package noise import ( "context" "crypto/rand" "encoding/binary" "fmt" "time" "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" "github.com/flynn/noise" "github.com/gogo/protobuf/proto" pool "github.com/libp2p/go-buffer-pool" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-core/crypto" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-core/peer" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-noise/pb" ) // payloadSigPrefix is prepended to our Noise static key before signing with // our libp2p identity key. const payloadSigPrefix = "noise-libp2p-static-key:" // All noise session share a fixed cipher suite var cipherSuite = noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256) // runHandshake exchanges handshake messages with the remote peer to establish // a noise-libp2p session. It blocks until the handshake completes or fails. func (s *secureSession) runHandshake(ctx context.Context) error { kp, err := noise.DH25519.GenerateKeypair(rand.Reader) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error generating static keypair: %w", err) } cfg := noise.Config{ CipherSuite: cipherSuite, Pattern: noise.HandshakeXX, Initiator: s.initiator, StaticKeypair: kp, } hs, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error initializing handshake state: %w", err) } payload, err := s.generateHandshakePayload(kp) if err != nil { return err } // set a deadline to complete the handshake, if one has been supplied. // clear it after we're done. if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok { if err := s.SetDeadline(deadline); err == nil { // schedule the deadline removal once we're done handshaking. defer s.SetDeadline(time.Time{}) } } // We can re-use this buffer for all handshake messages as it's size // will be the size of the maximum handshake message for the Noise XX pattern. // Also, since we prefix every noise handshake message with it's length, we need to account for // it when we fetch the buffer from the pool maxMsgSize := 2*noise.DH25519.DHLen() + len(payload) + 2*poly1305.TagSize hbuf := pool.Get(maxMsgSize + LengthPrefixLength) defer pool.Put(hbuf) if s.initiator { // stage 0 // // do not send the payload just yet, as it would be plaintext; not secret. // Handshake Msg Len = len(DH ephemeral key) err = s.sendHandshakeMessage(hs, nil, hbuf) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error sending handshake message: %w", err) } // stage 1 // plaintext, err := s.readHandshakeMessage(hs) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error reading handshake message: %w", err) } err = s.handleRemoteHandshakePayload(plaintext, hs.PeerStatic()) if err != nil { return err } // stage 2 // // Handshake Msg Len = len(DHT static key) + MAC(static key is encrypted) + len(Payload) + MAC(payload is encrypted) err = s.sendHandshakeMessage(hs, payload, hbuf) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error sending handshake message: %w", err) } } else { // stage 0 // // We don't expect any payload on the first message. if _, err := s.readHandshakeMessage(hs); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error reading handshake message: %w", err) } // stage 1 // // Handshake Msg Len = len(DH ephemeral key) + len(DHT static key) + MAC(static key is encrypted) + len(Payload) + //MAC(payload is encrypted) err = s.sendHandshakeMessage(hs, payload, hbuf) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error sending handshake message: %w", err) } // stage 2 // plaintext, err := s.readHandshakeMessage(hs) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error reading handshake message: %w", err) } err = s.handleRemoteHandshakePayload(plaintext, hs.PeerStatic()) if err != nil { return err } } return nil } // setCipherStates sets the initial cipher states that will be used to protect // traffic after the handshake. // // It is called when the final handshake message is processed by // either sendHandshakeMessage or readHandshakeMessage. func (s *secureSession) setCipherStates(cs1, cs2 *noise.CipherState) { if s.initiator { s.enc = cs1 s.dec = cs2 } else { s.enc = cs2 s.dec = cs1 } } // sendHandshakeMessage sends the next handshake message in the sequence. // // If payload is non-empty, it will be included in the handshake message. // If this is the final message in the sequence, calls setCipherStates // to initialize cipher states. func (s *secureSession) sendHandshakeMessage(hs *noise.HandshakeState, payload []byte, hbuf []byte) error { // the first two bytes will be the length of the noise handshake message. bz, cs1, cs2, err := hs.WriteMessage(hbuf[:LengthPrefixLength], payload) if err != nil { return err } // bz will also include the length prefix as we passed a slice of LengthPrefixLength length // to hs.Write(). binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(bz, uint16(len(bz)-LengthPrefixLength)) _, err = s.writeMsgInsecure(bz) if err != nil { return err } if cs1 != nil && cs2 != nil { s.setCipherStates(cs1, cs2) } return nil } // readHandshakeMessage reads a message from the insecure conn and tries to // process it as the expected next message in the handshake sequence. // // If the message contains a payload, it will be decrypted and returned. // // If this is the final message in the sequence, it calls setCipherStates // to initialize cipher states. func (s *secureSession) readHandshakeMessage(hs *noise.HandshakeState) ([]byte, error) { l, err := s.readNextInsecureMsgLen() if err != nil { return nil, err } buf := pool.Get(l) defer pool.Put(buf) if err := s.readNextMsgInsecure(buf); err != nil { return nil, err } msg, cs1, cs2, err := hs.ReadMessage(nil, buf) if err != nil { return nil, err } if cs1 != nil && cs2 != nil { s.setCipherStates(cs1, cs2) } return msg, nil } // generateHandshakePayload creates a libp2p handshake payload with a // signature of our static noise key. func (s *secureSession) generateHandshakePayload(localStatic noise.DHKey) ([]byte, error) { // obtain the public key from the handshake session so we can sign it with // our libp2p secret key. localKeyRaw, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(s.LocalPublicKey()) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error serializing libp2p identity key: %w", err) } // prepare payload to sign; perform signature. toSign := append([]byte(payloadSigPrefix), localStatic.Public...) signedPayload, err := s.localKey.Sign(toSign) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error sigining handshake payload: %w", err) } // create payload payload := new(pb.NoiseHandshakePayload) payload.IdentityKey = localKeyRaw payload.IdentitySig = signedPayload payloadEnc, err := proto.Marshal(payload) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error marshaling handshake payload: %w", err) } return payloadEnc, nil } // handleRemoteHandshakePayload unmarshals the handshake payload object sent // by the remote peer and validates the signature against the peer's static Noise key. func (s *secureSession) handleRemoteHandshakePayload(payload []byte, remoteStatic []byte) error { // unmarshal payload nhp := new(pb.NoiseHandshakePayload) err := proto.Unmarshal(payload, nhp) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling remote handshake payload: %w", err) } // unpack remote peer's public libp2p key remotePubKey, err := crypto.UnmarshalPublicKey(nhp.GetIdentityKey()) if err != nil { return err } id, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(remotePubKey) if err != nil { return err } // if we know who we're trying to reach, make sure we have the right peer if s.initiator && s.remoteID != id { // use Pretty() as it produces the full b58-encoded string, rather than abbreviated forms. return fmt.Errorf("peer id mismatch: expected %s, but remote key matches %s", s.remoteID.Pretty(), id.Pretty()) } // verify payload is signed by asserted remote libp2p key. sig := nhp.GetIdentitySig() msg := append([]byte(payloadSigPrefix), remoteStatic...) ok, err := remotePubKey.Verify(msg, sig) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error verifying signature: %w", err) } else if !ok { return fmt.Errorf("handshake signature invalid") } // set remote peer key and id s.remoteID = id s.remoteKey = remotePubKey return nil }