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perf(lez)!: borrow account data in the guests instead of cloning

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BREAKING CHANGE: six guest image ids move.
This commit is contained in:
moudyellaz
2026-08-16 23:41:00 +02:00
parent c3a40b299f
commit 073c9baa2d
8 changed files with 23 additions and 25 deletions
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lez/programs/bridge_lock/src/main.rs
+3 -3
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ fn lock(
config_account_id(self_program_id),
"first account must be the bridge-lock config PDA"
);
let (outbox_program_id, pinned_target) = read_config(&config.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let (outbox_program_id, pinned_target) = read_config(&config.account.data)
.expect("config account holds an outbox and a mint target");
// Value conservation: the forwarded payload must mint exactly what is locked.
@@ -221,8 +221,8 @@ fn init_config(
"bridge-lock config PDA is owned by another program"
);
assert_eq!(
config.account.data.clone().into_inner(),
config_bytes(outbox_program_id, target_program_id).to_vec(),
*config.account.data,
config_bytes(outbox_program_id, target_program_id),
"bridge-lock config already pins a different outbox or mint target"
);
}
lez/programs/clock/src/main.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ fn main() {
panic!("Clock accounts must be owned by the clock program");
}
let prev_data = ClockAccountData::from_bytes(&pre_01.account.data.clone().into_inner());
let prev_data = ClockAccountData::from_bytes(&pre_01.account.data);
let current_block_id = prev_data
.block_id
.checked_add(1)
lez/programs/cross_zone_inbox/src/main.rs
+3 -5
View File
@@ -102,15 +102,13 @@ fn dispatch(
"Third account must be the source marker PDA for this message"
);
let cfg = InboxConfig::from_bytes(&config.account.data.clone().into_inner())
.expect("inbox config decodes");
let cfg = InboxConfig::from_bytes(&config.account.data).expect("inbox config decodes");
assert!(
msg.src_zone != cfg.self_zone,
"Source zone must not be this zone"
);
let mut shard =
SeenShard::from_bytes(&seen.account.data.clone().into_inner()).expect("seen shard decodes");
let mut shard = SeenShard::from_bytes(&seen.account.data).expect("seen shard decodes");
// One block id, one delivering block. The address binds the zone and block
// id but not which block claimed them, so an equivocating peer's two blocks
@@ -209,7 +207,7 @@ fn init_config(
"inbox config PDA is owned by another program"
);
assert_eq!(
config_meta.account.data.clone().into_inner(),
*config_meta.account.data,
config.to_bytes(),
"inbox config already initialized differently"
);
lez/programs/ping_receiver/src/main.rs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ fn record(
receiver_config_account_id(self_program_id),
"second account must be the receiver config PDA"
);
let cfg = ReceiverConfig::from_bytes(&config.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let cfg = ReceiverConfig::from_bytes(&config.account.data)
.expect("config account holds a receiver config");
assert_eq!(
caller_program_id,
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ fn renounce_authority(
receiver_config_account_id(self_program_id),
"first account must be the receiver config PDA"
);
let mut cfg = ReceiverConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let mut cfg = ReceiverConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data)
.expect("config account holds a receiver config");
// Top-level, or the governance program the config names; see
// `ReceiverConfig::governance` for why the escape hatch exists.
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ fn update_sources(
receiver_config_account_id(self_program_id),
"first account must be the receiver config PDA"
);
let mut cfg = ReceiverConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let mut cfg = ReceiverConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data)
.expect("config account holds a receiver config");
// Top-level, or the governance program the config names; see
// `ReceiverConfig::governance` for why the escape hatch exists.
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ fn init_config(
"receiver config PDA is owned by another program"
);
assert_eq!(
config.account.data.clone().into_inner(),
*config.account.data,
config_value.to_bytes(),
"receiver config already initialized differently"
);
lez/programs/ping_sender/src/main.rs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ fn send(
sender_config_account_id(self_program_id),
"first account must be the ping-sender config PDA"
);
let outbox_program_id = read_outbox(&config.account.data.clone().into_inner())
.expect("config account holds an outbox program id");
let outbox_program_id =
read_outbox(&config.account.data).expect("config account holds an outbox program id");
let call = ChainedCall::new(
outbox_program_id,
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ fn init_config(
"ping-sender config PDA is owned by another program"
);
assert_eq!(
config.account.data.clone().into_inner(),
outbox_bytes(outbox_program_id).to_vec(),
*config.account.data,
outbox_bytes(outbox_program_id),
"ping-sender config already pins a different outbox"
);
}
lez/programs/wrapped_token/src/main.rs
+5 -5
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ fn mint(
config_account_id(self_program_id),
"second account must be the wrapped-token config PDA"
);
let cfg = WrappedTokenConfig::from_bytes(&config.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let cfg = WrappedTokenConfig::from_bytes(&config.account.data)
.expect("config account holds a wrapped-token config");
assert_eq!(
caller_program_id,
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ fn mint(
"mint amount exceeds the per-mint cap"
);
// The backstop against accumulation, which the per-mint cap does not bound.
let new_balance = read_balance(&holding.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let new_balance = read_balance(&holding.account.data)
.checked_add(amount)
.expect("wrapped-token balance overflow");
let mut holding_account = holding.account.clone();
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ fn renounce_authority(
config_account_id(self_program_id),
"first account must be the wrapped-token config PDA"
);
let mut cfg = WrappedTokenConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let mut cfg = WrappedTokenConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data)
.expect("config account holds a wrapped-token config");
// Top-level, or the governance program the config names; see
// `WrappedTokenConfig::governance` for why the escape hatch exists.
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ fn update_sources(
config_account_id(self_program_id),
"first account must be the wrapped-token config PDA"
);
let mut cfg = WrappedTokenConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data.clone().into_inner())
let mut cfg = WrappedTokenConfig::from_bytes(&config_meta.account.data)
.expect("config account holds a wrapped-token config");
// Top-level, or the governance program the config names; see
// `WrappedTokenConfig::governance` for why the escape hatch exists.
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ fn init_config(
"wrapped-token config PDA is owned by another program"
);
assert_eq!(
config.account.data.clone().into_inner(),
*config.account.data,
config_value.to_bytes(),
"wrapped-token config already initialized differently"
);
test_programs/guest/src/bin/pinata_cooldown.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ fn main() {
// Check the clock account is the system clock account
assert_eq!(clock_pre.account_id, CLOCK_01_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID);
let clock_data = ClockAccountData::from_bytes(&clock_pre.account.data.clone().into_inner());
let clock_data = ClockAccountData::from_bytes(&clock_pre.account.data);
let current_timestamp = clock_data.timestamp;
let pinata_state = PinataState::from_bytes(&pinata.account.data.clone().into_inner());
let pinata_state = PinataState::from_bytes(&pinata.account.data);
// Enforce cooldown: the elapsed time since the last claim must exceed the cooldown period.
let elapsed = current_timestamp.saturating_sub(pinata_state.last_claim_timestamp);
test_programs/guest/src/bin/time_locked_transfer.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ fn main() {
assert_eq!(clock_pre.account_id, CLOCK_01_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID);
// Read the current timestamp from the clock account.
let clock_data = ClockAccountData::from_bytes(&clock_pre.account.data.clone().into_inner());
let clock_data = ClockAccountData::from_bytes(&clock_pre.account.data);
assert!(
clock_data.timestamp >= deadline,