694 lines
25 KiB
Go
694 lines
25 KiB
Go
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// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package qtls
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/des"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rc4"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
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)
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// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package
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// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type.
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type CipherSuite struct {
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ID uint16
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Name string
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// Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can
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// negotiate this cipher suite.
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SupportedVersions []uint16
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// Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues
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// due to its primitives, design, or implementation.
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Insecure bool
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}
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var (
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supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12}
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supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12}
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supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13}
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)
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// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
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// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
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// InsecureCipherSuites.
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//
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// The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by
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// this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list,
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// and might not match those returned by this function.
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func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
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return []*CipherSuite{
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
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{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
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{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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}
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}
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// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
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// this package and which have security issues.
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//
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// Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should
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// only use those returned by CipherSuites.
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func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
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// This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See
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// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details.
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return []*CipherSuite{
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
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}
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}
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// CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID
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// (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation
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// of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package.
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func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string {
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for _, c := range CipherSuites() {
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if c.ID == id {
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return c.Name
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}
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}
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for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() {
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if c.ID == id {
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return c.Name
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}
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id)
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}
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const (
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// suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
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// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
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// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
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// that we're happy with.
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suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
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// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
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// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
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// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
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// is RSA based.
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suiteECSign
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// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
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// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
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suiteTLS12
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// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
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// handshake hash.
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suiteSHA384
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)
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// A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange
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// mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD.
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type cipherSuite struct {
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id uint16
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// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
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keyLen int
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macLen int
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ivLen int
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ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement
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// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
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flags int
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cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
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mac func(key []byte) hash.Hash
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aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
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}
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var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter.
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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}
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// selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which
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// is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter.
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func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite {
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for _, id := range ids {
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candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
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if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) {
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continue
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}
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for _, suppID := range supportedIDs {
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if id == suppID {
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return candidate
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}
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
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// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
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type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
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id uint16
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keyLen int
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aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
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hash crypto.Hash
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}
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type CipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
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ID uint16
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KeyLen int
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Hash crypto.Hash
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AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
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}
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func (c *CipherSuiteTLS13) IVLen() int {
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return aeadNonceLength
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}
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var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
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{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
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{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
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{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
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}
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// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the
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// server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites.
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//
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// Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and
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// peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if
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// any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker
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// cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last
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// word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection.
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//
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// The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the
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// first (most important) applicable one:
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//
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// - Anything else comes before RC4
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//
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// RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
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//
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// - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
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//
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// SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
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// countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
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// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
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//
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// - Anything else comes before 3DES
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//
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// 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
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// birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
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//
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// - ECDHE comes before anything else
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//
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// Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
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// property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
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// implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
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//
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// - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
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//
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// Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
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// are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
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// padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
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// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
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// https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
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//
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// - AES comes before ChaCha20
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//
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// When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
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// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
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//
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// When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
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// slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
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// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
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//
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// We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
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// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
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//
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// - AES-128 comes before AES-256
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//
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// The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
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// margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
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// TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
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// contribute to the advantages above).
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//
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// - ECDSA comes before RSA
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//
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|
|
// The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
|
|||
|
|
// as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
|
|||
|
|
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
|
|||
|
|
// AEADs w/ ECDHE
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// CBC w/ ECDHE
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// AEADs w/o ECDHE
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// CBC w/o ECDHE
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// 3DES
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// CBC_SHA256
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// RC4
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{
|
|||
|
|
// ChaCha20Poly1305
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// AES-GCM w/ ECDHE
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in
|
|||
|
|
// Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
|
|||
|
|
var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{
|
|||
|
|
// CBC_SHA256
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// RC4
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
var (
|
|||
|
|
defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites)
|
|||
|
|
defaultCipherSuites = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen]
|
|||
|
|
)
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no
|
|||
|
|
// disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as
|
|||
|
|
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies.
|
|||
|
|
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{
|
|||
|
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
|
|||
|
|
// TLS 1.2
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
|
|||
|
|
// TLS 1.3
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
|
|||
|
|
// TLS 1.2
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
|
|||
|
|
// TLS 1.3
|
|||
|
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list
|
|||
|
|
// is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it.
|
|||
|
|
func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
|
|||
|
|
for _, cID := range ciphers {
|
|||
|
|
if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil {
|
|||
|
|
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil {
|
|||
|
|
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return false
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
|
|||
|
|
cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
|
|||
|
|
return cipher
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
|
|||
|
|
block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
|
|||
|
|
if isRead {
|
|||
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
|
|||
|
|
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
|||
|
|
if isRead {
|
|||
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC.
|
|||
|
|
func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash {
|
|||
|
|
h := sha1.New
|
|||
|
|
h = newConstantTimeHash(h)
|
|||
|
|
return hmac.New(h, key)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and
|
|||
|
|
// is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites.
|
|||
|
|
func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash {
|
|||
|
|
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
type aead interface {
|
|||
|
|
cipher.AEAD
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
|
|||
|
|
// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
|
|||
|
|
// zero for modern ones.
|
|||
|
|
explicitNonceLen() int
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
const (
|
|||
|
|
aeadNonceLength = 12
|
|||
|
|
noncePrefixLength = 4
|
|||
|
|
)
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
|
|||
|
|
// each call.
|
|||
|
|
type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
|
|||
|
|
// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
|
|||
|
|
nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
|
|||
|
|
aead cipher.AEAD
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
|
|||
|
|
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
|
|||
|
|
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
|
|||
|
|
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
|
|||
|
|
return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|||
|
|
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
|
|||
|
|
return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// xoredNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
|
|||
|
|
// before each call.
|
|||
|
|
type xorNonceAEAD struct {
|
|||
|
|
nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
|
|||
|
|
aead cipher.AEAD
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
|
|||
|
|
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
|
|||
|
|
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
|
|||
|
|
for i, b := range nonce {
|
|||
|
|
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
|
|||
|
|
for i, b := range nonce {
|
|||
|
|
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
return result
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|||
|
|
for i, b := range nonce {
|
|||
|
|
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
|
|||
|
|
for i, b := range nonce {
|
|||
|
|
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
return result, err
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
|
|||
|
|
if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
|
|||
|
|
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
|||
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|||
|
|
panic(err)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
var aead cipher.AEAD
|
|||
|
|
aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
|
|||
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|||
|
|
panic(err)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
|
|||
|
|
copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
|
|||
|
|
return ret
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3
|
|||
|
|
func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
|
|||
|
|
return aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
|
|||
|
|
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
|
|||
|
|
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
|||
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|||
|
|
panic(err)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
|
|||
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|||
|
|
panic(err)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
|
|||
|
|
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
|
|||
|
|
return ret
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
|
|||
|
|
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
|
|||
|
|
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
|
|||
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|||
|
|
panic(err)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
|
|||
|
|
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
|
|||
|
|
return ret
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
type constantTimeHash interface {
|
|||
|
|
hash.Hash
|
|||
|
|
ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
|
|||
|
|
// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
|
|||
|
|
type cthWrapper struct {
|
|||
|
|
h constantTimeHash
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() }
|
|||
|
|
func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() }
|
|||
|
|
func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() }
|
|||
|
|
func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
|
|||
|
|
func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
|
|||
|
|
return func() hash.Hash {
|
|||
|
|
return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
|
|||
|
|
func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
|
|||
|
|
h.Reset()
|
|||
|
|
h.Write(seq)
|
|||
|
|
h.Write(header)
|
|||
|
|
h.Write(data)
|
|||
|
|
res := h.Sum(out)
|
|||
|
|
if extra != nil {
|
|||
|
|
h.Write(extra)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return res
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
|||
|
|
return rsaKeyAgreement{}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
|||
|
|
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
|||
|
|
isRSA: false,
|
|||
|
|
version: version,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
|||
|
|
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
|||
|
|
isRSA: true,
|
|||
|
|
version: version,
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
|
|||
|
|
// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
|
|||
|
|
func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
|
|||
|
|
for _, id := range have {
|
|||
|
|
if id == want {
|
|||
|
|
return cipherSuiteByID(id)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return nil
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
|
|||
|
|
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
|
|||
|
|
if cipherSuite.id == id {
|
|||
|
|
return cipherSuite
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return nil
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
|
|||
|
|
for _, id := range have {
|
|||
|
|
if id == want {
|
|||
|
|
return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return nil
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
|
|||
|
|
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
|
|||
|
|
if cipherSuite.id == id {
|
|||
|
|
return cipherSuite
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
return nil
|
|||
|
|
}
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
|
|||
|
|
// package.
|
|||
|
|
//
|
|||
|
|
// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
|
|||
|
|
const (
|
|||
|
|
// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c
|
|||
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca8
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1301
|
|||
|
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x1302
|
|||
|
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
|
|||
|
|
// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
|
|||
|
|
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
// Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256
|
|||
|
|
// suffix, retained for backward compatibility.
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
|
|||
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
|
|||
|
|
)
|