1/3.
dz = deanon_metrics(n=4, n_adv=2, observed_frac=0.5, blend_hops=2)
assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - 1.0 / 3.0) < 1e-12
assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - (1.0 / 3.0) * 0.5) < 1e-12
def test_deanon_rate_zero_when_too_few_adversaries():
assert deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=1, observed_frac=0.9, blend_hops=2)["deanon_rate"] == 0.0
assert deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=0, observed_frac=0.0, blend_hops=1)["deanon_rate"] == 0.0
# too few adversaries -> no full deanonymization either
too_few = deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=1, observed_frac=0.9, blend_hops=2)
assert too_few["full_deanon_rate"] == 0.0
def test_full_deanon_is_deanon_times_observed():
dz = deanon_metrics(n=5000, n_adv=1000, observed_frac=0.73, blend_hops=3)
assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - dz["deanon_rate"] * 0.73) < 1e-12
assert dz["full_deanon_rate"] <= dz["deanon_rate"] + 1e-12
def test_deanon_rate_is_placement_independent_but_full_is_not():
"""The whole-path-adversarial rate depends only on the adversary COUNT; the full rate also
tracks how many honest nodes are peered with an adversary, which the worst case maximizes."""
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=2000, degree=6, graph_seed=0))
rng = np.random.default_rng(0)
rand = adversary_metrics(g, place_adversary(g, 0.2, "random", rng, 10**9))
wc = adversary_metrics(g, place_adversary(g, 0.2, "worstcase_coverage", rng, 10**9))
assert rand["n_adv"] == wc["n_adv"] # same budget
dz_rand = deanon_metrics(g.n, rand["n_adv"], rand["observed_frac"], 3)
dz_wc = deanon_metrics(g.n, wc["n_adv"], wc["observed_frac"], 3)
assert abs(dz_rand["deanon_rate"] - dz_wc["deanon_rate"]) < 1e-12 # placement-independent
assert dz_wc["full_deanon_rate"] >= dz_rand["full_deanon_rate"] - 1e-12 # worst case >= random
def test_deanon_asymptotic_fadv_power():
# C(A,k)/C(n-1,k) -> f_adv^k for large n.
f, k, n = 0.3, 3, 20000
dz = deanon_metrics(n=n, n_adv=int(round(f * n)), observed_frac=0.5, blend_hops=k)
assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - f ** k) < 0.002
def test_deanon_matches_direct_sampling():
"""Closed form == empirical rate of the exact honest-sender/blind-relay draw the sim uses."""
f, k = 0.33, 2
cfg = SimConfig(n_nodes=1500, degree=8, graph_seed=3, f_adv=f, blend_hops=k)
g = build_graph(cfg)
mask = place_adversary(g, f, "random", np.random.default_rng(1), cfg.worstcase_max_n)
adv = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
dz = deanon_metrics(g.n, adv["n_adv"], adv["observed_frac"], k)
counts = np.add.reduceat(mask[g.indices].astype(np.int32), g.indptr[:-1])
observed_node = counts >= 1
honest = np.where(~mask)[0]
n = g.n
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
trials, d_hit, fd_hit = 40_000, 0, 0
for _ in range(trials):
s = int(rng.choice(honest))
r = rng.choice(n - 1, size=k, replace=False)
r[r >= s] += 1
if mask[r].all():
d_hit += 1
fd_hit += int(observed_node[s])
assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - d_hit / trials) < max(0.006, 0.1 * dz["deanon_rate"])
assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - fd_hit / trials) < max(0.006, 0.12 * dz["full_deanon_rate"])
def test_engine_emits_deanon_rows():
base = SimConfig(n_nodes=1000, degree=8, graph_seed=0, n_placements=2)
prop_grid = [(2, 0), (3, 0)] # distinct blend_hops = {2, 3}
adv_grid = [(0.2, "random"), (0.0, "random")]
prop_rows, adv_rows, deanon_rows, _ = run_graph_cell(base, prop_grid, [0.0], [1], adv_grid)
Add linkability, messaging redundancy and churn percolation to pd; report Extends the pd Blend simulator along two axes the deanonymization model opened up, adds the reports/blend/pd report of record, and fixes three correctness defects found while reviewing the result. Linkability over time (pd.linkability): - time to link an emitter ~ 30s*ln(1/(1-alpha))/(stake*q): inversely proportional to stake, so a 5% staker is linked in ~2 days and a 0.001% staker only after ~27 years; - time to certify a node's stake >= theta from the count of attributable observations (relative precision ~1/sqrt(N)): sizing a node costs 100-400x more than identifying it, and sub-0.1% stake is practically unlearnable. Both are closed forms over the exact deanonymization rates and a stake-proportional 30 s emission cadence, checked against a Monte-Carlo of the emission process in verify. Messaging redundancy (R independent cascades per emission, R = 1..4): - `redundancy` knob threaded through config/rng/propagation/engine/metrics/ sweep; a node receives from whichever cascade reaches it first, so arrival times combine element-wise. Delivery and capture both follow 1-(1-x)^R, so redundancy trades reliability against anonymity and divides time-to-link by ~R. Measured: delivery 0.34 -> 0.81 at 30% churn for R = 1 -> 4, while a 1%-staker's time to link falls 10 d -> 2.5 d. - Redundancy buys NO coverage: a cascade only delivers if the sender could already route to its relay, so every delivered cascade floods the sender's own component. Coverage is flat in R to four decimals at every degree. - Near the percolation threshold the cascades fail together rather than independently, so redundancy under-delivers against 1-(1-p1)^R there. Churn percolation (configs/percolation.yaml, verify check 7): - the flood only crosses responsive nodes, so it lives on the responsive sub-graph -- site percolation on a d-regular graph. A network survives churn only up to u_c = 1 - 1/(degree-1); measured collapse lands on the predicted threshold for every degree (3 -> 0.50, 6 -> 0.80, 16 -> 0.93), which inverts into the sizing rule degree > 1 + 1/(1-u). Correctness fixes: - redundancy delay used the fastest cascade's own full delay, which over-states it (min-max vs max-min); now the element-wise earliest arrival, reducing exactly to the single-cascade model at R = 1 (test); - the "redundancy improves coverage" claim was false in both the report and the simulator README -- removed and replaced with the measured result; - per-hop latency is degree-dependent (1.5 s at degree 16 to 2.7 s at degree 3), not a flat 1.6 s; and the worst-case observation figure was averaged over degrees -- at degree 8 and f_adv = 0.2 it is 0.83 -> 1.000. Statistics: round counts raised for resolution rather than speed -- 8000 rounds per cell in the main sweep, 9600 in the redundancy study, 6400 in the percolation study, giving SEM <= 0.009 on every delivery rate and <= 0.04 s on every delay mean. The previous redundancy grid (144 rounds/cell) produced a non-monotonic delivery curve; it is now monotonic and within 0.015 of theory. Adversary and deanonymization metrics remain closed-form and exact. reports/blend/pd: the report of record -- peering-degree trade-offs across speed, observation, eclipse, deanonymization and reliability, plus the time-to-link, stake-inference, redundancy and churn-threshold sections, with 21 figures of record and an explicit sampling-error statement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 22:37:22 +02:00
# one deanon row per (placement, distinct blend_hops, redundancy)
assert len(deanon_rows) == len(adv_rows) * 2
Add linkability, messaging redundancy and churn percolation to pd; report Extends the pd Blend simulator along two axes the deanonymization model opened up, adds the reports/blend/pd report of record, and fixes three correctness defects found while reviewing the result. Linkability over time (pd.linkability): - time to link an emitter ~ 30s*ln(1/(1-alpha))/(stake*q): inversely proportional to stake, so a 5% staker is linked in ~2 days and a 0.001% staker only after ~27 years; - time to certify a node's stake >= theta from the count of attributable observations (relative precision ~1/sqrt(N)): sizing a node costs 100-400x more than identifying it, and sub-0.1% stake is practically unlearnable. Both are closed forms over the exact deanonymization rates and a stake-proportional 30 s emission cadence, checked against a Monte-Carlo of the emission process in verify. Messaging redundancy (R independent cascades per emission, R = 1..4): - `redundancy` knob threaded through config/rng/propagation/engine/metrics/ sweep; a node receives from whichever cascade reaches it first, so arrival times combine element-wise. Delivery and capture both follow 1-(1-x)^R, so redundancy trades reliability against anonymity and divides time-to-link by ~R. Measured: delivery 0.34 -> 0.81 at 30% churn for R = 1 -> 4, while a 1%-staker's time to link falls 10 d -> 2.5 d. - Redundancy buys NO coverage: a cascade only delivers if the sender could already route to its relay, so every delivered cascade floods the sender's own component. Coverage is flat in R to four decimals at every degree. - Near the percolation threshold the cascades fail together rather than independently, so redundancy under-delivers against 1-(1-p1)^R there. Churn percolation (configs/percolation.yaml, verify check 7): - the flood only crosses responsive nodes, so it lives on the responsive sub-graph -- site percolation on a d-regular graph. A network survives churn only up to u_c = 1 - 1/(degree-1); measured collapse lands on the predicted threshold for every degree (3 -> 0.50, 6 -> 0.80, 16 -> 0.93), which inverts into the sizing rule degree > 1 + 1/(1-u). Correctness fixes: - redundancy delay used the fastest cascade's own full delay, which over-states it (min-max vs max-min); now the element-wise earliest arrival, reducing exactly to the single-cascade model at R = 1 (test); - the "redundancy improves coverage" claim was false in both the report and the simulator README -- removed and replaced with the measured result; - per-hop latency is degree-dependent (1.5 s at degree 16 to 2.7 s at degree 3), not a flat 1.6 s; and the worst-case observation figure was averaged over degrees -- at degree 8 and f_adv = 0.2 it is 0.83 -> 1.000. Statistics: round counts raised for resolution rather than speed -- 8000 rounds per cell in the main sweep, 9600 in the redundancy study, 6400 in the percolation study, giving SEM <= 0.009 on every delivery rate and <= 0.04 s on every delay mean. The previous redundancy grid (144 rounds/cell) produced a non-monotonic delivery curve; it is now monotonic and within 0.015 of theory. Adversary and deanonymization metrics remain closed-form and exact. reports/blend/pd: the report of record -- peering-degree trade-offs across speed, observation, eclipse, deanonymization and reliability, plus the time-to-link, stake-inference, redundancy and churn-threshold sections, with 21 figures of record and an explicit sampling-error statement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 22:37:22 +02:00
cols = {"n_nodes", "degree", "blend_hops", "redundancy", "f_adv", "adversary_mode",
"graph_seed", "placement_rep", "n_adv", "n_honest", "observed_frac",
"deanon_rate", "full_deanon_rate"}
assert cols <= set(deanon_rows[0])
assert {row["blend_hops"] for row in deanon_rows} == {2, 3}
for row in deanon_rows:
assert 0.0 <= row["full_deanon_rate"] <= row["deanon_rate"] + 1e-12
if row["f_adv"] == 0.0:
assert row["deanon_rate"] == 0.0 # no adversary -> no deanonymization
# --- attribution confidence -----------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_attribution_confidence_endpoints_and_monotonicity():
"""d/(2d-a): the 0.5 prior with no watched links, certainty when every link is watched."""
from blend.adversary import attribution_confidence
d = 8
assert abs(float(attribution_confidence(0, d)) - 0.5) < 1e-12
assert abs(float(attribution_confidence(d, d)) - 1.0) < 1e-12
vals = [float(attribution_confidence(a, d)) for a in range(d + 1)]
assert all(b > a for a, b in zip(vals, vals[1:], strict=False))
assert abs(vals[1] - 1 / (2 - 1 / 8)) < 1e-12 # one peer buys only ~0.53
def test_confidence_does_not_depend_on_the_number_of_relays():
"""The conditioning event fixes the relays as adversarial, so an honest sender is not one of
them; the path length cannot enter the estimator."""
import inspect
from blend.adversary import attribution_confidence
src = inspect.getsource(attribution_confidence)
assert "blend_hops" not in src and "hops" not in src.split('"""')[2]
def test_high_confidence_attribution_equals_the_eclipse_condition():
"""At degree 8, 90% confidence needs a >= 8 -- every peer adversarial. So the confidence-
weighted attribution collapses onto eclipse, not onto observed."""
from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, attribution_metrics, place_adversary
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=0))
for f in (0.33, 0.5):
mask = place_adversary(g, f, "random", np.random.default_rng(0), 10**9)
am = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
at = attribution_metrics(g, mask)
assert abs(at["attributable_frac_90"] - am["eclipsed_frac"]) < 1e-12
assert abs(at["attributable_frac_50"] - am["observed_frac"]) < 1e-12 # >=1 peer clears 0.5
def test_confident_attribution_is_far_rarer_than_observation():
"""The correction that matters: observed_frac massively overstates confident attribution."""
from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, attribution_metrics, place_adversary
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=1))
mask = place_adversary(g, 0.2, "random", np.random.default_rng(1), 10**9)
am = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
at = attribution_metrics(g, mask)
assert am["observed_frac"] > 0.8
assert at["attributable_frac_90"] < 1e-4
assert at["attribution_conf_mean"] < 0.6 # one or two peers buys very little
def test_neighbourhood_confidence_reduces_to_the_local_model_at_one_hop():
from blend.adversary import neighbourhood_confidence
for f in (0.1, 0.2, 0.33):
assert abs(neighbourhood_confidence(f, 1.0) - 1.0 / (1.0 + (1 - f))) < 1e-12
def test_confidence_rises_with_route_length_but_needs_an_unrealistic_one_for_certainty():
"""Seeing the message anywhere upstream rules out forwarding, so a longer route helps the
adversary -- but reaching 0.9 needs ~10 upstream hops at f_adv=0.2, and a low-diameter peer
graph offers about 2.6."""
from blend.adversary import neighbourhood_confidence
vals = [neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, L) for L in (1, 2, 5, 10, 20)]
assert all(b > a for a, b in zip(vals, vals[1:], strict=False))
assert neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, 2.6) < 0.7 # realistic route: still not confident
assert neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, 10) > 0.9 # needs ~4x the real route length
def test_measured_route_length_leaves_attribution_uncertain():
"""The bracket closes near the local model, not near certainty."""
from blend.adversary import mean_upstream_hops, neighbourhood_confidence
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=0))
L = mean_upstream_hops(g, np.random.default_rng(0), samples=12)
assert 1.5 < L < 4.0 # low-diameter graph, short routes
assert 0.55 < neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, L) < 0.75