mirror of https://github.com/vacp2p/rfc.git
chore(32-RLN): update v1 RFC (#581)
fix(32-RLN): change to stable version & rename to RLN-V1 chore(32-RLN): add SSS attack description chore(32-RLN): PR fixes chore(32-RLN): minor PR changes
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---
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---
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slug: 32
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slug: 32
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title: 32/RLN
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title: 32/RLN-V1
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name: Rate Limit Nullifier
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name: Rate Limit Nullifier
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status: raw
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status: raw
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editor: Blagoj Dimovski <blagoj.dimovski@yandex.com>
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editor: Rasul Ibragimov <curryrasul@gmail.com>
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contributors:
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contributors:
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- Barry Whitehat <barrywhitehat@protonmail.com>
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- Barry Whitehat <barrywhitehat@protonmail.com>
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- Sanaz Taheri <sanaz@status.im>
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- Sanaz Taheri <sanaz@status.im>
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- Oskar Thorén <oskar@status.im>
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- Oskar Thorén <oskar@status.im>
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- Onur Kilic <onurkilic1004@gmail.com>
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- Onur Kilic <onurkilic1004@gmail.com>
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- Blagoj Dimovski <blagoj.dimovski@yandex.com>
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---
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---
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# Abstract
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# Abstract
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@ -138,8 +139,7 @@ the user need to submit the following fields to the circuit:
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path_elements: Merkle_proof.path_elements,
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path_elements: Merkle_proof.path_elements,
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identity_path_index: Merkle_proof.indices,
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identity_path_index: Merkle_proof.indices,
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x: signal_hash,
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x: signal_hash,
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epoch: epoch,
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external_nullifier: external_nullifier
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rln_identifier: rln_identifier
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}
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}
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```
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```
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@ -155,8 +155,7 @@ The following fields are needed for proof output calculation:
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```
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```
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{
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{
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identity_secret_hash: bigint,
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identity_secret_hash: bigint,
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epoch: bigint,
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external_nullifier: bigint,
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rln_identifier: bigint,
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x: bigint,
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x: bigint,
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}
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}
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```
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```
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@ -164,8 +163,6 @@ The following fields are needed for proof output calculation:
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The output `[y, internal_nullifier]` is calculated in the following way:
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The output `[y, internal_nullifier]` is calculated in the following way:
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```
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```
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external_nullifier = poseidonHash([epoch, rln_identifier])
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a_0 = identity_secret_hash
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a_0 = identity_secret_hash
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a_1 = poseidonHash([a0, external_nullifier])
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a_1 = poseidonHash([a0, external_nullifier])
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@ -265,8 +262,7 @@ The `zk_proof` should be verified by providing the `zk_proof` field to the circu
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Merkle_proof.root,
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Merkle_proof.root,
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internal_nullifier,
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internal_nullifier,
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x, # signal_hash
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x, # signal_hash
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epoch,
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external_nullifier
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rln_identifier
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]
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]
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```
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```
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@ -345,15 +341,14 @@ using the [circomlib](https://docs.circom.io/) library.
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### System parameters
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### System parameters
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- `n_levels` - Merkle tree depth
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- `DEPTH` - Merkle tree depth
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### Circuit parameters
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### Circuit parameters
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**Public Inputs**
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**Public Inputs**
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- `x`
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- `x`
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- `epoch`
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- `external_nullifier`
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- `rln_identifier`
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**Private Inputs**
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**Private Inputs**
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* `identity_secret_hash`
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* `identity_secret_hash`
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@ -477,6 +472,16 @@ The standard for this is to use trusted [Multi-Party Computation (MPC)](https://
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which requires two phases.
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which requires two phases.
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Trusted MPC ceremony has not yet been performed for the RLN circuits.
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Trusted MPC ceremony has not yet been performed for the RLN circuits.
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## SSS security assumptions
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Shamir-Secret Sharing requires polynomial coefficients to be independent of each other.
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However, `a_1` depends on `a_0` through the Poseidon hash algorithm.
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Due to the design of Poseidon, it is possible to [attack](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) the protocol.
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It was decided *not* to change the circuits design, since at the moment the attack is infeasible. Therefore, implementers must be aware that the current version provides approximately 160-bit security and not 254.
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Possible improvements:
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* [change the circuit](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) to make coefficients independent;
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* switch to other hash function (Keccak, SHA);
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# Appendix B: Identity scheme choice
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# Appendix B: Identity scheme choice
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The hashing scheme used is based on the design decisions which also include the Semaphore circuits.
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The hashing scheme used is based on the design decisions which also include the Semaphore circuits.
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@ -557,13 +562,11 @@ The examples are written in [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/).
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use rln::protocol::*;
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use rln::protocol::*;
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use rln::public::*;
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use rln::public::*;
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use std::io::Cursor;
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use std::io::Cursor;
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// We set the RLN parameters:
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// We set the RLN parameters:
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// - the tree height;
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// - the tree height;
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// - the circuit resource folder (requires a trailing "/").
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// - the circuit resource folder (requires a trailing "/").
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let tree_height = 20;
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let tree_height = 20;
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let resources = Cursor::new("../zerokit/rln/resources/tree_height_20/");
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let resources = Cursor::new("../zerokit/rln/resources/tree_height_20/");
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// We create a new RLN instance
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// We create a new RLN instance
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let mut rln = RLN::new(tree_height, resources);
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let mut rln = RLN::new(tree_height, resources);
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```
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```
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@ -574,7 +577,6 @@ The examples are written in [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/).
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// We generate an identity tuple
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// We generate an identity tuple
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let mut buffer = Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
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let mut buffer = Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
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rln.extended_key_gen(&mut buffer).unwrap();
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rln.extended_key_gen(&mut buffer).unwrap();
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// We deserialize the keygen output to obtain
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// We deserialize the keygen output to obtain
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// the identiy_secret and id_commitment
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// the identiy_secret and id_commitment
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let (identity_trapdoor, identity_nullifier, identity_secret_hash, id_commitment) = deserialize_identity_tuple(buffer.into_inner());
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let (identity_trapdoor, identity_nullifier, identity_secret_hash, id_commitment) = deserialize_identity_tuple(buffer.into_inner());
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@ -585,7 +587,6 @@ The examples are written in [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/).
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```rust
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```rust
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// We define the tree index where id_commitment will be added
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// We define the tree index where id_commitment will be added
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let id_index = 10;
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let id_index = 10;
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// We serialize id_commitment and pass it to set_leaf
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// We serialize id_commitment and pass it to set_leaf
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let mut buffer = Cursor::new(serialize_field_element(id_commitment));
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let mut buffer = Cursor::new(serialize_field_element(id_commitment));
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rln.set_leaf(id_index, &mut buffer).unwrap();
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rln.set_leaf(id_index, &mut buffer).unwrap();
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@ -597,7 +598,6 @@ The examples are written in [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/).
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// We generate epoch from a date seed and we ensure is
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// We generate epoch from a date seed and we ensure is
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// mapped to a field element by hashing-to-field its content
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// mapped to a field element by hashing-to-field its content
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let epoch = hash_to_field(b"Today at noon, this year");
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let epoch = hash_to_field(b"Today at noon, this year");
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// We set our signal
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// We set our signal
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let signal = b"RLN is awesome";
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let signal = b"RLN is awesome";
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```
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```
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@ -607,13 +607,11 @@ The examples are written in [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/).
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```rust
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```rust
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// We prepare input to the proof generation routine
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// We prepare input to the proof generation routine
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let proof_input = prepare_prove_input(identity_secret, id_index, epoch, signal);
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let proof_input = prepare_prove_input(identity_secret, id_index, epoch, signal);
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// We generate a RLN proof for proof_input
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// We generate a RLN proof for proof_input
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let mut in_buffer = Cursor::new(proof_input);
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let mut in_buffer = Cursor::new(proof_input);
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let mut out_buffer = Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
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let mut out_buffer = Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
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rln.generate_rln_proof(&mut in_buffer, &mut out_buffer)
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rln.generate_rln_proof(&mut in_buffer, &mut out_buffer)
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.unwrap();
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.unwrap();
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// We get the public outputs returned by the circuit evaluation
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// We get the public outputs returned by the circuit evaluation
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let proof_data = out_buffer.into_inner();
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let proof_data = out_buffer.into_inner();
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```
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```
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```rust
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```rust
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// We prepare input to the proof verification routine
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// We prepare input to the proof verification routine
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let verify_data = prepare_verify_input(proof_data, signal);
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let verify_data = prepare_verify_input(proof_data, signal);
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// We verify the zk-proof against the provided proof values
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// We verify the zk-proof against the provided proof values
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let mut in_buffer = Cursor::new(verify_data);
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let mut in_buffer = Cursor::new(verify_data);
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let verified = rln.verify(&mut in_buffer).unwrap();
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let verified = rln.verify(&mut in_buffer).unwrap();
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// We ensure the proof is valid
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// We ensure the proof is valid
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assert!(verified);
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assert!(verified);
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```
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```
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@ -652,3 +648,5 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public
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- [10] https://ethresear.ch/t/gas-and-circuit-constraint-benchmarks-of-binary-and-quinary-incremental-merkle-trees-using-the-poseidon-hash-function/7446
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- [10] https://ethresear.ch/t/gas-and-circuit-constraint-benchmarks-of-binary-and-quinary-incremental-merkle-trees-using-the-poseidon-hash-function/7446
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- [11] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing
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- [11] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing
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- [12] https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/24/security-considerations-of-zk-snark-parameter-multi-party-computation/
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- [12] https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/24/security-considerations-of-zk-snark-parameter-multi-party-computation/
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- [13] https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/
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- [14] https://rate-limiting-nullifier.github.io/rln-docs/
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ bookMenuLevels: 1
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- [24/STATUS-CURATION]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/24/README.md" >}})
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- [24/STATUS-CURATION]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/24/README.md" >}})
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- [28/STATUS-FEATURING]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/28/README.md" >}})
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- [28/STATUS-FEATURING]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/28/README.md" >}})
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- [31/WAKU2-ENR]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/31/README.md" >}})
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- [31/WAKU2-ENR]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/31/README.md" >}})
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- [32/RLN-SPEC]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/32/README.md" >}})
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- [32/RLN-V1-SPEC]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/32/README.md" >}})
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- [34/WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/34/README.md" >}})
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- [34/WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/34/README.md" >}})
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- [35/WAKU2-NOISE]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/35/README.md" >}})
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- [35/WAKU2-NOISE]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/35/README.md" >}})
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- [37/WAKU2-NOISE-SESSIONS]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/37/README.md" >}})
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- [37/WAKU2-NOISE-SESSIONS]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/37/README.md" >}})
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