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fixes formatting issue

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Sanaz 2020-12-18 15:19:45 -08:00 committed by Sanaz Taheri Boshrooyeh
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commit 234a326946
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specs/waku/v2/waku-filter.md
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@ -65,8 +65,9 @@ The `WakuFilter` protocol supports the following security features.
The term Personally identifiable information (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII.
# Adversarial Model
- Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol i.e., both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious node intentionally hides the messages matching to one's subscribed content filter as it is against the description of the `WakuFilter` protocol.
- The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model:
Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol i.e., both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious node intentionally hides the messages matching to one's subscribed content filter as it is against the description of the `WakuFilter` protocol.
The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the nodes and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of nodes (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.