# Waku Noise Protocols for Waku Payload Encryption # Noise utilities module ## See spec for more details: ## https://github.com/vacp2p/rfc/tree/master/content/docs/rfcs/35 {.push raises: [Defect].} import std/[oids, options, strutils, tables, sequtils] import chronos import chronicles import bearssl/rand import stew/[results, endians2, byteutils] import nimcrypto/[utils, sha2, hmac] import libp2p/errors import libp2p/crypto/[chacha20poly1305, curve25519] import ./noise_types import ./noise logScope: topics = "wakunoise" ################################################################# ################################# # Generic Utilities ################################# # Generates random byte sequences of given size proc randomSeqByte*(rng: var HmacDrbgContext, size: int): seq[byte] = var output = newSeq[byte](size.uint32) hmacDrbgGenerate(rng, output) return output # Pads a payload according to PKCS#7 as per RFC 5652 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5652#section-6.3 proc pkcs7_pad*(payload: seq[byte], paddingSize: int): seq[byte] = assert(paddingSize<256) let k = paddingSize - (payload.len mod paddingSize) var padding: seq[byte] if k != 0: padding = newSeqWith(k, k.byte) else: padding = newSeqWith(paddingSize, paddingSize.byte) let padded = concat(payload, padding) return padded # Unpads a payload according to PKCS#7 as per RFC 5652 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5652#section-6.3 proc pkcs7_unpad*(payload: seq[byte], paddingSize: int): seq[byte] = let k = payload[payload.high] let unpadded = payload[0..payload.high-k.int] return unpadded # Simple utility that checks if the given variable is "default", # Therefore, it has not been initialized proc isDefault*[T](value: T): bool = value == static(default(T)) ################################################################# ################################# # Noise Handhshake Utilities ################################# # Generate random (public, private) Elliptic Curve key pairs proc genKeyPair*(rng: var HmacDrbgContext): KeyPair = var keyPair: KeyPair keyPair.privateKey = EllipticCurveKey.random(rng) keyPair.publicKey = keyPair.privateKey.public() return keyPair # Gets private key from a key pair proc getPrivateKey*(keypair: KeyPair): EllipticCurveKey = return keypair.privateKey # Gets public key from a key pair proc getPublicKey*(keypair: KeyPair): EllipticCurveKey = return keypair.publicKey # Prints Handshake Patterns using Noise pattern layout proc print*(self: HandshakePattern) {.raises: [IOError, NoiseMalformedHandshake].}= try: if self.name != "": stdout.write self.name, ":\n" stdout.flushFile() # We iterate over pre message patterns, if any if self.preMessagePatterns != EmptyPreMessage: for pattern in self.preMessagePatterns: stdout.write " ", pattern.direction var first = true for token in pattern.tokens: if first: stdout.write " ", token first = false else: stdout.write ", ", token stdout.write "\n" stdout.flushFile() stdout.write " ...\n" stdout.flushFile() # We iterate over message patterns for pattern in self.messagePatterns: stdout.write " ", pattern.direction var first = true for token in pattern.tokens: if first: stdout.write " ", token first = false else: stdout.write ", ", token stdout.write "\n" stdout.flushFile() except: raise newException(NoiseMalformedHandshake, "HandshakePattern malformed") # Hashes a Noise protocol name using SHA256 proc hashProtocol*(protocolName: string): MDigest[256] = # The output hash value var hash: MDigest[256] # From Noise specification: Section 5.2 # http://www.noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#the-symmetricstate-object # If protocol_name is less than or equal to HASHLEN bytes in length, # sets h equal to protocol_name with zero bytes appended to make HASHLEN bytes. # Otherwise sets h = HASH(protocol_name). if protocolName.len <= 32: hash.data[0..protocolName.high] = protocolName.toBytes else: hash = sha256.digest(protocolName) return hash # Performs a Diffie-Hellman operation between two elliptic curve keys (one private, one public) proc dh*(private: EllipticCurveKey, public: EllipticCurveKey): EllipticCurveKey = # The output result of the Diffie-Hellman operation var output: EllipticCurveKey # Since the EC multiplication writes the result to the input, we copy the input to the output variable output = public # We execute the DH operation EllipticCurve.mul(output, private) return output ################################################################# ################################# # ChaChaPoly Cipher utilities ################################# # Generates a random ChaChaPolyKey for testing encryption/decryption proc randomChaChaPolyKey*(rng: var HmacDrbgContext): ChaChaPolyKey = var key: ChaChaPolyKey hmacDrbgGenerate(rng, key) return key # Generates a random ChaChaPoly Cipher State for testing encryption/decryption proc randomChaChaPolyCipherState*(rng: var HmacDrbgContext): ChaChaPolyCipherState = var randomCipherState: ChaChaPolyCipherState randomCipherState.k = randomChaChaPolyKey(rng) hmacDrbgGenerate(rng, randomCipherState.nonce) randomCipherState.ad = newSeq[byte](32) hmacDrbgGenerate(rng, randomCipherState.ad) return randomCipherState ################################################################# ################################# # Noise Public keys utilities ################################# # Checks equality between two Noise public keys proc `==`*(k1, k2: NoisePublicKey): bool = return (k1.flag == k2.flag) and (k1.pk == k2.pk) # Converts a public Elliptic Curve key to an unencrypted Noise public key proc toNoisePublicKey*(publicKey: EllipticCurveKey): NoisePublicKey = var noisePublicKey: NoisePublicKey noisePublicKey.flag = 0 noisePublicKey.pk = getBytes(publicKey) return noisePublicKey # Generates a random Noise public key proc genNoisePublicKey*(rng: var HmacDrbgContext): NoisePublicKey = var noisePublicKey: NoisePublicKey # We generate a random key pair let keyPair: KeyPair = genKeyPair(rng) # Since it is unencrypted, flag is 0 noisePublicKey.flag = 0 # We copy the public X coordinate of the key pair to the output Noise public key noisePublicKey.pk = getBytes(keyPair.publicKey) return noisePublicKey # Converts a Noise public key to a stream of bytes as in # https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/35/#public-keys-serialization proc serializeNoisePublicKey*(noisePublicKey: NoisePublicKey): seq[byte] = var serializedNoisePublicKey: seq[byte] # Public key is serialized as (flag || pk) # Note that pk contains the X coordinate of the public key if unencrypted # or the encryption concatenated with the authorization tag if encrypted serializedNoisePublicKey.add noisePublicKey.flag serializedNoisePublicKey.add noisePublicKey.pk return serializedNoisePublicKey # Converts a serialized Noise public key to a NoisePublicKey object as in # https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/35/#public-keys-serialization proc intoNoisePublicKey*(serializedNoisePublicKey: seq[byte]): NoisePublicKey {.raises: [Defect, NoisePublicKeyError].} = var noisePublicKey: NoisePublicKey # We retrieve the encryption flag noisePublicKey.flag = serializedNoisePublicKey[0] # If not 0 or 1 we raise a new exception if not (noisePublicKey.flag == 0 or noisePublicKey.flag == 1): raise newException(NoisePublicKeyError, "Invalid flag in serialized public key") # We set the remaining sequence to the pk value (this may be an encrypted or not encrypted X coordinate) noisePublicKey.pk = serializedNoisePublicKey[1.. uint8.high.int: debug "PayloadV2 malformed: too many public keys contained in the handshake message" return err("Too many public keys in handshake message") # We get the transport message byte length let transportMessageLen = self.transportMessage.len # The output payload as in https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/35/. We concatenate all the PayloadV2 fields as # payload = ( protocolId || serializedHandshakeMessageLen || serializedHandshakeMessage || transportMessageLen || transportMessage) # We declare it as a byte sequence of length accordingly to the PayloadV2 information read var payload = newSeqOfCap[byte](1 + # 1 byte for protocol ID 1 + # 1 byte for length of serializedHandshakeMessage field serializedHandshakeMessageLen + # serializedHandshakeMessageLen bytes for serializedHandshakeMessage 8 + # 8 bytes for transportMessageLen transportMessageLen # transportMessageLen bytes for transportMessage ) # We concatenate all the data # The protocol ID (1 byte) and handshake message length (1 byte) can be directly casted to byte to allow direct copy to the payload byte sequence payload.add self.protocolId.byte payload.add serializedHandshakeMessageLen.byte payload.add serializedHandshakeMessage # The transport message length is converted from uint64 to bytes in Little-Endian payload.add toBytesLE(transportMessageLen.uint64) payload.add self.transportMessage return ok(payload) # Deserializes a byte sequence to a PayloadV2 object according to https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/35/. # The input serialized payload concatenates the output PayloadV2 object fields as # payload = ( protocolId || serializedHandshakeMessageLen || serializedHandshakeMessage || transportMessageLen || transportMessage) proc deserializePayloadV2*(payload: seq[byte]): Result[PayloadV2, cstring] {.raises: [Defect, NoisePublicKeyError].} = # The output PayloadV2 var payload2: PayloadV2 # i is the read input buffer position index var i: uint64 = 0 # We start reading the Protocol ID # TODO: when the list of supported protocol ID is defined, check if read protocol ID is supported payload2.protocolId = payload[i].uint8 i += 1 # We read the Handshake Message lenght (1 byte) var handshakeMessageLen = payload[i].uint64 if handshakeMessageLen > uint8.high.uint64: debug "Payload malformed: too many public keys contained in the handshake message" return err("Too many public keys in handshake message") i += 1 # We now read for handshakeMessageLen bytes the buffer and we deserialize each (encrypted/unencrypted) public key read var # In handshakeMessage we accumulate the read deserialized Noise Public keys handshakeMessage: seq[NoisePublicKey] flag: byte pkLen: uint64 written: uint64 = 0 # We read the buffer until handshakeMessageLen are read while written != handshakeMessageLen: # We obtain the current Noise Public key encryption flag flag = payload[i] # If the key is unencrypted, we only read the X coordinate of the EC public key and we deserialize into a Noise Public Key if flag == 0: pkLen = 1 + EllipticCurveKey.len handshakeMessage.add intoNoisePublicKey(payload[i..