From 5fabd8402b874dc3785f459211ecdd7c9f3ba283 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sanaz Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 15:14:12 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] minor update --- specs/waku/v2/waku-filter.md | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/specs/waku/v2/waku-filter.md b/specs/waku/v2/waku-filter.md index 02f981c9..fb4eb069 100644 --- a/specs/waku/v2/waku-filter.md +++ b/specs/waku/v2/waku-filter.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Waku version: 2.0.0-beta2 status: Draft -authors: Oskar Thorén , Dean Eigenmann , Hanno Cornelius +authors: Oskar Thorén , Dean Eigenmann , Hanno Cornelius , Sanaz Taheri --- # Table of Contents @@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ implementation, though a reasonable default is one minute. - **Prevention of Denial of Service**: DoS attack can be mitigated through accounting model as provided by [Waku Swap Accounting specs](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/master/specs/waku/v2/waku-swap-accounting.md). In a nutshell, nodes have to pay for the service they obtain from each other, which means, in terms of the `WakuFilter` protocol, the subscribing node will be charged for the messages that it obtains from other full nodes. In addition to incentivizing the service provider, accounting also makes DoS attacks costly for malicious nodes. # Future Work -- **Anonymous filter subscription**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter (i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol would be able to link nodes to their subscribed content filers. The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: + +- **Anonymous filter subscription**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter (i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol would be able to link nodes to their subscribed content filers. The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: - By hiding the source of the subscription i.e., anonymous communication. That is the subscribing node shall hide all its PII in its filter request e.g., its IP address. This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor. Note that the current structure of filter requests i.e., `FilterRPC` does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve anonymity. - By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the subscribing node obtains the messages matching a content filter whereas the full node learns nothing about the content filter as well as the messages pushed to the subscribing node. Examples of such 2PC protocols are [Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains.) and one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI).