vacp2p/research
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/vacp2p/research.git synced 2025-02-20 18:28:21 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

reorganizes a few subsection

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Sanaz 2021-07-05 13:45:05 -07:00
parent 70124a76ad
commit d69e43915d
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 0B5ACFC518E67998
1 changed files with 11 additions and 11 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

22
Tor-vs-Waku/Anonymous-Transport.md
View File

@ -250,22 +250,14 @@ Another possibility is to set light nodes to listen to all the network traffic a
Provides asynchronous communication by dedicated and online server (Tor hidden server) for each user.
-----------------------------------------
# Solution ideas
How to provide sender anonymity in waku as a broadcast system:
Querying nodes publish their request on a pubsub topic, and store nodes reply to that request with that given request id.
Publisher nodes must be relay nodes, otherwise it is evident that they are the origin of the messages they publish but not relaying. Maybe it is good to dedicate a network for querying nodes i.e., light nodes combined with the store nodes. A query layer just handle queries for light nodes that is comprised of light nodes.
Every x minutes, each node drops its current connections and re-establishes new one. So that not eny pair of connections in the graph last longer than x minutes and preclude traffic analysis. It does not have to happen for the store nodes, those are system's backbone.
There should be a directory service for all the available nodes. Each node id gets expired after x minutes automatically. New IDs get registered every x minute4s or even longer, the new ids differ from the past ids.
-----------------------------------------
# Threat Models
Based on domain of knowledge, the following non-exclusive categories of adversary exist. Any collusion among the adversaries is perceivable.
## Local adversary (passive (HbC), active (malicious)):
## Local adversary (passive (HbC), active (malicious))
An adversary with the control of local network
## Global adversary (passive (HbC), active (malicious)):
## Global adversary (passive (HbC), active (malicious))
An adversary with the control of a larger portion of the network e.g., ISPs.
## Service Providers:
## Service Providers
Any centralized service operator and aid the messaging system e.g., public key directories.
The end-point security is assumed, hence malware or hardware attacks are precluded.
@ -289,7 +281,15 @@ Human end users need to understand how to use the system securely and the effort
Requirements imposed by the underlying technology
-----------------------------------------
# Solution ideas
How to provide sender anonymity in waku as a broadcast system:
Querying nodes publish their request on a pubsub topic, and store nodes reply to that request with that given request id.
Publisher nodes must be relay nodes, otherwise it is evident that they are the origin of the messages they publish but not relaying. Maybe it is good to dedicate a network for querying nodes i.e., light nodes combined with the store nodes. A query layer just handle queries for light nodes that is comprised of light nodes.
Every x minutes, each node drops its current connections and re-establishes new one. So that not eny pair of connections in the graph last longer than x minutes and preclude traffic analysis. It does not have to happen for the store nodes, those are system's backbone.
There should be a directory service for all the available nodes. Each node id gets expired after x minutes automatically. New IDs get registered every x minutes or even longer, the new ids differ from the past ids.
-----------------------------------------
# Resources
Sharing some relevant resources for the record: