735 lines
22 KiB
Go
735 lines
22 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package qtls
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"hash"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
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)
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type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
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c *Conn
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ctx context.Context
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serverHello *serverHelloMsg
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hello *clientHelloMsg
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ecdheParams ecdheParameters
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session *clientSessionState
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earlySecret []byte
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binderKey []byte
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certReq *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
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usingPSK bool
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sentDummyCCS bool
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suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
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transcript hash.Hash
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masterSecret []byte
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trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
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}
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// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheParams, and,
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// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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// The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446,
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// sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
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if c.handshakes > 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation")
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}
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// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
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if hs.ecdheParams == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) != 1 {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
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hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
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if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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c.buffering = true
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if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.updateConnectionState()
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if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.updateConnectionState()
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if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
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c.updateConnectionState()
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return nil
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}
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// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and
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// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite.
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error {
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c := hs.c
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if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling ||
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hs.serverHello.ticketSupported ||
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hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
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len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 ||
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len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 ||
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len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3")
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
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}
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selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite)
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if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest")
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}
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if selectedSuite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
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}
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hs.suite = selectedSuite
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c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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return nil
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}
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// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
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// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
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if hs.sentDummyCCS {
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return nil
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}
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hs.sentDummyCCS = true
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_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
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return err
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}
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// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
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// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello.
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
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c := hs.c
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// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
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// HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
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// storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
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chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
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hs.transcript.Reset()
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hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
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hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
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hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
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// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
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// in any change in the ClientHello.
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if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
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hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
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}
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if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
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return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
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}
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// If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
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// a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
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// share for it this time.
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if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
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curveOK := false
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for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
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if id == curveID {
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curveOK = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !curveOK {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
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}
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if hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() == curveID {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
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}
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if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
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}
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params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), curveID)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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hs.ecdheParams = params
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hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: params.PublicKey()}}
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}
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hs.hello.raw = nil
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if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
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pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
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if pskSuite == nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
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// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
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ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
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hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd
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transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
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transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
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transcript.Write(chHash)
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transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
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pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
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hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
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} else {
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// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
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hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
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hs.hello.pskBinders = nil
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}
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}
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if hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
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c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
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}
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hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT
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hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
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}
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hs.serverHello = serverHello
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if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
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c := hs.c
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if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages")
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}
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if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
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return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
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}
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if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
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}
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if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
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return nil
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}
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if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
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}
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if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
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if pskSuite == nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
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}
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hs.usingPSK = true
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c.didResume = true
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c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
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c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
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c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
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c.scts = hs.session.scts
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
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c := hs.c
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sharedKey := hs.ecdheParams.SharedKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
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if sharedKey == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
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}
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earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
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if !hs.usingPSK {
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earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
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}
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handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
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hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
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clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
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clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
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c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
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c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
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serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
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serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
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c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
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c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
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err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
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hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
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}
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// Notify the caller if 0-RTT was rejected.
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if !encryptedExtensions.earlyData && hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
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c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
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}
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c.used0RTT = encryptedExtensions.earlyData
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if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
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hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions)
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}
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hs.transcript.Write(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
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if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
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return err
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}
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c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol
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if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.EnforceNextProtoSelection {
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if len(encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol) == 0 {
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// the server didn't select an ALPN
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c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
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return errors.New("ALPN negotiation failed. Server didn't offer any protocols")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
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c := hs.c
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// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
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// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
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if hs.usingPSK {
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// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
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// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
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// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
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if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
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if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
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if ok {
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hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
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hs.certReq = certReq
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
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return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
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}
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hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
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c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
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if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
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}
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// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
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if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
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}
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sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
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if err != nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
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}
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signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
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if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
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sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
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return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
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}
|
|
|
|
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
|
|
if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
|
|
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
|
|
|
|
hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
|
clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
|
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
|
serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
|
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
|
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
|
|
|
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if hs.certReq == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(toCertificateRequestInfo(&certificateRequestInfo{
|
|
AcceptableCAs: hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities,
|
|
SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
|
|
Version: c.vers,
|
|
ctx: hs.ctx,
|
|
}))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
|
|
|
|
certMsg.certificate = *cert
|
|
certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
|
|
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
|
|
|
|
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify.
|
|
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
|
|
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
|
|
|
|
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the
|
|
// CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms.
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
|
|
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
|
|
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
|
|
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
|
|
}
|
|
sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
|
|
|
|
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
finished := &finishedMsg{
|
|
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
|
|
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
|
|
|
|
if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
|
|
c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
|
resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
|
|
if !c.isClient {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
|
|
if msg.lifetime == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
|
|
if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
|
|
if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
|
|
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We need to save the max_early_data_size that the server sent us, in order
|
|
// to decide if we're going to try 0-RTT with this ticket.
|
|
// However, at the same time, the qtls.ClientSessionTicket needs to be equal to
|
|
// the tls.ClientSessionTicket, so we can't just add a new field to the struct.
|
|
// We therefore abuse the nonce field (which is a byte slice)
|
|
nonceWithEarlyData := make([]byte, len(msg.nonce)+4)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonceWithEarlyData, msg.maxEarlyData)
|
|
copy(nonceWithEarlyData[4:], msg.nonce)
|
|
|
|
var appData []byte
|
|
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState != nil {
|
|
appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState()
|
|
}
|
|
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
|
b.AddUint16(clientSessionStateVersion) // revision
|
|
b.AddUint32(msg.maxEarlyData)
|
|
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes(appData)
|
|
})
|
|
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes(msg.nonce)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK
|
|
// to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we
|
|
// know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections
|
|
// is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE.
|
|
session := &clientSessionState{
|
|
sessionTicket: msg.label,
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite,
|
|
masterSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
|
|
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
|
|
verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains,
|
|
receivedAt: c.config.time(),
|
|
nonce: b.BytesOrPanic(),
|
|
useBy: c.config.time().Add(lifetime),
|
|
ageAdd: msg.ageAdd,
|
|
ocspResponse: c.ocspResponse,
|
|
scts: c.scts,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
|
|
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session))
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|