Update ETH-PM specs (#455)

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--- ---
slug: 20 slug: 20
title: 20/TOY-ETH-DM title: 20/TOY-ETH-PM
name: Toy Ethereum Direct Message name: Toy Ethereum Private Message
status: raw status: draft
tags: waku-application tags: waku-application
editor: Franck Royer <franck@status.im> editor: Franck Royer <franck@status.im>
contributors: contributors:
@ -10,14 +10,16 @@ contributors:
**Content Topics**: **Content Topics**:
- Public Key Broadcast: `/eth-dm/1/public-key/json`, - Public Key Broadcast: `/eth-pm/1/public-key/proto`,
- Direct Message: `/eth-dm/1/direct-message/json`. - Private Message: `/eth-pm/1/private-message/proto`.
This specification explains the Toy Ethereum Direct Message protocol This specification explains the Toy Ethereum Private Message protocol
which enables a peer to send an encrypted direct message to another peer which enables a peer to send an encrypted message to another peer
using the Waku v2 network, and the peer's Ethereum address. using the Waku v2 network, and the peer's Ethereum address.
The main purpose of this specification is to demonstrate how Waku v2 can be used for direct messaging purposes. The main purpose of this specification is to demonstrate how Waku v2 can be used for encrypted messaging purposes,
using Ethereum accounts for identity.
This protocol caters for Web3 wallets restrictions, allowing it to be implemented only using standard Web3 API.
In the current state, the protocol has privacy and features [limitations](#limitations), has not been audited In the current state, the protocol has privacy and features [limitations](#limitations), has not been audited
and hence is not fit for production usage. and hence is not fit for production usage.
We hope this can be an inspiration for developers wishing to build on top of Waku v2. We hope this can be an inspiration for developers wishing to build on top of Waku v2.
@ -33,129 +35,170 @@ Here are the variables used in the protocol and their definition:
- `B` is Bob's Ethereum address (or account), - `B` is Bob's Ethereum address (or account),
- `b` is the private key of `B`, and is only known by Bob. - `b` is the private key of `B`, and is only known by Bob.
- `B'` is Bob's Eth-DM Public Key, which has `b'` as private key. - `B'` is Bob's Encryption Public Key, for which `b'` is the private key.
- `M` is the private message that Alice sends to Bob.
# Design Requirements # Design Requirements
The proposed protocol MUST adhere to the following design requirements: The proposed protocol MUST adhere to the following design requirements:
1. Alice knows Bob's Ethereum address, 1. Alice knows Bob's Ethereum address,
1. Bob is willing to participate to Eth-DM, and publishes `B'`, 2. Bob is willing to participate to Eth-PM, and publishes `B'`,
1. Alice wants to send message `M` to Bob, 3. Bob's ownership of `B'` MUST be verifiable,
1. Bob SHOULD be able to get `M` using [10/WAKU2](/spec/13), 4. Alice wants to send message `M` to Bob,
1. Participants only have access to their Ethereum Wallet via the Web3 API, 5. Bob SHOULD be able to get `M` using [10/WAKU2](/spec/13),
1. Carole MUST NOT be able to read `M`'s content even if she is storing it or relaying it, 6. Participants only have access to their Ethereum Wallet via the Web3 API,
1. ECDSA Elliptic curve cryptography is used, 7. Carole MUST NOT be able to read `M`'s content even if she is storing it or relaying it,
1. [eth-crypto](https://www.npmjs.com/package/eth-crypto), 8. [Waku Message Version 1](/spec/26/) Asymmetric Encryption is used for encryption purposes.
which uses [eccrypto](https://www.npmjs.com/package/eccrypto),
is used for encryption and decryption purposes.
## Limitations ## Limitations
Bob's Ethereum Address is present in clear in Direct Messages,
meaning that anyone who is monitoring the Waku network know how many messages Bob receives.
Alice's details are not included in the message's structure, Alice's details are not included in the message's structure,
meaning that there is no programmatic way for Bob to reply to Alice meaning that there is no programmatic way for Bob to reply to Alice
or verify her identity. or verify her identity.
Private messages are sent on the same content topic for all users.
As the recipient data is encrypted, all participants must decrypt all messages which can lead to scalability issues.
# The protocol # The protocol
## Eth-DM Key Generation ## Generate Encryption KeyPair
First, Bob needs to generate an Eth-DM keypair. First, Bob needs to generate a keypair for Encryption purposes.
To avoid Bob having to save an additional private key or recovery phrase for Eth-DM purposes,
we generate the Eth-DM keypair using Bob's Ethereum account.
This will allow Bob to recover his Eth-DM private key as long as he has access to his Ethereum private key.
Bob SHOULD get 32 bytes from a secure random source as Encryption Private Key, `b'`.
Then Bob can compute the corresponding SECP-256k1 Public Key, `B'`.
To generate his Eth-DM keypair, Bob MUST use his Ethereum private key 'b' to sign the Eth-DM salt message: # Broadcast Encryption Public Key
`Salt for Eth-Dm, do not share a signature of this message or others could decrypt your messages`.
The resulting signature 's' is then concatenated with itself once and hashed using keccak256. For Alice to encrypt messages for Bob,
The resulting hash is Bob's Eth-DM private key `b'`: Bob SHOULD broadcast his Encryption Public Key `B'`.
To prove that the Encryption Public Key `B'` is indeed owned by the owner of Bob's Ethereum Account `B`,
Bob MUST sign `B'` using `B`.
``` ## Sign Encryption Public Key
b' = keccak256(s + s)
To prove ownership of the Encryption Public Key,
Bob must sign it using [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712) v3,
meaning calling `eth_signTypedData_v3` on his Wallet's API.
Note: While v4 also exists,
it is not available on all wallets and the features brought by v4 is not needed for the current use case.
The `TypedData` to be passed to `eth_signTypedData_v3` MUST be as follows, where:
- `encryptionPublicKey` is Bob's Encryption Public Key, `B'`, in hex format, **without** `0x` prefix.
- `bobAddress` is Bob's Ethereum address, corresponding to `B`, in hex format, **with** `0x` prefix.
```js
const typedData = {
domain: {
chainId: 1,
name: 'Ethereum Private Message over Waku',
version: '1',
},
message: {
encryptionPublicKey: encryptionPublicKey,
ownerAddress: bobAddress,
},
primaryType: 'PublishEncryptionPublicKey',
types: {
EIP712Domain: [
{ name: 'name', type: 'string' },
{ name: 'version', type: 'string' },
{ name: 'chainId', type: 'uint256' },
],
PublishEncryptionPublicKey: [
{ name: 'encryptionPublicKey', type: 'string' },
{ name: 'ownerAddress', type: 'string' },
],
},
}
``` ```
The signature process is as per the current Ethereum best practice: ## Public Key Message
1. Convert the salt message to a byte array using utf-8 encoding, The resulting signature is then included in a `PublicKeyMessage`, where
2. Use [`eth_sign`](https://eth.wiki/json-rpc/API#eth_sign) Ethereum JSON-RPC command or equivalent.
# Eth-DM Public Key Broadcast - `encryption_public_key` is Bob's Encryption Public Key `B'`, not compressed,
- `eth_address` is Bob's Ethereum Address `B`,
- `signature` is the EIP-712 as described above.
For Bob to be reachable, he SHOULD broadcast his Eth-DM Public Key `B'`. ```protobuf
To prove that he is indeed the owner of his Ethereum account `B`, he MUST sign his Eth-DM Public Key. syntax = "proto3";
To do so, Bob MUST format his Public Key to lower case hex (no prefix) in a JSON Object on the property `ethDmPublicKey`, e.g.: message PublicKeyMessage {
bytes encryption_public_key = 1;
```json bytes eth_address = 2;
{ bytes signature = 3;
"ethDmPublicKey": "abcd...0123"
} }
``` ```
Then, Bob MUST sign the stringified JSON using [`eth_sign`](https://eth.wiki/json-rpc/API#eth_sign). This MUST be wrapped in a Waku Message version 0, with the Public Key Broadcast content topic.
This results in the `sigEthDmPubKey` signature. Finally, Bob SHOULD publish the message on Waku v2.
Bob then creates an Eth-DM Public Key Message containing: ## Consideration for a non-interactive/uncoordinated protocol
- Bob's Eth-DM Public Key `B'` on property `ethDmPublicKey`, Alice has to get Bob's public Key to send a message to Bob.
- Bob's Ethereum Address `B` on property `ethAddress`, Because an Ethereum Address is part of the hash of the public key's account,
- The signature of Bob's Eth-DM Public Key `sigEthDmPubKey` on property `sig`. it is not enough in itself to deduce Bob's Public Key.
In JSON format as follows: This is why the protocol dictates that Bob MUST send his Public Key first,
and Alice MUST receive it before she can send him a message.
```json Moreover, nim-waku, the reference implementation of [13/WAKU2-STORE](/spec/13/),
{ stores messages for a maximum period of 30 days.
"ethDmPublicKey": "abcd...0123", This means that Bob would need to broadcast his public key at least every 30 days to be reachable.
"ethAddress": "0x01234...eF",
"sig": "0x2eb...a1b"
}
```
Finally, Bob SHOULD publish the message on Waku v2 with the Public Key Broadcast content topic. Below we are reviewing possible solutions to mitigate this "sign up" step.
# Send Direct Message ### Retrieve the public key from the blockchain
Alice MAY monitor the Waku v2 to collect Ethereum Address/Eth-DM Public Key tuples. If Bob has signed at least one transaction with his account then his Public Key can be extracted from the transaction's ECDSA signature.
Alice SHOULD verify that the `sig` property of said message contains a valid signature as constructed above. The challenge with this method is that standard Web3 Wallet API does not allow Alice to specifically retrieve all/any transaction sent by Bob.
Alice would instead need to use the `eth.getBlock` API to retrieve Ethereum blocks one by one.
For each block, she would need to check the `from` value of each transaction until she finds a transaction sent by Bob.
This process is resource intensive and can be slow when using services such as Infura due to rate limits in place,
which makes it inappropriate for a browser or mobile phone environment.
An alternative would be to either run a backend that can connect directly to an Ethereum node,
use a centralized blockchain explorer
or use a decentralized indexing service such as [The Graph](https://thegraph.com/).
Note that these would resolve a UX issue only if a sender wants to proceed with _air drops_.
Indeed, if Bob does not publish his Public Key in the first place
then it can be an indication that he simply does not participate in this protocol and hence will not receive messages.
However, these solutions would be helpful if the sender wants to proceed with an _air drop_ of messages:
Send messages over Waku for users to retrieve later, once they decide to participate in this protocol.
Bob may not want to participate first but may decide to participate at a later stage
and would like to access previous messages.
This could make sense in an NFT offer scenario:
Users send offers to any NFT owner,
NFT owner may decide at some point to participate in the protocol and retrieve previous offers.
### Publishing the public in long term storage
Another improvement would be for Bob not having to re-publish his public key every 30 days or less.
Similarly to above, if Bob stops publishing his public key then it may be an indication that he does not participate in the protocol anymore.
In any case, the protocol could be modified to store the Public Key in a more permanent storage, such as a dedicated smart contract on the blockchain.
# Send Private Message
Alice MAY monitor the Waku v2 to collect Ethereum Address and Encryption Public Key tuples.
Alice SHOULD verify that the `signature`s of `PublicKeyMessage`s she receives are valid as per EIP-712.
She SHOULD drop any message without a signature or with an invalid signature. She SHOULD drop any message without a signature or with an invalid signature.
Using Bob's Eth-DM Public Key, retrieved via [10/WAKU2](/spec/13), Alice MAY now send an encrypted message to Bob. Using Bob's Encryption Public Key, retrieved via [10/WAKU2](/spec/13), Alice MAY now send an encrypted message to Bob.
If she wishes to do so, Alice MUST encrypt her message `M` using Bob's Eth-DM Public Key `B'`. If she wishes to do so, Alice MUST encrypt her message `M` using Bob's Encryption Public Key `B'`,
as per [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD Asymmetric Encryption specs](/spec/26/#asymmetric).
The result of the encryption is as follows Alice SHOULD now publish this message on the Private Message content topic.
(see [eth-crypto's encryptWithPublicKey](https://www.npmjs.com/package/eth-crypto#encryptwithpublickey)):
```json
{
"iv": "...",
"ephemPublicKey": "...",
"ciphertext": "...",
"mac": "..."
}
```
Alice MUST then set this result in a Direct Message's property `encMessage`,
with Bob's Ethereum address `B` set to property `toAddress`.
```json
{
"toAddress": "...",
"encMessage": {
"iv": "...",
"ephemPublicKey": "...",
"ciphertext": "...",
"mac": "..."
}
}
```
Alice SHOULD now publish this message on the Direct Message content topic.
# Copyright # Copyright

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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ bookMenuLevels: 1
- Raw - Raw
- [17/WAKU2-RLNRELAY]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/17/README.md" >}}) - [17/WAKU2-RLNRELAY]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/17/README.md" >}})
- [20/TOY-ETH-DM]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/20/README.md" >}}) - [20/TOY-ETH-PM]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/20/README.md" >}})
- [21/WAKU2-FTSTORE]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/21/README.md" >}}) - [21/WAKU2-FTSTORE]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/21/README.md" >}})
- [24/STATUS-CURATION]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/24/README.md" >}}) - [24/STATUS-CURATION]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/24/README.md" >}})
- [25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/25/README.md" >}}) - [25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY]({{< relref "/docs/rfcs/25/README.md" >}})