2018-04-10 09:33:48 +00:00
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A list of potential models to explore in experiments as part of this swarm
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2018-04-10 10:16:03 +00:00
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- [Bountify All](#bountify-all)
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2018-04-10 10:56:12 +00:00
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- [Grant & Burn](#grant--burn)
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2018-04-10 09:33:48 +00:00
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2018-04-10 10:16:03 +00:00
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# Bountify All
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2018-04-10 09:33:48 +00:00
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## Problem
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We have a lot of issues in various Status repositories. These could to a large
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extent be solved by the larger community, as well as incentivized according to
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priority by core contributors.
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Additionally, there's no reward for putting bounties on issues, which leads to
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an uphill battle in terms of bounty growth (see Andy's slides Town Hall).
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## Solution
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Create a swarm that will put a bounty on all outstanding issues and give
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bountifier/issue creator a reward (finder's fee) for doing so, assuming the
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issue gets solved.
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The finder's fee can be ad hoc in inital implementation, and if proven
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successful it can be encoded in a SOB contract.
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There are five objections for putting a bounty on all issues as far as I
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can see:
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1. **Issue is not well-defined enough**
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Then it should be closed.
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2. **Issue requires privileged access**
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OK exception - mark with label 'closed-flow' and move on.
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3. **Cost**
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Currently we have around 500 issues in status-react. Assuming they are all good
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issues, and they get rewarded an average of $100 _if solved_, that's $50k. This
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isn't an unreasonable amount, assuming we actually solve these issues.
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Additionally, we can put an artificial growth limit on this. So first week 20 issues,
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next week 22, etc.
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4. **Perverse incentives**
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This is only true for core contributors, and we aren't currently operating in a
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byzantine environment. So this can be solved simply by a basic honor system, and
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simple soft rules like not solving bounties you yourself put up.
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5. **Effort involved**
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The finder's fee of 10% (or 5% for issue creator 5% for bounty creator)
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hopefully solves this issue. This is the hypothesis this swarm would test.
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## Future work
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1. Automatically put bounties on all new issues, given some conditions
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2. Instead of spitballing bounty size, use issue size and priority to determine
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bounty size. E.g. a matrix where bounty size can be 1\*3=3 (small, high prio),
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3\*3=9 (big, high prio).
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2018-04-10 09:42:41 +00:00
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2018-04-10 10:56:12 +00:00
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# Grant & Burn
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2018-04-10 09:42:41 +00:00
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1. A user can request funds for a certain time interval, e.g. SNT10.000 for the next 30 days.
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- Usually this request will be tied to a specific proposed project/piece
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of work but that should be treated as implementation detail.
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2. Other people "Supporters" can pay into this contract until the threshold is reached
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3. After 30 days all supporters can either do
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2018-04-10 10:38:30 +00:00
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- A) Nothing, their stake will be paid out to the requesting user in full after 10 more days.
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- B) Burn half their stake and receive back the other half.
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2018-04-10 09:42:41 +00:00
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Burning half the money is a big statement and people won't do that
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lightly — it's useful to flag bad actors though. The more usual case
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would be just not working with the user again (which is an acceptable
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outcome that should not have negative consequences for either side).
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Allowing supporters to delegate the burning decision to someone else
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could be interesting in making this work for swarms as well. Swarm
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lead could be delegate for other people on the team while the swarm
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lead still remains accountable to original supporters. This might
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create a weird dynamic when the swarm lead doesn't get his chunk
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though.
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