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18: Bump update

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Oskar Thoren 2021-03-30 13:14:38 +08:00
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ The Waku network makes up a service network, and some nodes provide a useful ser
By using a delayed payment mechanism in the form of cheques, a barter-like mechanism can arise, and nodes can decide on their own policy as opposed to be strictly tied to a specific payment scheme. Additionally, this delayed settlement eases requirements on the underlying network in terms of transaction speed or costs. By using a delayed payment mechanism in the form of cheques, a barter-like mechanism can arise, and nodes can decide on their own policy as opposed to be strictly tied to a specific payment scheme. Additionally, this delayed settlement eases requirements on the underlying network in terms of transaction speed or costs.
Theoretically, nodes providing and using resources over a long, indefinite, period of time can be seen as an iterated form of [Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma). Specifically, and more intuitively, since we have a cost and benefit profile for each provision/usage (of Waku Message's, e.g.), and the pricing can be set such that mutual cooperation is incentivzed, this can be analyzed as a form of donations game. Theoretically, nodes providing and using resources over a long, indefinite, period of time can be seen as an iterated form of [Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma). Specifically, and more intuitively, since we have a cost and benefit profile for each provision/usage (of Waku Message's, e.g.), and the pricing can be set such that mutual cooperation is incentivized, this can be analyzed as a form of donations game.
# Game Theory - Iterated prisoner's dilemma / donation game # Game Theory - Iterated prisoner's dilemma / donation game
@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ This can be complemented with node selection mechanisms.
See [Book of Swarm](https://swarm-gateways.net/bzz:/latest.bookofswarm.eth/the-book-of-swarm.pdf) section 3.2. on Peer-to-peer accounting etc., for more context and details. See [Book of Swarm](https://swarm-gateways.net/bzz:/latest.bookofswarm.eth/the-book-of-swarm.pdf) section 3.2. on Peer-to-peer accounting etc., for more context and details.
This approach is based on communicating payment treshholds and sending cheques This approach is based on communicating payment thresholds and sending cheques
as indications of later payments. The first part is done with a handshake, the as indications of later payments. The first part is done with a handshake, the
second done once payment threshhold is hit. second done once payment threshold is hit.
TODO: Illustrate payment and disconnection treshholds TODO: Illustrate payment and disconnection thresholds
TODO: Elaborate on how accounting works with amount in the context of e.g. store TODO: Elaborate on how accounting works with amount in the context of e.g. store
@ -86,15 +86,15 @@ NOTE: This may later be complemented with other metrics, either as part of SWAP
Assuming we have two store nodes, one operating mostly as a client (A) and another as server (B). Assuming we have two store nodes, one operating mostly as a client (A) and another as server (B).
1. Node A performs a handshake with B node. B node responds and both nodes communicate their payment threshhold. 1. Node A performs a handshake with B node. B node responds and both nodes communicate their payment threshold.
2. Node A and B creates an accounting entry for the other peer, keep track of peer and current balance. 2. Node A and B creates an accounting entry for the other peer, keep track of peer and current balance.
3. Node A issues a `HistoryRequest`, and B responds with a `HistoryResponse`. Based on the number of WakuMessages in the response, both nodes update their accounting records. 3. Node A issues a `HistoryRequest`, and B responds with a `HistoryResponse`. Based on the number of WakuMessages in the response, both nodes update their accounting records.
4. When payment threshhold is reached, Node A sends over a cheque to reach a neutral balance. Settlement of this is currently out of scope, but would occur through a SWAP contract (to be specified). 4. When payment threshold is reached, Node A sends over a cheque to reach a neutral balance. Settlement of this is currently out of scope, but would occur through a SWAP contract (to be specified).
5. If disconnect threshhold is reached, Node B disconnects Node A. 5. If disconnect threshold is reached, Node B disconnects Node A.
## Policy ## Policy
- If a node reaches a disconnect threshhold, which MUST be outside the payment threshhold, it SHOULD disconnect the other peer. For the PoC, this behavior can be mocked. - If a node reaches a disconnect threshold, which MUST be outside the payment threshold, it SHOULD disconnect the other peer. For the PoC, this behavior can be mocked.
- If a node is within payment balance, the other node SHOULD stay connected to it. - If a node is within payment balance, the other node SHOULD stay connected to it.
- If a node receives a valid Cheque it SHOULD update its internal accounting records. - If a node receives a valid Cheque it SHOULD update its internal accounting records.
- If any node behaves badly, the other node is free to disconnect and pick another node. Peer rating is out of scope of this specification. - If any node behaves badly, the other node is free to disconnect and pick another node. Peer rating is out of scope of this specification.
@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ Assuming we have two store nodes, one operating mostly as a client (A) and anoth
## Protobuf ## Protobuf
``` ```
// TODO What information to include here? For now "payment" threshhold // TODO What information to include here? For now "payment" threshold
message Handshake { message Handshake {
bytes payment_threshhold = 1; bytes payment_threshold = 1;
} }
// TODO Signature? // TODO Signature?