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feat(noise): add Noise Handshake State Machine and primitives
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import
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../protocol/waku_message,
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../protocol/waku_noise/noise
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import libp2p/crypto/[chacha20poly1305, curve25519]
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import libp2p/crypto/[curve25519]
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export whisper_types, keys, options
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@ -9,21 +9,22 @@
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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import std/[oids, options, tables]
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import std/[oids, strformat, options, math, tables]
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import chronos
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import chronicles
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import bearssl
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import strutils
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import stew/[endians2]
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import stew/[endians2, byteutils]
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import nimcrypto/[utils, sha2, hmac]
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import libp2p/stream/[connection]
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import libp2p/stream/[connection, streamseq]
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import libp2p/peerid
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import libp2p/peerinfo
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import libp2p/protobuf/minprotobuf
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import libp2p/utility
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import libp2p/errors
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import libp2p/crypto/[crypto, chacha20poly1305, curve25519]
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import libp2p/crypto/[crypto, chacha20poly1305, curve25519, hkdf]
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import libp2p/protocols/secure/secure
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when defined(libp2p_dump):
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@ -58,6 +59,63 @@ type
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nonce*: ChaChaPolyNonce
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ad*: seq[byte]
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#Noise Handshakes
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NoiseTokens* = enum
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T_e = "e"
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T_s = "s"
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T_es = "es"
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T_ee = "ee"
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T_se = "se"
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T_ss = "se"
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T_psk = "psk"
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T_none = ""
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MessageDirection* = enum
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D_r = "->"
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D_l = "<-"
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D_none = ""
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HandshakePattern* = object
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name*: string
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pre_message_patterns*: seq[(MessageDirection, seq[NoiseTokens])]
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message_patterns*: seq[(MessageDirection, seq[NoiseTokens])]
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#Noise states
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# https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#the-cipherstate-object
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CipherState* = object
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k: ChaChaPolyKey
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n: uint64
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# https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#the-symmetricstate-object
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SymmetricState* = object
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cs: CipherState
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ck: ChaChaPolyKey
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h: MDigest[256]
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# https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#the-handshakestate-object
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HandshakeState = object
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s: KeyPair
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e: KeyPair
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rs: Curve25519Key
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re: Curve25519Key
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ss: SymmetricState
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initiator: bool
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handshake_pattern: HandshakePattern
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msg_pattern_idx: uint8
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psk: seq[byte]
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HandshakeResult = object
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cs1: CipherState
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cs2: CipherState
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rs: Curve25519Key
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h: MDigest[256] #The handshake state for channel binding
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NoiseState* = object
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hs: HandshakeState
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hr: HandshakeResult
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NoiseError* = object of LPError
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NoiseHandshakeError* = object of NoiseError
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NoiseDecryptTagError* = object of NoiseError
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@ -66,6 +124,228 @@ type
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NoiseMalformedHandshake* = object of NoiseError
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# Supported Noise Handshake Patterns
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const
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EmptyMessagePattern = @[(D_none, @[T_none])]
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NoiseHandshakePatterns* = {
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"K1K1": HandshakePattern(name: "Noise_K1K1_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256",
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pre_message_patterns: @[(D_r, @[T_s]),
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(D_l, @[T_s])],
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message_patterns: @[(D_r, @[T_e]),
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(D_l, @[T_e, T_ee, T_es]),
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(D_r, @[T_se])]
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),
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"XK1": HandshakePattern(name: "Noise_XK1_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256",
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pre_message_patterns: @[(D_l, @[T_s])],
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message_patterns: @[(D_r, @[T_e]),
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(D_l, @[T_e, T_ee, T_es]),
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(D_r, @[T_s, T_se])]
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),
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"XX": HandshakePattern(name: "Noise_XX_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256",
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pre_message_patterns: EmptyMessagePattern,
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message_patterns: @[(D_r, @[T_e]),
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(D_l, @[T_e, T_ee, T_s, T_es]),
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(D_r, @[T_s, T_se])]
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),
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"XXpsk0": HandshakePattern(name: "Noise_XXpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256",
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pre_message_patterns: EmptyMessagePattern,
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message_patterns: @[(D_r, @[T_psk, T_e]),
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(D_l, @[T_e, T_ee, T_s, T_es]),
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(D_r, @[T_s, T_se])]
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)
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}.toTable()
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PayloadV2ProtocolIDs* = {
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"": 0.uint8,
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"Noise_K1K1_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256": 10.uint8,
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"Noise_XK1_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256": 11.uint8,
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"Noise_XX_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256": 12.uint8,
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"Noise_XXpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256": 13.uint8,
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"ChaChaPoly": 30.uint8
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}.toTable()
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# Utility
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#Printing Handshake Patterns
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proc print*(self: HandshakePattern)
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{.raises: [IOError].}=
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try:
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if self.name != "":
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echo self.name, ":"
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#We iterate over pre message patterns, if any
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if self.pre_message_patterns != EmptyMessagePattern:
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for pattern in self.pre_message_patterns:
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stdout.write " ", pattern[0]
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var first = true
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for token in pattern[1]:
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if first:
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stdout.write " ", token
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first = false
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else:
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stdout.write ", ", token
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stdout.write "\n"
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stdout.flushFile()
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stdout.write " ...\n"
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stdout.flushFile()
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#We iterate over message patterns
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for pattern in self.message_patterns:
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stdout.write " ", pattern[0]
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var first = true
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for token in pattern[1]:
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if first:
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stdout.write " ", token
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first = false
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else:
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stdout.write ", ", token
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stdout.write "\n"
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stdout.flushFile()
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except:
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echo "HandshakePattern malformed"
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proc genKeyPair*(rng: var BrHmacDrbgContext): KeyPair =
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result.privateKey = Curve25519Key.random(rng)
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result.publicKey = result.privateKey.public()
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proc hashProtocol(name: string): MDigest[256] =
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# If protocol_name is less than or equal to HASHLEN bytes in length,
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# sets h equal to protocol_name with zero bytes appended to make HASHLEN bytes.
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# Otherwise sets h = HASH(protocol_name).
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if name.len <= 32:
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result.data[0..name.high] = name.toBytes
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else:
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result = sha256.digest(name)
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proc dh(priv: Curve25519Key, pub: Curve25519Key): Curve25519Key =
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result = pub
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Curve25519.mul(result, priv)
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# Cipherstate
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proc hasKey(cs: CipherState): bool =
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cs.k != EmptyKey
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proc encrypt(
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state: var CipherState,
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data: var openArray[byte],
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ad: openArray[byte]): ChaChaPolyTag
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{.noinit, raises: [Defect, NoiseNonceMaxError].} =
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var nonce: ChaChaPolyNonce
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nonce[4..<12] = toBytesLE(state.n)
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ChaChaPoly.encrypt(state.k, nonce, result, data, ad)
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inc state.n
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if state.n > NonceMax:
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raise newException(NoiseNonceMaxError, "Noise max nonce value reached")
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proc encryptWithAd(state: var CipherState, ad, data: openArray[byte]): seq[byte]
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{.raises: [Defect, NoiseNonceMaxError].} =
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result = newSeqOfCap[byte](data.len + sizeof(ChaChaPolyTag))
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result.add(data)
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let tag = encrypt(state, result, ad)
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result.add(tag)
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trace "encryptWithAd",
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tag = byteutils.toHex(tag), data = result.shortLog, nonce = state.n - 1
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proc decryptWithAd(state: var CipherState, ad, data: openArray[byte]): seq[byte]
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{.raises: [Defect, NoiseDecryptTagError, NoiseNonceMaxError].} =
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var
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tagIn = data.toOpenArray(data.len - ChaChaPolyTag.len, data.high).intoChaChaPolyTag
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tagOut: ChaChaPolyTag
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nonce: ChaChaPolyNonce
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nonce[4..<12] = toBytesLE(state.n)
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result = data[0..(data.high - ChaChaPolyTag.len)]
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ChaChaPoly.decrypt(state.k, nonce, tagOut, result, ad)
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trace "decryptWithAd", tagIn = tagIn.shortLog, tagOut = tagOut.shortLog, nonce = state.n
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if tagIn != tagOut:
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debug "decryptWithAd failed", data = shortLog(data)
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raise newException(NoiseDecryptTagError, "decryptWithAd failed tag authentication.")
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inc state.n
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if state.n > NonceMax:
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raise newException(NoiseNonceMaxError, "Noise max nonce value reached")
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# Symmetricstate
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proc init*(_: type[SymmetricState], hs_pattern: HandshakePattern): SymmetricState =
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result.h = hs_pattern.name.hashProtocol
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result.ck = result.h.data.intoChaChaPolyKey
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result.cs = CipherState(k: EmptyKey)
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proc mixKey(ss: var SymmetricState, ikm: ChaChaPolyKey) =
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var
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temp_keys: array[2, ChaChaPolyKey]
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sha256.hkdf(ss.ck, ikm, [], temp_keys)
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ss.ck = temp_keys[0]
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ss.cs = CipherState(k: temp_keys[1])
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trace "mixKey", key = ss.cs.k.shortLog
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proc mixHash(ss: var SymmetricState, data: openArray[byte]) =
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var ctx: sha256
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ctx.init()
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ctx.update(ss.h.data)
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ctx.update(data)
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ss.h = ctx.finish()
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trace "mixHash", hash = ss.h.data.shortLog
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# We might use this for other handshake patterns/tokens
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proc mixKeyAndHash(ss: var SymmetricState, ikm: openArray[byte]) {.used.} =
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var
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temp_keys: array[3, ChaChaPolyKey]
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sha256.hkdf(ss.ck, ikm, [], temp_keys)
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ss.ck = temp_keys[0]
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ss.mixHash(temp_keys[1])
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ss.cs = CipherState(k: temp_keys[2])
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proc encryptAndHash(ss: var SymmetricState, data: openArray[byte]): seq[byte]
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{.raises: [Defect, NoiseNonceMaxError].} =
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# according to spec if key is empty leave plaintext
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if ss.cs.hasKey:
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result = ss.cs.encryptWithAd(ss.h.data, data)
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else:
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result = @data
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ss.mixHash(result)
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proc decryptAndHash(ss: var SymmetricState, data: openArray[byte]): seq[byte]
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{.raises: [Defect, NoiseDecryptTagError, NoiseNonceMaxError].} =
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# according to spec if key is empty leave plaintext
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if ss.cs.hasKey and data.len > ChaChaPolyTag.len:
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result = ss.cs.decryptWithAd(ss.h.data, data)
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else:
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result = @data
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ss.mixHash(data)
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proc split(ss: var SymmetricState): tuple[cs1, cs2: CipherState] =
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var
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temp_keys: array[2, ChaChaPolyKey]
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sha256.hkdf(ss.ck, [], [], temp_keys)
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return (CipherState(k: temp_keys[0]), CipherState(k: temp_keys[1]))
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# Handshake state
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proc init*(_: type[HandshakeState], hs_pattern: HandshakePattern, psk: seq[byte] = @[]): HandshakeState =
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# set to true only if startHandshake is called over the handshake state
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result.initiator = false
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result.handshake_pattern = hs_pattern
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result.psk = psk
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result.ss = SymmetricState.init(hs_pattern)
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#################################################################
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@ -105,13 +385,6 @@ proc randomChaChaPolyCipherState*(rng: var BrHmacDrbgContext): ChaChaPolyCipherS
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#################################################################
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# Utility
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proc genKeyPair*(rng: var BrHmacDrbgContext): KeyPair =
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result.privateKey = Curve25519Key.random(rng)
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result.publicKey = result.privateKey.public()
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# Public keys serializations/encryption
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proc `==`(k1, k2: NoisePublicKey): bool =
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@ -170,9 +443,11 @@ proc decryptNoisePublicKey*(cs: ChaChaPolyCipherState, noisePublicKey: NoisePubl
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#################################################################
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# Payload functions
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# Payload V2 functions
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type
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PayloadV2* = object
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protocol_id: uint8
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@ -215,7 +490,6 @@ proc encodeV2*(self: PayloadV2): Option[seq[byte]] =
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return none(seq[byte])
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let transport_message_len = self.transport_message.len
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#let transport_message_len_len = ceil(log(transport_message_len, 8)).int
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var payload = newSeqOfCap[byte](1 + #self.protocol_id.len +
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1 + #ser_handshake_message_len
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