when (NimMajor, NimMinor) < (1, 4): {.push raises: [Defect].} else: {.push raises: [].} import std/[algorithm, sequtils, strutils, tables, times, os, deques], chronicles, options, chronos, chronos/ratelimit, stint, web3, json, web3/ethtypes, eth/keys, libp2p/protocols/pubsub/rpc/messages, libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub, stew/results, stew/[byteutils, arrayops] import ./group_manager, ./rln, ./conversion_utils, ./constants, ./protocol_types, ./protocol_metrics when defined(rln_v2): import ./nonce_manager import ../common/error_handling, ../waku_relay, # for WakuRelayHandler ../waku_core, ../waku_keystore, ../utils/collector logScope: topics = "waku rln_relay" type WakuRlnConfig* = object rlnRelayDynamic*: bool rlnRelayCredIndex*: Option[uint] rlnRelayEthContractAddress*: string rlnRelayEthClientAddress*: string rlnRelayCredPath*: string rlnRelayCredPassword*: string rlnRelayTreePath*: string rlnEpochSizeSec*: uint64 onFatalErrorAction*: OnFatalErrorHandler when defined(rln_v2): rlnRelayUserMessageLimit*: uint64 proc createMembershipList*( rln: ptr RLN, n: int ): RlnRelayResult[(seq[RawMembershipCredentials], string)] = ## createMembershipList produces a sequence of identity credentials in the form of (identity trapdoor, identity nullifier, identity secret hash, id commitment) in the hexadecimal format ## this proc also returns the root of a Merkle tree constructed out of the identity commitment keys of the generated list ## the output of this proc is used to initialize a static group keys (to test waku-rln-relay in the off-chain mode) ## Returns an error if it cannot create the membership list var output = newSeq[RawMembershipCredentials]() var idCommitments = newSeq[IDCommitment]() for i in 0 .. n - 1: # generate an identity credential let idCredentialRes = rln.membershipKeyGen() if idCredentialRes.isErr(): return err("could not generate an identity credential: " & idCredentialRes.error()) let idCredential = idCredentialRes.get() let idTuple = ( idCredential.idTrapdoor.inHex(), idCredential.idNullifier.inHex(), idCredential.idSecretHash.inHex(), idCredential.idCommitment.inHex(), ) output.add(idTuple) idCommitments.add(idCredential.idCommitment) # Insert members into tree let membersAdded = rln.insertMembers(0, idCommitments) if not membersAdded: return err("could not insert members into the tree") let root = rln.getMerkleRoot().value().inHex() return ok((output, root)) type WakuRLNRelay* = ref object of RootObj # the log of nullifiers and Shamir shares of the past messages grouped per epoch nullifierLog*: OrderedTable[Epoch, Table[Nullifier, ProofMetadata]] lastEpoch*: Epoch # the epoch of the last published rln message rlnEpochSizeSec*: uint64 rlnMaxEpochGap*: uint64 groupManager*: GroupManager onFatalErrorAction*: OnFatalErrorHandler when defined(rln_v2): nonceManager*: NonceManager proc calcEpoch*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, t: float64): Epoch = ## gets time `t` as `flaot64` with subseconds resolution in the fractional part ## and returns its corresponding rln `Epoch` value let e = uint64(t / rlnPeer.rlnEpochSizeSec.float64) return toEpoch(e) proc stop*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay) {.async: (raises: [Exception]).} = ## stops the rln-relay protocol ## Throws an error if it cannot stop the rln-relay protocol # stop the group sync, and flush data to tree db info "stopping rln-relay" await rlnPeer.groupManager.stop() proc hasDuplicate*( rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, epoch: Epoch, proofMetadata: ProofMetadata ): RlnRelayResult[bool] = ## returns true if there is another message in the `nullifierLog` of the `rlnPeer` with the same ## epoch and nullifier as `proofMetadata`'s epoch and nullifier ## otherwise, returns false ## Returns an error if it cannot check for duplicates # check if the epoch exists let nullifier = proofMetadata.nullifier if not rlnPeer.nullifierLog.hasKey(epoch): return ok(false) try: if rlnPeer.nullifierLog[epoch].hasKey(nullifier): # there is an identical record, mark it as spam return ok(true) # there is no duplicate return ok(false) except KeyError: return err("the epoch was not found: " & getCurrentExceptionMsg()) proc updateLog*( rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, epoch: Epoch, proofMetadata: ProofMetadata ): RlnRelayResult[void] = ## saves supplied proofMetadata `proofMetadata` ## in the `nullifierLog` of the `rlnPeer` ## Returns an error if it cannot update the log # check if the epoch exists if not rlnPeer.nullifierLog.hasKeyOrPut( epoch, {proofMetadata.nullifier: proofMetadata}.toTable() ): return ok() try: # check if an identical record exists if rlnPeer.nullifierLog[epoch].hasKeyOrPut(proofMetadata.nullifier, proofMetadata): # the above condition could be `discarded` but it is kept for clarity, that slashing will # be implemented here # TODO: slashing logic return ok() return ok() except KeyError: return err("the epoch was not found: " & getCurrentExceptionMsg()) # should never happen proc getCurrentEpoch*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay): Epoch = ## gets the current rln Epoch time return rlnPeer.calcEpoch(epochTime()) proc absDiff*(e1, e2: Epoch): uint64 = ## returns the absolute difference between the two rln `Epoch`s `e1` and `e2` ## i.e., e1 - e2 # convert epochs to their corresponding unsigned numerical values let epoch1 = fromEpoch(e1) epoch2 = fromEpoch(e2) # Manually perform an `abs` calculation if epoch1 > epoch2: return epoch1 - epoch2 else: return epoch2 - epoch1 proc validateMessage*( rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, msg: WakuMessage, timeOption = none(float64) ): MessageValidationResult = ## validate the supplied `msg` based on the waku-rln-relay routing protocol i.e., ## the `msg`'s epoch is within MaxEpochGap of the current epoch ## the `msg` has valid rate limit proof ## the `msg` does not violate the rate limit ## `timeOption` indicates Unix epoch time (fractional part holds sub-seconds) ## if `timeOption` is supplied, then the current epoch is calculated based on that let decodeRes = RateLimitProof.init(msg.proof) if decodeRes.isErr(): return MessageValidationResult.Invalid let proof = decodeRes.get() # track message count for metrics waku_rln_messages_total.inc() # checks if the `msg`'s epoch is far from the current epoch # it corresponds to the validation of rln external nullifier var epoch: Epoch if timeOption.isSome(): epoch = rlnPeer.calcEpoch(timeOption.get()) else: # get current rln epoch epoch = rlnPeer.getCurrentEpoch() let msgEpoch = proof.epoch # calculate the gaps gap = absDiff(epoch, msgEpoch) trace "epoch info", currentEpoch = fromEpoch(epoch), msgEpoch = fromEpoch(msgEpoch) # validate the epoch if gap > rlnPeer.rlnMaxEpochGap: # message's epoch is too old or too ahead # accept messages whose epoch is within +-MaxEpochGap from the current epoch warn "invalid message: epoch gap exceeds a threshold", gap = gap, payloadLen = msg.payload.len, msgEpoch = fromEpoch(proof.epoch) waku_rln_invalid_messages_total.inc(labelValues = ["invalid_epoch"]) return MessageValidationResult.Invalid let rootValidationRes = rlnPeer.groupManager.validateRoot(proof.merkleRoot) if not rootValidationRes: warn "invalid message: provided root does not belong to acceptable window of roots", provided = proof.merkleRoot.inHex(), validRoots = rlnPeer.groupManager.validRoots.mapIt(it.inHex()) waku_rln_invalid_messages_total.inc(labelValues = ["invalid_root"]) return MessageValidationResult.Invalid # verify the proof let contentTopicBytes = msg.contentTopic.toBytes input = concat(msg.payload, contentTopicBytes) waku_rln_proof_verification_total.inc() waku_rln_proof_verification_duration_seconds.nanosecondTime: let proofVerificationRes = rlnPeer.groupManager.verifyProof(input, proof) if proofVerificationRes.isErr(): waku_rln_errors_total.inc(labelValues = ["proof_verification"]) warn "invalid message: proof verification failed", payloadLen = msg.payload.len return MessageValidationResult.Invalid if not proofVerificationRes.value(): # invalid proof warn "invalid message: invalid proof", payloadLen = msg.payload.len waku_rln_invalid_messages_total.inc(labelValues = ["invalid_proof"]) return MessageValidationResult.Invalid # check if double messaging has happened let proofMetadataRes = proof.extractMetadata() if proofMetadataRes.isErr(): waku_rln_errors_total.inc(labelValues = ["proof_metadata_extraction"]) return MessageValidationResult.Invalid let hasDup = rlnPeer.hasDuplicate(msgEpoch, proofMetadataRes.get()) if hasDup.isErr(): waku_rln_errors_total.inc(labelValues = ["duplicate_check"]) elif hasDup.value == true: trace "invalid message: message is spam", payloadLen = msg.payload.len waku_rln_spam_messages_total.inc() return MessageValidationResult.Spam trace "message is valid", payloadLen = msg.payload.len let rootIndex = rlnPeer.groupManager.indexOfRoot(proof.merkleRoot) waku_rln_valid_messages_total.observe(rootIndex.toFloat()) return MessageValidationResult.Valid proc validateMessageAndUpdateLog*( rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, msg: WakuMessage, timeOption = none(float64) ): MessageValidationResult = ## validates the message and updates the log to prevent double messaging ## in future messages let isValidMessage = rlnPeer.validateMessage(msg, timeOption) let decodeRes = RateLimitProof.init(msg.proof) if decodeRes.isErr(): return MessageValidationResult.Invalid let msgProof = decodeRes.get() let proofMetadataRes = msgProof.extractMetadata() if proofMetadataRes.isErr(): return MessageValidationResult.Invalid # insert the message to the log (never errors) discard rlnPeer.updateLog(msgProof.epoch, proofMetadataRes.get()) return isValidMessage proc toRLNSignal*(wakumessage: WakuMessage): seq[byte] = ## it is a utility proc that prepares the `data` parameter of the proof generation procedure i.e., `proofGen` that resides in the current module ## it extracts the `contentTopic` and the `payload` of the supplied `wakumessage` and serializes them into a byte sequence let contentTopicBytes = wakumessage.contentTopic.toBytes() output = concat(wakumessage.payload, contentTopicBytes) return output proc appendRLNProof*( rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, msg: var WakuMessage, senderEpochTime: float64 ): RlnRelayResult[void] = ## returns true if it can create and append a `RateLimitProof` to the supplied `msg` ## returns false otherwise ## `senderEpochTime` indicates the number of seconds passed since Unix epoch. The fractional part holds sub-seconds. ## The `epoch` field of `RateLimitProof` is derived from the provided `senderEpochTime` (using `calcEpoch()`) let input = msg.toRLNSignal() let epoch = rlnPeer.calcEpoch(senderEpochTime) when defined(rln_v2): let nonce = rlnPeer.nonceManager.getNonce().valueOr: return err("could not get new message id to generate an rln proof: " & $error) let proof = rlnPeer.groupManager.generateProof(input, epoch, nonce).valueOr: return err("could not generate rln-v2 proof: " & $error) else: let proof = rlnPeer.groupManager.generateProof(input, epoch).valueOr: return err("could not generate rln proof: " & $error) msg.proof = proof.encode().buffer return ok() proc clearNullifierLog(rlnPeer: WakuRlnRelay) = # clear the first MaxEpochGap epochs of the nullifer log # if more than MaxEpochGap epochs are in the log # note: the epochs are ordered ascendingly if rlnPeer.nullifierLog.len().uint < rlnPeer.rlnMaxEpochGap: return trace "clearing epochs from the nullifier log", count = rlnPeer.rlnMaxEpochGap let epochsToClear = rlnPeer.nullifierLog.keys().toSeq()[0 ..< rlnPeer.rlnMaxEpochGap] for epoch in epochsToClear: rlnPeer.nullifierLog.del(epoch) proc generateRlnValidator*( wakuRlnRelay: WakuRLNRelay, spamHandler = none(SpamHandler) ): WakuValidatorHandler = ## this procedure is a thin wrapper for the pubsub addValidator method ## it sets a validator for waku messages, acting in the registered pubsub topic ## the message validation logic is according to https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17/ proc validator( topic: string, message: WakuMessage ): Future[pubsub.ValidationResult] {.async.} = trace "rln-relay topic validator is called" wakuRlnRelay.clearNullifierLog() let decodeRes = RateLimitProof.init(message.proof) if decodeRes.isErr(): trace "generateRlnValidator reject", error = decodeRes.error return pubsub.ValidationResult.Reject let msgProof = decodeRes.get() # validate the message and update log let validationRes = wakuRlnRelay.validateMessageAndUpdateLog(message) let proof = toHex(msgProof.proof) epoch = fromEpoch(msgProof.epoch) root = inHex(msgProof.merkleRoot) shareX = inHex(msgProof.shareX) shareY = inHex(msgProof.shareY) nullifier = inHex(msgProof.nullifier) payload = string.fromBytes(message.payload) case validationRes of Valid: trace "message validity is verified, relaying:", proof = proof, root = root, shareX = shareX, shareY = shareY, nullifier = nullifier return pubsub.ValidationResult.Accept of Invalid: trace "message validity could not be verified, discarding:", proof = proof, root = root, shareX = shareX, shareY = shareY, nullifier = nullifier return pubsub.ValidationResult.Reject of Spam: trace "A spam message is found! yay! discarding:", proof = proof, root = root, shareX = shareX, shareY = shareY, nullifier = nullifier if spamHandler.isSome(): let handler = spamHandler.get() handler(message) return pubsub.ValidationResult.Reject return validator proc mount( conf: WakuRlnConfig, registrationHandler = none(RegistrationHandler) ): Future[RlnRelayResult[WakuRlnRelay]] {.async.} = var groupManager: GroupManager wakuRlnRelay: WakuRLNRelay # create an RLN instance let rlnInstance = createRLNInstance(tree_path = conf.rlnRelayTreePath).valueOr: return err("could not create RLN instance: " & $error) if not conf.rlnRelayDynamic: # static setup let parsedGroupKeys = StaticGroupKeys.toIdentityCredentials().valueOr: return err("could not parse static group keys: " & $error) groupManager = StaticGroupManager( groupSize: StaticGroupSize, groupKeys: parsedGroupKeys, membershipIndex: conf.rlnRelayCredIndex, rlnInstance: rlnInstance, onFatalErrorAction: conf.onFatalErrorAction, ) # we don't persist credentials in static mode since they exist in ./constants.nim else: # dynamic setup proc useValueOrNone(s: string): Option[string] = if s == "": none(string) else: some(s) let rlnRelayCredPath = useValueOrNone(conf.rlnRelayCredPath) rlnRelayCredPassword = useValueOrNone(conf.rlnRelayCredPassword) groupManager = OnchainGroupManager( ethClientUrl: string(conf.rlnRelayethClientAddress), ethContractAddress: $conf.rlnRelayEthContractAddress, rlnInstance: rlnInstance, registrationHandler: registrationHandler, keystorePath: rlnRelayCredPath, keystorePassword: rlnRelayCredPassword, membershipIndex: conf.rlnRelayCredIndex, onFatalErrorAction: conf.onFatalErrorAction, ) # Initialize the groupManager (await groupManager.init()).isOkOr: return err("could not initialize the group manager: " & $error) # Start the group sync (await groupManager.startGroupSync()).isOkOr: return err("could not start the group sync: " & $error) when defined(rln_v2): return ok( WakuRLNRelay( groupManager: groupManager, nonceManager: NonceManager.init(conf.rlnRelayUserMessageLimit, conf.rlnEpochSizeSec.float), rlnEpochSizeSec: conf.rlnEpochSizeSec, rlnMaxEpochGap: max(uint64(MaxClockGapSeconds / float64(conf.rlnEpochSizeSec)), 1), onFatalErrorAction: conf.onFatalErrorAction, ) ) else: return ok( WakuRLNRelay( groupManager: groupManager, rlnEpochSizeSec: conf.rlnEpochSizeSec, rlnMaxEpochGap: max(uint64(MaxClockGapSeconds / float64(conf.rlnEpochSizeSec)), 1), onFatalErrorAction: conf.onFatalErrorAction, ) ) proc isReady*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay): Future[bool] {.async: (raises: [Exception]).} = ## returns true if the rln-relay protocol is ready to relay messages ## returns false otherwise # could be nil during startup if rlnPeer.groupManager == nil: return false try: return await rlnPeer.groupManager.isReady() except CatchableError: error "could not check if the rln-relay protocol is ready", err = getCurrentExceptionMsg() return false proc new*( T: type WakuRlnRelay, conf: WakuRlnConfig, registrationHandler = none(RegistrationHandler), ): Future[RlnRelayResult[WakuRlnRelay]] {.async.} = ## Mounts the rln-relay protocol on the node. ## The rln-relay protocol can be mounted in two modes: on-chain and off-chain. ## Returns an error if the rln-relay protocol could not be mounted. try: return await mount(conf, registrationHandler) except CatchableError: return err("could not mount the rln-relay protocol: " & getCurrentExceptionMsg())