2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
package secio
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
|
|
"context"
|
|
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
|
|
"errors"
|
|
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
|
|
"net"
|
|
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-09 07:24:20 +00:00
|
|
|
"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-core/peer"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-core/sec"
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
proto "github.com/gogo/protobuf/proto"
|
|
|
|
logging "github.com/ipfs/go-log"
|
2019-06-09 07:24:20 +00:00
|
|
|
ci "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-core/crypto"
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
pb "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-secio/pb"
|
|
|
|
msgio "github.com/libp2p/go-msgio"
|
|
|
|
mh "github.com/multiformats/go-multihash"
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var log = logging.Logger("secio")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ErrUnsupportedKeyType is returned when a private key cast/type switch fails.
|
|
|
|
var ErrUnsupportedKeyType = errors.New("unsupported key type")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ErrClosed signals the closing of a connection.
|
|
|
|
var ErrClosed = errors.New("connection closed")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ErrWrongPeer is returned when we attempt to handshake with the wrong peer.
|
|
|
|
var ErrWrongPeer = errors.New("connected to wrong peer")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ErrBadSig signals that the peer sent us a handshake packet with a bad signature.
|
|
|
|
var ErrBadSig = errors.New("bad signature")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ErrEcho is returned when we're attempting to handshake with the same keys and nonces.
|
|
|
|
var ErrEcho = errors.New("same keys and nonces. one side talking to self")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// HandshakeTimeout governs how long the handshake will be allowed to take place for.
|
|
|
|
// Making this number large means there could be many bogus connections waiting to
|
|
|
|
// timeout in flight. Typical handshakes take ~3RTTs, so it should be completed within
|
|
|
|
// seconds across a typical planet in the solar system.
|
|
|
|
var HandshakeTimeout = time.Second * 30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// nonceSize is the size of our nonces (in bytes)
|
|
|
|
const nonceSize = 16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// secureSession encapsulates all the parameters needed for encrypting
|
|
|
|
// and decrypting traffic from an insecure channel.
|
|
|
|
type secureSession struct {
|
|
|
|
msgio.ReadWriteCloser
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
insecure net.Conn
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
localKey ci.PrivKey
|
|
|
|
localPeer peer.ID
|
|
|
|
remotePeer peer.ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
local encParams
|
|
|
|
remote encParams
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sharedSecret []byte
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-09 07:24:20 +00:00
|
|
|
var _ sec.SecureConn = &secureSession{}
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (s *secureSession) Loggable() map[string]interface{} {
|
|
|
|
m := make(map[string]interface{})
|
|
|
|
m["localPeer"] = s.localPeer.Pretty()
|
|
|
|
m["remotePeer"] = s.remotePeer.Pretty()
|
|
|
|
m["established"] = (s.ReadWriteCloser != nil)
|
|
|
|
return m
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func newSecureSession(ctx context.Context, local peer.ID, key ci.PrivKey, insecure net.Conn, remotePeer peer.ID) (*secureSession, error) {
|
|
|
|
s := &secureSession{localPeer: local, localKey: key}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
|
|
case s.localPeer == "":
|
|
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no local id provided")
|
|
|
|
case s.localKey == nil:
|
|
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no local private key provided")
|
|
|
|
case !s.localPeer.MatchesPrivateKey(s.localKey):
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer.ID does not match PrivateKey")
|
|
|
|
case insecure == nil:
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("insecure ReadWriter is nil")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s.insecure = insecure
|
|
|
|
s.remotePeer = remotePeer
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
handshakeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, HandshakeTimeout) // remove
|
|
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
|
|
if err := s.runHandshake(handshakeCtx); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func hashSha256(data []byte) mh.Multihash {
|
|
|
|
h, err := mh.Sum(data, mh.SHA2_256, -1)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
// this error can be safely ignored (panic) because multihash only fails
|
|
|
|
// from the selection of hash function. If the fn + length are valid, it
|
|
|
|
// won't error.
|
|
|
|
panic("multihash failed to hash using SHA2_256.")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return h
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// runHandshake performs initial communication over insecure channel to share
|
|
|
|
// keys, IDs, and initiate communication, assigning all necessary params.
|
|
|
|
// requires the duplex channel to be a msgio.ReadWriter (for framed messaging)
|
|
|
|
func (s *secureSession) runHandshake(ctx context.Context) error {
|
|
|
|
defer log.EventBegin(ctx, "secureHandshake", s).Done()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result := make(chan error, 1)
|
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
|
|
// do *not* close the channel (will look like a success).
|
|
|
|
result <- s.runHandshakeSync()
|
|
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
|
|
case <-ctx.Done():
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ctx.Err()
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
// State unknown. We *have* to close this.
|
|
|
|
s.insecure.Close()
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
// Wait for the handshake to return.
|
|
|
|
<-result
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
case err = <-result:
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (s *secureSession) runHandshakeSync() error {
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
insecureM := msgio.NewReadWriter(s.insecure)
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 1. Propose -- propose cipher suite + send pubkeys + nonce
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Generate and send Hello packet.
|
|
|
|
// Hello = (rand, PublicKey, Supported)
|
|
|
|
nonceOut := make([]byte, nonceSize)
|
|
|
|
_, err := rand.Read(nonceOut)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s.local.permanentPubKey = s.localKey.GetPublic()
|
|
|
|
myPubKeyBytes, err := s.local.permanentPubKey.Bytes()
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proposeOut := new(pb.Propose)
|
|
|
|
proposeOut.Rand = nonceOut
|
|
|
|
proposeOut.Pubkey = myPubKeyBytes
|
2019-06-09 07:24:20 +00:00
|
|
|
proposeOut.Exchanges = SupportedExchanges
|
|
|
|
proposeOut.Ciphers = SupportedCiphers
|
|
|
|
proposeOut.Hashes = SupportedHashes
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debugf("1.0 Propose: nonce:%s exchanges:%s ciphers:%s hashes:%s",
|
|
|
|
// nonceOut, SupportedExchanges, SupportedCiphers, SupportedHashes)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Marshal our propose packet
|
|
|
|
proposeOutBytes, err := proto.Marshal(proposeOut)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Send Propose packet and Receive their Propose packet
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
proposeInBytes, err := readWriteMsg(insecureM, proposeOutBytes)
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
defer insecureM.ReleaseMsg(proposeInBytes)
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Parse their propose packet
|
|
|
|
proposeIn := new(pb.Propose)
|
|
|
|
if err = proto.Unmarshal(proposeInBytes, proposeIn); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debugf("1.0.1 Propose recv: nonce:%s exchanges:%s ciphers:%s hashes:%s",
|
|
|
|
// proposeIn.GetRand(), proposeIn.GetExchanges(), proposeIn.GetCiphers(), proposeIn.GetHashes())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 1.1 Identify -- get identity from their key
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// get remote identity
|
|
|
|
s.remote.permanentPubKey, err = ci.UnmarshalPublicKey(proposeIn.GetPubkey())
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// get peer id
|
|
|
|
actualRemotePeer, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(s.remote.permanentPubKey)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch s.remotePeer {
|
|
|
|
case actualRemotePeer:
|
|
|
|
// All good.
|
|
|
|
case "":
|
|
|
|
// No peer set. We're accepting a remote connection.
|
|
|
|
s.remotePeer = actualRemotePeer
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
// Peer mismatch. Bail.
|
|
|
|
s.insecure.Close()
|
|
|
|
log.Debugf("expected peer %s, got peer %s", s.remotePeer, actualRemotePeer)
|
|
|
|
return ErrWrongPeer
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log.Debugf("1.1 Identify: %s Remote Peer Identified as %s", s.localPeer, s.remotePeer)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 1.2 Selection -- select/agree on best encryption parameters
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// to determine order, use cmp(H(remote_pubkey||local_rand), H(local_pubkey||remote_rand)).
|
|
|
|
oh1 := hashSha256(append(proposeIn.GetPubkey(), nonceOut...))
|
|
|
|
oh2 := hashSha256(append(myPubKeyBytes, proposeIn.GetRand()...))
|
|
|
|
order := bytes.Compare(oh1, oh2)
|
|
|
|
if order == 0 {
|
|
|
|
return ErrEcho // talking to self (same socket. must be reuseport + dialing self)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s.local.curveT, err = selectBest(order, SupportedExchanges, proposeIn.GetExchanges())
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s.local.cipherT, err = selectBest(order, SupportedCiphers, proposeIn.GetCiphers())
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s.local.hashT, err = selectBest(order, SupportedHashes, proposeIn.GetHashes())
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// we use the same params for both directions (must choose same curve)
|
|
|
|
// WARNING: if they dont SelectBest the same way, this won't work...
|
|
|
|
s.remote.curveT = s.local.curveT
|
|
|
|
s.remote.cipherT = s.local.cipherT
|
|
|
|
s.remote.hashT = s.local.hashT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debugf("1.2 selection: exchange:%s cipher:%s hash:%s",
|
|
|
|
// s.local.curveT, s.local.cipherT, s.local.hashT)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 2. Exchange -- exchange (signed) ephemeral keys. verify signatures.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Generate EphemeralPubKey
|
|
|
|
var genSharedKey ci.GenSharedKey
|
|
|
|
s.local.ephemeralPubKey, genSharedKey, err = ci.GenerateEKeyPair(s.local.curveT)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Gather corpus to sign.
|
|
|
|
selectionOut := new(bytes.Buffer)
|
|
|
|
selectionOut.Write(proposeOutBytes)
|
|
|
|
selectionOut.Write(proposeInBytes)
|
|
|
|
selectionOut.Write(s.local.ephemeralPubKey)
|
|
|
|
selectionOutBytes := selectionOut.Bytes()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debugf("2.0 exchange: %v", selectionOutBytes)
|
|
|
|
exchangeOut := new(pb.Exchange)
|
|
|
|
exchangeOut.Epubkey = s.local.ephemeralPubKey
|
|
|
|
exchangeOut.Signature, err = s.localKey.Sign(selectionOutBytes)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Marshal our exchange packet
|
|
|
|
exchangeOutBytes, err := proto.Marshal(exchangeOut)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Send Exchange packet and receive their Exchange packet
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
exchangeInBytes, err := readWriteMsg(insecureM, exchangeOutBytes)
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-10-04 15:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
defer insecureM.ReleaseMsg(exchangeInBytes)
|
2018-07-04 10:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Parse their Exchange packet.
|
|
|
|
exchangeIn := new(pb.Exchange)
|
|
|
|
if err = proto.Unmarshal(exchangeInBytes, exchangeIn); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 2.1. Verify -- verify their exchange packet is good.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// get their ephemeral pub key
|
|
|
|
s.remote.ephemeralPubKey = exchangeIn.GetEpubkey()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
selectionIn := new(bytes.Buffer)
|
|
|
|
selectionIn.Write(proposeInBytes)
|
|
|
|
selectionIn.Write(proposeOutBytes)
|
|
|
|
selectionIn.Write(s.remote.ephemeralPubKey)
|
|
|
|
selectionInBytes := selectionIn.Bytes()
|
|
|
|
// log.Debugf("2.0.1 exchange recv: %v", selectionInBytes)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// u.POut("Remote Peer Identified as %s\n", s.remote)
|
|
|
|
sigOK, err := s.remote.permanentPubKey.Verify(selectionInBytes, exchangeIn.GetSignature())
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
// log.Error("2.1 Verify: failed: %s", err)
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if !sigOK {
|
|
|
|
// log.Error("2.1 Verify: failed: %s", ErrBadSig)
|
|
|
|
return ErrBadSig
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// log.Debugf("2.1 Verify: signature verified.")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 2.2. Keys -- generate keys for mac + encryption
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// OK! seems like we're good to go.
|
|
|
|
s.sharedSecret, err = genSharedKey(exchangeIn.GetEpubkey())
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// generate two sets of keys (stretching)
|
|
|
|
k1, k2 := ci.KeyStretcher(s.local.cipherT, s.local.hashT, s.sharedSecret)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// use random nonces to decide order.
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
|
|
case order > 0:
|
|
|
|
// just break
|
|
|
|
case order < 0:
|
|
|
|
k1, k2 = k2, k1 // swap
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
// we should've bailed before this. but if not, bail here.
|
|
|
|
return ErrEcho
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.local.keys = k1
|
|
|
|
s.remote.keys = k2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debug("2.2 keys:\n\tshared: %v\n\tk1: %v\n\tk2: %v",
|
|
|
|
// s.sharedSecret, s.local.keys, s.remote.keys)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 2.3. MAC + Cipher -- prepare MAC + cipher
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := s.local.makeMacAndCipher(); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err := s.remote.makeMacAndCipher(); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debug("2.3 mac + cipher.")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// step 3. Finish -- send expected message to verify encryption works (send local nonce)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// setup ETM ReadWriter
|
|
|
|
w := NewETMWriter(s.insecure, s.local.cipher, s.local.mac)
|
|
|
|
r := NewETMReader(s.insecure, s.remote.cipher, s.remote.mac)
|
|
|
|
s.ReadWriteCloser = msgio.Combine(w, r).(msgio.ReadWriteCloser)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debug("3.0 finish. sending: %v", proposeIn.GetRand())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// send their Nonce and receive ours
|
|
|
|
nonceOut2, err := readWriteMsg(s.ReadWriteCloser, proposeIn.GetRand())
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
defer s.ReleaseMsg(nonceOut2)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// log.Debug("3.0 finish.\n\texpect: %v\n\tactual: %v", nonceOut, nonceOut2)
|
|
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(nonceOut, nonceOut2) {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to read our encrypted nonce: %s != %s", nonceOut2, nonceOut)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Whew! ok, that's all folks.
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|